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ABSTRACT
TIME TO LEAVE UCHRONIA:
QUEER ECO-TEMPORALITIES FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
SEPTEMBER 2015
CLAIRE BRAULT, B.A. UNIVERSITE RENNES I HAUTE BRETAGNE
M.A. UNIVERSITE RENNES I HAUTE BRETAGNE
PHD UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Barbara Cruikshank
My dissertation is a Feminist contribution to Environmental Political Theory focused on
temporality. My research investigates the tension between the urgent need to act fast in a
fast-changing world, and the necessity for time to pause and think through such radical
and rapid changes. As it signals our nearing the planet’s limits, the emergence of the
“anthropocene” crisis challenges growth-driven “progress.”
I begin this dissertation with a survey of Environmental Thought that helps situate
my contribution to the ongoing debates in this field, underscoring that as ecosophers pose
the question of the nonhuman, in so doing they also are confronted with problems related
to temporality. Then, building on the concept of “utopia,” I critique a temporality that
assumes infinite growth on a planet with finite resources, while constantly postponing its
promises of abundance to an impossible future. The concept I propose is “uchronia”:
growth-driven progress is a timeless (ou-chronos), dangerously idealized (eu-chronos)
temporality, just like “utopia” refers to both a “nowhere” place and an “ideal” place (ouand eu-topos). I draw from Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return to problematize
teleologies of progress: the eternal return prompts us to live our lives as though we were
vi

prepared to re-live them eternally.

In contrast with uchronia, alternative, queer eco-temporalities – I call these “antiuchronia,” “heterochronia,” and “synchrony” – build upon and radicalize sustainability.
However, not all “eco-temporalities” – alternatives to the hegemonic, in-crisis
temporalities – constitute themselves as non-linear or radical – i.e not all of them are
queer: I have also coined the concept of “counter-uchronia” to describe certain
understandings of “sustainable growth,” justifications of geoengineering and carbon
markets creation, as well as primitivist (often virilist) environmentalist discourses which
respectively advocate the “return” to a golden past of harmony with (often feminized)
“Nature,” or technofixes and green capitalism to amend and resume growth-driven
progress’ uchronian course.
To advance this conceptual framework, I offer close readings of environmental
science fiction stories, activist manifestos, graffiti art, performing arts including
contemporary dance and circus, as well as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change scientific reports.
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INTRODUCTION
JUST A MATTER OF TIME
A seer, a purposer, a creator, a future itself, and a
bridge to the future – and alas! Also as it were a
cripple on this bridge. (…) To redeem what is past,
and to transform every “It was” into “Thus would I
have it!” (…) “It was” : thus is the Will's teethgnashing and lonesomest tribulation called.
Impotent toward what hath been done – it is a
malicious spectator of all that is past. Not backward
can the Will will; that it cannot break time and
time's desire – that is the Will's lonesomest
tribulation. (…) That time doth not run backward –
that is its animosity; “That which was”: so is the
stone which it cannot roll called.”
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, XLII

Urgent Matters, Time and Again
“It’s Not Too Late!” was Greenpeace’s slogan in one of its worldwide campaigns a
couple of years ago, in a formulation symptomatic of the urgency often omnipresent in
environmentalist discourse. Since 1992 when 12-year old Severn Suzuki spoke to the
United Nations Earth Summit in Rio, many environmentalist images and events have
relied upon children as the symbols of “future generations,” to the point that this phrase
has practically become idiomatic in environmentalist talk. The slow movement’s ranks
are growing, defending lifestyles that would break away from the fast speeds and paces
of late modern life. Degrowth and conviviality-oriented environmentalists take clocking,
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the work week, the work day as well as “free time” as their targets to argue in favor of
“liberated time,” in what they denounce as a “speed society” (Illich, 2013). This comes
with denunciation of consumerism and commodities’ planned obsolescence, critiques
pointing out that the only good consumer is a never-satiated one, this state always
postponing satisfaction to an abstract future which won’t and should not be reached, but
always desired. Activists often also involved in the slow movement create “time banks”
everywhere to turn away from the capitalist markets and to barter skills, activities, labor
with hours as the bartering unit rather than money.
Geologist Paul Crutzen has offered the idea to invent a new “epoch” in geology’s
periodization of Earth history, to designate the current one as distinct in that humancaused markings will come to predominate the lithosphere: thus, we are told, the
“anthropocene” may have begun, and a hypothetical deep future geologist would be able
to read Earth’s history to see its anthropogenic scars – granted geology as a science
produced by humans is as unlikely to exist as humans are, in this posthuman future
(Colebrook, 2014). Thousands of researchers worldwide wonder and debate about when
exactly to situate the start of such epoch, while some wonder about the meaning of the
convergence of Gaia and the human calendars (Colebrook, 2014; Chakrabarty, 2010;
Hache, 2010; Gibson-Graham, 2011). Both to dramatize the destruction associated with
the “anthropocene,” and as an attempt to make sense of Earth’s deep time in relation to
humans,’ geologists translate deep time by explaining that if the Earth’s old age was
converted into an annual scale, humans would have made their appearance at the last
minute before midnight on New Year’s Eve.
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The world’s largest and most cited panel of scientists and the only one ever to
have won a Nobel Peace Prize, a.k.a the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), produces periodic reports synthesizing all climatological data available regarding
past millenia of climate trends into computer-modelized futures, subsequently making
recommendations for present world leaders. One of the most cited marking points for the
origins of the contemporary environmental movements is 1962, the date of publication of
Rachel Carson’s now world-famous Silent Spring, in which, to denounce the
omnipresence of toxic pollutants in daily life in the United States, the author opens her
essay with the description of a dystopian, imagined future Spring where no more birds
will be able to sing.

Slowing down, before it’s too late, because it’s urgent, to take care of future
generations, to avoid apocalyptic futures, to imagine other futures, given the new epoch
and new calendars on Earth’s deep time, while humans have been Earth dwellers for a
second, while capitalism took a split second to emerge, and while greenhouse gases
destructive of the holocene atmosphere proliferated in about the same split second: these
claims may all be coming from environmentalist voices, but they have something else in
common as well. They are injunctions, invitations to rethink temporality, to conceptualize
and experience time differently.

The other most cited date used to mark a starting point for contemporary
environmentalist movements is 1972. Ten years after Carson imagined future Springs as
gloomily silent, the now-famous Limits to Growth report used computer models designed
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to imagine the future, a bit like the IPCC’s modelizations: in this case, the data treated
was focusing on the (impossible) relationship between exponential growth of economic
production and linear growth of access to natural resources. On the basis of this scientific
evidence and many other symptoms of resource depletion, possible scarcity, current
pollution and ecological damage of all sorts, environmentalists everywhere mobilize to
denounce risks and consequences involved in “going beyond limits,” “passing critical
tipping points,” beyond “thresholds,” sometimes accompanying their urgent warnings
with dramatic end-times descriptions. Here acting in concert against climate change and
ecological catastrophe takes the form of attempts at finding the right moment, again,
before “it’s too late,” as long as “it’s not.”
In 1987, the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and
Development published its now famous “Brundtland Report,” which was titled Our
Common Future, and which tied the already temporally-connoted term “sustainability”
with the idea of “future generations” : “sustainable development” was defined here as
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and
Development, 1987). Environmentalist activists keep calling for taking into account the
long term as well as the short term (many refer to capitalist markets as characterized by
“short-termism”), accusing capitalist growth of being blind to the former, and defending
de-growth. The climate crisis forces distinctions to be made between the weather (short
term) and climate (long term). It invites deep time into fast-paced lives, as it becomes
ever more threatening when visible not only in climate trends, but also in weather events.
But though global warming has long seemed ever too fast and vast to act upon, it turns

4

out to be simultaneously (paradoxically) so slow, gradual, non-linear as to be the target of
(heavily right-wing funded) “skepticism.” Though Louisiana’s territory is sinking at a
rate described as “the equivalent of one football field every hour,” and though dramatic
weather events cause sudden accelerations in damage in specific locations, U.S
politicians and international summits react ever so slowly, if at all. Just like the sixth
extinction under way, the imperceptible, slow and erratic acceleration of climate change
causes Gaia theory inventor James Lovelock to wish a sudden and catastrophic event
would give it a sufficiently palpable, urgent nature, so as to provoke “blood, sweat and
tears” emergency action. Urgency sometimes turns to despair, outcries and frustration,
and the risk of a failure to think critically: in an album dedicated mostly to global
warming, Radiohead singer Thom Yorke sings: “there is no time… to analyze… to think
things through… to make sense.” Thus the singer underscores the tension between needs
for rapid changes in the face of a rapidly yet to an extent imperceptibly developing event,
and the need to take the time to “think things through.” On another end of the
environmentalist spectrum, the Climate Reality Project, founded by Al Gore (who also
offers “Earth Inc.” and such green capitalist ideas, thus the distinct positioning compared
to a more radical environmentalist like Thom Yorke), has initiated the “24 hours of
reality” event organized around “24 reasons to hope” and “24 reasons to believe.”
Banners on the events’ website claim: “now is our time!”
Post-apocalyptic movies proliferate, most with ecological catastrophe as their
moment of dramatic shift. Some (perhaps not enough of “us”) worry about how to signal
to future generations of human and nonhuman beings that they should not dig up the
nuclear waste that has been and still is being accumulated over the last half century,
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designing impossibly universally decipherable monuments and atemporal or allegedly
deep temporal warning signs supposed to be understood by species and beings radically
unknown to us, separated from us by 10, 000 years. Along with its desperate attempts at
communication, this potential anthropogenic mass destruction into deep time inaugurates
a new kind of unknown and a new kind of unimaginable.
To highlight urgency, new forms of clocks are called upon and performatively tell
a new time (Bastian, 2012): the doomsday clock, created in 1947 by the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (BAS) as a way to quantify the likelihood of “the end of time” (mass
destruction) approaching, has been coming closer to its symbolic midnight to incorporate
not only risks related to nuclear catastrophes – the most pressing possibility of ecological
destruction when this clock was initially invented, but also climate change and other
ecological disasters. The “One Hundred Months project” is a similar instance: in August
2008, the New Economics Foundation started its hundred-months’ countdown to the
moment when action to prevent the Earth’s average surface temperature from increasing
above the threshold of two centigrades would not be possible anymore. Granted, the
hundred months project’s accuracy is already challenged as the calculations supporting
our passing 2 centigrades one hundred months from August 1st, 2008, was based upon the
estimate that the atmosphere’s concentration in CO2 would go beyond 400ppm (parts per
million) at the end of December 2016, 1 a threshold that was in fact passed in April 2014. 2
Though the clock is still ticking on the campaign’s website (“100 Months,” 2015), before

1

See more detail on the calculations that initially informed the hundred months’ project at
http://www.neweconomics.org/page/-/files/100_Months_Technical_Note.pdf; retrieved July 13, 2015.
2
Though the carbon dioxide concentration has never been so high in human history, and only reached such
levels anywhere from 800,000 to 15 million years ago, this level remaining as high is subject to seasonal
fluctuation: 2015 is suspected to become the first time when the 400 ppm threshold will have been passed
on an annual average.
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the 100 months countdown expired, the Hundred Months Project was already the
obsolete marker of a beaten race against time.
Other resorts to time warning us about ecological disaster take a calendar rather
than a clock form: each year, Earth Overshoot Day marks the approximate date when
humanity’s resource consumption for that year exceeds Earth’s capacity to regenerate
those resources that year (in 2014 this occurred on August 19th). Also designed by the
New Economics Foundation and widely campaigned about by the Global Footprint
Network, Earth Overshoot Day performatively simplifies and dramatizes the ecological
debt to provide it with a temporal measurement, qua the following equation: the world
biocapacity is divided by the world ecological footprint, and the result is multiplied by
365 days. The result is an estimation of when “humanity” (here performative time-telling
flattens unequal contributions and effects of this situation across different humans and
nonhumans) starts living off the Earth on a credit which future generations will allegedly
have to refund one day. Time will tell when.
Some argue in favor of a “return” to a supposed past when humans allegedly lived
in harmony with nature. Many denounce the paces and speeds of the digital age, the car
culture, globalization and its fast flows. Progress, this arrow that – once upon a time –
used to provide the direction of modernity, is everywhere questioned by planetary limits
and what some refer to as “the eruption of Gaia” (Hache, 2010; Stengers, 2009) in a
volcanic metaphor which rhetorically impresses the reader or interlocutor as signifying a
sudden emergence, an event, a surprise, and again, urgency, a state of emergency. This is
so to the point that philosophers now studying ecology and politics have resorted to
provocations – demonstrations – formulated in the past perfect: “we have never been
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modern” (Latour, 1991). Not only ‘sustainability’ but also ‘renewability,’‘recycling,’
evoke ideals of perennity, of taking the long term, or at least, future generations into
account, making new from the old and from the present without damage to the future,
maintaining and supporting resources so as to promote their endurance, transforming
trash so that it can cycle back and again, repeating use and privileging the perennial and
the enduring rather than a consumerist and destructive ephemeral.
‘Conservation,’‘preservation,’‘restoration’ are terms often used by yet other strands of
environmentalisms, and which posit a pristine wilderness, a “nature before man” both in
the sense of chronological preceding and prioritization in terms of importance.
Conserving and preserving, a bit like sustainability, connote endurance, longevity, and
restoration emphasizes a return, a reconstruction of the alleged past health of a lost
wilderness. Times of ecological crises are times when time becomes an urgent matter.

This dissertation is titled Time to Leave Uchronia. “Uchronia” is a concept I have
coined 3 to synthesize a number of notions and arguments in ecosophy, and add to these
debates as I argue that capitalist temporalities rely upon a timeless time, one that
presumes, values and desires (and values the desire for) infinite growth on a finite planet,
and one which promises abundance for all who deserve, satiety in an impossible,
unattainable and untenable future that subjects the present. As I will further explain

3

Though I have indeed coined this concept, I am not the first to deploy this neologistic term. The word
“uchronia” has sometimes been used to designate a micro-literature, a sub-genre within science fiction that
imagines different past worlds based on a re-writing of history. My conceptual ruminations have lead me to
build the term “uchronia” as a mirror to “utopia” stressing temporality instead of spatiality, without my
initially being aware of this neologism’s preexistence. The previous use is obviously very distinct than the
meanings I ascribed to my own concept here.
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below, while utopia is built on “eu-topos” (the “good place” in ancient Greek) and “outopos” (a place that is no-where), uchronia is the ideal(ized) time which has no time.
But uchronia, capitalism’s ideal and idealized time, has recently encountered a
new crisis. For the most part, capitalism’s temporal horizon has been clouded with
stormy clouds since inception, in spite and because of some blind and blinding discourses
that imagined a sun that in fact never shone there. The promises and limitlessness carried
have notoriously not been kept or upheld, as the poor, many women, many minorities,
and capitalism’s myriad “others” could easily see. Today, another dimension of this
world bears witness to this reality, a dimension which some have named Gaia, Nature,
the environment, the mesh, climate, the biosphere, the planet. This takes the form of
lithospheric scars that will testify of an age some have called the anthropocene, all the
way into a deep future very different from uchronia’s bright and shiny growth future,
though deep future could indeed be bright and shiny for quite a moment – again, quite
differently so. With this event, I argue it is about time to leave uchronia, that we need to
take the time to leave uchronia, and that this is the right time to leave uchronia. This
requires the (ongoing) emergence or eruption of alternative temporalities, ones that would
make human and nonhuman lives livable.
My argument is a Feminist intervention in Environmental Political Theory (thus
the subtitle of this dissertation, Queer Eco-Temporalities for a Livable World). In the last
couple of decades, Feminist and Queer theory have become animated by a number of
debates directly pertinent to my reflection here. Firstly, over the last couple of decades,
“New Materialist” Feminist theory has revisited central problems regarding matter, the
body, the environment, nature, often in light of the ecological crises. Feminist theory has
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long been engaged in challenging, contesting, rethinking both the human and nature as
problematic categories that supported the contradictory and violent exclusion of certain
“others,” as well as violence, inequalities, etc: either these “others” were excluded
because these were associated with nature as opposed to “fully human,” in modern
ontologies that held the one as strictly separate from the other, or on the contrary, some
were judged “unnatural,” a judgment that, paradoxically depending also on modern
understandings of nature, implied abnormality, deviance, abjection, etc.
But if these challenges to what and who counts as human and what and who
counts as natural have long been central to feminist and queer theory, new materialist
feminisms and queer ecologies have posed these problems anew. As Stacy Alaimo (2008)
has pointed out, in order to offer critiques of these human/nature exclusions and
separations (Plumwood, 1993) insofar as they acted as the foundation for gender
inequalities, feminists often would abandon nature altogether, casting it as an
unredeemably normative concept and endeavoring to critique and rethink the human
instead. With the ecological crises, the digital and technological age and its proliferation
of cyborgs (Haraway, 1989; 1991), and late modernity at large, questions related to
biology, nature, the environment, humans’ intimate relationships to nonhumans, and what
French science philosopher Isabelle Stengers has called “the eruption of Gaia” have
caused new materialist feminist and queer theory to engage in queering nature (Hird,
2004), queering ecologies.
Meanwhile, and with little overlap so far between these debates, queer theory has
engaged in debates over questions of temporality which will be helpful to think with in
what follows. Straight time, linear time, progress, the relationship between normativity
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and time, utopia v. the present, are all concepts and questions that have attracted the
attention of queer theory. Finally, I turn to Queer and Feminist theory for support in my
intervention in Environmental Political Thought because the latter has important
shortcomings in terms of its thinking about and deploying temporalities in relation to the
nonhuman. This relation manifests itself in often gendered forms, as I will demonstrate in
the first chapter below. Indeed, while the new materialist turn in Feminist Theory has
sometimes been rightly cast as a need for internal critique on feminism’s part (Alaimo,
2008), it is also the case that feminist critique is highly necessary as an intervention in
ecosophy.
The Eternal Return of Temporality and
the Temporality of the Eternal Return
One thread running through this dissertation is the Nietzschean notion of eternal return,
according to which time has no origin or end, and of all the infinite pasts and infinite
futures are with us at each moment. This notion rejects any possible reading of time as
linear, progressive or teleological. I am not the first to turn to Nietzsche for purposes of
queering temporality: queer theorists McCallum and Tuhkanen have already done so in
their “Becoming Unbecoming: Untimely Meditations,” opening a co-edited volume on
queer temporalities. Neither am I first to draw from Nietzsche within ecosophy,
especially with respect to temporality and becoming, as William Connolly’s last couple
of books attest (2011; 2013). However, what distinguishes the argument I present here
from these examples is that I draw more specifically from Nietzsche’s concept of eternal
return, which, I suggest, resonates particularly strongly with our current context of
ecological crisis.
11

The Eruption of Gaia: Intensity and Possibilities for Improbable Joy
As we have seen, thinking at a planetary scale and in deep time is forced upon us in a
context named the Anthropocene, the sixth extinction, the climate crisis. The markings
referred to by the concept of Anthropocene, which allegedly engrave “human” presence
in the lithosphere all the way to a hardly imaginable future lacking a human geologist to
decipher them, remind us of how short the Holocene has been (Colebrook, 2014). It was
but an ephemeral period of hospitality on the part of an Earth now damaged by some of
its self-extinguishing guests. Meanwhile, in the midst of these ecological crises, desires to
alternately slow down or rapidly make changes with respect to even quotidian and larger
scales temporalities so as to match our world of becoming, along with challenges to
historical time as progress or decay or neither, all emerge as increasingly salient and
intense because of the eruption of Gaia, and her deep time. In the end of the nineteenth
century, a few years before a 1908 earthquake devastated the area and as the famous
volcano Etna was erupting as usual, threatening erasure of fragile lives and things,
Nietzsche wrote a series of Idylls while in Messina, Sicily, which would subsequently
serve as an appendix to his Gay Science. He proposed them to the Internationale
Monatschrift claiming that “even the most serious publication need something cheerful.”
In the Idylls, Nietzsche indeed entertained a conversation with a woodpecker, who made
him laugh by calling him a poet, and admired an albatross who “felt sorry for envy.” How
could such joyful thoughts and affects emerge under volcanic and seismic threats? Could
it be that we similarly may laugh and encounter joy, in our anthropocene and sixth
extinction context? I will argue, throughout the pages that follow, that it is in fact due to
this very context that we may experience a vast array of affects with a special intensity,
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and that this intensity is further heightened also, by the notion of eternal return – which is
linked, as we will see, to extinction and necessary to a philosophy of becoming. If every
moment passes, everything becomes, every time difference returns, then how do we face
and perhaps embrace this becoming, especially in moments when the ephemeral and the
long term are simultaneously so salient, and when tensions arise between needs for rapid
change in a fast-changing world and for pauses allowing philosophical ruminations to
think such change. Could our “sixth extinction” or “Anthropocene” (or “Capitalocene” –
Haraway, 2015) be or become ripe with an intensity that may highlight life in all its thick
layers and striating scars, while we are pushed to envision, down to best-sellers, “the
world without us” (Weisman, 2008)? Could joy also be part of these moments where the
short and long term, deep time and the speed society, needs for slowness and quick
change, tear our temporalities apart? The eruption of Gaia threatens to sweep the world as
we know it… now shall we join Zarathustra’s dance?
Eternal Return: a Critique, an Ontology, an Ethics
The Nietzschean concept of eternal return is a very complex one that suffers or perhaps
enjoys multiple interpretations. If I were to simplify it to the point of risking doing
violence to it, I would say that for Nietzsche (or at least for a Deleuzean Nietzsche) the
idea is to denounce any teleological understanding of time according to which the origin
of time absurdly already containing its ends, to instead see the universe as made up of
finite forces which constantly re-organize from one instant to the next. This has a number
of ontological and ethical consequences which I find highly pertinent to a context of
extinction, as the eternal return intensifies each instant, prompting a transvaluation of all
values (in other words it requires to question the value of values). The eternal return
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entails that the entire infinity of the past as well as the infinity of the future, are present in
each present moment, such that the oft-cited notion of “interconnectedness of all things,”
often stressed in a spatial sense in environmentalist discourses, takes on a temporal
dimension as well. This last aspect will feed into my concept of synchrony, in contrast
with the atemporal time of uchronia.
One of the eternal return’s recurring characteristics as a concept has to do with the
fact that it was repeatedly dismissed as the incoherent thought of a soon-to-become mad
man. Milan Kundera dismissively referred to it as “Nietzsche’s half-mad idea.” 4 Yet,
Nietzsche’s notion offers a critique of linear, teleological visions of time (thus
Zarathustra exclaims: “I have liberated them of goals!”), allows to celebrate chance and
the unpredictable, unexpected, random (thus Zarathustra’s reign is called “the reign of
great randomness”). Such a critique is vital, as we will see, to efforts to carve queer ecotemporalities against straight time, to challenge growth-driven progress. The eternal
return also provides a philosophy of becoming, helping to think how all pasts can flow
into all futures through present moments. Finally, it entails a radical, ethical challenge: if
we were to weigh each of our actions against the possibility (or quasi-certainty) that the
moment in which they arise would repeat itself forever, would we drive an SUV up to
mount Etna for a “once-in-a-lifetime” tourist experience, without feeling the presence of
future generations on the passengers’ seat along with Nietzsche’s poetry writing moments
in nearby Messina? We may still opt for the SUV, yet the intensity of each moment,
4

Though he extensively draws from Nietzsche throughout his inspiring work on temporality and becoming,
in the Fragility of Things (2013), William Connolly dismisses this notion, read in one specific way, as
“incompatible with a philosophy of becoming” (p. 217). Throughout this dissertation, one of the
implications of my main argument will be about advancing a different reading: to me the eternal return is
not only highly pertinent to our contemporary ecological context, it is the very condition for a philosophy
of becoming. See especially chapter 6 (see for instance ibid., p. 349), for more engagement with Connolly’s
dismissal and a more detailed my (partial) disagreement with this reading.
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including all joyful, or mediocre, or terrible ones, would have to be confronted
differently, inviting indeed, a trans-valuation of all values.
Uchronia, Anti-Uchronia, Counter-Uchronia, Heterochronia
My effort to queer temporalities in times of ecological crisis will thus draw from
Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return and, as we will soon see, strive to argue against
visions of ecological thought as utopian. As I will further explain (chapter 2), one of my
goals is to turn the tables, to shift the burden of proof, to turn accusations around, against
common suspicions: radical queer ecological thought and praxis are by no means utopian.
In fact, it may offer pragmatic antidotes to decenter capitalocentric temporalities. By
contrast, the latter temporalities, as they forever postpone the satisfaction of capitalist
promises to an ever-receding impossible horizon of consumerist and productivist
abundance, purporting to offer limitless growth on a limited planet, are what I call
“uchronian.”
Time and Ecosophy
In the first chapter, I will show that temporality is a central theme threading
Environmental Political Thought and interlaced with the central ecosophical question of
the human/nonhuman relationship emerging in varied gendered forms. This will enable
me to further situate my argument as an intervention in EPT from a Feminist and Queer
Theory perspective. In the chapters that follow, I will develop four concepts that together
provide tools for queering capitalocentric temporalities. Their goal is to detect the
possibility for other temporalities to emerge, and ways to distinguish between various
alternative temporalities that are already emerging in environmentalist discourses.
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Uchronia
In chapter 2, I overview some key concepts in environmentalist discourses and ecosophy,
again bringing out the temporal thread which runs across these, to advance my own
concept of “uchronia,” and elaborate upon the critical lens it offers. “Uchronia” aims to
underscore how capitalocentric temporality teleologically postpones promises of inifinite
economic growth to an abstract and impossible future (ou-chronos, no-time) of also
infinite accumulation, where all those who “deserve” (“worked hard for”) it, would
allegedly revel in consumerist and productivist abundance (eu-chronos, good time). This
future is impossible as it assumes infinite growth on a finite planet (ou-chronos). The
environmentalist concept of limits to growth underlines the impossibility of infinite,
exponential growth in a world with finite resources. Thus the idea of limits to growth
makes it possible to see capitalocentric temporality for what it is: uchronian. I open the
chapter with the environmentalist theme of urgency, specifically with a close-text reading
of some slogans and videos Greenpeace released a couple of years ago, in the context of
its “It’s Not Too Late!” campaign. I also start drawing from the Nietzschean concept of
the eternal return’s critical dimension, to question the teleological character of
capitalocentric temporality, or “uchronia.” Through this lens, I explore what exactly is so
new and unprecedented in making future generations and nonhumans a matter of
concern: I distinguish this concern from the self-proclaimed future-oriented (or “futurist”)
character of modern, capitalocentric progress. As Bruno Latour has claimed, moderns
have always “run to the future… with their backs turned.” In my formulation, the
fundamental distinction between uchronian futurism and the futurity at stake in the
concept of responsibility toward future generations, is revealed by my concept of
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uchronia: uchronia is inherently reliant upon the abstraction of consumerist and
productivist horizons (the point is to accumulate and grow, with more or less regard and
fetishization for the objects of such growth). In contrast, future generations offer concrete
and vitalist, material matters of concern (the point is to affirm life and/or the livability of
life). Finally, I discuss “end-times” themes in some environmental discourses, i.e to
underscore the limits of limits’ discourse. For instance, I challenge a certain kind of –
capitalocentric – Marxist despair-ridden sigh which has been resonating too often in the
last decade (e.g., Zizek’s or Harvey’s work), according to which with the current
ecological crises, “we” (late modern humans) have less difficulty imagining the end of
times than the end of capitalism, or the radical (non-capitalist) means by which we would
avoid end-times. I argue that this type of colonization of the imaginary (Castoriadis) by
capitalocentric temporalities is one of the powerful and problematic effects of uchronia.
Anti-Uchronia
In chapter 3, I advance a second moment in my reflection on uchronia, one that asks: how
can we cultivate an ability to see uchronia differently, how can we develop a perspective
from which to start seeing that there may be other possibilities, i.e to see uchronia as a
contingent, fragile and not so self-evident temporality which cannot but imagine the
future as capitalist (and it is indeed in this sense that it is a “capitalocentric” temporality),
and which (inaccurately) presents itself as the only possible and desirable reality.
“Anti-uchronia” is not a symmetrically oppositional perspective, supposed to
confront uchronia, as anti-capitalism may be for “Capitalism.” It is, however, a moment
of my argument which may be described as “critical” (crucial and critically-minded). I
conceptualize anti-uchronia as a pause to take the time to think, in creative tension with
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fast-paced, rapidly changing worlds and with urgent needs for radical change. Though
anti-uchronia is not yet an alternative temporality, it is a breech opened in the selfnaturalizing character of uchronia, into and against the capitalist pretension to the
colonization of the temporal imaginary: anti-uchronia “makes other possible (temporal)
order of things glitter,” to use Foucault’s formula regarding what he calls, in the Order of
Things (2014), heterotopias (although the “temporal” in parentheses is my addition here).
Anti-uchronia thus refers to the opening up of the possibility for other temporal
possibilities.
Anti-uchronian art, science, thought, events, would be those which allow to see
the essential contingency in a temporal order that attempts to naturalize itself, in spite of
all odds – as it is, in fact, timeless, disconnected, absurdly teleological, unsustainable and
unbearable, as it always already postpones the promise it carries, running after sand
castles in clouds so destructive to our Earth presents. Anti-uchronian moments are
moments of “idiocy” in the Deleuzian and Stengersian sense, where we allow ourselves
to ask interruptive, disruptive questions that “slow others down”: “wait! Why do we/I
need/desire capitalist growth again? But… do we indeed need it?” They are moments of
suspension of a rushed, supposed common sense (a frenetic race to a capitalocentric
temporal horizon), moments when we are invited to look at temporalities differently.
In this third chapter I draw from world-renowned graffiti artist Blu’s works,
arguing that some of his frescos can be interpreted as “anti-uchronian.” I juxtapose these
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, suggesting that the famous
panel of climatologists provides evidence that capitalocentric temporalities “lead us into a
wall” (Stengers, 2009). I also offer a close reading of a science fiction short story where
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artificially intelligent self-renewable houses become cannibal, and of a contemporary
circus piece and its work on suspension, a choreographic movement I associate with antiuchronia. Through the examination of these various forms, genres and discourses which I
read as anti-uchronian, I discuss the need for a conceptualization of interruptive time that
would include kairos (time in the sense of the moment, the event, the right or wrong time,
etc) and chronos (series and duration, successions, etc). I also weave the anti-teleological
moment of the Nietzschean concept of eternal return into my interpretation of these
various examples.
Counter-Uchronia and Hyper-Uchronia: Regression and Progression
The fourth chapter starts to develop a third concept to think with in times of ecological
crises, when uchronia comes apart as such. “Counter-uchronia” refers to alternative
temporalities emerging in this context, but which still take on the form of a
capitalocentric temporality, either because they merely modify or amend growth-driven
progress (sustainable growth, and most mainstream understandings of the concept of
sustainability), or because they attempt to diametrically oppose this temporality by way
of a primitivist narrative of “return,” often reifying pre-modern, pre-industrial, precapitalist economies as well as non-Western ones. The attempt, in both of these cases, is
to propose a “counter-uchronia,” (i.e uchronia under a slightly different guise), a reactive,
symmetrically oppositional temporality created so as to counter uchronia. I underscore
that this is insufficient, as counter-uchronias remain caught in a temporal
capitalocentrism (it fails to challenge, go beyond, circumvent or de-center uchronia,
remaining caught up in capitalist times).
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Regression
Anarcho-primitivist works, a de-growth manifesto, Viennese environmentalist artist
Hundertwasser’s “five skins” and “tree tenant” theory serve as some of the examples with
which to think the extent to which different environmentalist discourse may be called
“counter-uchronian,” when they rely upon a “return” to a supposed golden age when
humans and nonhumans lived happily-ever-before, when harmony between “Man” and
“Nature” allegedly prevailed. If Bruno Latour has described moderns as running to the
future with their backs turned to it, “primitivist” moments in environmental discourse and
thought would have us run to the past in the same uchronian manner. Chances of falling
are just as high. Often, the “return” proposed is also one that reifies diverse (often
indigenous) economies and worlds that are in fact coeval (Fabian, 2014) with capitalist
economies, thus taking on a colonizing form.
Furthermore, with chapter 4’s focus on regressive counter-uchronias, we will see
that the problem with nature does not reside in the nature of nature, as much as it does in
its temporalities: if “Nature” is imagined as mere background, stable, static, or moved by
eternal cycles (in contrast with the eternal return of becoming), then it becomes an object
of reification and a counter-uchronian, teleological end or goal. However, the examples I
use can be read for difference, i.e as not counter-uchronian all the way. Indeed, after
problematizing their counter-uchronian aspects, in chapter 6 I will also offer to read some
of the same art works as also stressing hybridity and becoming.
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Progression
The second form of counter-uchronia, which I call “progressive” counter-uchronia, is the
focus of chapter 5. In this chapter I turn again to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change reports, this time to underscore their counter-uchronian rather than antiuchronian character. While in chapter 3, I underscored that the IPCC made it possible for
welcome and needed “idiotic” questions to be asked (such as, “but is endless growth even
possible in a finite world?),” in this chapter I stress that these reports do not sufficiently
part ways from capitalocentric temporalities and remain (counter) uchronian in their
proposal of creating carbon markets, their relative blindness to gender, class, race and
other inequalities in climate change impacts (supposedly affecting all of “humanity”),
their understanding of sustainability’s object as… capitalist economies. Indeed, these
reports are the perfect examples of a counter-uchronian understanding of sustainability,
as needing to sustain capitalist growth. Yet, for sustainability to become synchronic
rather than counter-uchronian, its object should shift from capitalist economies to a form
of nonhuman/human (hybrid) ethics. Sustaining capitalist futurism with windmills and
other technofixes as well as carbon markets thus differs from sustaining an ethical
perspective taking present and future generations of human, nonhuman and hybrid lives
into account: the former sustainability is counter-uchronian, the latter would be
synchronic.
I then ask “idiotic” or anti-uchronian questions (ones that intend to create pause).
The IPCC’s counter-uchronian perspective deploys what Isabelle Stengers would call
“stupidity,” i.e it places demands on a situation which demands completely otherwise,
aggravating it rather than taking into account the current demands (made by the
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ecological crises, by the situation). Thus the IPCC indeed proposes to address a crisis it
has demonstrated was caused by capitalist economies… with more “Capitalism.” In
doing so, and in spite of its own anti-uchronian moment, the IPCC is traversed by what
may be called stupidity. The world-renowned panel compares millenia of climate data
with data over a period of high levels of carbon dioxide causing unprecedented global
heating: that of 1750 and on. The IPCC reports then proceed to argue that global warming
is “anthropogenic.” Problematizing the undifferentiated “anthropos” once again, I ask the
following idiotic questions: have “we” become “human” only in 1750? Should climate
change be called “capitalogenic” instead of “anthropogenic” (Donna Haraway has
recently proposed to the term “capitalocene” to describe what some have been calling the
“anthropocene” – 2015)? What does this correspondence tell (or confirm to) us about the
emergence of humanism and the concept of the universal “human” in relation to carbonemitting capitalist economies?
I conclude chapter 5 with examples of the potentially hubristic consequences of
anthropocentrism in a context of climate crisis, advancing a critique of geoengineering
measures that have been defended by the IPCC, Gaia theorist James Lovelock, and
millionaire Russ George.
Heterochronia and Synchrony
Chapter 6 closes the argument with a couple of additional concepts to think with, in the
hope of better seeing and creating alternative temporalities. It asks, how do we go from
an anti-uchronian moment, taking pause to consider the possibility for other possible
temporalities, to experimenting with alternative temporalities that may decenter uchronia,
without finding ourselves trapped by a counter-uchronian logics?
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One term I propose is “heterochronia,” to refer to other times, other temporalities:
to Foucault, heterotopias were spaces which juxtaposed otherwise incompatible spaces
(2009), just like in medical language, heterotopia referred to the growth of an organ in an
anomalous place on the body. In Foucault’s view, heterotopias made it possible for
“another order of things to glitter” (2002, p. vii). “Heterochronia,” in my
conceptualization, 5 refers to moments of surprise when otherwise distinct and separate
temporalities coexist simultaneously, when they converge in a synchronic moment. One
way of nurturing heterochronia would be to ask ‘what is being done?,’ as Gibson-Graham
invites us to do (2010). Here for instance, I offer an alternative reading of
Hundertwasser’s five skins and tree-tenants theories, which I had read as partly counteruchronian in chapter 4. I argue that this artwork also offers a heterochronian dimension, if
one reads Hundertwasser’s art in the form of three dimensional spirals. Imagining and
creating a different oikos enables decolonizing the imaginary, and while this could be
called a utopia, I argue that we can also read it as offering ecochronian antidotes resisting
the pull of uchronia.
In discussing synchrony, I bring in Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return again.
According to this latter idea, all the infinity of the past (pasts) and all of the infinity of the
future (futures) are contained in each passing moment, and the universe is but a constant
re-distribution of forces which do not know any maximal or optimal point, do not suffer
any diminution or increase, as teleological time is an impossibility. For moments to pass,
for time and for being to exist, all must be becoming. If this is the case, Nietzsche invites
us to an ethical attitude resulting from this ontological condition: were we to relive our
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Foucault had proposed the term as well, but only mentioning it in passing as the temporal dimension of
heterotopia (see Foucault, 2009).
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lives eternally, would we cry enthusiastically, joyfully, “da capo”? Temporalities that
have been cultivated in the performing arts, certain community economies, science
fiction, etc foster a sense that many times, paces, rhythms and speeds, many temporal
orders, can be experienced at once: this is what I call synchrony. I discuss this concept of
synchrony in relation to a couple of contemporary dance choreographer Pina Bausch’s
pieces as well as a choreographic moment in a recent “Flood Wall Street!” protest, to
illustrate this concept and demonstrate the embodied nature of such an ethics.
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CHAPTER I
WHAT NOW? TIME AND ECOSOPHY

Morning Glory
The deployment of time and temporality within what has come to be called
Environmental Political Thought and ecosophy is both new and old, central and often
insufficiently foregrounded. Early in the XIXth century, Henry David Thoreau, who is
often read as a precursor of environmental thought, 6 already pointed to the acceleration of
paces and speeds in the quotidian as one of the symptoms for the lack of simplicity
characteristic of his industrializing times. In Walden, he poetically describes the rhythms
and cycles of “nature” and opposes them with the acceleration produced by the railway
system then in the making:
the soul of man, or its organs rather, are reinvigorated each day... All memorable
events, I should say, transpire in morning time and in a morning atmosphere… To
him whose elastic and vigorous thought keeps pace with the sun, the day is a
perpetual morning. It matters not what the clocks say or the attitudes and labors of
men. Morning is when I am awake and there is a dawn in me… In any weather, at
any hour of the day or night, I have been anxious to improve the nick of time, and
notch it on my stick too; to stand on the meeting of two eternities, the past and
future, which is precisely the present moment; to toe that line (2008).

6

See for instance Bennett, J. (2002).
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The valuation of the present moment and of the moment of morning, of awakening, are
associated with the regularity of nature’s cycles. “Nature,” understood as granting access
to transcendance, is seen as self-coherent, predictable, and immutable in its cyclical
character. It is associated with a double eternity, into both the past and the future. It is
also situated beyond, outside, apart from conventions and the socius: clock time does not
affect the morning state Thoreau claims to be capable of whatever the hour. But morning,
like Nature as granting access to transcendence, is a state of mind disconnected from the
concrete moment (be it “social” or “natural”), and thus it is not only abstracted from
social conventional time, but also from day and night. This abstract understanding of
nature as made of immutable cycles is now becoming ever more clearly problematic –
many environmentalists altogether reject the concept of Nature, contrary to the cliché
portraying them as Nature-lovers. Thus Tim Morton denounces “Nature” as a form of
“crystallized history.” As Dipesh Chrakrabarty has claimed, the emerging geological
concept of anthropocene prompts the human and the Earth calendar to converge – I
would rather say they may be – problematically – read together, as whatever is referred to
as “the human” was always indeed a period of so-called “natural” history and as our
months, seasons and years, like other calendars in various cultures, attempt to pace
themselves imperfectly along the Earth’s rotation in relation to the sun and the moon’s in
relation to the Earth. The anthropocene event incites zooming out in “deep time” and
understanding the ryhthms and cycles Thoreau took to be the key to some eternal
transcendance as ever more fragile, as passing, with all other moments. The (Western and
relatively temperate, 7 cyclical) milieu described in Walden, the Holocene “man” – now

7

Note that the term temperate has time for its root, just like Thoreau’s Nature relies upon a certain,
relatively static vision of time. I will return to this temporal dimension of the conceptualization of nature,

26

allegedly transformed into an “anthropocene” one – was but the product of a fleeting
exception of hospitality on the part of an Earth that would have been and will most likely
go back to being inhabitable for human forms. This vision was as ethnocentric as it was
anthropocentric. Thoreau’s time and Thoreau’s Nature are problematic, even while and
perhaps precisely because it opposes “human” fast-paced “modernity” to a supposed
stillness or predictability found in “Nature.” Thoreau’s temporal dualism is ultimately
quite similar to that which has founded the possibility of understanding a “Nature”
passively awaiting humans so as to be mystified, reified, festishized, conserved, and, also,
colonized, “mastered,” destroyed (Grosz, 2004; Bennett, 2002). Thoreau invoked what I
read as a triple return: at the scale of a life, he praised infancy associated with purity and
innocence (2008, p. 63). At the smaller scale of the day, we have seen that mornings and
awakenings were to be returned to so as to constantly begin again (p. 64). Finally, at the
scale of history, Thoreau associated cardinal points, and his fetishized visions of both
“the Orient” and “the West,” with an allegedly different kind of progress, a westward
movement following both the direction of the sun each day and manifest destiny,
celebrating a wilderness whose human inhabitants he erased (at most Thoreau would
abstractly praise Native Americans as “savages,” while most of the time he would refer to
Native American land as empty – p. 268), and which Americans were inevitably drawn to
(p. 269). The reactionary and colonial dimension of this thought was accompanied by the
projection of purity and transcendance into an abstract, constant and cyclical Nature
which ultimately was the precursor of ways in which what is now called biocentrism
meets anthropocentrism: “[Thoreau] took a walk in the woods and came back taller than

this teleological nature, in chapter 4.
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the trees” (2008, p. 265 ). Today’s deep ecologists and conservationists have continued
on this particular trend of thought, as we will see below.
I will also come back to the problematic utopian nature of Thoreau’s transcendent
Nature below, but for now I want to stress that these glimpses into Thoreau’s works show
the important place of temporality in relation to the Man/Nature relationship here, an
importance that carries on beyond Thoreau. The disobedient transcendentalist’s insistence
that Americans “live too fast,” that the division of labor and productivism, the
construction of railtracks, the exclusions and destructions associated to the fast and
speeding-up rise of industry (“if some have the pleasure of riding on a rail, others have
the misfortune of being ridden on” – 2008, p. 66), which he opposed to the eternal cycles
of Nature, indicate the importance of temporality for environmental thought all the way
down to its precursors. Thoreau makes it possible to begin my reading of this barely
visible yet central thread, this importance of temporality (whether explicit or not) which I
see as one of the few commonalities between otherwise disparate visions, throughout
Environmental Thought.
Humans/Nonhumans, Temporality, Gender
Beyond a critical speed, no one can
save time without forcing another to
lose it.
Ivan Illich
Environmental Political Thought (EPT), or “ecosophy” as it is often called (more often
by European thinkers), is now an increasingly established field in political theory,
philosophy and ethics, though of relatively recent emergence. Right before the twenty
first century, J. Baird Callicott pointed out that “during the decade that has elapsed since
the publication of [his book] In Defense of the Land Ethic, environmental philosophy has
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developed explosively.” However, this conservationist ethicist, who strove to continue
the works of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethics,” claims that: “nevertheless, environmental
philosophy remains something of a pariah in the mainstream academic philosophical
community” (1999, p. 2). What in 1999 Callicott considered a marginal place held by
EPT within philosophy has for sure changed significantly since, to the point that even
beyond the confines of this field, many authors who previously did not address ecological
issues now feel compelled to do so. 8 However the canon of Environmental Political
Theory remains contested, as well as the exact boundaries that could help define what
may count as “ecosophy.” Thus environmental theorist Matthew Humphrey claims: “we
lack an all-encompassing concept for green/environmental, political thought” (2010, p.
182). Searching for the lowest denominator that may bring together sometimes disparate
traditions of environmental thought, Green theorist and politician Andrew Dobson quotes
Andrew Vincent who claims that
most [political ecologists] assert the systematic interdependence of species and the
environment … and there is a tendency to be minimally skeptical about the
supreme position of human beings on the planet. Furthermore there is a general
anxiety about what industrial civilization is actually doing to the planet (2007, p.14)

8

Examples could include Latour, whose work Actor Network Theory going from the French Conseil d’Etat
to the production of scientific knowledge and truth contributing to shape Science and Technology Studies,
has taken a resolutely clearer focus on political questions regarding the Earth, the ecological crisis, the
concept of humans, hybridity, and nonhumans etc over the last decade or so (e.g. The Politics of Nature,
2004). J.K. Gibson-Graham and community economies scholars are also increasingly focusing on
ecological dimensions, hybridity and nonhumans in their work. Many among the Left(s) especially have
dedicated at least significant portions of their latest works on ecology when critiquing capitalist economies.
Writers beyond academia also exemplify this change. Naomi Klein’s latest book’s title is quite telling: This
Changes Everything marks her shift from her latest study on the “shock doctrine” where she appeared
much more as a keynesian, to more radical critiques of capitalism provoked by her investigation of the
climate crisis (Klein, 2014).
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Environmental thought is eclectic, disparate, and many schools of thought, many visions
and positions are incompatible with one another within this vast movement or these
movements. One common denominator nonetheless stands out and ultimately brings
these together, sketching the contested contours of the field so that it may indeed be
considered one, so that it may be called ecosophy or environmental thought. Namely,
environmental thought engages with the human/nature dualism, also known as
human/nonhumans, modernity/Nature, Man/Nature, humans/more-than-humans,
humans/environment, human/Earth. Various traditions within environmental thought
indeed conceptualize this problem or relationship using slightly different terms, and the
relationship itself may be called or critiqued as a dualism, a binary, a separation, a divide,
a dichotomy, depending on the tradition. Various schools of thought and authors also
offer differing responses or insight with respect to this question, thus resulting in
differences and disagreements between not only the formulation of the problem, but also
what should be done or thought through to address it: as we will see some may wish to
reverse the hierarchy binding the two terms, celebrating “Nature” and denouncing its
modern subjection to “the human.” This biocentrism denouncing anthropocentrism is
found in deep ecology and conservation, as well as some social ecologists. It is probably
the most known image of environmentalism, though not by any means unambiguously
majoritarian. In contrast, some environmentalists (e.g. political ecologists, critical
ecologists, post-structuralist and new materialist ecological perspectives) sometimes call
for our abandoning the very concept of nature and altogether challenging the concept of
human, to emphasize the blurriness of lines separating the human and its environment as
well as the role of the very separation in creating conditions of ecological crisis. In other
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words, reversing the hierarchy in the human/nonhuman binary may not be enough, and
the ecological crises call for carefully examining both terms critically, potentially even to
subsequently reject either or both of them. In this chapter, as one point of entry to situate
my own contribution to the field of environmental thought, I discuss some of the most
important schools of thought and authors involved in this work, showing that, to each
respective understanding and critique of the human/nonhuman relationship, corresponds a
specific understanding and mobilization of temporality.
We have just seen that Thoreau’s rendering of the human/nonhuman dualism was
one whereby he praised the regular (supposedly “eternal”) rhythms, patterns and cycles
of “Nature” (daily, seasonal…), contrasting those with the paces and speeds of the fastindustrializing America of his times. The former have an ability to invigorate the self
against conventional time (mornings as awakening, despite “what the clocks say”), while
the latter function as a means of exclusion (some ride on trains and others are “ridden
on”). Now if we leap in time from this nineteenth century transcendentalist (alleged) 9

9

Henry David Thoreau’s status as a precursor of EPT or ecosophy is open to debate, though I lack the
space and time to discuss it and take a more substantiated position on the subject here. First, Thoreau is far
from being the only candidate for early modern thinkers that have inspired the environmentalist movement
as we know it today. Darwin could of course be cited, as well as Thoreau’s friend Emerson, but also the
romantics, and the precursor of romanticism Rousseau. We could also consider the Lockean imperative to
save only what one can consume to be a premise which some environmental thought is based on, and this
one has obvious roots in a long tradition within Christian thought. The eternal regression to many
philosophers throughout the Western canon can go on to any thinker having thought (with) the concept of
Nature… i.e virtually all (virtually all of the canon has reflected upon “nature,” as a central concept even –
Thoreau’s innovation may be said to be about the opposition between industrialization and this concept,
announcing the ecological crises to come more than he founded a current of thought including “ecosophy”
in general). This regression also tends to obscure female or feminist, and nonwestern nature writers to
foreground white, male, upper middle class Westerners. In my view, Thoreau is just such a nature writer
primarily, and rather than a precursor anticipating the themes developed by contemporary ecosophy, he has
inspired some (very specific) authors within Environmental Political Theory. I am using this latter phrase,
distinguishing here between ecosophy and EPT in the sense that the former is more often used as the term
to describe this field in North American literature, while the latter is more often used in European
philosophy. Indeed, Thoreau is more often cited as a precursor of environmental thought on the former side
of the Atlantic. He also is claimed as legacy by specific currents of the broad field of environmental
thought. Namely, (self-proclaimed) “deep” ecologists and conservationists rarely hesitate to consider him
as a founding father (gendered phrase intended), and as we will see, they indeed often inherit some of the
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precursor of environmental thought to the beginnings of the contemporary movement, a
couple of important founding figures stand out (e.g Ivan Illich, Hans Jonas, Aldo
Leopold 10), and a number of different schools of thought subsequently developed (deep
ecology, social ecology, political ecology, ecofeminism, critical ecology, poststructuralist and new materialist ecology). Qua a few (inevitably non-exhaustive)
examples from these various currents, I will argue that while each propose their specific
formulation of the human/nonhuman problem, these formulations respectively have
idiosyncratic consequences for their mobilization of temporality. The goal of this
overview is two-fold: it will underscore a less obvious thread within Environmental
Theory, and its importance, i.e temporality. It will also allow me to further to situate my
own contribution concerning the new temporalities emerging in a context of sixth
extinction, anthropocene, climate change, in short, in times of ecological crises. Thirdly,
as we meander through a number of ecosophers’ works, my examination of the
connection between temporality on the one hand, and the human/nonhuman on the other,
as threads of ecosophy, will prove to be more or less explicitly gendered in each instance,
for better or worse.

problematic understanding of “Nature” he mobilized, his response to the problem of the Man/Nature
relationship in the form of a reversal of the dualism’s hierarchy in favor or “Nature” or the wilderness, and
the gendered characters of these two ontologico-ethical positions: Nature is often a “she,” either calm and
motherly (as for instance in his essay “Walking”) or erratic and hysterical (in many instance both in
“Walking” and Walden), and part of the true ecologist’s attitude has to do with facing, embracing it in ways
quite… masculine or virile (famously killing animals with one’s own hands is described in such terms in
Walden – a reminder to the reader than meanwhile Thoreau was regularly taking cookie-collecting trips at
his mother’s would perhaps excessively specifying the kind of masculinity – boyhood? – indeed at play
here.
10
I will be discussing Illich, Jonas and Leopold here so as to provide a couple of major examples of
inspirations for contemporary ecosophical work. However, by no means do these offer an exhaustive
genealogy situating environmental thought: the survey of EPT literature I offer here is selective: the goal of
this selection is to highlight, through enough important figures and schools of thought within the
movement, the relation I wish to underscore here, between EPT’s common thread, i.e its reflection on
human/nonhuman relations, and temporality.
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Anti-Elitist Feminist Conviviality
Ivan Illich’s considerations on the energy crisis strikingly resonate with Thoreau’s
denunciation of the speed of railtracks, though Illich was no transcendentalist. In a 1973
essay first published in Le Monde (2013), the late 20th century philosopher who inspired
the de-growth and political ecology movements (conversely, Thoreau inspired more
thinkers and groups among the deep ecology and conservation movements) laments the
“speed-stunned imagination” of cultures dominated by motorcars, where the “habitual
passenger” of such vehicles suffers from “inherited perceptions of space and time and of
personal pace” which “have been industrially deformed.” The concept of “net transfer of
lifetime” (2013, p. 83) is crucial to his critique of the energy crisis: Illich points out that
with motor vehicles and high speed transportation in general, “the exchange-value of
time becomes dominant, and this is reflected in language: time is spent, saved, invested,
wasted, and employed” (2013, p. 84). By “net transfer of time,” Ivan Illich simply means
that once transportation’s acceleration reaches a critical threshold, equity and the quality
of social relations cannot but be greatly damaged:
Beyond a critical speed, no one can save time without forcing another to lose it.
The man who claims a seat in a faster vehicle insists that his time is worth more
than that of the passenger in a slower one. Beyond a certain velocity, passengers
become consumers of other people’s time, and accelerating vehicles become the
means for effecting a net transfer of life-time (2013, p. 85).
Illich goes so far as to insist that neither the specific technological make-up of a
particular technology nor the specific persons owning these technologies of transportation
(and this extends to other examples than transportation) are as important as the
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technologies’ speed. The speed society is damaging of sociability, damaging of the
“conviviality” (1973) which Illich stressed and advocated (very simply put, Illich
understood the concept of conviviality as corresponding to societal arrangements where
tools allow people to express themselves, as opposed to machines subjecting their users).
Speed matters in matters of motion, more than the matter moving. Temporality here is
foregrounded, as central to conviviality and the socius:
The effect of speed on the autonomy of people is only marginally affected by the
technological characteristics of the motorized vehicles employed or by the persons
or entities who hold the legal titles to airlines, buses, railroads, or cars. High speed
is the critical factor which makes transportation socially destructive. A true choice
among practical policies and of desirable social relations is possible only where
speed is restrained. (2013, p. 55)
Illich, a bit like Thoreau in his denunciation of speeds and paces of modernity as opposed
to rhythms and cycles of nature, underscores the ways in which beyond a certain
threshold, the speed and acceleration certain technologies bring about becomes
poisonous, insofar as they participate crucially not only in production, but also in the
production of new inequalities and exclusions as well as their reproduction. He thus calls
for a slowing down, a restraint on speed and a re-valuation of slow, more “natural”
modes of transport, insisting upon embodied practices not involving high-speed
machines: motion by way of walking on one’s feet procures more autonomy. Speed has
become a nuisance to both autonomy (in an almost Castoriadian 11 sense) and
conviviality, and empoverishes those whose quotidian lives it purports to make more
11

In fact the impact of Cornelius Castoriadis on French political ecology could also be noted.
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efficient. Of note here is the emphasis on sociability, autonomy, equality, conviviality.
Surely Illich also discussed thresholds and technological innovation in relation to natural
resources. Yet, inaugurating the political ecology tradition (and to an extent offering
some inspiration to social ecology as well), Illich is not focused on “Nature,” but rather
on the livability of (human) life. In fact, deep ecology’s “biocentrism” clashes quite
explicitly with Illich, Gorz, Bookchin, in other words with political and social ecology’s
relative “anthropocentrism.” Furthermore, Illich’s stance contrasts with Thoreau, deep
ecology, and conservationism’s, also in the sense that then the time in question and under
scrutiny is about a concrete, social temporality, rather than an abstract mental state
whereby one would always be invigorated by an eternal morning, away from social time.
Illich’s critique of the speed society also importantly integrates temporality,
gender/sex, and his critique of industrialism/growth. In his book Gender, Illich contrasts
preindustrial societies’ “reign of vernacular gender” to industrialism’s “regime of
economic sex.” Insisting on “lost time,” which disappearance he bemoans, he carves the
concept of “ghost work.” In the “apparent economy,” i.e that characterized by salaried
work, sexual discrimination is made clear by wage disparities which Illich sees as
inherently present in the growth society. Thus he reads the (sexually) “neutral” (growthoriented) economy as a liberal feminist illusory promise of emancipation in fact further
alienating women and other minoritized groups. Illich emphasizes that, in industrial
societies that abolish “vernacular gender” (i.e, the differentiated quotidian roles shared by
women on the one hand, and men on the other), “sexism” becomes prevalent not only due
to wage discrimination in the apparent economy but also because of the unpaid time spent
by women to transform commodities into useable products. Only the time spent
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performing salaried work is considered to have any sort of value: Illich mentions car rides
to and from vast grocery stores, use of laundry machines abolishing possible moments of
social gatherings of women when they previously all washed clothes together, etc. Thus
he defines “ghost work” as follows:
any labor by which the consumer transforms the purchased commodity in a usable
good, … the time, toil and effort spent which must be expended in order to add to
any purchased commodity value without which it is unfit for us… The
transformation of household labors is by no means superficial, but indeed very
profound. The increase of standard of living makes these labors ever more
dependent upon capital by having multiples machines and gadgets penetrate
households… New domestic chores have also become more solitary, monotonous,
impersonal, and considerably more polluting. Among other palliatives to this
silent stress, we note the consumption of Valium and mind-numbing in front of a
TV screen … If economic growth is intrinsically and irreparably … sexist, then
sexism will not decrease unless it does at the ‘price’ of contraction of the
economy. (1983, p. 47)
One of the most important aspects of such subordination in a society that inaugurates
vernacular genderlessness yet so profoundly relies upon sex-based discrimination has to
do with both the quality and the quantity of quotidian time spent by women
accomplishing tasks which used to take place in common with other women and which
collective dimension is now supplanted by machinic alienation. This critique should not
be confused with an advocacy in favor of a return to medieval times and the “reign of
vernacular gender.” Liberal feminist Elizabeth Badinter’s caricatural and sweeping
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denunciations (2010) of all environmentalists as necessarily anti-feminist, or even sexist,
because they dare critique the allegedly wonderful progress laundry machines have
represented for women, would be quite inapt at accounting for what Illich is pointing to
here. Rather than advocating a return to different and allegedly purer forms of subjection,
Illich uses past arrangements to contrast them with the “modern” “West,” showing that
the latter’s is a story of “progress” understood as the proliferation of new, machinic form
of sexist subordination eating up autonomous moments and “liberated” time. He refrains
from speculating on the future, but calls for “contraction,” in the de-growth sense I will
clarify a bit below. In sum, Illich brings together environmental degradation with an
astute attention to quotidian temporalities, showing the gendered and sexed dimensions of
both.
Patriarchs and Technocrats
While Illich’s reflection on technology and modernity’s speeding up paces focuses on
temporality as it is transformed at the (sexed) quotidian scale, Hans Jonas, another major
influence who inspired contemporary ecosophy, offered a multi-dimentional and multipace, complex deployment of temporality in relation to his critical reflection on
ecological crises. Jonas’ work indeed engages not only the paces at which we live on a
daily basis, but also, at a larger scale, the ways in which our “technological age” forces a
rethinking of ethics to incorporate nature and future generations as objects and subjects of
present generations’ ethical obligations. Here the scale is thus not the quotidian, but a
larger temporal scale, a historical perspective, inclusive of future generations’ capacity to
exist, to live. Jonas’ ethics is also “multi-pace,” in the sense that he called for the
deceleration of technological developments accompanied by the acceleration of a science
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of prediction, which he called “futurology,” to inform what he called an “ethics of the
future.”
As a student of Heidegger, Hans Jonas read the current “technological age” as one
where technology had radically altered the scope of ethics. Namely, to him responsibility
was commensurate to powers, to what a thing can do: granted that the technological age
had provided humanity with unprecedented powers for self- and nature’s destruction,
human responsibility knew totally new scales which forced taking into account
nonhuman nature and a duty toward future generations’ non-extinction. In short, progress
had turned into threat with the advent of the technological age. Writing in 1979, as
nuclear threats were highly tangible and global warming and such planetary ecological
crises were barely starting to emerge in ecological knowledge, Jonas wrote:
Modern technology, informed by an ever-deeper penetration of nature and
propelled by the forces of the market and politics, has enhanced human power
beyond anything known or even dreamed of before. It is a power over matter,
over life on earth, and over man himself; and it keeps growing at an ever
accelerating pace. … But lately, the other side of the triumphal advance has
begun to show its face, disturbing the euphoria of success with threats that are as
novel as its welcomed fruits. Not counting the insanity of a sudden, suicidal
atomic holocaust, which sane fear can avoid with relative ease, it is the slow,
long-term, cumulative – the peaceful and constructive use of worldwide
technological power, a production, consumption, sheer population growth – that
poses threats much harder to counter. The net total of these threats is the
overtaxing of nature, environmental and (perhaps) human as well. Thresholds
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may be reached in one direction or another, points of no return, where processes
initiated by us will run away from us on their own momentum – and toward
disaster. (1985, p. ix)
According to Jonas, before the technological age, the human polis was comparatively
separate from nature, in the sense that human powers could only impact nature in
restricted ways: in his view the polis coexisted with nature with little effect on the latter,
thus nature was primarily moved by “immutable” laws, untouched by human artefact.
This separation of nature and the human sphere of action (and therefore of responsibility)
collapsed with modern technology’s new powers: “the raping of nature and the civilizing
man go hand in hand” (1985, p. 2). Or, as he puts it in the quote above, “modern
technology [is] informed by an ever-deeper penetration of nature.” Formulated in yet
another way, Jonas claimed that “the nature of human action has de facto changed, and an
object of an entirely new order – no less than the world biosphere of the planet – has been
added to what we must be responsible for because of our power over it” (1985, p.7). The
threatening acceleration of technological development is thus directly linked, in Jonas’
rendition, to the collapse of an allegedly previously separate and intact sphere of
“Nature:”
The boundary between ‘city’ [here Jonas is referring to the polis] and nature has
been obliterated: the city of men, once an enclave in the nonhuman world, spreads
over the whole terrestrial nature and usurps its place. The difference between the
artificial and the natural has vanished, the natural is swallowed up in the sphere of
the artificial, and at the same time the total artifact generates a nature of its own.
(1985, p. 10)
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With this comes an unprecedented need to rethink ethics. The new “ethics for the future”
takes on various radical, temporal changes: for Jonas, a new science of predictability is
necessary: this is what he called a “futurology.” Differentiated changes of pace follow in
various domains: futurology’s development must be accelerated, and meanwhile,
technology’s development must be slowed down, as there is a “gap between the ability to
foretell and the power to act,” a gap which has created this novel ethical problem. Armed
with the lessons drawn by futurology, the decision-maker or statesman must espouse “an
ethics for the future” taking on a form which Jonas compares to the patriarch’s protective
attitude toward his family (!): futurological experts will examine the future, in terms of
risks, probabilities, predictions and uncertainties, and on this basis, with nature and future
generations in mind, statesmen may make sound, protective decisions (for now fragile
Nature and for children – including those who do not yet exist). Jonas places nature and
future generations on the same footing, in that neither have the ability to represent
themselves – this is also part of the novelty of the technological age’s human condition.
One major imperative falls on the statesman’s shoulders, that of preserving the capacity
for future generations to exist, which is also what links them to nature, as nature is a
condition for the livability of future human life.
With the case of this major precursor of contemporary ecosophy, we see quite
clearly how there is a striking connection between needs for paces of scientific,
technological and ethical developments to be radically altered in a differentiated manner,
on the one hand, and the eruption of Gaia, on the other. According to Jonas science and
ethics must take on a future-oriented form – “futurology” and the “ethics of the future” ;
futurology’s pace must accelerate ; technology must slow down ; politics must start
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incorporating the ethics for the future. And all these modifications of temporality must
take place due to the greater and greater dissolution of separation between nature and the
human, as well as the eruption of awareness that future generations’ living conditions are
highly altered by the technological present. Temporality and the relationship between the
human and the nonhuman are at the center of Jonas’ philosophy.
However compelling and helpful the case of Jonas may be so as to see the
human/nature dualism in relation to temporality, his diagnosis, prognosis and program
are highly problematic in a number of respects. For one, his claim that nature and the
polis used to be relatively separate, that nature was “immutable,” is dubious at best. We
know that with the very beginnings of human history and the settling of human societies
throughout the planet, whole species have constantly disappeared, and that this took place
much before what Jonas calls the “technological age.” Of course his association of human
modernity with natural devastation has some truth to it, as the rate of these extinctions
has notoriously accelerated with the industrial revolution and on, such that we currently
are confronted with what scientists call the sixth great extinction. Nonetheless, the
portrayal of pre-modern nature as animated by “immutable” laws in contrast to a period
where “the natural is swallowed up in the sphere of the artificial” is rather unconvincing:
environmental historians like Mike Davis (2002) have demonstrated how an ahistorical
reading of nature as changing ever so slowly, or moved stably by cycles, is mostly the
result of ethnocentric perceptions of “Nature” in relatively (and relatively recently)
temperate climates. And as mentioned above, the eruption of the concept of
“anthropocene” reminds us of how short the hospitable Holocene has been relative to
Earth history.
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Another problematic dimension of Jonas’ critique and program has to do with the
specific gendered terms of both: Jonas depicts human civilization as “raping” and
“penetrating” nature ever more deeply, in a move that many ecofeminists have
denounced where nature is feminized, women are “reduced” to biology and nature, and
both are depicted as passive, or in this case as victims of penetration. Conversely, the
human is more or less implicitly equated with a certain masculinity, risking women’s
exclusion from a category that is (problematically) traditionally centered and privileged.
Further, Jonas’ recommendation that decision-makers espouse the “patriarch’s” ethical
attitude may raise more than one queer and/or feminist eyebrow. The technocratic,
potentially anti-democratic dimension of Jonas’ programmatic moment is quite clear:
Jonas encourages us to rethink the role of technology in late modernity, only to affirm the
celebration of the scientific expert and his capacity to inform (and arrest) debate, to
curtail civil society’s potential interference – the latter is not even mentioned in Jonas’
Imperative of Responsibility, besides as a passive feminized force in need of patriarchal
protection. As Latour would say, scientists come in and out of the cave, exercising a
monopoly over the kind of truth capable of eliminating any participatory democracy dear
to others in the political ecology tradition (above-discussed Illich’s anti-elitism contrasts
with these views, for instance).
Yet Jonas’ insight into the technological age, the centrality of both temporality
and the human-nonhuman relationship to his thought, and the gendered terms of such
insight, are helpful insofar as they further confirm my claim that while ecosophy has
proposed, in varying, specifically gendered terms, to focus on the human-nonhuman
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question, it has done so in ways that foreground the temporal, or at least considerably
affect temporality – being especially critical of temporalities of progress.
Conserving Virility
The conservation movement, as yet another specific tradition within ecosophy, similarly
deploys discussions of the “Nature”/human relationship in temporal and gendered terms.
Environmental feminist Karen Warren has praised one of the founders of conservation
ethics, Aldo Leopold, claiming that:
Many feminist environmental philosophers adopt key aspects of Leopold's land
ethic. For example, many defend a notion of the self as a relational, ecological
being who is a member of the larger biotic (living, organic, ecological)
community. (Warren, 2015)
Warren also goes on to quote Leopold’s praise of both cultural diversity and biodiversity:
“Leopold claimed that an ecological interpretation of history shows that ‘the rich
diversity of the world's cultures reflects a corresponding diversity in the wilds that gave
them birth’” (Warren, 2015). Yet, if Aldo Leopold’s famous land ethic does indeed
resonate in part with some environmental feminist ideas regarding the diverse
interconnectedness between humans and nonhumans, we may also remember that in
1925, Leopold wrote that “public wilderness areas are essentially a means for allowing
the more virile and primitive forms of outdoor recreation to survive the receding
economic fact of pioneering” (Leopold, 1992, p. 138). This sentence captures a number
of dimensions of conservationist thought’s complex and at least partly problematic
positioning with respect to the correlated questions of temporality, human/nonhuman
relations, and gender.
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The adjectives “virile” and “primitive,” along with the phrase “outdoor
recreation” are symptomatic of some of the conceptual grounds that have conservation
ethics is rooted in. Leopold saw “wilderness” as calling for “conservation” so as to
preserve possibilities for certain manly men to fully experience their manhood by
accessing land with no roads or “civilization” (also a commonly used term in Leopold’s
writings) as “playgrounds” (this word appears extremely often in Leopold’s essays).
Though the land ethic that Leopold crafted repeatedly asserts that “Nature” must be
“protected” for its own sake, because of its intrinsic rather than instrumental value,
underneath this distinction lays an opposition between Nature for leisure and Nature for
labor. “Using” “Nature” as a playground for purposes of serving upper-middle class
men’s feeling of wild exploration of “primitive” ways is deemed of higher moral value
than exploitation of Nature as a resource for one’s livelihood. The term “primitive”
signals a narrative imbued by a temporality of “return” that permeates conservation
ethicists through and through, whereby certain nonwestern ways of life are symbolic of
the past while the West stands for the present and future (themselves read in a
declentionist perspective). Denying any coevalness to so-called “primitive” economic
ways of life, these are subsequently exoticized for purpose of play. At the same time, and
this is not by any means a contradiction but rather more proof of the erasure committed
here, when Leopold contributes to imagining the national parks system in the United
States, he rejoices: “any system of wilderness areas would have to be owned and held for
public use by the Government. The fortunate thing is that the Government already owns
enough of them” (Leopold, 1992, p. 125) Let’s all clap at the completed U.S. occupation
of the land all the way to the West coast.
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Though it is true that Leopold inaugurated an ecological tradition of questioning
economic logics as sole drivers of land policy, his was a project, not of contesting ideas
of manifest destiny and economic growth, but of merely tempering, reforming or limiting
it. Therefore, although he is often read as related to the deep ecology tradition and to
what Dobson will call ecologism as opposed to environmentalism (see my next section
below), his legacy must be complicated as also constituting a precursor of green
capitalism, informed by certain colonial and patriarchal undertones. Leopold did critique
industrialization’s overtaking all American land, with some provocatively critical
formulas such as “there is no God but Gasoline and Motor is its Prophet!” (Leopold,
1992, p. 127) Yet, the “father” of land ethic also repeatedly asserts that economic
expansion is desirable, as long as it is limited in pace: thus he denounces “the tragic
absurdity of trying to whip the March of Empire into a gallop.” Though the image is
again beautifully provocative, here it is the pace, the speed of Empire’s march that is
denounced, and not so much Empire per se. Let’s note here that Leopold’s critique of
paces and speeds at which modernity travels, echoing Thoreau’s, and his vision of the
“primitive,” his partly declentionist objections to progress, enable him to attack only part
of the imperial logics he seems to denounce: rather than the logics themselves, it is their
rapidity that is at stake. The emphasis is on “loss” of “the Unknown,” on a “return” to
pristine (“virgin”) wilderness, i.e the deceleration of a process which in itself is not
contested. Although Leopold may inspire more radical agendas, he also preached for
what would now stand as “green consumerism”: “would not many people pay an extra
penny for a ‘clean’ newspaper?” (Leopold, 1992, p. 192) And although as Warren
underscores, Leopold insists in the Land Ethic that humans are part of an interconnected
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nonhuman world, he relies upon clear distinctions between “Man” and an – often
feminized – “wilderness” that should be preserved from mass tourism so that the uppermiddle class man may use it as his “playground.” 12 “Man” is hubristically defined as “the
first creature in all the immensities of time and space whose evolution is self-directed,”
while wilderness is evoked in the following terms: “the most pleasing [road] is the one
that ‘opens up’ some last little vestige of virgin wilderness.” (Leopold, 1992, p. 184).
Again, we see a narrative of loss, of return, to a “Mother Nature” that calls for protection
and for recreational exploration on the part of a privileged manly man. This agenda also
relies upon a strong nationalistic rhetoric: part of the justification Leopold provides for
his conservation advocacy taps into a supposed idiosyncratically American spirit, and the
stakes emphasized have to do with preserving a rugged individualism at the core of
“Americanness” : “there is little question that many of the attributes most distinctive of
America and Americans are the impress of the wilderness and the life that accompanied it
… its distinguishing marks are a certain vigorous individualism” (Leopold, 1992, p. 138).
Formulations of the human-nonhuman relationship and what exactly may be
problematic or helpful with them changes with almost each author, or at least each school
of thought within ecosophy. So do their implications for temporality, and in each case the
terms of these two facets of the ecosophical question are gendered in different ways. It
remains that ecosophy is marked by: an engagement with the human-nonhuman
relationship which is often the most obvious common denominator between
environmentalists; a subsequent or rather simultaneous engagement with temporality; we

12

In her Primate Visions (1989), Donna Haraway has offered another striking example of the ways in
which racialized, gendered and classed narratives about “adventurers” and “explorers” so fond of
“wilderness” (like, for instance, Teddy Roosevelt’s) indeed contributed to constitute the white, male,
privileged subject qua figures of “other,” non-white, “natural” beings.
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should now add, an often gendered language to defend these two endeavors – whether
authors advance feminist critiques or, as in Jonas’ or Leopold’s case, explicitly
patriarchal positions. This has become apparent through four precursors of ecosophy
(XIXth century transcendentalist Thoreau, conservation ethicist Leopold in the first half
of the XXth century, Illich and Jonas in the second half). In the remainder of this section
I will survey some of the more recent schools of thought which have emerged in
Environmental Political Theory (from the 1980s and 1990s, on), underscoring how each
of these both critique and understand the human-nonhuman relationship, and what
consequences this has on the way they may mobilize temporality. I will first focus on
what Andrew Dobson has called ecologism and distinguished from environmentalism.
Yet contrary to his defense and amalgamation of ecologism as one singular “ideology in
its own right,” I read ecologist thought as importantly traversed by disagreements which
matter tremendously, and this importance will be particularly apparent in discussing
temporality in these respective currents. These include deep ecology, social ecology,
political ecology (and de-growth), and finally (more recently) critical, post-structuralist
and new materialist ecologists (note that many of these categories of course overlap, as
we will see).
Ecologism as Ideology
The green movement has spent years trying to get the environment on to the
political agenda, and the major political parties have so artfully stitched a green
stripe into their respective flags that there seems to be no need for a specifically
green politics any longer.” (Dobson, 2007, p. 193)
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This apparent lack of need for a specifically ecologist agenda, for what he called
“ecologism,” understood as “an ideology in its own right,” is what Andrew Dobson tried
to refute in Green Political Thought, which presented a survey of debates within
Environmental Political Thought and a synthetic overview of ecologism still often cited
as a reference in the field, even twenty years after its first publication, and many new
editions. For this reason I will devote a substantial amount of attention to it: not that it
represents the field exhaustively by any means, but it is a great entry point to discern
some of the connections mobilized, sometimes in spite of the authors’ intentions, between
temporality, human/nonhuman relations, and gender. Dobson’s argument distinguishing
ecologism from environmentalism was indeed a needed one, and helps situate some of
the following reflection, as my own intention is to intervene in ecologist rather than
environmentalist debates. However, I contend that Dobson’s battle being to defend
ecologism as “an ideology in its own right,” his attention to the flags within the (British)
party system 13 and their stripes (see the above quote), sometimes prevent Dobson from
distinguishing with nuance the complex spirals intertwined, the intersections and parallel
13

The term “ecologism” is relatively absent of American Environmental Political Thought. The
terms“ecosophy” or “ecophilosophy”are equally rare. This is not the place for me to specify these nuances,
but a passing clarification may interest readers wishing to further refine their understanding of the field and
the contexts in which it has been developing. While in the United States, “political ecology” often refers to
an academic field of scientific scholarship (which should however be understood as having political
implications and going beyond disciplinary boundaries, including between so-called “hard” and social
sciences - citations), in France “l’écologie politique” is a false cognate referring to what could perhaps be
loosely translated as a movement sharing many similarities with the American “Environmental Justice”
movement (citations). Thus when Bruno Latour opens his Politics of Nature with a provocative “What is to
be done with political ecology?,” to which he answers: “more political ecology!,” he is calling for a
furthering of a movement that has grown out of associative (non-profit) life, left-libertarian greens, and the
Green Party there, problematizing the human/nonhuman relationship in relation to social, economic,
geographic, gender and racial inequalities and participatory democracy. When Dobson refers to ecologism,
he is speaking within his British context, where he has run for elections within the British Green party (and
he has held a position of advisor to the British government’s Sustainable Development Commission, among
other such institutional responsibilities). The two movements (British “ecologism” and “écologie
politique”) do not exactly overlap, as what Dobson describes does not stress social inequalities as much as
his continental counterparts, and as the latter ones are influenced by Ivan Illich, Hans Jonas, Andre Gorz
more than deep ecologists like Arne Naess, and overlaps with the mostly Franco-Italian de-growth
movement, which I also discuss above and below.
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lines within the fabric of ecologism, the nuances among dark greens (I will try to offer a
glimpse at some of these in the following sections on deep, social, political ecology).
Though Dobson insists upon the distinction between light or shallow, and dark or deep
greens, he is color-blind to some dimensions of the debates. I will start with the
nonetheless very helpful definition he provides of ecologism (dark or deep greens) as
opposed to environmentalism (light or shallow greens) to grasp this, and examine how it
is directly connected to his treatment of the nature/human dualism, in relation to
temporality and gender. Dobson explains, as do many in the field, 14 that ecologism refers
to a movement which advocates for fundamental societal and institutional change as
necessary to address the ecological crises, while environmentalism would include, for
instance, ecological modernization, technological fixes, so-called green capitalism,
sectorial reforms in the use of very specific sorts of pollutants and ecological damages,
etc.
More specifically substantiating his definition of ecologism, Dobson provides a
synthetic and clear formulation. In his view and others,’ “it is the limits to growth thesis,
together with the ethical conclusions to be drawn from ecocentrism and hybridity … that
divides light-green from dark-green politics” (2007, p. 53). And Dobson also emphasizes
the human/nonhuman relationship more explicitly elsewhere, as a distinctive trait of
ecologism: “what sets ecologism apart from other political ideologies is its focus on the
relationship between human beings and the non-human natural world” (p. 28). These
quotes are indeed quite rich in terms of helping one grasp the meaning of ecologism. I
14

See for instance Humphrey’s review article, “Green Political Thought” where he writes: “We will use
‘green’ political theory as a broad category encompassing all forms of political thought that have as a high
priority the conservation or preservation of the natural environment. ‘Ecological’ will refer to those forms
of green thought that seek the dissolution of contemporary political and economic institutions, and
environmental is reserved for approaches that would specifically adapt existing institutions” (2010, p. 182).
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would rephrase this analysis as follows: ecologism or dark green politics comprises a
critique, an ontology, and an ethics. The ontological moment in Green Political
Philosophy has to do with posing the problem of the relationship between the human and
the nonhuman. The ethics unfolds from this moment, while the critical moment, which
can either be read as an implication of the first two or as the premise engaging an
ontologico-ethical proposal, attacks the idea of progress, its direction being set by growth
– thus the attack also targets growth itself. In Dobson’s depiction, what I read as his
programmatic moment would consist of building the “sustainable society.” As I will
discuss (and critique) later on in this chapter, the British thinker characterizes the
sustainable society as a “utopia” – under his pen an appraisive term.
Dobson’s identification of the ontology and ethics, the limits to growth critique,
and the sustainable society program, all constitute the distinguishing elements that allows
ecologism to be “an ideology in its own right.” Of note here is that this statement
contains both the question of the human/nonhuman relationship, along with a critique and
program which temporal dimension is fundamental, though the author does not
underscore this. Throughout his works, Dobson (and in this he is quite representative of
many green thinkers) discusses the limits to growth not only in terms of material
resources being exhaustible, but also with the implication of a deadline, thresholds,
temporal limits: the critique is, after all, that growth is unsustainable, i.e that it cannot go
on forever, in a (temporally, substantially) unlimited manner. In fact, Dobson points out
(synthesizing the views of many ecologists, as is the goal of his book here) that the limits
to growth not only impose a deadline, a moment when growth will inevitably collapse on
itself: he emphasizes that this moment is also likely to be sudden and catastrophic. “The
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rapid rates of growth aimed for by industrialized and industrializing societies have an
exponential character, which means that dangers stored up over a relatively long period
of time can very suddenly have a catastrophic effect” (2007, p. 54). The emphasis on
sustainability is quite clearly a way in which temporality meets imperatives to care about
the nonhuman: the idea is to sustain conditions for present and future life to continue (or
begin again) to thrive, thus imagining a present and future of contraction rather than
expansion. Like a number of other Green thinkers, Dobson deploys a battery of temporal
concepts, yet does not thematize temporality or underscore that these concepts have more
in common than addressing the relationship between humans and nonhumans – and of
course, this means that the connection between this relationship and temporality is left
unexplored as well.
This characterization is very helpful on our journey to start seeing the link
between temporality and the question of the human/nonhuman dualism, and the gendered
ways in which these questions are formulated by various green theorists. Yet as I have
mentioned above Dobson is so focused on drawing the line separating ecologism from
environmentalism, that he amalgamates a number of currents within the former under a
single rallying umbrella many may have qualms with (myself included). Firstly, Dobson
grants deep ecology a virtual monopoly over what he calls the “philosophical”
foundations of ecologism (what I would instead call, more specifically, the ontologicoethical moment in this thought). Yet as we will see below, social and political ecology,
understood as distinct from deep ecology, have nothing to envy the latter current in terms
of ontological and ethical insight. Dobson sees de-growth as the pragmatic implication of
deep ecology, rather than as one strategy and program shared by many deep, social and
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political ecologists but not by all (in any of these three currents). Deep ecology asserts
that all natural things have an intrinsic value, and this justifies sustaining them beyond
the instrumental fact that human society could not do without natural resources. This is
indeed a helpful way to read ecologism to an extent, yet the kind of biocentrism defended
by deep ecology is not shared across the whole movement: in fact, deep ecology’s
concept of “intrinsic value” has been critiqued by ecofeminists in particular, along with
social and political ecologists, which disagreement Dobson somehow avoids even when
discussing ecofeminism (as for new materialist feminist or queer theory, Dobson seems
to ignore the very existence of this critical development in feminist thought). According
to a number of social ecologists (e.g. Murray Bookchin, discussed below), political
ecologists (e.g. Bruno Latour, who as we will see proposes to further deploy political
ecology beyond itself), ecological feminist theorist Val Plumwood (1993), Tim Morton’s
(2010) “dark ecology,” as well as queer ecology, the response proposed by deep ecology
to the problem of the human/nonhuman relationship merely consists of re-valuing the deor under-valued term in this dualism. Simply reversing the hierarchy that organizes this
dualism insufficiently problematizes both terms: it fails to deconstruct the binary under
scrutiny – in other words, what is needed is rather to dehumanize and denaturalize
ecology.
This is directly linked to the temporal dimension of Dobson’s version of
ecologism: he thus claims that, to the question aiming at specifying the object of
sustainability, “what is to be sustained?,” ecologists answer: “natural value.” Yet instead
of flipping values around, instead of mere reversal, I argue that strands of ecologism
could potentially propose a “transvaluation of all values,” to borrow a Nietzschean phrase
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(I will further discuss this idea below and to some extent throughout this dissertation).
Thus it is not so self-evident to all ecologists that “natural value” is to be sustained, and
in fact many (myself included) would argue that this mere reversal is likely to result in a
further fetishization, reification and mystification of nature, thus perpetuating and
reinforcing the human/nature separation, however much deep ecologists claim that
humans are also part of nature, however much they stress the interconnectedness of all
things. Yet, of interest here is the fact that Dobson is quite symptomatic of an interesting
assumption that all ecological thought has to be about “nature” : put differently, while the
most mainstream and least “deep” – in spite of their self-proclamations – critiques that
have erupted from the ecological movement 15 regarding the relationships between
“nature” and “the humans” fail to de-naturalize and de-humanize politics, in doing so
they further strengthen the very dualism that produced the current ecological crisis, solely
striving to either reverse or flatten its hierarchy by way of a simplistic “mise en
equivalence” (Stengers, 2009) or altogether a praise of “pure” “wilderness.” As we will
start seeing below in discussing Dobson’s treatment of utopia and in chapter 4, this
results in a highly problematic envisioning of the future in ways that reproduce patterns
having created the “anthropocene”’s sixth extinction. For the time being, let’s just point
out that Dobson sometimes reduces green envisionings of the future and warnings in the
present, to terms of pessimism/optimism. This is motivated principally by a desire, as the
ideologue, to fend off accusations made against greens of pessimism. Doom and gloom
15

Note that here I am calling Dobson’s ecologism “mainstream” in the double sense that it seeks to
amalgamate disparate and complexly distinct movements within ecologism, and in that it thus leans toward
what I see as the least profound and radical questioning of the human/nature dualism, in relation to
temporality and gender. I do not mean to refer to environmentalism by way of the adjective “mainstream,”
as I agree with Dobson regarding his distinction between environmentalism and ecologism (up until he
claims that adherence to deep ecology’s ontological and ethical vision is one of the distinguishing element
between the two).
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warnings used as mobilizing tools, fear as anticipation of dire times are indeed central, as
we have seen above, to a precursor of ecosophy like Hans Jonas: this has earned
ecologism a reputation for party-poopers Dobson wants to counter with a life-of-the-party
identity. Dobson thus “defends” ecologism as follows : “greens are generally unerringly
optimistic with respect to our chances of dealing with the crisis” (2007, p. 20). I would
not only disagree with such a statement (as we will see, many ecosophers fully expect
and reflect upon mass extinction, not a particularly or necessarily optimistic vision), but I
would also argue that the pessimism/optimism dyad is at best unhelpful, at most
detrimental to both thought and praxis. In fact, overcoming, side-tracking, marginalizing
such incentives to self-description as either optimistic or pessimistic – and, similarly,
self-proclaimed utopianism relying upon threats of dystopia – is part of the point of the
conceptual apparatus I propose, so as to think and experience temporality differently in
times of ecological disaster. Hopefully the project of circumventing utopia/dystopia,
optimism/pessimism, human/nonhuman visions will become more and more clear
throughout, as well as the connection between needs to denaturalize and dehumanize
ecologism, on the one hand, and needs to create new temporalities on the other.
Dobson’s ecologism is also resolutely universalist, and in this respect very much
part of a liberal kind of ecologism, in spite of its claims to radicality (or, as he, Naess and
the likes enjoy calling it, “depth”). To underline the unique nature of ecologism, Dobson
writes that it is a “function of the green movement’s argument that environmental
degradation and the social dislocation that goes with it are everybody’s problem therefore
ought to be everybody’s concern” (2007, p. 21). Yet even the most moderate and liberal
institutions are well aware of the uneven impacts and responsibilities related to various
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environmental crises. Demonstrating that gender, class, race, ability, geographic location
inequalities are not only reflected but also exacerbated by, say, the climate crisis is
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However one could quote, for instance, this report
published by UN WomenWatch, to underscore the gendered character of the crisis:
“women are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than men—primarily as
they constitute the majority of the world’s poor and are more dependent for their
livelihood on natural resources that are threatened by climate change.” The report goes on
to emphasize that
women are not only vulnerable to climate change but they are also effective actors
or agents of change in relation to both mitigation and adaptation. Women often
have a strong body of knowledge and expertise that can be used in climate change
mitigation, disaster reduction and adaptation strategies. Furthermore, women’s
responsibilities in households and communities, as stewards of natural and
household resources, positions them well to contribute to livelihood strategies
adapted to changing environmental realities. (“Women, Gender Equality and
Climate Change,” 2015) 16
Reciprocally, uneven contributors to climate change challenge the idea that it is
simplistically “everyone’s concern and everyone’s problem,” as Dobson calls it without
much further qualification (the average carbon footprint of an American is about 10 times
that of a Brazilian, more than 13 times that of an Indian, and 40 times that of a
Senegalese, and one could also observe similar gaps within each of these countries, along
with gaps in impacts of climate change unevenly distributed across class, race, gender,
ability lines). Thus we may remind gender, class, race-neutral advocates of carbonneutral politics that, for instance, three times as many women as men died in each of the
16

Note the language of “vulnerability” deployed here, as is the case also with the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change reports: this language poses a number of problems as it risks reifying certain
populations to a relatively passive role, while also obscuring the interdependencies, power dynamics and
inequalities which produce the so-called “vulnerability.” I will return to this point in my critique of the
IPCC reports in chapter 4.
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last Asian tsunamis in the 2000s, and that age and income level also contributed to this
disparity. This is never evoked by Dobson even when he discusses women’s alleged
“greater proximity to nature,” which he makes the only, vague and essentialist reason to
acknowledge ecofeminism in the last couple of pages of his book. Dobson then
recognizes that ecofeminism, contrary to other “ideologies” he distinguishes (socialism,
liberalism, conservatism) from ecologism, is quite close to the latter and apt at providing
robust concepts with which to think ecologist themes and advocate an ecologist program.
Though he does approvingly discuss Val Plumwood’s deconstructive efforts (Dobson,
2007, pp. 176 – 188) with respect to human/Nature and the man/woman, male/female,
master/slave dualisms, Dobson fails to truly integrate any of these anti-essentialist
environmental feminist insights in his own writings. When he refers to feminists’ antiessentialist skepticism with regards to “Nature” being read as having a “feminine
character” (allegedly inspiring “care” and nurturing qualities), Dobson describes such
skepticism as “balking.” He not only fails to fully recognize the essentialism in this
feminization of nature, but also proceeds to espouse such “nature as female” as a
“normative model,” claiming that “ecologists” at large do so.
Getting Deep
Up until the third edition of Dobson’s Green Political Thought, the British advocate of
“ecologism” indeed offered “principal features of the natural world” which were
supposed to act as a normative model: each of these ontological features “translated” in
programmatic principles for ecologist politics. Though he has retired this passage with
the latest edition of the volume without further ado, these normative “lessons from
nature” are indicative of a certain kind of deep ecology-informed ecologism born in the
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1980s under the pen, for instance, of ecosopher Arne Naess. Dobson then characterized
“Nature” as coterminous with “diversity,” “interdependence,” “longevity,” and, last but
not least, “nature as ‘female.’’ These characteristics respectively translated into the (thus
separated) political world as “toleration, stability and democracy,” “equality,” “tradition,”
and finally “a particular conception of feminism.” I must note here the interlaced features
of ecologist thought I have been underscoring throughout: longevity, stability and
tradition again signal an at least implicit importance of the temporal – in this case a
specific temporality imbued here with an account of “Nature” and femininity as constant
if not altogether static, unchanging, perennial, an account which we could already make
out in both Jonas and Thoreau’s depictions including transcendence, cycles, reproduction
and even eternity. We may also note that within these lineages of environmental thought,
feminized Nature and naturalized femininity have also been alternately associated with
portrayals as “temperamental” – both the angelic, pristine, pure and eternal Virgin and
the hysterical, unpredictable woman have been invoked.
From a deep ecology perspective, the human/nonhuman dualism has been
addressed as a problem which solution resided in the re-valuation of Nature. Arne Naess,
who originally coined the term “deep ecology,” distinguished this current from what he
called “shallow ecology” by stressing that all natural things had “intrinsic value.” This
included individual animals and plants, but also ecosystems, the Earth, etc. Thus Arne
Naess and others (e.g. Naess, Drengson, Devall, 2008; Devall & Sessions, 1985)
denounced anthropocentrism and advocated for biocentrism, advancing various
fundamental principles to ground this biocentric worldview. In his essay on “the Basics
of the Deep Ecology Movement,” Naess synthesized these principles as a “common
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platform” comprising eight essential points (Naess, 2008, pp. 105-120). The very first
point declared that “the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on earth has inherent
value. The value of nonhuman life-forms is independent of the usefulness of the
nonhuman world for human purposes” (p. 111). By “inherent” or “intrinsic” value, deep
ecologists meant to refer to a value beyond any instrumental use found in natural things.
Nature is not only to be “preserved,” “conserved,” or “protected” (note the past-oriented,
paternalistic language often used by deep ecologists and conservationists) as a resource
upon which humans depend, but also for its own sake. The “inherent” value is part of
why Naess claimed deep ecology went “deeper” into the problem of the relationship
between humans and “Nature” than did “shallow” ecologists and their anthropocentric,
instrumental views. Point 5 of Naess’ platform echoed this proposition, and also gave
away the extent to which this valuation of nature came with a reproduction of the
separation between humans and nonhumans: “present human interference with the
nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening” (p. 111). Note the
stress on the urgency, the pace of the crisis included in this point. Arne Naess called for a
“more joyful experience of the connectedness of all things,” yet his deep ecology
urgently demanded that humans cease to “interfere” with the nonhuman world so much –
having declared, at the same time, that humans were indeed part of nature. Point 1 of
Naess’ deep ecology platform proposed the ontologico-ethical claim that all human and
nonhuman life had inherent value, while point 5 advanced a critical moment in deep
ecologist thinking, whereby human “interference” must become more limited. Though
deep ecology did celebrate a re-valuation of nature, it not only failed to challenge the
human/nonhuman dualism per se but also would deepen… the separation of the human
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from the nonhuman, as it called for a retreat of humans from the nonhuman world.
“Deep” ecology’s biocentrism is trapped in contradictions that ultimately tend to have it
fall back onto anthropocentrism. 17
Naess’ deep ecology also advanced a slightly different version of the concept of
sustainability than that outlined by the Brundtland report, though this institutional source
provided the model to amend: to Arne Naess, “there is sustainable development if, and
only if, it meets the vital needs of the present-day human population without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own vital needs” (p. 194).
Here the amendment of mainstream “sustainability” concerned the idea of “vital” needs:
Naess claimed that deep ecology went deeper than environmentalists among the United
Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)’s injunction to
make present needs’ satisfaction compatible with future ones, as contrary to the
Brundtland report, he stressed that the needs to be satisfied must be restricted to those
which are deemed “vital.” According to Naess’ own admission, the term is “ambiguous,
[yet it] is a good starting point for a critical approach to the term ‘need’ in its relation to
demand in the marketplace of the world’s rich countries” (p. 194). However, deep
ecology has been critiqued by many social and political ecology advocates as well as degrowth and environmental justice ones, for failing to altogether reject the notion of
development as it is, in their views, too deeply entangled with colonial legacies and
universalizing, linear visions of progress – a sort of depth to which deep ecology did not

17

On this point and for a more extensive critique of deep ecology’s ultimately anthropocentric biocentrism,
see Andrew Biro, 2005.
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seem as sensitive. Further, deep ecology has also been denounced for the often
reactionary priorities set by its idiosyncratic defense of biocentrism. 18
On this point we may turn to the strategic and programmatic moment of Naess’
deep ecology. As he discussed some of the programmatic claims defended by deep
ecology, Arne Naess declared: “people in the materially richest countries cannot be
expected to reduce their excessive interference with the nonhuman world to a moderate
level overnight” (p. 283). This concession to an expectation of incremental change in the
Global North contrasts with Naess’ recommendations with regards to “global actions …
across every border:” “local communities or areas with scattered population are
uncritically in favor of so-called development and must be forced to a more ecologically
responsible policy by central authorities” (p. 113). This is an interesting limit to Naess’
call for decentralization and participatory democracy. In other words, Naess’ deep
ecology was open to concessions and negotiation with regards to changes of lifestyles for
Global North inhabitants, allowing these to transition smoothly to “less interference.”
Meanwhile, Naess claimed that people in “developing” countries may be coerced into a
deep ecologist orientation to their politics. On the one hand, changes must “realistically”
be incremental and transitions relatively slow (rich people “cannot be expected to”
“change overnight”), and on the other, urgency allegedly justifies coercion (poorer areas
shall “be forced” into ecological responsibility “by central authorities”).Though Naess’
occasionally critical view of the concept of development had sensible reasons and in fact
could afford to be significantly more radical (without requiring coercion), Naess did not
provide much explanation as to why exceptions to democratic, decentralizing imperatives

18

See for instance, for a critique of deep ecology from the perspective of social ecology, Bookchin, 2007
and for a feminist critique of deep ecology, Plumwood, 2002.
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usually defended by radical environmentalists should be made when it comes to the
Global South or “developing” countries.
This is just one among many examples of Naess’ envisioning transitions and
futures, or conceptualizing “sustainability,” in such a way as to barely take global, class
or gender inequalities into account, even potentially aggravating these. When examining
his deep ecology’s strategic moment, we similarly find an apology of tree-spiking direct
action tactics in spite of the fact that this means of protest has notoriously killed more
logging workers than it has dissuaded logging companies to curtail or stop their
deforestation efforts (p. 105). Naess also praised the displacement of indigenous
populations in Australia so as to extend the boundaries of conservation land (p. 279).
These are justified by Naess with a rhetoric of “return” to an allegedly pristine natural
state ecosystems enjoyed “before” human “interference,” as well as urgency, along with a
selective understanding of present and future “vital needs.” Thus the specific ways in
which deep ecology critiques the human/nonhuman dualism, in a specific gendered and
ethnocentric form, informed by certain temporal assumptions including themes of return,
urgency and sustainability, together result in a mere reversal of the human/nonhuman
dualism’s hierarchy, while tending to exclude already minoritized humans.
Some deep ecology advocates have also been problematically selective regarding
the question of what sacrifices shall be made by whom among humans, so as to ensure
“less interference” into “Nature”: thus in 1988, the journal Earth First! infamously
published a deep ecology-inspired piece where the author (who signed as “Ann
Throphy”) suggested violently homophobic means for addressing overpopulation: “if
radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human population to sanity, it
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would probably be something like AIDS, [which] has the potential to end industrialism”
(cited by Dobson, p. 52). Co-founder of Earth First! Dave Foreman also has been known
to make xenophobic claims regarding restrictions on Mexican immigration in the U.S as
somehow enabling better land conservation. When some self-proclaimed “deep”
ecologists may rejoice at the mass deaths of queers and AIDS-infected people, fantasize
about the coercion of developing countries, imagine “Nature” as “female,” or not shy
away from displacing indigenous populations so as to “conserve” “wilderness,” the
“depth” of these advocates of “biocentrism” is seriously questioned, in spite of its still
popular perception among the ranks of some in the environmentalist movement.
One, Two, Nature!
Bookchin’s social ecology stands in stark contrast with many of the theories’ discussed
above, and though it shares the same central threads (temporality and the
human/nonhuman relation) I have been emphasizing and drawing out in the above survey
of the field so far. His theories conflict with the lineage described above from Thoreau,
Leopold, deep ecology and conservation, within environmental thought, while they find
more affinities with (and are nonetheless distinct from) political ecology (discussed in the
next section) and its precursors (e.g Ivan Illich, Hans Jonas to an extent, and Jacques
Ellul). For instance, Bookchin opened an essay titled “What Is Ecology?” with a
statement in clear disagreement with deep ecology’s biocentric perspectives: “ecological
problems originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2007, p. 19). Indeed,
when he wrote this Bookchin was quite aware of the incompatibility of this assertion with
deep ecologists and conservationists’ views, whom he refered to negatively, in the
following terms: “those environmentalists who identify the primary ecological problem
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as being the preservation of the wildlife and wilderness, or more broadly as attending to
‘Gaia’ to achieve planetary ‘oneness.’”
Bookchin opposed this characterization to his own “dialectical materialism,”
which has the merit of explicitly stressing the processual nature of “Nature,” rather than
portraying it, as we have seen in some of the above cases, as static or at best constant in
its allegedly regular cycles, and calling for a ‘return,’ a ‘conservation,’ or any such pastprivileging accounts. In contrast, Bookchin critiques
the beautiful vistas we see from a mountaintop or images fixed on the backs of
picture postcards. Such vistas and images of nonhuman nature are basically static
and immobile. …Such static images deceive us into believing in the ‘eternality’ of
single moments in nature. (Bookchin, 2007, p. 23)
In Bookchin’s ecology, the processual nature of “Nature” emphasizes that both the
nonhuman and the human world profoundly change over time: they are granted a History
rather than transcendance. Yet Bookchin does see order in “Nature:” he describes nature
as a teleological process. To him nonhuman nature is a “developmental” and “enduring”
process which, qua a simplified reading of Darwin, goes from less adaptable, flexible
organisms with lesser intelligence, and capacities for subjectivity and self-reflectivity,
to… humans, who are more of all these things than any other species, creatures or
organisms. What sets “first nature,” i.e nonhuman nature, apart from “second nature,” i.e
human, or social nature, is indeed the “fact” that “humans are highly intelligent, … very
self-conscious primates” who can alter their environment. Thus “human beings belong to
a natural continuum,” they emerge from nature and are natural creatures, yet contrary to
other nonhuman beings, they are capable of affecting their surroundings. However,
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Bookchin does concede, throughout a pseudo-Rousseauist narrative of progress mixed
with degeneration (toward more dominance, more hierarchy, more inequalities), that
humans are not alone in being able to alter their environs.
Yet when he is forced to such a concession he quickly escapes from further
investigating the rather arbitrary and contestable criteria distinguishing first and second
nature, by claiming that what he is describing is a spectrum, a continuum, and therefore if
nonhumans also may affect their surroundings and/or exercise intelligence or demonstrate
some degrees of consciousness, they are not equipped with these capacities “to the same
extent” as humans. Difference between first and second nature becomes a mere matter of
degree. What he first establishes as qualitative criteria for distinction becomes
quantitative, with the quantities measured being identifiable on “developmental,”
“evolutionary,” “organic” teleological line. This continuum emphasizes a human
“superior” intelligence. Besides the fact that the meaning of the concept “intelligence” is
(inaccurately) assumed to be sufficiently agreed upon to remain unqualified, this
emphasis on human superiority is interesting for a “dialectical naturalism” that also relies
upon a “libertarian municipalism” rejecting hierarchization. There remains (unexamined)
tension between the Hegelian ontology advanced, and the anti-hierarchy anarchist project
defended. Though Bookchin’s emphasis on human self-reflexivity, consciousness and
capacity to alter one’s environment allows him to ground an argument according to
which humans would have all the more responsibility toward nonhuman nature, as a
“supportive” rather than “dominant” species, and qua an “ethics of complementarity” that
social ecology aims to develop, the reasons for human nature to have degenerated into
hierarchization, dominance, inequality, as well as ecological damage (the narrative
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offered is a mix of progressivism and declentionism) are left to the wonders and
mysteries of dialectics. The progress of this teleological nature is also described thusly:
Nature is the history of nature. … [This] require[s] a way of thinking that
recognizes that ‘what is,’ as it seems to lie before our eyes, is always developing
into ‘what is not,’ that it is engaged in a continual self-organizing process in
which past and present, along a richly differentiated but shared continuum, give
rise to a new potentiality for an ever-richer degree of wholeness. (p. 28)
Yet if the teleological movement guiding natural evolution is one that makes for more
“wholeness,” and if the development of human capacities for reflexivity etc is praised as
coterminous with such progress, Bookchin also claims that second nature is not currently
fulfilling human potentialities (among others, as a “supportive” species). Thus the
founder of social ecology describes the negative moment of his “dialectical naturalism”
as follows:
Second nature as it exists today, far from marking the fulfillment of human
potentialities, is riddled by contradictions, antagonisms, and conflicting interests
that have distorted humanity’s unique capacities for development. Its future
prospects encompass … the danger of tearing down the biosphere. (p. 31)
Bookchin thus sees social nature as having failed the achievement of its teleological ends,
and as currently taking a “distorted” and destructive form whereby a teleology of
progress turns into a declentionist one. Extracting both humans and nonhumans from this
path is possible if a “true” second nature, one that actually fulfills human “potentialities”
is restored, qua “libertarian municipalism,” or the ecological society: small communes
with restricted needs would be self-managed in direct democratic manners, and federate
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in broader bioregional sets. To Bookchin, capitalist societies distort second nature,
organizing structurally around an imperative to growth that intrinsically is incompatible
with ecological well-being, and instead promotes devastation. The regeneration that
would occur in the ecological society would not reject technology per se, but would be
capable of creating different technology. In a quasi-Illichean way, Bookchin claims that
technology in a capitalist society is necessarily thought through the prism of the growth
imperative, but that technique is not in and of itself noxious. I will return to the
programmatic moment of Bookchin’s social ecology in the section below on utopia and
ecosophy. For the time being, we may underscore that for Bookchin, temporality and the
human/nonhuman dualism are inseparable, insofar the processual, historicizable and
developmental character of nature makes the two terms parts of a single continuum rather
than completely separate spheres. However, Bookchin does not try to part ways with the
dualistic nature of this process, and instead he further reinforces a normative ordering
privileging the human. He does so qua a reading of the process as a teleological one – as
we will see, this teleology will clash with the temporality of becoming that I will defend
here.
What Is To Be Done With Political Ecology?
“What is to be done with political ecology? Nothing. What is to be done? Political
ecology!” (Latour, 2004, p. 1) This provocative and enthusiastic exclamation is Bruno
Latour’s, and it opens his book Politics of Nature. Though in the United States, it is
sometimes misread as referring strictly to the field of scholarship called “political
ecology” and calling for further politicization of this academic field, in the French
context where Latour’s book was first published it is rather the social and political
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movement of this name that the first chapter of the text stresses (though the STS scholar
also includes ecology as a scientific subfield). 19 I will suggest below that Latour, along
with an eclectic crowd made of science studies, philosophy of science, environmental and
feminist theorists that could very loosely and imperfectly be described as “poststructuralist” for some, “new materialist” for others, “object-oriented ontologists” for
many (these three currents also overlap and clash, to various extents) have together
radicalized and complicated some of the insight that proliferated in part out of the
political ecology tradition. 20 We will see that this double elan of complication and
radicalization is particularly visible if we read these various texts and currents from the
perspective of temporality in relation to the nonhuman. For now, and to clarify some of
what Latour is inviting to “be done,” I turn to one of the founding thinkers who
influenced “l’écologie politique,” understood as a political movement and a current of
ecosophy. 21
Andre Gorz, a prominent figure of the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s, focused
on and developed what he and many in continental Europe called “political ecology”
starting in the aftermath of May 68. Influenced by the Frankfurt school (he was a friend
of Marcuse’s) and also by Ivan Illich, Gorz advocated for an “ecological, social and
cultural revolution which would abolish the constraints of Capitalism” (1980, p. 40). In
his Ecology as Politics, Gorz denounced both “monopolistic capitalism” and

19

See my and Elizabeth Barron’s upcoming paper: “Political Ecology, Ecologie Politique: Interdisciplinary
Losses in Translation.”
20
See the introduction to this dissertation for more on queer and feminist ecologies.
21
Granted that, as I have mentioned above in other authors’ cases, a number of other important figures
could have provided a general idea of where political ecology originated, and the survey in this chapter is
by no means exhaustive. It rather offers prominent examples, for each current examined, of authors’ insight
regarding the human/nonhuman dualism in relation to temporality. In the case of political ecology, I could
have turned for instance to Michel Serres (1995), or co-founder of Generation Ecologie, activist and
anthropologist Serge Moscovici (2002).
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“bureaucratic socialism” as the two facets of an industrialism incompatible with the
limited resources of this planet. He thus participated in inaugurating the tradition now
lead by thinkers like Serge Latouche and called “de-growth,” formulating its ideals of
economic contraction by claiming that the only way compatible with limited planetary
resources would require to “produce less, to consume less, to work less, to live
differently.” Gorz proposed a polemical reading of productivism and consumerism that
resolutely aimed at thinking social and economic inequalities alongside ecological
devastation, bringing class-oriented left themes together with environmental justice. He
insisted that “nature is not a garden planted for our benefit,” while also repeatedly
asserting that nature was not sacred either. In this perspective, the relationship between
the human and the nonhuman cannot be animated by a deep ecologist reversal of the
dualism’s hierarchy celebrating “Nature” now placed on a pedestal. Neither did Gorz part
ways from humanism. A generous reading of his works could conclude that he pushes
aside both biocentrism and anthropocentrism, yet Gorz did remain focused on a relatively
unapologetic anthropocentric viewpoint which argued for economic contraction mainly
because natural resources’ depletion and exhaustion create increased inequalities among
humans and risk serving as justifications for anti-democratic measures in the emergent
event of ecological catastrophe. Three axes could thus be identified in Gorz’ works:
social and economic inequalities, democratic participation, and ecological damage were
his principal inter-related concerns. Though visibly close to Bookchin’s social ecology,
with regards to temporality (at the historical level) Gorz’s political ecology contrasted
with Bookchin’s critique, in that it did not propose a reading of natural or social evolution
in (potentially rigid) teleological terms, and neither was it moved by a declentionist nor
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progressive vision. Instead, Gorz proposed an astute critique of productivism and
consumerism grounded in a largely revised Marxist analysis, along with a resolute
conviction that lifestyles could indeed be re-invented to adjust to natural limits and
radical democratic imperatives, slowing down the relentlessly sped-up paces of late
modernity (thus Gorz follows his friend Illich at the level of quotidian temporalities). He
offered such a horizon of change away from capitalist growth as one possibility which
may or may not prevail, depending on collective mobilization, just as he tended to
explain the current ecological crisis in ways suggestive of over-determined contingency
rather than progress or decay. Yet I will suggest that the role of temporality in Gorz’s
works remained problematic, when I discuss his description of “a possible utopia” in the
section below (II).
More Political Ecology: OOO Subjectivity, and Matter Matters
But for the time being, let’s return to Bruno Latour’s invitation: as I mentioned, in his
Politics of Nature, he asks provocatively “what is to be done with political ecology?,”
answering this provocation with a simple “nothing,” itself followed immediately by a
second question: “what is to be done?” The answer offered then: “political ecology!”
Latour’s invitation to “do” political ecology is interestingly quite inseparable from an
insistence both on temporality, and on human/nonhuman subjectivities. However in his
case, the agency at works is one lacking agents, and including instead actants, hybrids,
involved in a “parliament of things,” nonhumans being allotted “spokespersons” found in
part in the sciences, and a new constitution bringing together or assembling “Nature” and
culture, the sciences and politics, running counter to modernity’s efforts of separation and
translation between these two poles. This would perhaps position Latour as – at least
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partly – an environmental philosopher, though more significantly his works are the result
of a general trend in some segments of (overlapping) Science and Technology Studies,
(so-called) post-structuralist theory, philosophy of science and what has now been named
“new materialisms.” 22 These have recently turned to new “matters of concern” due to the
“eruption of Gaia” (2009). The events and changes mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, including various sorts of ecological crises and urgencies, have indeed prompted
many to address themes that so far had mostly interested Environmental Political Theory
or ecosophy per se. So rather than reading Latour as such an ecosopher, which would risk
being reductive (though not entirely inaccurate anymore), it is interesting to note that he
and others, though not originally or exclusively environmental theorists, have felt
compelled to focus their attention to ecology in this context. In the case of Latour,
temporality also seemed an inevitable problem related to the nonhuman turn. I would
contend that this is not only caused by the importance granted to time and temporality in
Latour’s previous works, though it helped: if a meeting took place between on the one
hand, a Latour who had previously asserted that “we have never been modern,” critiquing
the unidirectionality and unidimentionality of time in modern discourse, and on the other,
the nonhuman turn, it was because this problematic linearity of modern time is also
problematic when nonhumans invite us to rethink the world and the separations
“moderns” have attempted (ultimately with limited results) to create. To Latour, hybridity
proliferates particularly in our contemporary context, a hybridity that requires to rethink
democracy as well as the passing of time. In fact, the futurism at work in modernity
22

Exhaustive discussion of the work done over the last couple of decades in this booming field is beyond
the scope of my argument, but just as an indication of this development, we may cite a couple of
anthologies, which to an extent are the start of a good indicator for how prolific this area has been lately:
Grusin et al., 2015; Van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2012; Braun, Whatmore, Stengers et al., 2010; Afeissa,
2009; Bennett, Cheah, Orlie, Grosz, Coole, et al., 2010.
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(which I will further discuss in much of this dissertation), is described by Latour in the
following terms: moderns have always been running toward the future, only their backs
were turning backwards the whole time. This metaphor will come back a number of times
in what follows, but already we may point out that, simply put (for now), the unidirectionality and uni-dimentionality of modern progress poses serious threats to both
human and nonhuman life. Understandably, while hybridity (between humans and
nonhumans and technological things and creatures) becomes ever so salient when hitting
planetary limits, challenging a “modern constitution” that desperately attempted to
separate for a more efficient reign, so does the need for critique of modern temporality
become inevitable. In times of ecological crisis, times of progress are especially put in
doubt.
Similarly and before Latour (already in 1989), Felix Guattari had reflected on
what Stengers has called “the eruption of Gaia”: he opened a short essay titled Les trois
écologies with an expression of urgency and threat:
Planet Earth is going through a period of intense technico-scientific
transformations and phenomena of ecological unbalances are being engendered as
a result, which threaten, in the long run and if they are not remedied, the
implantation of life on Earth’s surface. (1989, p. 11) 23
In this essay Guattari called for an ecosophy operating in three registers or ecologies,
namely that of the environment, that of social relations, and last but not least, the domain
of human subjectivity. He argues that “there will only be a truthful response to the
ecological crisis at the planetary scale if an authentic political, social and cultural
revolution occurs, that would reorient the goals of the production of material and
23

NB: all the following quotes are my translations.

71

immaterial goods” (p. 14). If Guattari’s call, which he further explored in the concluding
chapter of his later book Chaosmose (1995), was strikingly urgent and related to the
livability of human and nonhuman life, he mentioned that the necessary re-invention of
subjectivity needed to match these circumstances would have to also “re-invent … the
relationship of the subject to the body, fantasy, time that passes, and the ‘mysteries’ of
life and death” (1989, p. 19). Guattari adds that “what is now in order is the release of
fields of ‘futurist’ … virtualities,” as “the unconscious only remains attached to archaic
fixations only insofar as no engagement has it reach out to the future. This existential
tension will operate qua human and nonhuman temporalities” (p. 28).
We are again invited to think the human and the nonhuman in relation to
temporality, and though these are dispersed and omnipresent yet passing mentions,
spread throughout Guattari’s text, the importance of temporality to a number of authors
who turned to the nonhuman from post-structuralism has become increasingly even
clearer since. Perhaps this is also in part due to the proliferation of “new materialist” and
“object-oriented ontology” literatures that occurred since the beginning of the 21st
century, with some among these publications addressing temporality: in so many texts, it
seems relatively sensible that temporality would erupt from time to time. Yet something
more fundamental seems at play, perhaps more fundamental even than some passing
references to temporality might seem to indicate in some of these works: if authors in
these emerging fields do not all substantially develop new conceptualizations of
temporality, it is omnipresent at least as a frequently recurring mention, almost taken for
granted as important, so self-evidently crucial that it sometimes acts as a background,
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undeveloped given. This may require that the question of time be foregrounded and
accorded the time and attention it needs.
Though not alone (we have already started to see how feminist and queer theory
has contributed here), William Connolly’s works have advanced such a project to great
extents. Connolly situates his own work on the fragility of things and thinking a new
philosophy of becoming for this age thusly:
The ‘new materialism’ is the most common name given to a series of movements
in several fields that criticize anthropocentrism, rethink subjectivity by playing up
the role of inhuman forces within the human, emphasize the self-organizing
powers of several nonhuman processes, explore dissonant relations between those
processes and cultural practice, rethink the sources of ethics, and commend the
need to fold a planetary dimension more actively and regularly into studies of
global, interstate and state politics. (2013, p. 399)
Connolly situates this new materialism in a different manner than I am here, as he sees it
(rightly) as a number of convergent movements coming from philosophy, biology and the
humanities. This further confirms what I was starting to suggest above: the eruption of
Gaia is forcing a rethinking of subjectivities and matter, nature and culture, the human
and the nonhuman, such that the latter two relationships are not taken on just by scholars
exclusively or originally engaged in ecosophy or EPT.
In continuation of Deleuze’s Nietzschean exhortation to take the difficult task of
making chance an object of affirmation, Connolly affirms becoming as he re-thinks the
world and the human condition, as well as humans’ relationship to the world. He
describes temporality in a world of becoming as “action-orientated perception and the
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slower experience of the past flowing into the present and both flowing toward the
future” (p. 305). Underscoring the limits both of linear causality and providential design,
he points to the “bumpiness,” randomness, surprise and contingency of time, marking the
movement of the past into the future. A recognition of the limits of human powers, a
world of becoming is made up of force fields always already engaged in motion and
transformation, which would not be possible without the passing of time (and
reciprocally, time could not possibly pass if it weren’t for such force fields in motion).
Thus once we know that matter indeed matters, that the nonhuman and the human are
always already entangled, we cannot but also think the world in terms of motion, speeds,
bumps, shifts, constant re-distributions. Temporality needs to be radically reconceptualized as characterized by contingency and becoming.
Drawing not only from Deleuze but also from complexity theory and with an
open sense of accommodation for a plurality of creeds, Connolly’s philosophy of
becoming could result in a groundlessness that may be frightening to some. Yet it is
above all an occasion to affirm agency without subjects, a needed project in a context
where the nonhuman emerges as omnipresent and entangled with the human. In
conjunction to this philosophy of becoming, Connolly offers possible antidotes, ways to
live that may creatively address some of the forces that have either fueled the climate and
other ecological crises, or denied it to defend instead a specific – and volatile – version of
capitalism. One way is to affirm a tragic temporality (2008), which instead of relying
upon vengeance, resentment and eschatological visions, would turn to awareness and
affirmation of conflict and of finitude – here William Connolly is clearly re-asserting his
works in the agonistic tradition. Others have to do with positive visions of alternative
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futures, which I will discuss below as a point of contrast to utopian ecologisms (see II
below).
Queer Eco-Temporalities
With the above survey of the recent history of Ecosophy and Environmental Political
Theory I have shown that, in posing the problem of the relationship between the
nonhuman and the human in response to the current ecological crises, temporality has
also become a central thread to key authors and schools of thought within this field.
However we see from the readings I offer here that this connection between temporality
and the question of the nonhuman has often taken on problematic gendered forms. For
this reason I now turn to feminist and queer theory’s dealings with both temporality and
ecology. A number of pertinent debates within queer and feminist theory have erupted in
the last few decades: firstly, feminist and queer theory have gone through what some
have called a “new materialist” turn (Alaimo, 2008) that has discussed nature, ecology
and the nonhuman in innovative ways. Related to this shift is the emergence of “queer
ecologies” (Mortimer-Sandilands & Erickson, eds., 2010), i.e efforts to rethink nature as
queer, confounding our cultural gendered categories rather than caught in essentialist,
static sex binaries. Finally, queer theorists have engaged in rich debates over temporality,
contesting “straight time” (Halberstam, 2005) and reflecting on what alternate
temporalities queers inhabit. However, feminist and queer debates over queer ecologies,
nature matters, and time, have not or very rarely crossed paths. Rather, they have been
pursued as parallel realms of inquiry. In other words, while the former two (new
materialist feminisms and queer ecologies) greatly overlap, queer times and queer natures
have yet to meet and be entertained as interconnected problems. Posing the question of
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queer eco-temporalities would bring these debates in conversation with one another and
enable a much needed feminist intervention into ecosophy.
In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Val Plumwood (2002) has offered
feminist insight into what she reads as the human/nonhuman ‘dualism’ which organizes
much of Western discourses, and which operates not only similarly to but also
interdependently with other dualisms opposing Man/women, culture/nature, master/slave,
mind/body, etc. Plumwood’s deconstructive approach helpfully strives to distinguish
these dualisms from simple binaries or dichotomy, arguing that they rely upon radical
exclusion (or hyperseparation), backgrounding or denial (the supposed dominating term
in each dualism is seen as independent from the dominated one, negating the essential
work the “Other” does to sustain the “self”); incorporation (or relational definition: the
subjugated term is defined in relation to the upperside, as a lack or negativity);
instrumentalization (or objectification, e.g nature is man’s garden); homogenization or
stereotyping (the lower side of the dualism is caricatured, which implies that a simple
reversal of the relation of power at stake with both terms unchanged is insufficient at
best, dangerous at worst, as occurs when deep ecology celebrates the “intrinsic value” of
nature and failing to sufficiently re-conceptualize it). Plumwood’s deconstruction exposes
this logic of colonization and re-conceptualize both terms for a new ethics. She thus has
opened the possibility to see how valuable feminism may be to environmentalism, and
vice versa. Further even, she has demonstrated that one cannot do without the other: the
implication of demonstrating that various dualisms like human/nonhuman and
male/female are interdependent is that the resistances against the orders organized by
such logics are also interdependent.
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The work of Donna Haraway has also enabled a feminist or queer ecology to
come into existence. For instance, she read primatology (1989) as a discourse that
constituted white, male, Western, upper class subjects and cast non-human, non-white,
non-western and female subjectivities as “Others” against whom the norm may establish
itself as such. Her famous cyborgs and companion species manifestoes (1987; 2003) have
challenged readers to think of the hybridities that make up all situated subjects and
situated knowledge, as discursively constituted – while reminding us that these discursive
constitutions have a materiality also requiring problematization. As Stacy Alaimo has
written, “Nature, as a philosophical concept, a potent ideological mode, and a cultural
repository of norms and moralism, has long been waged against feminists, people of
color, indigenous people, queers, and the lower class. Paradoxically, feminists, the
working class, tribal peoples, and people of color have been denigrated because of their
supposed ‘proximity’ to nature, even as queers have been castigated for being ‘unnatural”
(Alaimo, 2008, p. 239).
Environmental feminist theory has simultaneously engaged these
interconnections, these complex and contradictory uses of “Nature” against women and
“Others,” while also pursuing an internal critique of feminist theories. The latter have
indeed often been so intent on parting from essentialism to demonstrate the social
construction of gender that they have sometimes paradoxically failed to properly address
ontological and epistemological questions of matter, the material, “Nature,” the
environment, the biological body. In contrast, Alaimo’s approach conceptualizes the
fundamental hybridity of our makeup, by way of her notion of “transcorporeality,”
allowing for a queer feminist engagement of the nonhuman and questioning the porous
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boundaries of human and nonhuman life, including at the skin’s scale. Transcorporeality
provides substance to re-imagine nature as queer, as processual, agentic rather than
serving as passive background, fragmented, traversed by historical/herstorical change,
having porous boundaries or hardly discernable ones, entangled with human bodies. The
nonhuman is thus invested with feminist stakes, and reciprocally, feminist critique and
struggles have nonhuman stakes.
Similarly, Myra Hird’s work on animal biology (2008) shows that “we may no
longer be certain that it is nature that remains static and culture that evinces limitless
malleability.” Indeed, she provides a profusion of examples from the so-called natural
world which queer it to the point that heterosexism may seem, in this perspective, quite
“unnatural.” Supposedly female and male characteristics shift and change rapidly among
animals and living beings, “the vast majority of cells in our bodies are intersex,” etc. This
re-reading of “Nature” and biology from a queer perspective suggests open possibilities
that, instead of avoiding or casting aside biology and nature as threatening to feminist
positioning, may indeed nourish the latter. Claire Colebrook advances yet another kind of
queering, proposing an alternative reading of the genealogies of vitalism where certain
vitalisms have historically served normatively dominant valuations of life, while a
vitalism emphasizing the virtual rather than the actual (from Nietzsche and Bergson to
Deleuze, etc), may be thought of as queer (2014, pp. 100 – 126). Queer Deleuzian
Feminist Rosi Braidotti invites new materialist feminism to rethink subjectivities in terms
of nomadic subjects, and emphasizes becoming-nomad and becoming-animal as ways to
experience a groundless world of precarious becoming (2011; 2013). Object-Oriented
Ontologist Timothy Morton (2010; 2013) also was one of the first authors to propose the
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phrase “queer ecology,” in his case to advocate for the abandoning of the concept of
Nature, which he deems a crystallization of history, and asserting our constant partaking
into a mesh or interdependent, complex beings simultaneously uncanny and familiar
whom he calls “strange strangers.” Strange strangers require us to “think big,” and
“hyperobjects” such as the planet, climate change, deep time do so as well. There have
been significant tensions which I cannot elaborate on here, between object-oriented
ontology and speculative realisms, on the one hand, and new materialist feminist theory
on the other, yet they converge to an extent in calling for queer ecologies. 24
This whole literature indeed stresses contingency, the unexpected, and becoming
as central to the feminist intervention into matter and the nonhuman and to the new
materialist turn within feminism. However, few spend as much time on time as Elizabeth
Grosz does (1999; 2004; 2005). Re-reading Darwin, Bergson and Deleuze from a
feminist perspective and stressing temporality, she affirms randomness, chance, surprise,
unexpectedness in stories of evolution, in art, and in a context of ecological damage.
Indeed, queering both the human and the nonhuman calls for queering temporalities and
challenging straight time.
But parallel to these debates among new materialist feminists and regarding queer
ecologies, queer theory has also sought to question visions and experiences of time, so as
to “queer” it. This has taken place without necessarily or often being connected to the
ecological debates, so that bringing the two literatures together may enrich a queer
perspective on eco-temporalities. I will now turn to a couple of authors in this vast array
of work (Halberstam, 2005; Freeman, 2010; McCallum & Tuhkanen, 2011), as the goal
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here is not to exhaustively review this literature, but rather to extract pertinent insights
which can feed into my own contribution. Specifically, I choose the central debate
between Edelman and Munoz, as it also staged a familiar character whom Munoz
introduces against Edelman’s presentism and which I will discuss further in the pages to
come: utopia. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004)
played a crucial role in launching the debates within queer theory regarding temporalities.
In his book, Edelman argues that the reigning, heteronormative temporality rests upon
what he denounces as “reproductive futurism.” In his view, heteronormativity powerfully
subjects the present to an always already postponed future qua the fetishized figure of the
Child. Because of a constant obsession with the Child as representing innocence and
calling for protection, queerness becomes the incarnation of the negation of futurity, the
embodiement of a dangerous death drive. All sexuality, when not redeemed by the
imperative to reproduce, is indeed dangerous, both in itself and with respect to the status
quo. Edelman calls for queerness’ espousal of this dangerousness. He asks that queerness
embrace the refusal of the – futurist – social and political order. Queerness must, in
Edelman’s account, further mobilize and deploy the negativity of which reproductive
futurism accuses it. Fuck the future! Fuck the Child! (p. 29) thus becomes a queer outcry
meant to contest and resist the heteronormative subjection to the future. To a great extent,
this critique of reproductive futurism could also be extended to ecological questions of
limits on growth: what I call uchronia is in part defined by a subjection of the present to a
future of always more. This ever-postponed tomorrow of impossible illimited abundance
in a limited planet purports to justify ecological damage and destruction today, just like
the abstract, fetishized figure of the Child enables the normalization of heteronormative
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reproductive sex today. Thus Edelman’s attack on reproductive futurism can be
transposed to the questions pursued in queer ecologies and offer insight.
However, while the sort of anti-relational presentism Edelman then calls for, and
the eloquence with which Edelman portrays it, can be highly seductive, his critique of
reproductive futurism also contains – or so I wish to object – a potentially nihilistic
hyper-individualism incompatible with the stance of an environmentalism that also would
invite an uprise against futurism (understood as the subjection of the present to an
abstract singular future), without abandoning futurity. Instead, queer eco-temporalities
could endeavor to re-think the future with respect to virtualities and possibilities beyond
heteronormativity, beyond capitalist growth. In the next chapter I will further discuss the
figure of the Child, which Edelman rightly underscores as heteronormative and in need of
challenging in its abstracted, fetishized form, versus children, queer kinships (Haraway,
2015) and “future generations” involved in eco-politics. Helped with Claire Colebrook’s
queer vitalism (2014), I defend futurity against futurism, a distinction which Edelman
fails to make: rejecting the futurist ways in which an abstract future (in this case a
heteronormative future where the figure of the Child dominates) subjects the present,
Edelman rejects futurity in general. Edelman’s critique is highly valuable, insofar as it
gestures at destabilizing the subjection of concrete present and future realities under the
yoke of abstract futurism. Yet the critique of “reproductive futurism” should focus more
specifically to futurism, rather than rejecting all vitalism and interdependency in favor of
a presentist nihilism. Presentism can indeed be a form of abstracted time, separated from
both futures and pasts, thus equally problematic compared to remote utopias of growth.
In fact, Edelman’s presentism illustrates that attempting to resist against the submission
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of the present to a singular normative future qua a merely reactive stress on the present is
itself a form of utopianism. Such reaction simplistically re-locates the “good time” (euchronos, uchronia) in an isolating and hyper-individualist present instead of the future or
futures.
Jose Munoz pointed out, in his Cruising Utopia: the Then and There of Queer
Futurity (2009), that Edelman’s anti-relational account posed problems not only as it may
indeed result in a solitude or hyper-individualism not all queers may enjoy, but also
because the present may not be such a pleasurable or desirable place for queerness to
occupy. Instead, qua Ernst Bloch’s conceptualization of utopia, Munoz defends the “not
yet here” character queerness affords. While I find that Munoz is right to critique
Edelman’s anti-sociality and his presentism, I also find the former author’s turn to utopia
highly problematic. Both authors take issue with ‘straight time,’ as Halberstam has put it
(2005), and Edelman in particular underscores one of its fundamental problems, namely
the subjection of the present to an abstract futurism. Yet Edelman falls into the rejection
of the future and futurity which he fails to distinguish from abstract futurism, while
Munoz, seeing the trap of Edelman’s presentism, falls into another: he ultimately situates
possibility and change in an ever-receding horizon line once again, armed with Bloch’s
concept of utopia. I argue that the needed queer eco-temporalities that the current ecocrises call for cannot afford to project desires, hopes and concrete actions for change on a
time disconnected from time (uchronia), whether it be an anti-relational, hyperindividualist, presentism, or eco-queer utopia.
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Utopia and Ecosophy:
Gazing Through Concrete Landscapes To an Ever-Receding Horizon Line?
Without concluding that narratives which recount an
elsewhere and an otherwise be solely a nuisance, I declare
it brutally: utopia is death, as we would like to live it. … It
congeals time, submitting existence to rituals that are often
obsessive; it neutralizes space, situating its narratives in the
improbable and the “placeless” … Yet, desirable, it does so
while rendering this death attractive and pain-free. … [It
evokes a] fascination for an immersion in an
undistinguishable fetal and lethal state.
J.M. Besnier

Utopian Voices v. the Voice of Reason
Utopia, a bit like temporality, is a recurring theme in ecosophy that is often obscured by
the more obvious human/nonhuman thread, yet is directly connected to both the latter,
and to temporality, in their various gendered manifestations. As this section aims to
illustrate, a number of the authors discussed above either praise or reject utopia, or they
may include a utopian moment in their reasoning. However, few actually explain what
they may mean even when they use these terms, or what function this category serves in
their thinking. In this section I will describe and analyze this, and though what follows is
by no means an exhaustive portrayal of the ways in which ecosophical literature so often
incorporates the theme of utopia, I will provide a couple of examples I find particularly
pertinent so as to further situate my own position with respect to ecology, utopia and
temporality, laying the ground for my own contribution. From these, the need for
queering eco-temporalities will become increasingly apparent (see section III).
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Utopia, a term famously coined by Thomas More’s eponymous novel depicting
the visit of a (Western) traveler into a Platonic ideal Republic in a remote location, is
etymologically built on a double meaning: “eu-topos” refers to the good-place, while
“ou-topos” means no-place or placeless place, the place that is no-where. More’s
dropping the vowels leaves an ambiguity, a tension and/or a conflation which the modern
meanings of utopia often comprises. The good place is also the place outside of all actual
places, the unattainable one, perhaps to strive for, or perhaps to melancholically regret as
a desirable and desired impossibility. Consequently, characterizing a political project or
strategy as utopian may be appraisive, as we will see in the instances of ecological
thinkers who proudly assert their utopianism. It may also be discrediting, accusatory:
what is utopian is deemed unrealistic, unrealizable, impossible and naïve, idealistic.
These appraisive and accusatory or discrediting meanings are also informed by
the either internal or external perspective which the qualification comes from: some
within a particular current of environmentalism may adamantly refuse to be called
utopian, as they may see this mostly as a discredit shed upon proposals they intend as
realistic as well as demands they deem to belong to non-negotiable necessities. A
description of ecofeminists as “utopian” by some eco-modernization, non-feminist
currents of environmentalism would, for instance, be greeted with uproar and counteraccusations that it is the latter perspectives which aren’t as realistic as the ecofeminist
ones, and that, for instance, the project of re-conceptualizing women and men’s roles as
well as humans’ relationship to nature is not an idealist but a necessary one, one which
ecofeminists have every intention to turn into reality. Perhaps a more specific and telling
example could make this point even clearer. Leaving aside schools of thought or broader
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movements like ecofeminism as such, let’s think of one of the many women Vandana
Shiva (among others) has written about as involved in leading the Chipko movement in
India. Now let’s imagine her reaction if told that this movement’s efforts to protect
Himalayan villagers’ livelihoods, their access to water, land, and forest shall be described
as “utopian.” The violence committed by characterizations of certain radical
environmentalist claims, projects and views as “utopian” is especially clear when
ecological devastation becomes a more and more explicitly vital matter. Insisting to
depict such vital matters in terms of utopianism is a claim to the probability of death: it
would be so beautiful (eu-topos) if you could keep living livable lives, and at the same
time this idea is outside of any realistic imaginings (ou-topos). We may also imagine the
reactions of a person belonging to a generation a couple of decades into the future, whose
life has been directly affected by runaway climate change (this is not to imply, far from it,
that climate change only affects remote future generations). Knowing this change which
has damaged her life (or perhaps rendered it impossible) has been caused to a great,
crucial extent, by the globalized carbon-emitting economies of today, should we even
bother asking this person whether the contraction and radical re-invention of such present
economies is utopian or whether it is needed, worth a shot, whether it should be granted
possibility no matter how probable? We may finally imagine a conversation with one of
the hundreds of nonhuman species currently endangered by the anthropogenic sixth mass
extinction under way: if we were able to hold such a conversation, would such a species
agree that ideas of radical change formulated so as to contain further destruction are
“utopian”? Of course these examples are hardly comparable beyond this thought
experiment, and actually deeming a more profound commonality would risk doing
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violence to the unique subject positions at stake. Nonetheless, this question of who and
what can afford to concede a “utopian” character to certain radical ecological critiques,
claims and agendas seems especially salient and concerning, given how widespread the
use of this term is. 25 It has become quite commonplace, both for appraisive purposes
within the ranks of – mostly Western, mostly white, mostly non-feminist – ecosophers
and/or environmentalists, and, at the same time, to serve the discrediting and dismissive
purposes of environmentalism’s detractors (whose “voice of reason” may utter things like
“come on, we know you’re cute and utopian and idealist, but let’s be realistic, remember
growth and the market really dictate what reality demands: in fact your ‘reality’ is
unreasonable and their reality is the only one that counts as such”). As will start to
become apparent by the end of this section, I wish to debunk both uses (appraisive and
dismissive: their effects are equally noxious), and to reverse the charges (making room
for snapping back: “the voice of reason is wrong, the market is the utopia, its demands
are unrealistic”).
For instance, ecologist Andrew Dobson proudly praises his own depiction of
ecologism’s program for a sustainable society as ‘utopian,’ in the hope of connoting how
closely related to the good life and how radical the Green project is. At times, his use also
signals that the project is a rather unconceding whole, while in other instances Dobson
calls the Green program a “utopia” in order to connote the admission that ‘realistic’ room
for negotiation exists when it comes to building a sustainable society, and that
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We may mention, for instance, that French ecosophy includes a whole set of works published as a series
in the independent presses “Editions Utopia,” including a Manifeste Utopia (2008) postfaced by French
political ecology precursor Andre Gorz. I will further comment on this text in chapter 4 below. Many books
on de-growth philosophy and political ecology are published under this same series.
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ecologism’s platform of claims and vision for a green society is but an ideal to strive for 26
(“dear voice of reason, don’t worry, we hear you: we radical ecologists and de-growth
advocates realize how crazy we sound, and really we’re reasonable enough to readily
accept your reality, with all subsequent concessions amending what we first saw as
realistically needed”). Ultimately, as I will try to suggest in what follows, these
contradictory deployments point to the insufficient attention paid to the meanings and
effects conveyed by a term that has become commonplace enough for at least a
significant contingent of ecosophers to use. (Appraisive) meanings of ‘Utopia’ are often
taken for granted even though this term does no less than indicate the situation of a
political project and strategy with respect to the real. As such, the notion in fact calls for
further scrutiny.
My defense of and critique with regards to ecologism addresses precisely these
tensions: I wish to show that though many greens have or have been identified as
‘utopians,’ sometimes espousing this term as appraisive, sometimes fending off
accusations of a utopianism they rejected, they (we) would benefit from turning the tables
around, and accusing the productivist, growth society of being utopian. Shifting the
emphasis from topos to chronos (and kairos), I have coined the term “uchronian” to
characterize capitalist growth-oriented temporalities. Thus I agree and defend a lot of
elements in the respective ontological, ethical, political visions, strategies and projects
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“[The planet’s] finitude provides the fundamental framework within which any putative picture of a
green society must be drawn. The guiding principle of such a society is that of ‘sustainability,’ and the
stress on finitude and the careful negotiation of Utopia that it seems to demand forces political ecologists to
call into question green consumerist-type for environmental responsibility” (Dobson, 2013, p. 64). This
quote is quite revealing of the tension here: finitude in planetary resources, requiring economic contraction,
is depicted as the identifying criterion which define “dark greens.” But however fundamental of a
framework this provides for the sustainable society, Dobson grants this a negotiability expressed qua the
term “Utopia.” Utopia is the ultimate goal, that which will never be attained, and which one is willing to
chop in order to obtain a “more realistic” sustainable society.
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developed in certain strands of ecological thought (as should already be clear based on
the overview of debates over temporality and the human/nonhuman dualism, above). Yet,
I intervene in this field by calling for a non-utopian claim to ecological ways of living
and seeing the world, considering many of these as radically pragmatic, and capable of
displacing the impossible temporal horizon which capitalist growth offers and which has
brought us to an ecologically catastrophic situation.
A Utopia of One
From Thoreau to William Connolly, many of the authors mentioned above have felt
compelled to envision worlds, societies, futures, projects more or less concrete or remote
from their actual present as a form of thought experimentation. These have aimed to
describe the alternative lifestyles and societal models ecosophers consider to be needed
so as to confront environmental damage. Thoreau’s famous novel Walden (2008),
allegedly describing his experience living for a year in “the wilderness” and in autarky,
has sometimes been described as a “utopia of one.” Indeed, though Thoreau’s narrative
told a story of autarky in the wild, where he killed an animal with his bare hands, his selfmade wooden barrack on Walden Pond was just a couple miles away from his mother’s
house, where he would regularly go get a cookie. The “reality” behind Walden was closer
to a kid’s backyard’s tree house than to the concrete realization of an alternative way to
live. Yet children’s tree houses are important to imagination, and imagination is in turn
crucial to creating new ways, and to apprehending the real (critically): thus as a tree
house narrative imagining a possible alternative lifestyle, as fiction, therefore, Thoreau’s
book remains tremendously inspiring. Walden describes an ideal for a solitary way of
life, a hypothetical set-up, the possibilities that open up once one lives by the motto
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“Simplify, simplify, simplify!” (p. 62) More than an accurate depiction of a ‘real’
experiment, Thoreau offered a valuable description of what could be, what worlds could
emerge at the individual level, if only the ever so busy moderns that then surrounded him
were to scale (and slow) down. Thoreau even provides a budget and a list of necessities
(p. 37), such that this thought experiment in a place abstractly called ‘the wild’ which
existed more in his imagination than by Walden Pond, could act as a form of concrete
proposition. He reminds his readers that neither those who came before any given
generation nor himself as a writer should dictate young ones how to live, and that each
individual must devise their own ways (p. 219). Thus Walden describes Thoreau’s
version of the good life (‘eu’ –‘topos’), in a non-place (‘ou’ – ‘topos’) named
‘wilderness’ or ‘Nature,’ loosely imagined based on actual woods next to Concord,
Massachusetts. Like many utopias previously and subsequently written, Walden projects
some possibilities and criticisms from the here and now, to imagine them as realities of a
distorted future or distanced place, then bringing certain lessons about the good life, to
our the concrete present and its needs for change.
A Possible Utopia
What Thoreau devised at the individual level, in his “utopia of one,” a number of
ecosophers have since developed at a collective level. I have mentioned Andrew
Dobson’s appraisive use of the term ‘utopia’ so as to recognize the negotiability of
Greens’ project for a sustainable society. Andre Gorz, whose works I discussed above,
and Serge Latouche, one of the main theorists of the de-growth movement, also resort to
utopia, inserting it in oxymoronic phrases like “a possible utopia” (1980, pp. 42 – 50) or
“a concrete utopia” (2009, pp. 31- 67) respectively. In both cases, what they are referring
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to is the outline of a program, which in itself may pose a number of problems with
respect to imperatives to collectively and democratically decide upon common societal
and lifestyle paths, yet if presented as such, could constitute interesting proposals that
would undoubtedly have their place within the kinds of semi-manifesto genres espoused
by both thinkers, and for purposes of “de-colonizing imaginaries” (as Latouche puts it,
following Cornelius Castoriadis), a.k.a tree house building. After all, many branches may
indeed burgeon from such trees and their oikos.
Specifically, Andre Gorz closes his famous essay, “Ecology and Freedom”
(1980), with a whole section titled “a possible utopia,” narrated from the uncanny point
of view of the citizens of a revolutionized France that transitions to a sustainable society.
The narrative opens with the sentence “when they woke up that morning, the citizens
asked themselves what new turmoil awaited them.” The citizens’ viewpoint comes back
up a number of times, each formulated in reference to various moments throughout the
day, thus situating Gorz’s “possible utopia” in a quotidian temporality: the third
paragraph opens with “at noon, …” ; the next starts with “that evening, …” The
description of this revolutionized moment of transition is to an extent programmatic and
indeed quite quotidian, mundane, concrete: “on this morning, no tickets were being sold
or required on the buses or suburban trains … At noon, the government announced [its]
decision to institute free public transportation throughout the country.” The pace of the
sustainable transition is fast, yet the goals have to do with slowing down, reducing work
time, liberating time for leisure. Temporality is at least quadruply essential to this
narrative: Gorz projects his readers into a potentially relatively close future to imagine
radical change capable of facing ecological constraint, a future which can thus be easily
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compared to the very dry economic critique of the present which preceded in the essay.
Secondly, the formal contrast between the latter critical moment of the essay (the
economic analysis) and the “possible utopian” narrative part is abrupt, sudden, stark.
Thirdly, the transition to a revolutionized green society is fast, opening on an awakening
in all senses (the morning plays an important role in conveying this) with important
governmental measures being taken each couple of hours. Finally, however clumsily
Gorz leaps into this thought experiment after his dry economic analysis, Gorz rhetorically
stresses the temporal dimensions of the revolutionary society: to a great extent the
changes implemented are depicted in terms of quotidian paces, rhythms and speeds of
life.
Slogans attributed to the revolutionary government also punctuate the narrative,
such as “we shall work less,” “we must consume better,” “we must re-integrate culture
into the everyday life of all,” all four being quotes from a hypothetical Green president’s
speech. By consuming “better,” Gorz means that the value of objects will not be dictated
by capitalist markets’ exchange anymore, but rather by their use, this contrast between
use-value and exchange-value being measured in temporal terms, as what would then
matter would be the durability of objects. While free and public transport, along with bike
lanes, would be greatly enhanced, private cars would be gradually phased out of urban
centers. Factories would be self-managed by the workers such that surplus value created
collectively would be self-appropriated, and schools would be organized around the “selfreliance” of students, who, “with or without the collaboration of the teachers,” would
raise rabbits and fish, learn crafts so longed neglected in conventional modern schools
and learn in an atmosphere and manner close to Fresnais pedagogical styles. Note that all
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these changes are described, not by resorting to the conditional mode I am using to sum
them up, but qua the indicative mode, a mode made possible by the political fiction
narrative form which invites the readers to extend their imagination into a possible near
future, however probable.
If the depiction of this utopia may seem naïve to some, my point is not by any
means to portray them as such: in fact I would contend that these are concrete, sensible
and desirable propositions for a context of ecological crisis. Furthermore, they are open
to debate rather than an authoritarian program or strictly prescriptive outline. As Gorz
specifies upon introducing his utopian narrative, that this is “one of several possible
utopias,” and that his critical analysis could “be given a different expression from the one
suggested here: its only function is to liberate the imagination as to the possibilities for
change” (p. 42). In other words the utopia Gorz proposes is neither unsensible, absurd,
nor supposed to outline some kind of iron law or rigid societal plan. My qualm is not by
any means with the proposals themselves, but with the disconnect between, on the one
hand, the concrete, open, even pragmatic and simple (albeit ambitious) propositions
made, and on the other, the act of naming this political project “utopian,” conceding some
alleged disconnect with reality instead of defending such changes as both as already
happening in places here and now, as desirable and possible, without subjecting them to
assessment in terms of probability.
A Concrete Utopia
De-growth economist Serge Latouche, who is widely read in the ranks of the movement
of the same name, also mobilizes an oxymoronic phrase to advance his and de-growthers
political project in a book described by Le Monde Diplomatique journalist Nicolas
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Truong as “a breviary of the de-growth [décroissance] movement.” Gorz and Latouche’s
utopias share at least three traits in common: the expression of a tension between
possibility and reality conveyed by their respective “possible utopia” and “concrete
utopia” is one commonality. Another is the fact that both of these are included in texts
that propose strong economic critiques accompanied with programmatic moments.
Finally, these are indeed written, to an extent, as “breviaries,” or perhaps “manifestoes”
for the rising movements the authors belong to. Though this indicates how appealing the
term ‘utopia’ may be for a certain left in contexts of collective mobilization that require
stressing “imagination at work” or “l’imagination au pouvoir,” and though the tensions
contained in “concrete utopias” may be productive ones, I contend that these depictions
are not sufficient in facing claims to the reality of the growth imperative at odds with
political ecology’s proposals. Rather than assert possibility, these calls to utopia risk to
(at the very least rhetorically) further confirm the alleged unfeasibility of de-growth and
ultimately strengthen the colonization of the imaginary denounced by Gorz, Latouche,
etc. I wish to provoke a search for how we may foster dreams, new imaginaries,
capacious strategies and project for sustainable change, without depicting these as
radically outside the real, as unfeasible, and instead showing that those ridiculing such
dreams, those usually called realists (true believers in the marvels of capitalist markets
and growth) are offering nothing but utopian dreams and imaginaries legitimizing
destruction.
Latouche writes: “The de-growth project is therefore a utopia, or in other words a
source of hope and dreams. Far from representing a flight to fantasy, it is an attempt to
explore the objective possibility of its implementation” (2009, p. 32). A bit like Gorz’s
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fictional president’s slogans, Latouche offers “eight Rs”: “re-evaluate, reconceptualize,
restructure, redistribute, relocalize, reduce, re-use and recycle” (p. 33). The “Rs” in all
these are stressed as implicitly sharing another: that of “Resist.” In contrast, Latouche
opposes the present “over-speeding thermo-industrial system” as one with “a growing list
of words beginning with the prefix ‘de’: industrial delocalization, monetary deflation,
political disenchantment (desenchantement), cultural demotivation and religious
demystification” (p. 43). To potential accusations that his list of “Rs” may be read as
past-oriented (passeiste or primitivist), retrograde or reactionary, Latouche retorts:
Let me simply say that … the actions in question are as much part of a revolution
as a backward move, and are at once innovative and repetitive. If there is an
element of reaction, it is a reaction to the system’s excesses and hubris – which
finds expression in many ‘overs’… ‘over-development, over-production, overabundance, over-extraction, over-fishing, over-grazing, over-consumption, overpackaging, over-communications, over-medicalization, over-indebtedness, too
much traffic (surcirculation). (p. 43)

Like Gorz’s, Latouche’s utopia is highly charged with importantly temporal dimensions.
The de-growth program he outlines does not only require “slowing down, and therefore
resisting both the empire of speed and current trends” (p. 55). Neither does Latouche’s
‘concrete utopia’ solely project the readers to a close future imagined as veering off the
growth path. It also stresses a resistance against the “speed society” (as Ivan Illich put it),
excesses that have thrown it beyond unsustainable thresholds. Latouche consequently
advocates for future innovations alongside repetition and returns to more simple modes of
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living, the latter being adamantly defended as non-retrograde. However, Latouche’s
insistance on the importance of place stands at odds with the non-placeness or ou-topos
of utopia, again reiterating the tension between desirability (eu-topos) and feasibility.
Furthermore, utopia risks obscuring some of the concrete elements in fact constitute the
make-up of Latouche’s very proposals: he mentions Bookchin’s eco-municipalism, ideas
of ecopolis, and the ‘slow city’ movements. Yet, perhaps inevitably, and to an extent selfadmittedly, Latouche ultimately describes de-growth in negative terms, by way of what it
is not or should not be – thus the oppositions between his eight ‘R’s and the list of ‘de’s
and ‘overs.’ This latter part is not discrediting by any means, as to make oneself clear one
often needs to primarily explain what one is opposing or objecting to. But the question
arises of why de-growth should be described as a pseudo-pristine utopia outlined in
advance (with the anti-democratic risks this comprises) rather than being affirmed as
innovative, concrete and ongoing, convivial resistance to the speed society. I contend
that, was Latouche not characterizing the positive moment of his argument as “utopian,”
perhaps the place of this negative would be reduced, and the proposals advanced would
not risk to sound like a (potentially limitedly democratic) program.
Futurological Anti-Utopianism
We have seen 27 that Heidegger’s student Hans Jonas proposes a very different kind of
program, one where the development of a science of prediction or ‘futurology’ would be
accelerated, where the production of risky technology would be slowed down, where an
‘ethics for the future’ fueled by futurological, expert recommendations would inform
policy makers, who would model their actions with regards to political subjects
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See the third subsection of Section I above – “Technocrats and Patriarchs.”
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(including present and future generations of human and nonhuman beings) on the
patriarch’s allegedly benevolent protective stance with respect to his family. Though
there are so many disagreeable aspects to this technocratic and patriarchal program, Jonas
interestingly uses the term “utopian” as a form or dimension of human hubris particularly
characteristic of ecologically devastating modernity. Thus he denounces
the inherently ‘utopian’ drift of our actions under the conditions of modern
technology, whether it works on nonhuman or on human nature, and whether the
‘utopia’ at the end of the road be planned or unplanned. By the kind and size of its
snowballing effects, technological power propels us into goals of a type that was
formerly the preserve of Utopias. (1985, p. 21)
Though I side with de-growth regarding a number of insights, I part ways from a certain
political ecology which risks associating itself with such hubris in the form of a praise of
utopia. On this subject, although I have made clear that a feminist and convivial (thus
anti-elitist) political ecologist reading of Hans Jonas reveals many limits to his work on
the ecological crises, I side with this precursor of ecosophy’s anti-utopianism. Here Jonas
reverses the roles (though he would probably not phrase it this way), and accuses
industrialist modernity of utopia, which is in part what I intend to propose we continue
(or, for some of us, start) doing. Utopia has many undesirable traits, in spite of an
association to dreaming and hoping and with “the good place,” and even, to an extent,
related to this depiction as ‘the good place’ (starting with the problematic singular, and
the apparent smoothness of prescriptions which could afford room for complexity,
unpredictability and bumpiness, potentially lacking in this regard to the detriment of a
possibly more desirable agonistic pluralism). It is this dimension (the association to the
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“good place”) which, for instance, prompts critical ecology theorist Andrew Biro to
depict Theodore Adorno’s works as including a utopian moment supposed to redeem him
from portrayals as a doom-and-gloom pessimist (Biro, 2005).
One limit of utopia which Jonas underscores above has to do with the totalizing,
all-encompassing and potentially hubristically smooth character of the societal projects it
stages. Another crucial problem is that of the relationships between possibility,
impossibility, feasibility, reality and placelessness. Questions arise, for instance, as to
what is obscured by green projects depicted as utopian. Utopia comes with the potential
implication of erasing ongoing changes and resistances very similar to, and in fact often
inspiring, the supposedly more general utopian societies defended within a remote sphere
or future. In the following chapters, we will see for instance how political eco-fiction
imagining green worlds or ‘ecotopias’ draws from ongoing practices, movements,
collectives and communities to generalize them. But it is one thing for works explicitly
situated in literary eco-fiction to stimulate our imagination and spread or magnify
existing realities, and quite another for environmental theorists to outline what the perfect
world shall look like resorting to the term ‘utopia’ with a strong ‘ou-topos’ connotation,
in other words risking to negate the existence and/or possibility of alternatives in the
present. This is what seems to occur with the presence of ‘Utopia’ (often wearing a proud
capital ‘U’) as described in Latouche for instance, where the fact that already existing
cooperatives, practices, groups that are already pushing alternatives into existence is
being relegated in footnotes instead of advanced as evidence that, well, ecological
suggestions are not, in fact, remote from reality. Thus both the conflation of the good
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place and the placeless place meanings in the term utopia, and each meaning separately,
become highly problematic and operate as so many erasures of possibilities.
If utopias have the explicit status of fiction aimed to inspire present efforts not
implicitly denied, as a literary genre therefore, they are fascinating thought experiments.
And it remains that Thoreau, Gorz, Latouche and others have contributed to envisioning
different lifestyles as potentially rich sources for alternatives to growth, speed,
consumerism and productivism. Yet the tension within the term, the framing of the good
place as a placeless place, of ecological thinking as unrealistic dreaming encourages to
ask what today may serve as exemplars for different modes of living, what credit one
may grant to ecological thought, visions, proposals. In other words, caution is in order
with respect to grand attempts to gaze through concrete landscapes in the hope of walking
toward a line which by definition, being erected as horizon, will forever recede (Brault &
Morrow, 2015). One may wonder what could happen if we start thinking about
concreteness, not as lying at the utopian horizon line, but as part of the landscapes we
may risk leaping or stomping over: perhaps we could find alternatives to growth growing
within the concrete’s surprising and unpredictable bumps, cracks and pot-holes. The
following two examples of ecosophical envisioning could be read as opening such cracks
to see what is or could be growing under the pavement (“sous les pavés, la plage”?).
Interim Futures and Now-Topians
As I mentioned above, William Connolly’s dealings with the ecological crises advance a
philosophy of becoming and tragic temporality to face the volatility of late capitalism as
well as the fragility of things. Connolly also advocates for an “eco-egalitarianism” he
considers to be possible if, among other conditions, we strive to envision what he calls
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“interim futures.” These futures do echo, to an extent, the utopian visions attempting to
foster optimism which I discussed above. However, Connolly’s “optimism” (deserving as
it is of quotation marks) situates itself within a tragic temporality that greatly differs from
utopia, which in turn justifies the preference for the phrase “interim future.” Connolly
proposes to fuel a “counter-resonance machine” opposing apocalyptic visions coming
from the cowboy-capitalist evangelical Christian “assemblage” by way of “positive
political energies” depicting eco-egalitarianism. This is made possible by a “philosophy
of time, emerging from the lived experience of the unexpected and from theoretical
study, [and suggesting] that time is punctuated by surprise, not only because of
limitations in our ability to know the world but also because the world itself contains an
element of volatility” (Connolly, 2008, p. x). Capitalist economies are far from exempt
from this: “complexity, interactivity, and an uncertain degree of temporal openness
compose [capitalism’s] mode of being” (p. 11). Here we are quite far removed from
smooth utopian horizons, resolutely committing to the asperities and volatility of
unpredictable concrete landscapes instead. Yet this non-utopian portrayal of a volatile
world is not left as dry and arid land deprived of hydrating imagination and visions. The
task is then to underscore the contingency of late capitalist economies (without
underestimating their powerful assemblages and resonance machines), in a move echoing
J.K. Gibson-Graham, whose work Connolly turns to when mentioning her use of current
examples of “non-capitalist spaces” (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Thus we may “visualize an
interim future that departs significantly from the shape of the present” (Connolly, 2008,
p. 14). This future is not remote or abstracted from the present, as utopia risks being.
Instead, Connolly “imagine[s] a positive future no more than twenty years away” (p. 94).
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But temporal proximity is not the only difference between utopia and such interim future
(in fact, some of the problematic utopias discussed above may be envisioned as relatively
near us). It also includes a defiance to linear or unidirectional (Latour) time much more
explicit and concrete than potentially static and disconnected utopian visions. Upon
envisioning an interim future, Connolly proposes to
then work back from that point to specific reforms that could actualize the image.
But why participate in visualization at all? You do so because imaging is
ubiquitous and unavoidable in thought, and if negative images are not countered
by positive visualizations the creative potential of thought and action is stifled. (p.
94).
The necessity for positive envisioning which, in spite of their shortcomings, utopian
narratives discussed above attempt to meet, and which I have referred to as tree-house
making, thus compel us to project ourselves into positive imaging of possible (though not
necessarily probable) futures which depend upon imagination among other complex
conditions. Without imaging and imagination, “the creative potential of thought and
action is stifled.” Again, one of the stakes is the envisioning and location of asperities in
our present landscape “by coming to terms with the periodic volatility and messiness of
capitalism you can better discern both how tragic binds could unfold to capture it and
identify experimental actions that might help to move it in more positive directions” (p.
10). Connolly’s interim future may not be probable, yet the attachment is rather one of
possibility, and “the shifts may be more radical and arrive sooner than earlier anticipated”
(p. 102). With this nuanced distinction between the probable and the possible, as well as
the multi-directionality of this thought experiment, Connolly disrupts the risks to fall
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back onto the hubristic dimension of utopia denounced by Jonas as in fact being
intimately connected with modernity (and modernity’s temporality of growth-driven
progress). Though Connolly’s depiction of the interim future included, at the time of his
writing Christianity and Capitalism, an equally impossible and improbable “reversal” of
climate change, it is quite close in content to the de-growth program. We are invited to
envision an “ecologically sound economy” where “soil, air, and water pollution are
curtailed; the food system promotes health; waste disposal systems are organized around
recycling; and nonrenewable sources of energy are increasingly replaced by renewable
modes” (p. 93). Thus the affinity between de-growth and other political ecologies is quite
apparent, with the important nuance of avoiding risk that discredit be cast upon these
project due to the impossibility contained in the term utopia.
If we were to combine this multi-directional temporality with an attention to
present experiments, we would not land very far from what I will call “synchrony,” in
contrast to “uchronia.” Chris Carlsson (2008) has called attention to current resistances
against what Ivan Illich denounced as the speed society and its standardized knowledge.
Proposing the term “now-topia,” Carlsson offers a glimpse into what he considers a “selfemancipatory class politics.” The “now” of “now-topia” thus replaces the privative prefix
“ou” and the appraisive one “eu” to stress, as Gibson-Graham (2010) puts it, the question
of “what is being done?” instead of that of “what is to be done?” Carlsson describes this
move as follows:
Tinkerers, inventors, and improvisational spirits who bring an artistic approach to
important tasks that are ignored or undervalued by market society are what I call
Nowtopians… [Now-topia includes] urban gardening/farming, do-it-yourself
bicycle repair co-operatives often called ‘bike kitchens,’ hacker collectives
engaged in developing free software tools and expanding and improving social
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communications, recycled clothing makers, biofuels co-ops, and more. (2008, p.
47)
Through these experiments, “people are taking their time and technological know-how
out of the market” in surprising and unanticipated ways which disrupt existing
productivist logics. In recycling, innovating, organizing qua mutual aid, care and
solidarity within people’s free time rather than salaried work, now-topians not only
demonstrate that other worlds are possible, but enact them in the here and now. Contrary
to utopian versions of de-growth, the emphasis is on creating “post-capitalist forms of
life” in clear locations and time re-valuing what Ivan Illich would call the vernacular, and
granted renewed conviviality to tools having erupted so far from the waste of capitalist
economies. In this anti-elitist perspective, ecological change is neither left to
technology’s recognized experts nor contained in an image that risks being accused of a
lack of pragmatism. There is, however, a tangible overlap with de-growth politics, which
Carlsson himself underscores in a piece published in a recent degrowth glossary:
Degrowth, a Vocabulary for a New Era: “[Nowtopians] are ‘exiting the economy,’ which
is the slogan of degrowth. Their tinkering and inventive practices turn waste into
productive matter yet operate outside the market and against the current of relentless
growth.” To Carlsson the two major components of such efforts are “time and the
technosphere.” Most activities pursued by urban gardeners and farmers, hackers, bicycle
cooperative repair workers and others are indeed quite time consuming, but carve into the
speed society for a quotidian liberated time of conviviality today. While a combination of
Connolly’s interim futures and these now-topian practices would land quite close to the
synchronic landscapes I am interested in (see chapter 6), the term “now-topia” is a partial
corrective to utopia, and of course interim futures envisioning are only helpful if a
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multidirectional movement occurs between projecting ourselves into future positive
images and making our way back to the present so as to promote change there. A mere
presentism, as we will see, is insufficient, and so would be an imagined future lacking
bridges to the present.
Turning the Tables Around
These two examples of envisioning alternatives to the growth-driven progress of
capitalist economies contrast with utopias insofar as they protect imaginaries of a risk to
erase, or at least obscure, current, ongoing, or possible (though not always probable)
alternatives presents, and immediate or long-term futures. They emphasize contingency
and surprise, unpredictability and randomness or chance, becoming rather than linearity,
instead of proposing a potentially static plan or smooth program. The double meaning of
utopia as the good place and the placeless place, along with each meaning separately,
expose self-identifying utopian Greens to discredit, situating their worlds away from the
real and their strategies away from pragmatism, while having them admit to
impossibility. The deployment of utopia in green thought prevents ecosophy to concede
some improbabilities while still affirming a will to create possible and perhaps even
necessary innovative ways of living. The singular “good place” also risks forcing
concessions and sacrifices on democratic agonism, erasures of complexity and conflict.
The good place dimension in utopia smooths ecological programs, getting rid of
asperities in complicated and ecologically damaged landscapes in need of reconstruction,
improvisation and inventiveness. Though “now-topia” and “interim futures” offer
capacious beginnings, I will argue that these should be combined into a synchronic vision
that may supplant uchronia. But before synchronic modes of experiencing temporality
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can be invented, the tables must be turned on who is calling whom ‘utopian,’ who is
being unrealistic, what the “voice of reason” proposes to accomplish, what demands are
being made upon a situation which demands otherwise. Modern hubris has long been
utopian, and it is about time that improvisational, playful, seemingly mad or anomalous,
queer times be pushed to the foreground instead. In order to do so, new temporalities
required by contexts of ecological crisis must be invented. Ecosophy has long had time in
the back of its thoughts, now the point is to queer it.
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CHAPTER II:
IT’S NOT TOO LATE!
CAPITALOCENTRIC TEMPORALITIES AS UCHRONIA

Uchronia as a Synthesizing Concept, and More
This country was conquered by those who move forward. And so will space.
John F. Kennedy
On September 12th 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy gave a speech at Rice
University, where he celebrated the ever-accelerating progress made by “human history”
that would reach new, lunar heights seven years later, with the “giant leap for mankind”
committed by proud U.S. citizen Neil Armstrong. In this speech, Kennedy translated
“50,000 years of man’s recorded history” into the shorter time-scale of 50 years:
No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if you
will, the 50,000 years of man’s recorded history in a time span of but a half
century. Stated in these terms, we know very little about the first 40 years, except
at the end of them advanced man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover
them. Then about 10 years ago, under this standard, man emerged from his caves
to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man learned to write and
use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less than two years ago. The printing
press came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50year span of human history, the steam engine provided a new source of power.
Newton explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and
telephones and automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last week did
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we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, and now if America's
new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the
stars before midnight tonight. (2015)
The opening sentence gorgeously captures the paradoxical nature of the hubris expressed
in this text. Here “man” is used to refer to the individual watching, mesmerized, the
history of “His” species (the latter is referred to, later on, as “advanced man” or simply
“man,” in the sense of humankind, “emerging from his caves”), an individual whose
comprehension powers are challenged (“no man can fully grasp”) by the spatial and
temporal scales (“how far and how fast”) of the history “he/we” belongs to (“we have
come”). The humbling experience of this challenge to understanding apparently requires
a reduction to more palpable, more relatable scales, ones that may fit in a lifetime or
generation. However Kennedy’s leap from 50, 000 years to a 50 years fast-motion
summary is not only meant to serve clarification or pedagogical purposes, translating the
deep time of history into generation-scaled time and the fates of myriad humans
(nonhumans are apparently left out of the picture) into gendered, technology-propelled
space-traveling “man.” Evidently the acceleration also dramatizes the recent nature of
what is read as tremendous human progress. To an extent, this dramatization could also
seem to confirm the initial sentiment of humility first evoked by the individual difficulty
grasp these time-scales: we moderns are so recent compared to a mostly primitive,
“caveman” history: we’ve only just come out of our dark caves! But with this cohabits a
sentiment of omnipotence created by the acceleration: we moderns have finally made this
tremendous leap, just now, after our ancestors dragged their (bare) feet in their dark cave
for eons. Zoom in an out, fast-forward a long slow course, from one key marker of the
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“advancement” of “man” to the next. The selection of such markers are telling: the use of
animal skin, i.e the use of nature (here are the useful, resource-full nonhumans) to make
clothes, precedes the construction of shelter as opposed to dwelling in caves, i.e the
erection of “man”-made roofs to extract “man” from nature, etc. In a swift ethnocentric
gesture, Kennedy later skips over all kinds of spiritualities to mention Christianity only.
Though this has the merit of underscoring its recent character, (perhaps inadvertently)
suggesting its contingency, this leap centers Christianity as among the most relevant
markers for progress, among a list of technological innovations. A playful counterreading could of course underscore that Christianity is indeed, rather than the anomalous
presence of the spiritual amidst technological bumps, itself a technology, one that
required human invention and contributed to enabling a certain mode of production. But
one may legitimately doubt that such implication is exactly what Kennedy wished to
convey here. Then the printing press, the steam engine, physics, have us jump right into
the industrial revolution, and it takes but two short sentences for JFK to introduce the
essence of contemporary times, from electric lights to nuclear power and spacecrafts.
Note that each of the last phases presented here (three periods include primitive selfextraction from the cave, the industrial revolution, late modernity) correspond to some
forms of new communication (the printing press, telephone, television), power and
energy (steam, electricity, nuclear), mobility (the cart with wheels, the automobile, the
spacecraft). These provide a ternary rhythm which accelerates at the end of the
paragraph, when Kennedy enumerates (and… and…) while in contrast, events
symbolizing the slow beginnings of history had each been narrated with their own, longer
sentences. Later in the text, Kennedy affirms that “this country was conquered by those
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who move forward. And so will space.” The accelerating march of progress,
accomplished by inventive Christians and Americans as they colonize greater and greater
spaces all the way to the outer space, barely has limits. The very form of the text echoes
this colonizing hubris, and rhetorically ties this history with a movement “forward” that
assumes a linear and teleological foray into limitless “advances.” History is envisioned
here as linear, teleological movement in a “forward” motion to greater and greater
expansion, a motion moved by ever-accelerating paces. In short, both the expansion and
the acceleration seem limitless.
However, ten years later the Limits to Growth report would be published, perhaps
another marker in human understanding, one that challenged the idea of progress as
endless expansion. This is just one example among many critiques of hegemonic
temporalities of progress emerging with the ecological crises. I have mentioned a
constellation of these in the introduction to this dissertation. In this chapter, I will
examine a couple more closely (I): the question of limits, that of urgency, the image of
future generations, and finally, pressures on every second in the quotidian to solely be
dedicated to consumerism and productivism, with no interruption. My own concept of
“uchronia” synthesizes these critiques and contributes further critical work. Considering
them closely will therefore allow me to develop the concept: by calling capitalist
temporalities “uchronian,” I underscore that these idealize a promised abstract future of
abundance (good time, “eu-chronos”) that is always postponed, thus relying upon and
generating insatiability, while they assume illimited growth in a limited world
(impossible, timeless, or non time, “ou-chronos”) (II).
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Because the critique I present qua this notion of uchronia builds upon existing
critiques in environmental discourses to then contribute further contestation of capitalist
temporalities, to an extent this concept is a synthesizer (one could argue all concepts may
be mostly this). For this reason, the notes and sounds will sound familiar, though I’ll
compose my own tune to add to the concert of voices denouncing the ever-accelerating
progress depicted here by JFK. More precisely, the goal of this chapter is not to
demonstrate empirically that growth is overwhelmingly, hegemonically taken to be one
of the principal measurements of a healthy economy, and yet is impossible. Ecologists,
many economists, 28 and myriad environmentalists have already accomplished this work.
These give plenty of material to think with, and to go beyond. My goal here is to draw
out the threads that run through many key environmentalist notions and arguments, and to
more fully realize and conceptualize the implications of these arguments as well as how
they impact the nature of the temporalities at work.
I will draw from critiques of capitalist temporalities to assert that it is high time to
turn the tables, i.e to affirm that radical environmentalist proposals do not offer a
beautiful, bright and shiny utopian horizon (contrary to what some even within these
ranks have claimed, as we have seen in the previous chapter), a horizon that could easily
be dismissed because as “utopian,” it would be unrealistic, situated outside reality and
pragmatic demands. The ecosophical thought I defend sheds light on capitalist economies
and capitalist temporalities’ own utopian and (especially) uchronian nature, as these are
disconnected from concrete needs and conditions for sustaining the livability of human
and nonhuman lives. In other words, I am not going to demonstrate the impossibility of
exponential growth on a planet where human access to natural resources grows linearly,
28

Starting in 1996 with economist Herman Daly’s “impossibility theorem.”
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and may in all likelihood decrease (for some resources especially). But I will work on the
conceptual implications of this insight concerning capitalocentric temporalities reliant
upon growth-driven progress, consumerism and productivism. I will not either
demonstrate that the desire for growth is hegemonic or inherent to capitalist economies.
Not only has this been done by myriad authors before, but a simple 30 minutes spent
watching the news and counting how many times the term “growth” or the acronym
“GDP” 29 are uttered would suffice to anyone paying attention, without even
necessitating a consultation of the vast literatures showing the omnipresence of this desire
and its predominance in modern imaginaries. Surely one may object that growth is not
always driving economies, and refer to periodic crises as moments of non-growth or even
“de-growth.” But it is the desire for growth, the ideal temporality constituting
capitalocentric imaginaries, and by no means its achievement, that uchronia designates.
Reciprocally, de-growth is not only the absence of growth or the presence of negative
growth, but most importantly the de-colonization of our imaginaries from the imperative
to growth (e.g. D’Allisa, Demaria, Kallis, 2014). In fact, in periods of crisis, mass-media
eyes are riveted on GDP movement in the hope of its increase, and this indicator is taken
as the crucial one, which sustained presence, authorizes to claim that the crisis has
passed. As Serge Latouche and other de-growth theorists and economists have argued,
when growth is there, we are supposed to desire for it to last, and when it is lacking that
its prompts return becomes all we shall want. This in fact is quite important: uchronia
does not literally describe how time passes under capitalist regimes, but rather how
capitalocentric discourses represent an ideal and idealized version of historical time (as
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Granted this prevalence is a relatively recent phenomenon, datable after World War II. See for instance
Timothy Mitchell, 2011.
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characterized by progress, expansion, growth). This concept also highlights the ways in
which such idealization obscures, abstracts time from, and/or seeks (fails) to justify
ecological and other damages, harms, destructions caused in the mean time. Uchronia
always fails: that is its point, as it is a teleological temporality, one that assume a singular
direction toward a certain goal always postponed, never actually achieved, always
contested and contradicted in spite of its claims to reality. 30
The Eruption of Gaia: Critiques of Capitalist Temporalities Emerging
Thus uchronia refers to capitalocentric temporalities which, as such, only envision the
future (in the singular – only one is possible, plausible and probable in uchronia) oriented
toward one direction: that of progress, which is itself measured by growth. The satiation
of productivist-consumerist economies, practices, and desires is impossible, and must
remain impossible so as to keep going, allegedly “forward,” that is to say on a
teleological line. But uchronia is also impossible because it pretends to defy the laws of
thermodynamism, as well as planetary limits. It projects desires and imaginaries to a
singular, timeless (ever-postponed) future time, and subjects the present and possible
30

One may perhaps object that growth-oriented progress is not as desired anymore, or even that it is being
rendered obsolete by “sustainable” growth. While I will address sustainable growth in chapter 5 (I read it as
an oxymoron, and a form of “counter-uchronia”), I would respond that if this adjectival modification is
indeed contesting and modifying the face of growth-driven progress in some arenas, sustainable growth is
far from having supplanted growth “tout court.” The latter one’s omnipresence is again very obvious, as
soon as one turns on CNN, Fox News, and even NPR or such left-of-center, mainstream media sources, and
when one has a look at or listens to almost any of U.S president Obama’s speeches, etc. For instance, a
quick survey of the new year’s wishes speeches pronounced by Western European heads of state in 2015
would suffice to see that growth (tout court) is absolutely central, especially in a period of economic crisis,
as a supposedly desired and desirable goal and one of the principal indicator of economic health,
unqualified by any adjective supposed to moderate it. The adjective surely erupts in specialized occasions
like international environmental summits, but when “the economy” at large is discussed, convenient
forgetfulness drops it. It is true that sustainable growth can be seen as one of the innumerable internal
contradictions and contestations within growth true believers’ circles, but it is far from having won the
battle, or posing a threat of obsolescence to the pertinence of uchronia as a concept to think critically about
teleological, linear, futurist, expansionist progress-oriented temporalities that assume a limitless world. In
this chapter I discuss growth at large, as critiqued for the last couple of decades and until now by countless
of environmentalists, and will return in chapter 5 to the ways in which sustainable growth is partly
amending growth discourse, yet not the point of making it non-uchronian, or supplanting it.
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futures to it (this component of uchronia, the subjection of the present to an abstract
future, is what I would call futurism). Concrete present and future generations of humans,
hybrids and nonhumans are expected to concede most of anything to the imperative of
growth (thus futurity and the future or futures are distinct from futurism: futurism
obliterates different possible futures, and reduces futurity to uchronian futures, deemed
the only ones possible). More, more, more is what we cannot not want, “naturally”: that
is to say, this desire is naturalized in the sense that it is envisioned as going without
saying, it is assumed, erected as a norm, perhaps even the only normal. 31 As we will see,
uchronian temporalities operate at the scale of history, national discourse, international
economies, but also at the quotidian level: the norm is to always want more, and all
temporal interstices of life, including at the level of the everyday, shall be all about
producing, consuming, 24/7 (Crary, 2013). The good consumer is a never satiated
consumer, running after the next iPhone, which most of the time runs too fast – in fact,
devices themselves are constantly trying to catch up the futurism of uchronia, in their
planned obsolescence which condemns them to be running too slow for the latest
application or operating system.

31

We will see in chapter 4 that “nature” and “naturalization” is in fact only problematic if one understands
“nature” in a uchronian or counter-uchronian sense, as reduced to a teleological end, and that therefore the
problem with nature and naturalizing is not nature but its often teleological temporality, from which flows a
normative and normalizing purchase. If nature is reconceptualized as contingent, unstable, surprising,
unpredictable, with some agentic aspects, etc, or as William Connolly may put it, as made up of “bumpy
temporalities,” rather than as teleological goal, it would not have these same normative implications. But
for the time being, when I refer to uchronia as (abusively) presenting itself as “natural,” self-naturalizing, it
is with this problematic teleological nature in mind. Indeed, uchronia presupposes an understanding of
nature as mere stable background: this is precisely how it purports to defy or how it negates planetary
limits.
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Growth, Its Limits, and the Limits of Limits, or Endism’s Dead End
For us, it’s easier to imagine the end of the
world than serious social change. Witness
the numerous blockbusters about global
catastrophe and the conspicuous absence of
films about alternate societies.
Slavoj Zizek
The rise of environmental crises and environmentalist movements have corresponded to
the emergence of the problem of limits, specifically of capitalism’s limits, which as I will
now discuss, should not be confused with all economies and all worlds’ limits. Some of
these emphases on limits are very tangible, while others flirt with millenarist, alarmist
fears. Worries about limits thus have varying levels and degree of evidence, though many
limits are quite certainly going to create and/or already creating threats to human and
nonhuman lives and species: for instance, the sciences have demonstrated that a “sixth
extinction” is now under way, that climate change is occurring and overwhelmingly
anthropogenic, that bees’ extinction is threatening entire ecosystems – which exact
causes, while most likely linked to mass uses of pesticides, are the object of ongoing
debate. Oil spills, biocides, risks of nuclear catastrophes and realized nuclear catastrophes
(Fukushima), but also the specter of oil scarcity to come, all threaten the livability of life
for an overwhelming proportion, perhaps virtually all humans and nonhumans. The
proximity of various threats are not always in proportion to what is already ongoing or to
future risks: for example, climate change is often presented exaggeratedly as being
mostly a future issue, when myriad effects are already very palpable in the third world or
in certain poor or less visible areas of the first world (Louisiana is apparently losing the
equivalent of a football field of coast every few hours, while many in the United States
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continue to talk of climate change as a remote problem both in time and space, an effect
also of environmental racism – Cole, Foster et al., 2001). The images associated with
limits are consequently distorted: we know that capitalist expansion and growth has very
serious limits, but the lines drawn depend upon many factors. Thus some seemingly
alarmist discourses are in fact in very close proximity to many people’s realities, while
others may indeed be the results of disproportioned end-times narratives. In this section I
will examine limits as one of the features uchronian temporalities tend to obscure, as well
as some of the limits of certain discourses of limits, specifically the problematic equation
of the possible and possibly necessary end of capitalist economies with the end of the
world. Building upon yet revisiting critically environmental limits’ discourse, I hope to so
further specify the way limits may highlight capitalocentric progress as uchronian in the
sense of impossible, unsustainable. The eruption of ecological conceptualizations of
limits are indeed shedding light on the “ou” of uchronia’s “ou-chronos,” non-time.
If the question of limits gradually and complexly arose in multiple forms and
from various perspectives, I have already mentioned that one famous marking point
stands out: the Limits to Growth report, written in 1972 by Meadows et al. at the request
of the Club of Rome, demonstrated that exponential economic growth could not be met
by linear growth of available planetary resources. The report did not include global
warming as one of the disruptions of linear growth of resources, among other stakes that
emerged later on and added to skepticism and to the critique of capitalist growth. It
nonetheless marks one of the cornerstones of the global environmentalist movement’s
worldwide history, on par with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (2002). Thirty years later,
predictions that were dismissed by some to be mere scaremongering, alarmist outcries or
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doomsday prophecies have continued to find confirmations (Turner & CSIRO, 2008).
Yet, although the computer models deployed have so far been credited with accuracy, the
equally computerized arguments that a gradual decrease of the growth rate – or “degrowth” – would curtail this problem of limits (adjusting to equilibrium below
environmental limits) was far from translating into concrete implementation. Marx, and
after him Rosa Luxemburg, had already pointed out that capitalism would eventually hit
at least the world’s limits. But the current environmental crises have given this prediction
a new acuteness. Let’s note, on this point, that Luxemburg’s reading of this may be
problematic to our purpose here: it equates capitalism’s limits to the world’s, assuming
that capitalism is unstoppable besides such limits. Narratives continuing to equate
capitalism’s limits with the world’s dangerously depict the former as an all-powerful, all
invasive monster always already about to penetrate every noncapitalist space (J.K.
Gibson-Graham has shaken such accounts – 2006), these being reciprocally thought of as
empty and passive and about to be raped. Such narratives evidently foreclose noncapitalist possibility, and differing or dissident economies. In what follows I will discuss
how some still equate the end of capitalism with the end of the world, more or less
intentionally, willingly or consciously. This hinders possibilities and imagination which
may foster non-capitalist presents and futures. This is one of the constitutive elements of
uchronian temporalities: capitalist temporalities are uchronian in part because they
conceive the temporal horizon from the perspective of a capitalocentric tunnel vision: if
capitalism collapses, all the world will follow suit, as the only organizing principle of this
world is assumed to be capitalism. But if critiques of limits run the risk of reproducing
this account, then what is the value of the notion of limits? How can we distinguish the
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latter critical notion from capitalocentric gestures equating the end of capitalism to the
end of times?
In his preface to a 2012 colloquium titled “Already Beyond? 40 Years of Limits
to Growth,” William Krull, secretary general of the Volkswagen Foundation (who partly
funded the initial report) asked: “was the shock that the Limits to Growth caused not
strong enough?” Would the apparent lack of concrete change following the report have to
do with a need for greater fear and trauma, a need for more “scaremongering” or
“doomsday prophecies”? This raises the question of the mobilizing value of discourses of
fear and the rhetorical effectiveness of urging outcries, considering the limited time we
have to act (the urgency of recognizing limits and of radically changing existing growthdriven modes of production) and the long-term impossibility of growth (the limits
themselves). An easy critique of environmentalist warnings would consist of brushing
these off as more panic-causing, pessimistic, or depressing, than they can be mobilizing.
What, then, is the value of anticipation, or warnings concerned with upcoming
limits? Andrew Dobson thus describes William Ophuls’ warnings (among others) as
“dystopian ecologism” (2003) which potentially and dangerously implies (even in spite
of Dobson’s conscious intentions) that these scenarios are improbable, remote,
impossible and exaggerated threats. This characterization risks the quick dismissal of
environmentalist critiques as not only inaccurate, but also insufficiently constructive,
incapable of providing the nice happy end which the emotionally fragile, infantilized
American(ized) public is allegedly counting on, the only scenario that will not reek havoc
and chaos (on capitalism) and that audiences could bear.
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Yet, these critiques and warnings are arguably not so much “dystopias” as they
are environmentalist demonstrations that capitalism’s temporality – illimited progress
lead and defined by growth as its engine – is uchronian. In other words, it is not
necessarily the environmentalist apocalyptic scenarios that are dystopian, science
fictionesque, excessively alarmist, gratuitously resorting to scaremongering with no
productive mobilization in sight. Instead, here again we may need to reverse the charges:
it is the world we are heading into if action is not taken that is indeed dystopian. Just like
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring can be credited for having brought about significant –
albeit limited – changes regarding the omnipresence of carcinogenic pollutants in our
everyday lives, The Limits to Growth report, along with Paul Ehrlich’s famous
Population Bomb (1968), can hardly be denied a value in having acknowledged what
Isabelle Stengers – another supposed scaremongerer – calls “the eruption of Gaia”
(2009). These warnings have caused some, however insufficient in numbers, to carve
useful concepts like “de-growth” or “sustainability” (which I will further discuss in
chapter 4 and 5 below), however insufficient these temporal theoretical weapons may still
be. Because these mobilizations are insufficient does not mean that no alarms should be
sounded. Hans Jonas infamously emphasized fear as a mobilizing tool for what he called
an “ethics for the future” (as I have explained in the previous chapter). Granted the
legitimate critiques he and others like Ophuls faced for the anti-democratic risk involved
in their use of fear, the value of Jonas’ attempts to reconceptualize responsibility through
the lens of environmental crises can hardly be denied.
Emphasizing the threat presented by technological innovations’ increase of the
scale of our actions’ consequences was in itself a form of mobilization that would not
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have seen the light of day without the existential fear of mass destruction that drove Jonas
to write. One could speculate that without his and the above-mentioned “alarmists’”
anticipation of destructive futures, i.e without their anticipation and their fears, without
their pointing out the problem of limits and proposing critiques of growth-driven
progress, the “precautionary principle,” now commonly mobilized in European law,
would not have been born. Thus the high stakes at play in these concepts, which converge
in inciting us to inscribe the temporal in the political and in economies: fear, anticipation,
limits, are all the more concepts and affects grounded in present threats, which resolutely
future-oriented character incites one to rethink the present world and its hegemonic
temporalities.
The invention of “overshoot day,” mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, is
yet another striking example of how the temporality of limits, manifests itself as so
central to environmental discourse, often in the form of a deadline clashing with and
highlighting the assumptions of infinity that relentless consumerist paces rely upon. The
following is provided by the Global Footprint Network, a nonprofit organization created
in 2003 to defend sustainability and produce science and data in support of it:
August 20 is Earth Overshoot Day 2013, marking the date when humanity
exhausted nature’s budget for the year. We are now operating in overdraft. For the
rest of the year, we will maintain our ecological deficit by drawing down local
resource stocks and accumulating carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Just as a
bank statement tracks income against expenditures, Global Footprint Network
measures humanity’s demand for and supply of natural resources and ecological
services. And the data is sobering. Global Footprint Network estimates that in

118

approximately eight months, we demand more renewable resources and C02
sequestration than what the planet can provide for an entire year. (2013)
Providing a date to mark the ecological debt, and bringing the concept of unsustainability
to an annual scale, Overshoot Day makes limits palpable by resorting to time as a
tangible measurement of environmental exhaustion. However, two limits should be noted
regarding the language of limits deployed here: the use of the first person plural pronoun
“we” and the word “humanity” fails to differentiate between groups and places in terms
of the exhaustion of planetary resources, erasing inequalities and differentiated levels of
demands, limits, and urgency (the demands placed on the planet by Americans is on
average much higher than that of, say, many Camerounese women – who are also more
likely to experience more urgent needs for climate change mitigation). This language
relies upon an opposition between what “we” humans, indistinctively, demand of
“nature,” which category implies in an equally undifferentiated manner “everything nonhuman,” assuming a homogeneity and self-coherent whole to be alternately mastered or
protected. Further, one sentence stands out: “the data is sobering.”
Humanity is inebriated, drunk on its frenetic consumerism, and expected to be
arrested in its track thanks to… data and notions of credit or debt. The drunken metaphor
is powerful, as it too, within the discourse produced by “overshoot day,” has temporal
dimensions: consumerist and productivist inebriation corresponds to the fast pace of
capitalist modes of living and economies, and like addiction, this drunkenness prevents
humans (again, some more or less than others) to see further than their next drink. Yet the
consideration of the relationship between a year’s worth of consumption and a year’s
worth of planetary resources replenishing themselves, i.e the temporal quantification in
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annual and calendar terms, allows for the addict to consider “sobering up.” But what
would this sobering, this slowing down look like, and is there a risk of paralysis, coming
to a complete and destructive halt rather than a slow yet urgent reconsideration? What
will the shaking inherent in the detoxification transition feel like? Are all these efforts for
warning and for conveying limits in all their temporal dimensions potentially so sobering
that “we” may either die of thirst or keep drinking to forget that “we” are drinking (in an
accelerationist move), and to continue seeing exclusively the short term, denying the
possibility for a long term to even come into being (or rather, becoming)?
It is indeed important to underscore a different risk involved in alarms to the
limits of growth. We do need to take limits, fear, and anticipation seriously, yet we have
to also consider the limits of the concept of limits. Joining a concert of other voices,
philosopher Slavoj Zizek (2010) has characterized the environmental crises as a situation
in which we are more capable of imagining the end of the world than imagining the
radical change that could curtail such end. In a similar yet distinct vein, some have
claimed that our imaginations were keener on envisioning the end of the world than
capable of considering the possibility that capitalism may (need to) end. “We” allegedly
may prove incapable of conceiving that such end of capitalism, although an incredibly
significant historic event, would not necessarily entail the end of the world. Yet, radical
alternatives beyond the equation of capitalism’s and the world’s collapses do not always
lack or fail “our” imaginations, nor do they lack everywhere. The concepts of “antiuchronias,” “heterochronias,” and “synchrony” I advance in the following chapters
should help fuel the envisioning and recognition of such radical alternatives. 32 Paying
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Meanwhile, my discussion of “counter-uchronias” is meant to offer an internal critique of certain
shortcomings of some eco-temporalities.
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attention to ways in which some discourses may stage alternative visions for the present
and future is at least as crucial as the critiques pointing to or symptomatic of the
prevalence of end-times visions.
Again, this is not to say that the latter “endist” critiques are not important and to
dismiss their ability to stage a sense of urgency needed for mobilization around
environmental issues, making the uchronian character of late capitalist temporality
clearer. Neither does this amount to dismissing these critiques’ capacity to pertinently
portray the dilemmas facing environmental thought – or the world. Both as rhetorical,
mobilizational tools and as critical observations of the situation late capitalism has
created, or even as truth claims, warnings about the finite nature of our world are highly
useful, even critical – in the sense of “crucial.” Avoidance of facile dismissals of these
warnings as “dystopian” is necessary given the high stakes they make clear to us. And the
reversal of such accusations, to assert that it is capitalist times that are dystopian, is
necessary. It is indeed one of the goals of naming “uchronia.” Yet, I wish to nurture a
relative skepticism with respect to the equally facile slippage from the problem of limits
to a problem of end-times equating doubts on the viability of capitalism to certainties
about the end of the world, including when this equation is put in the form of a critique of
our alleged lack of imagination. Depending on the form granted to the denunciation of
such lack, we may foreclose possibilities for the envisioning and making of any present
or future alternative (Gibson-Graham, 2006; 2011; Connolly, 2008, 2013). The
consequence of this equation between the end of capitalism and the end of the world, is
that it syllogistically implies another: the equation between the world and capitalism. And
if, as is often the case in such essentialist, capitalocentric accounts, “the world” is
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understood not as becoming, but as the necessary, given environment we have (rather
than make) in common, then the equation becomes one that amalgamates capitalism and
the very constitutive fabric of the real: capitalism is taken to be the only possible reality.
This equation is grounded on the temporal: capitalist futures are taken to be the only
possible futures, and if these were compromised, so would the future tout court. This
futurist, capitalocentric tunnel vision is one of the principal constituents of what I call
uchronia: a capitalocentric temporal horizon purporting to erase any other possible
futures.
When taking act of modern progress’ limits and the resulting crisis, no
inevitability forces us to leap into conclusions such as: “modern progress has become
impossible, it is rapidly throwing us into a wall, … but we cannot imagine anything else.”
“We” may even have a moral obligation toward future generations to force ourselves to
imagine “something else” as in fact possible, even if this “something else” first may seem
improbable, otherwise the logical next step of this reasoning would lead to nihilism or at
least fatalistic resignation, in the form of a: “… thus we are doomed.” This resignation
quickly turns into a “so let’s just continue to do what we are so busy doing in exactly the
same way as we are doing it now, for lack of imagination, even while we know it is
ultimately destructive.” In short, end-times warnings and alarmist cries regarding the
limits of resources and of bearable planetary heating can risk resulting in a certain
fatalism, in the paralysis evoked above. Although pertinent and important, observing the
current situation as one where we may be more susceptible to imagine our end than
capitalism’s, or where we may equate the two, can overshadow alternative visions. By
critiquing ourselves and our contemporaries’ lack of imagination in this way, we risk
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reproducing the very lack we are denouncing. Given these risks, but granted the strategic
and truth value of the problem of limits, foregrounding this problem remains useful and
needed, along with underscoring it as one of the multiple instances in which temporality
makes itself present to environmentalist thinking (theory and discourse). The “eruption of
Gaia,” this sudden realization that what was taken to be illimited resource is in fact finite,
indeed takes on a temporal form: it presents itself as end-times narratives, anticipation of
possible dangerous futures that call for drastic questioning of our destructive presents. A
new light is thus shed on the ways in which these presents rely upon a progress
temporality, and how this temporality is driven by a teleological movement of capitalist
growth. Such warnings express the imminence of our encounter with scarcity and limits,
an urgency worth taking into account.

Urgency
It’s Not Too Late!
Greenpeace
Greenpeace’s “It’s Not Too Late” campaign was one example of environmentalist calls
for mobilization based on such a sense of urgency, drawing upon notions of tipping
points and accelerations, the problem of the present’s responsibility toward future
generations, and questions of limits. In 2007, with the alleged beginning of a climate
change “tipping point” period according to many climate scientists and the publication of
the penultimate IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) report (I will discuss
the latest, 2014 reports, in the next chapters), the famous environmentalist organization
posted small stickers simply marked with this short phrase on street signs, walls, and car
bumpers: “It’s Not Too Late.” In small font, the stickers also indicated Greenpeace’s
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website address. “It’s Not Too Late”: this sentence intrigued its interlocutors, an urgent
yet anxiously hopeful phrase seen in passing, in the corner of one’s eyes, yet acting in
part like a flash, almost subliminal presence, and in part as a provocation to arrest one’s
gaze. This campaign also included videos evoking responsibility toward future
generations along urgency – I will return to these in the section below. But on the stickers
themselves, no explicit mention of climate change was needed. Neither did this utterance,
“it’s not too late,” need any reference to one of the many current environmental perils
“we” face: no explicit litany regarding environmental destructions was required, as these
lists were (assumed to be) on everyone’s minds, sufficiently associated with urgency and
limits to resonate in public spaces, even when the mere idea of urgency was evoked on its
own. In other words, the reference was not one directed at the content of the crisis per se,
but, following a metonymic form, to its temporal dimension only, which temporal
dimension implied all the rest. That this is possible is further proof of the importance of
temporality within environmentalist discourse. For those whose curiosity stopped them
long enough, for those with whom this quick and urging call resonated, the reference to a
time sensitivity sufficed, along with, perhaps, if viewers noticed the signature, the name
of the famous environmentalist group. The slogan and its signature on the green
background were enough to cause the mental connection with climate change, perhaps
arousing curiosity regarding Greenpeace’s proposals, perhaps even enrolling a few more
recruits in the pressing struggle. Interpellated by both the anxiety, the dramatic charge,
and the hope which this short phrase evoked, one may pause. Greenpeace public
relations’ strategy assumed such an affective response, in at least enough viewers to make
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the campaign message worth spreading like street art ornating each corner of countless
cities.
These mixed feelings of apprehension, fear, and desire or hope, the affective
charges attributed to uncertain futures, this urgency, these pauses, these interruptions, and
these quick glimpses in an ever accelerating world which assumes growth as its necessary
engine, the eruption of this call for rapid change, are all central to environmentalist
rhetoric. The temporal dimensions of our shared environmental context have become so
crucial that a major environmentalist organization like Greenpeace can rhetorically rely
solely on a temporally charged phrase, “It’s Not Too Late,” for said context at large to
come to mind. While so many environmentalist texts (including the present chapter) have
repeated and will repeat lists of environmental dangers and damage, from
mass extinctions to pesticide pollution, from water and air pollution to genetically
modified organisms (once upon a time advertised as capable of “solving” the problem of
world hunger and actually resulting in an array of lawsuits and monopolies lead by
infamous Montsanto), with Greenpeace’s slogan nothing but urgency stands as a
signifier, and the need to enumerate matters of concern is circumvented. We are simply
offered a glimpse at urgency and limits, which suffices to signify current perils. This is of
course due precisely to the omnipresence of these enumerations and warnings, to the
context. But these warnings’ temporal nature also makes them susceptible to be referred
to solely by way of a mobilization of hope, fear, excessive lateness and desperation, the
absence thereof, urgency, limits, rapid change. If their temporal dimension wasn’t as
omnipresent as and in association with themselves, these perils would not come to mind
at the sight of the short phrase “it’s not too late.”
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Now what effects does urgency have and what exactly does it entail? In the
context of ecological crises, the urgency is caused by the ever so accelerating approach of
limits, the approach of the moment when it may in fact be too late. This growing
proximity and increased presence of limits requires rapid change in a world that already
changes rapidly, and often does not change in the same direction as that which would
allow us to confront the problem of limits, to avoid or to limit further ecological
destruction. Urgency entails a call for quick mobilization, for action, yet runs the risk of
resulting in rushed, insufficiently thought-through, or insufficiently democratic, or, on the
contrary, it risks resulting in complete paralysis given the fear invoked, the scale of
urgency, the tension caused by ecological destruction’s proximity (and current presence).
As a result of the limits of urgency regarding the risk for rushed, frenetic action on the
one hand, and paralysis on the other, a tension emerges: this is a situation where urgency
simultaneously creates a need to act rapidly in a fast-growing world with fast-growing
environmental damage, and an opposite need for extensive time to think through the
changes urgency demands, which changes in turn take on a tremendous scale and scope
characteristic of urgent circumstances.
In spite and maybe because of this tension between a need to act quickly and
another to take the time to pause and think, Greenpeace claims that “it is not too late.”
The slogan does not limit itself to expressing urgency, but also carries a form of desperate
hope. It metonymically suggests, evokes and provokes, the notion that things could
change: it’s not too late… to change directions, to slow down, to quiet growth down, in
other words… the idea that it may be time to leave uchronia. I will discuss this kind of
cairological intervention in the next chapter, as a form of “anti-uchronia.” For the time
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being, we may simply underscore that this campaign highlights yet another characteristic
or trait of uchronia: that capitalist temporalities throwing us against the wall are
contingent. They can (still) be side-tracked. There is still time, we must make the time,
we have to take the time, so as to imagine other futures. This implied contingency clashes
against the first characteristic I underscored above, as denounced by limits discourses: we
saw then that uchronian temporality is defined by a capitalocentric tunnel vision,
reducing the future or futures in general, to the allegedly one and only possible future: a
capitalist one. Greenpeace’s “It’s Not Too Late!” provocatively suggests that underneath
this reduction, this teleological movement of time, lies contingency: it can (still)
be(come) otherwise. The organization links this resolute hope and determination, to a call
for mobilization carried through by videos projected on monuments’ walls in big cities’
public spaces. The call came from an 8 year-old boy, who prompted adult viewers to take
their responsibility with respect to his generation’s survival and the livability of his
generation’s future life.
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Future Generations
Climate risks are not identical with climate catastrophes.
Climate risks are the anticipation in the present of future
catastrophes in order to prevent them. This ‘present future’
of climate risks is real; the ‘future future’ of climate
catastrophes, on the other hand, is (still) unreal. Yet even
the anticipation of climate change sets a fundamental
transformation in motion in the here and now.
Ulrich Beck
Since the beginnnings of the environmentalist movement, and culminating with the
climate crisis, the concept of “future generations” has been a central thread of
environmental discourse, including in Environmental Political Theory, or ecosophy.
These have often ascribed a novelty to “future generations” which this section attempts to
further discuss, adding to the above considerations on limits, end-times, which critical
notions I will synthesize to inform my conceptualization of capitalist temporalities as
uchronian. Continuing on the analysis of Greenpeace’s campaign and then providing a
few examples of environmental theorists’ conceptualizations of the future and future
generations, in what follows I reflect on what exactly is so new about “future
generations.”
Through Greenpeace’s “It’s Not Too Late” campaign, thousands of people were
provoked to pause and think of climate change while walking by major cities’
monuments. In Paris, Greenpeace hanged an immense banner shouting the slogan at
tourists and Parisians coming to see the Eiffel tower. The banner covered most the middle
section of the tower, with a giant picture of a thermometer accompanying the slogan, and
the indication: “> 2°” in reference to the IPCC’s assessment that the average temperature
of the Earth was potentially going through, perhaps beyond, a dangerous 2 degrees
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(celcius) increase. The two degrees’ increase has been the maximum “agreed” upon (and
highly contested) as a result of the Rio, Kyoto and Cancun conferences. This maximal
target is highly criticized as a tolerable threshold, as many have pointed out that such
increase would sacrifice many small island-states and poorer coastal areas of the world,
whose populations did not obtain sufficient voice at international summits. Thus this
cairological threshold, which has been (mis)read as an “objective” scientific estimation
and consequently reified as the objective, is also loaded with political contestation.
Greenpeace however was responding here to the then recent publication of the third IPCC
report, taking up the opportune (cairological) moment of its release as an occasion for
visible mobilization.
The French word “temps” has two meanings: time and weather. In Paris, on the
Eiffel tower, both meanings were presented in association with one another, and the
banner dramatically staged this urgent preoccupation upon one of the symbols of the
Industrial Revolution’s culmination, the iron lady. As part of the same campaign,
Greenpeace screened a video clip on a large screen placed on the façade of the French
Parliament, among many other monuments of capital cities worldwide. This clip showed
a young, probably 10 year-old boy staring for one single fixed shot at the camera,
wearing a grey hoodie and with his traits somber, tense, the tension on his face
accentuated by the absence of any TV make-up, and delivering the following speech
solemnly and with great determination:
The scientific community released a report that proves beyond a doubt that the
Earth is getting warmer. This global warming is caused by things you grown-ups
do, and by the things you don’t. If drastic measures aren’t taken soon, by the time
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I grow up there won’t be any fish left in the sea. Rainforests and clean air will be
a thing of the past. The polar icecaps will be gone. Oceans will rise. Entire
countries will disappear. Life will change in ways you can’t even imagine. There
could be famine, worldwide epidemics, life expectancy will be lower. We’re not
just talking about the future. We’re talking about my future. But this is no
surprise. You adults have known about this for years. Now you could’ve done
something about it. You haven’t. You can say, it’s not my problem. You can say,
‘I won’t be around in fifty years. But from now on, you can’t say ‘I didn’t know.’
Starting today, the lines are drawn. You have to choose sides. Either you’re for
my future, or you’re against it. You’re a friend, or you’re an enemy. I may just be
a kid today, but tomorrow will be different. This is the last time I’ll be talking to
you adults. You’ve had your chance to fix this problem, now we have ours. We
won’t be cute. We won’t be patronized. We will not be denied our future. [cut to a
screen with the banner ‘It’s Not Too Late’, followed by another screen]: ‘Join the
energy revolution. Greenpeace.’ (2015)
Pronouncing this speech, because of the sobriety of his makeup, the aggressive lighting
on his face, and the tense, serious, accusatory and focused look, the young boy looks his
age yet older. One could almost mistake this tense expression for wrinkles, and the
specter of the adult who will experience the most catastrophic effects of climate change is
looming through him. The tone here is not so much one of hope, but one of assertive
determination, accusation, authority and call to responsibility. It is intentionally radical:
the call is for “drastic measures (…) now,” and the grey hoodie is evocative of many
diverse images of late twentieth century rebellions, as part of a dress code shared by hip
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hop cultures, black blocks and anarchist groups in many places throughout the world.
Subjects of the present world are interpellated directly and concretely as contributors of
the collective problem at stake: “you adults,” “you grown-ups.” The question of
the future is posed equally concretely, thanks to the very vehicle of this speech, a ten
year-old standing up as one voice among his generation that of course evokes so many
others. This 2007 resort to a child as the spokesperson of a whole generation for a
concrete embodiment of the present responsibilities and concerns emanating from the
climate crisis was notably not a first. 12 year-old Canadian activist Severn Cullis-Suzuki
(Environmental Children’s Organization) famously gave a speech at the 1992 at the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, also representing her and her future children’s generation. By
the time the Greenpeace video clip came out, the actor pronouncing the above-quoted
speech could have been Cullis-Suzurki’s son. In 1992 already, the goal had been to
embody concretely the lives that would directly be affected by global warming, to make
the future (not in the abstract, but rather specific people, many people’s future lives)
concretely and not only conceptually present, in the present.
The tone of the young Greenpeace activist in 2007 is resolutely dramatic. The
speech opens on a dramatizing apocalyptic picture, similar to many of the dire end-times
warnings discussed above. But this picture is depicted by a ten-year old whose speech
illustrates very strikingly the novelty of the concept of future generations, compared to
previous understandings of and questions about the future: “we’re not just talking about
the future. We’re talking about my future. (…) We won’t be denied our future”
(emphases mine). The most drastic effects of the climate crisis have now approached us
closely enough that the question of the future is embodied, can be easily personified, and
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loses its abstraction. We must also note the shift from the pronouns “I” to “we” in the
text. The speech is organized in three moments: an apocalyptic, end-of-times scenario is
first challenging our imaginations (“life will change in ways you can’t even imagine”).
The concretization from “the” future to “my” future then signs the second moment,
calling for a recognition of everyone’s responsibility and interpellating “adults” today
(“You adults have known about this for years. Now you could’ve done something about
it. You haven’t (…) from now on, you can’t say ‘I didn’t know.’”). The third moment in
the text is marked by a polarization of the struggle into two distinct camps (Starting
today, the lines are drawn. (…) Either you’re for my future, or you’re against it), one of
which including the child’s entire generation in the form of this shift to his use of “we”.
The speech indeed ends on three sentences rhythmically opened with the first person
plural pronoun, and which closing one enables the dramatization to culminate: “we won’t
be denied our future.” The modal “will” is present throughout the speech in reference
both to the apocalyptic scenario thus described, and to children’s resistance. In this last
sentence, it conveys the full array of possible meanings “will” can include (in its negative
form): a refusal (“I will not”, i.e will as determination) and a future fact (will be, i.e a
future indicative form).
This close reading sheds light on the uniqueness and the newness of the problem
of responsibility toward future generations: this newness resides in a shift from
considering the future in abstract ways, to concrete, incarnated, embodied, personal ones.
This is done in two crucial ways: firstly, the new sense of responsibility toward future
generations shifts the affective charge associated to the future from hope, promises and
dreams (of abundance, accumulation, full employment, etc) to concern and
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determination. Secondly, the object of the future also shifts, from consumption,
production and accumulation or profit, i.e growth, to concrete human and nonhuman
lives’ livability. Finally, and as a result of these two shifts, the arrow of time is shattered,
the specter haunting us is not that of past generations or of a millenarist (utopian) promise
(like communism), but that of children and their own children’s future adult selves, and
the damaged non-humans who will cohabit interdependently with them. This is what the
above incipit for this section points to. There, Ulrich Beck underscores this movement
from the future, back, making future catastrophes present to the present. In sum, the
concept of future generations distinguishes itself by its affective charge (concern and care
rather than hope), its object (making agentic future subjects concrete in the present), and
its direction (from the future back to the present rather than the opposite).
French philosopher Emilie Hache has partly cleared the ground in underscoring
the newness and endemic character of “future generations” in ecosophy. In Ce à quoi
nous tenons, she links “future generations’” emergence in politics to Hans Jonas’ “ethics
for the future,” focused as it was on critiquing both liberal and Marxist ethics. In Jonas’
view, these lacked a concrete concern for the survival and well-being of humans and
nonhumans to come. 33 Hache’s reading is helpful because it further contributes to outline
a crucial distinction between the future-oriented character of progress and the ecosophical
concept of future generations :
Although moderns have always turned toward the future, it was in the sense that
they used to place their hopes in it. They did not care about it… Think about
liberal and Marxist ethics, which Jonas explicitly crafted his ethics of
responsibility against, precisely because they were both founded upon the notion
33

See also my discussion above (chapter 1) on temporality and anti-utopianism in Jonas’ work.
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of progress… It is not certain that trusting the future – trusting class struggle or
economic growth – or, even less, as has been heard multiple times, justifying the
casualties and miseries of yesterday and today in the name of a hypothetical better
tomorrow, is all that moral. (Hache, 2010, p. 146. Translation mine, author’s
emphasis)
Here Hache stresses that if modern temporality is characterized by progress and if
progress is fundamentally about the future, that future consisted of abstract hopes rather
than concern or care. Hache confirms that this is where the novel character of « future
generations » lies : the affective stance regarding the future has shifted. I’ve added that
the objects and subjects of these affective stances also differ from those associated with
previous representations of the future. The hopes placed in the future by temporalities of
progress focused on the expansion of consumption and production and an increase in
accumulation or profit, i.e growth, as their object (however uneven its distribution may
be, which poses the question of which subjects were to benefit for this orientation to the
future : the abstraction operated as a mask silencing such unevenness). This ever-growing
abundance was assumed to indicate comfort, the capitalist promise in the process of
realization. In other words, the teleological movement here was one pointing toward
more of a consumerist and productivist horizon (« horizon » needing to be understood in
the very specific sense of the term, as a line which eternally recedes as one approaches
it). As is made evident by examples like that of the above-cited Greenpeace video clip,
the concept of future generations’ object, rather than production, consumption, profit, and
accumulation, includes concretely incarnated, humans and nonhumans’ survival and
(livable) personal lives. What is at stake in the concern for future generations is a vitalist,
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concrete, material concern or care, rather than abstract capitalist hopes and dreams – with
their share of terribly destructive present, material consequences.
This difference between the specific future-oriented character of capitalocentric
progress, and the environmental notion of “future generations” is interesting to juxtapose
to Lee Edelman’s denunciation of reproductive futurism and his critique of
heteronormative temporality. I have already briefly discussed the pertinence of queer
temporalities and the need to queer eco-temporalities in the introduction to this
dissertation, and pursued a feminist overview of temporality and the nonhuman in
ecosophy in the previous chapter. In the rest of this section I return to queer temporalities,
to argue that Greenpeace’s revolutionary progeny highlights the need for queer ecotemporalities for livable present and future worlds, a need that would include making
room and time for queer kinships (Haraway, 2015).
This may seem surprising at first. Indeed, we may remember that Lee Edelman
opposes queer sexualities to the figure of the fetishized, heteronormative Child. How
then, could Greenpeace’s resort to one child supposedly emblematic or speaking in the
name of at least some among future generations, be read as form of performative
queering of eco-temporalities, or perhaps an ecologizing of queer temporalities, or both?
Let us backtrack: Lee Edelman has argued, in substance, that heteronormative
temporality relies upon reproductive futurism: any sexualities or sexual comportments
that cannot or will not be redeemed, guilty pleasures as they are, by the at least spectral
presence of the Child who will and must be bred as a result of the sex act, is dangerous,
anomalous, queer. To Edelman queers and queerness should espouse this dangerous
character, as a form of resistance to and disruption of reproductive futurism.
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Consequently, Edelman advances an exhortation to “fuck the future!” and “fuck the
Child!”
Yet, the child in Greenpeace’s video is distinct from the fetishized Child evoked
and denounced by Edelman, and so are all kinds of present and possible future human
children, adults and nonhumans, just like one must also distinguish between the future,
futures, futurity, and futurism. The latter is a constitutive element of what I call uchronia,
while the three first notions may be conceived, envisioned and experienced in a number
of ways, including some that, as Haraway has recently put it would help us proliferate all
sorts of “queer kinships” (Haraway, 2015). The concrete actual and virtual children, and
their virtual children, are not the issue per se, and Edelman is very clear on this
distinction between them and the fetishized Child of heteronormative reproductive
futurism. However, as I have started to suggest before (introduction) he confuses the
future, futures, futurities and futurism. I would define these various notions as follows.
The future is made up of all the actual and virtual possibilities, events, people, living
beings, things and many more “to come” (the French for future is also the term avenir, or
a venir, as Derrida has reminded us, though I won’t turn to his understanding here). The
future may be understood a plural, and in the present there exist all sorts of conditions for
multiple potential or virtual futures. Thus the second distinction is between “the future”
and “futures,” where the former is not problematic in itself as long as it is understood as
plural, as admitting the possibilities of several “futures.” Futurity is the characteristic of a
given time, past, present or future, that has a future, that has futures, and the virtual
presence of these in the time in question. In a sense (and I will discuss this in chapter 6
regarding synchrony), futurity is always with us, or so we may hope, as it is part of our
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existence to pass, to become, to change at every moment: the conditions of the future are
constantly present in the present, so is often its imagination or envisioning, and our
(multiple) virtual future selves. But if futurity is only imagined as having one possible
course, one single direction, and if this direction or course is erected as an end, a goal, in
a teleological manner, if futurity and the future begin to subject the present as well as
other possible and/or virtual futures to its dictate, then, and only then, we have futurism.
It is indeed futurism that Edelman means to say “fuck” to. And if this is the case, there is
still time and space, it is not too late for a queer vitalism 34 and for queer kinships that
values the Greenpeace child without Child fetishism, that wishes to value futurity as
multiple, plural, perhaps even multidirectional (it is through a projection to future
generations that we imagine different presents, etc). And queer kinships are especially
needed, insofar as these are imagined solidarities and care for concretely virtual, future
living human and nonhuman beings and things, which do not necessarily require
conventional kinship: as Donna Haraway has recently underscored, the development of
more heteronormative kinships is dangerous in a world over-populated with humans (and,
we may add, their nonhuman companions, cattle, etc). Queer kinships, Greenpeace’s
child activist, futures, futurity are valuable and helpful ways to resist, contest, challenge,
perhaps supplant uchronia. And reciprocally, the problem with futurism is not futurity,
but the subjection at play, the fact that the future in the abstract is permitted to play a
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In Vibrant Matter (2009), Jane Bennett has argued that one can and should distinguish between the
vitalism of, say, pro-life advocates, and a critical vitalism concerned with human, hybrid and nonhuman
lives in contexts of ecological crises. As I also mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Claire
Colebrook (2014) has identified two different traditions of vitalism throughout the history of Western
philosophy: one relying upon the actual, and the other, which she calls queer vitalism and unites Spinoza,
Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and others (similar to Bennett’s vitalism to an extent), proposes to turn to the
virtual. In a way this was the (failed) attempt of Jose Munoz (2009) who proposed to oppose Edelman’s
(2004) presentism and hyper-separation with a “not yet here,” though Munoz sadly falls back onto utopia
for this purpose.
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subordinating role with respect to the present, justifying ecological and other kinds of
damage. As such, futurism is an essential component of uchronia.
Put differently, one could object to the newness of the concept of “future
generations” and the central place of the future in environmental discourse, pointing out
the already future-oriented character of the very progress temporality environmentalists
denounce. Yet I argue that the concept of “future generations” as I read it inaugurates an
original way to envision the future, and futures, to experience futurity, not in terms of
hope but in terms of concern, not with ever expanding futurist production, consumption
and accumulation as its abstract and fetishized objects subjecting the present and concrete
futures, but focusing instead on human and nonhuman lives’ livability qua a multiplicity
of futures. This critique contributes to denounce and challenge the disincarnated, abstract,
non-time of growth temporality’s specific, problematic futurity, one made of futurism.
Growth-driven progress has so far been nothing but (and no less than) uchronian, an
empty promise where more always calls for even more, and this desire for growth, taken
for granted in a capitalocentric vision of time, is being shattered along with the futurism it
contains. Futurism appears for what it is, a means of subjection, and a constitutive
element of uchronia, because of the realization and denunciation of the impossibility of
sustaining indefinitely a productivism and consumerism running against the planet’s
finitude and finite tolerance, into its over-heating.
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Quotidian Temporalities: Insatiable Speed, 24/7
24/7 is a time of indifference … characterized as a generalized
inscription of human life into duration without breaks, defined by a
principle of continuous functioning. It is a time that no longer
passes, beyond clock time … There are now very few significant
interludes of human existence … that have not been penetrated and
taken over as work time, consumption time, or marketing time …
hence the ceaselessness of needs and their incitement, but also
their perpetual non-fulfillment.
Jonathan Crary
Critiques of late modern temporalities which relate to the ecological crises, the question
of the human, nonhuman and posthuman, and the technological and digital age do not
limit themselves to inviting Earth’s deep time into human calendars and history, or to
contesting imperatives to growth born in the second half of the twentieth century, or to
challenging progress as it has been conceptualized since the industrial revolution and
with the rise of productivism and consumerism. At more micro-scales of quotidian life,
many have denounced the paces, speeds and rhythms of late modernity. Examples of
resistances abound, like the slow movement, of which slow food is most famous, or the
notion of “liberated time” circulating in de-growth discourses. As for critiques, I
discussed in chapter 1 how Ivan Illich, one of political ecology and ecosophy’s early
figures, characterized our times as symptomatic of a “speed society” (2013). He
underscored the ways in which the fast paces of some becomes the extended hours of
others because of the emerging velocity of transport (by motor vehicle) creating, once it
occurs en masse, slow and excruciating traffic, versus the apparently slow yet efficient
and convivial pace of transit (on foot and bicycle). Illich also crafted new concepts to
describe the time consumed by “ghost work” (i.e, what is necessary to consume
commodities once purchased – e.g transport from distant suburban grocery stores to the
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home, work on domestic machines like dishwashers, etc). To Illich, the speed society’s
compulsory paces generate profound inequalities and a form of colonization of times of
autonomy. Autonomy, along with what Illich called conviviality depends on the social
relation to time, and time has everything to do with the distribution of power and
arrangement of social relations. Michel Foucault’s depictions of the disciplinary society
famously contrast an old regime power that harms the body in retaliation for certain
crimes, with modern power, which “invests the body in depth” (1977, p. 72) emprisoning
it into the soul as this form of power produces docile subjects. Disciplinary power
calibrates each gesture for an efficient economy of power, in great part qua temporalities
rhythmically punctuating the days and weeks of prisoners, school students, soldiers,
hospital patients and staff. Thus Discipline and Punish famously opens with a gruesome
description regicide’s quartering, juxtaposed with a timetable (p. 3 – 7). Discipline relies
upon temporality, which is present throughout the book.
Jonathan Crary (2013) has recently argued that the digital age, the fast flows of
the late twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century, are increasingly
imposing a temporality he calls “24/7,” where “everyday life,” once a refuge from market
exchanges, salaried work, commodification, is now invaded by the relentlessness of
stimulation, image, frenetic information and communication, various commodities,
devices and technologies. To Crary, “24/7 announces a time without time, a time
extracted from any material or identifiable demarcations, a time without sequence or
recurrence” (p. 29) Crary opens and closes his book with an analysis of how sleep
becomes one of the last remnants of sequential pauses, vulnerable moments of social time
unsubjected to the (often digitalized) flows of capitalist markets. Many reviews of this
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recent book have reduced the argument to one where, qua sleep, Crary draws from Guy
Debord’s denunciations of the society of spectacle or Gilles Deleuze’s critique of the
society of control, so as to critique capitalist temporalities. Yet the argument goes much
beyond sleep. Surely, many metaphors (and literal descriptions) regarding brightness,
continuous lighting, restlessness populate his argument even when Crary doesn’t directly
discuss sleep or dreams. But more generally, the author paints the picture of a timeless
time that purports to replace the quotidian and commodify, control, subject all life in
depth, in an age of digitalized and globalized consumerism and productivism. This is
particularly relevant to my own argument here, insofar as this critique adds to the concert
of voices showing that capitalist temporalities are not only unsustainable in the long run,
in ecological terms, at the historical level, or in terms of the planet’s deep time, but they
are also unbearable on a smaller time scale, at the level of micro-ecologies, and at
individual or smaller groups’ levels, all of which are related in various ways to the larger
time-scale examined so far. In an echo to Illich’s critique of the speed society as
detrimental to personal autonomy and collective conviviality, Crary explains that due to
this 24/7 temporality, which involves “temporalities of networked systems” operating
constantly, accelerations and relentlessness produce a situation where “long-standing
notions of shared experience atrophy” (p. 31). Crary thus denounces the “relentless
incursion of the non-time of 24/7 into every aspect of social and personal life” (p. 30). In
the fabric of quotidian lives, indistinction and homogeneity, flattening and constant
stimulation, strive to stifle rest, social time, sleep, dreams, non-productive or useless
activity, passivity, tasks and occupations pursued for their own sake and devoid of
information, communication, digital means, lucrative and speculative effects, etc. The
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temporality Crary (among others) describes is the quotidian dimension of what I call
uchronia: the timeless time of late capitalism, of the speed society.
However, Crary tends to insist on the presentism, the ephemerity, the moment
obscuring any future, which result from 24/7 temporality. This analysis goes so far as
erasing futurism from the 24/7 equation. I differ here, in that I argue that uchronia
entangles two seemingly contradictory aspects of control at the level of quotidian
temporalities, one that is indeed characterized by a timeless presentism, both forgetful of
the past and future-less, as Crary aptly describes, and another facet of this temporality of
speed that constantly subjects all to a never satiated state of desire for more (information,
technological devices, newer commodities, etc). As a result, late moderns are indeed
constantly running toward an abstract immediate future well-being and non-time, which
is always postponed to better fuel the present non-time, made of consumerist impulses
and frenetic paces.
Crary, in contrast, asserts that:
For much of the twentieth century, novelty production, in spite of its
repetitiveness and nullity, was often marketed to coincide with a social
imagination of a future more advanced than, or at least unlike, the present. Within
the framework of a mid-twentieth century futurism, … there was at least the
misplaced belief in technological solutions to intractable social problems. Now
the accelerated tempo of apparent change deletes any sense of an extended time
frame that is shared collectively, which might sustain even a nebulous anticipation
of a future distinct from contemporary reality. 24/7 is shaped around individual
goals of competitiveness, advancement, acquisitiveness, personal security, and
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comfort at the expense of others. The future is so close at hand that it is
imaginable only by its continuity with the striving for individual gain or survival
in the shallowest of presents. (p. 41)
In this analysis, the futurism prevalent in the mid-twentieth century has given way to
accelerated tempos that now tend to erase futurity tout court, or to reduce it to “the
continuation … of the shallowest of presents.” Yet this futurism which Crary describes as
made up of “misplaced belief in technological solutions to intractable social problems”
still seems quite resilient when one thinks, for instance, of geoengineering and such
technofixes to the climate crisis (I will discuss these counter-uchronias in chapter 5). At
the quotidian and the individual or micro-levels, the next device, the new social network
or app, the hippest commodities continue to provide ways for consumerism to never
reach yet always pursue the satiation of a continuously increasing or at least open-ended
appetite. More than “the shallowest of presents,” this could be described as a constantly
receding horizon where the sun barely ever sets, or if it does, neons and touch screens
have taken over so drastically one fails to notice. With 24/7 temporality, the future still
subjects the present, including at quotidian levels.
Crary does note that this is the case in the sense that 24/7 frenesy results in a
tunnel vision detrimental to imagining futures different from the present, different from
present monotonous agitation. And in the incipit that opens this section, he also concedes
that the takeover of almost all “interludes of human existence” by “work time,
consumption time, or marketing time” results in a “perpetual non-fulfillment” (p.10).
Though Crary mostly insists on the erasure of the past and the future by 24/7
temporalities, reducing this “perpetual non-fulfillment” to a mention and not seeing a
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futurity there, I contend that this permanent insatiability is precisely the futurism at play
for this non-time. The ideal consumer is an eternally dissatisfied consumer, and the
devices and commodities of today, ever so quickly outdated and obsolete, procure but
split second pleasures that, as they are so fleeting, let desire take over and project oneself
into the nontime of another similar split second in one immediate future disguised as the
only future. This futurism is what Jean-Michel Besnier (2013) has described as a posthuman utopia. In his view the digital age and globalization, combined and entangled,
offer the promise of an eu- and ou-topos where technical and scientific means would fully
“accomplish humankind,” that is to say, they would allow “the suppression of all
imperfections that bar humanity from access to happiness” (p. 94, my translation). Thus
the utopian transhumanist and/or certain posthumanist fantasies: with these, “utopia is
indeed present as such, in the perspective of a happiness which would put an end to the
wanderings of history” (p. 96). This happiness is one where time stops, where one is
finally liberated from time, entering into a stillness symptomatic of humanity’s ends
having been realized. This speaks to the seduction also exercized on the left, to a Slavoj
Zizek (2011) who understandably questions that there has ever been such a thing as
Nature, but then concludes that we need to throw ourselves forward even more deeply
into an artificialism that would allegedly provide the way to confront the eco-crises. A
similar appeal of the paces and speeds of the technological and digital age also manifests
itself in accelerationist aesthetics, according to which capitalism’s acceleration should be
deepened, pushed to its utmost possibilities, promising radical change. Though Besnier
does not mention Zizek or accelerationism as examples, he too confesses that he was

144

once attracted to a utopianism defended by a certain kind of leftism, convinced then that
“life rimes with utopia.” However, he explains that
Today [he is] ready to recognize [his] mistake, without concluding however that
narratives which recount an elsewhere and an otherwise be solely a nuisance. [But
he] declare[s] it brutally: utopia is death, as we would like to live it. … It congeals
time, submitting existence to rituals that are often obsessive; it neutralizes space,
situating its narratives in the improbable and the “placeless;” it asepticizes
humanity by exempting it of its flaws. … Yet, desirable, it does so while
rendering this death attractive and pain-free. … [It evokes a] fascination for an
immersion in an undistinguishable fetal and lethal state. (p. 98)
We may remember that in Plato’s Republic, which could arguably be back-read as one of
the first utopias (a city of words in a historical time where, however, Thomas More had
not yet coined the term utopia), time, first incarnated by muses who announced that
everything will ineluctably decay, is what ultimately breaks the harmony of Callipolis.
The goal, the end of utopia is fixity, and is fundamentally at odds with becoming. In other
words, utopia’s temporal dimension, or uchronia, is a timeless time, and we may
currently be swimming in images of uchronia that claim to truth 35. The paradox of 24/7
temporality is that the way in which this self-identical, monotonous or still time, this nontime is attained is by throwing production and consumption into a faster and faster
supposedly ‘forward’ race.

35

In fact, Platonic capital T “Truth” is arguably utopian and uchronian, but that is another story for another
project.

145

Queering Times: Capitalocentric Temporalities as Uchronia
This does not mean, of course, that we shall throw future generations and their babies
with the acidifying oceans’ waters. For instance, Jean-Michel Besnier denounces utopia
as the supposedly good non-place, because we now realize it would end time if fully
realized (and, I would add, because we realize that its full realization will always fail: in
fact that is one of its conditions of reproduction). Yet he also underscores that this does
not mean that we should judge “all narratives that recount an elsewhere and an
otherwise” to be noxious. In fact, I would argue that critiquing utopia reminds us that not
all elsewheres are or have to be utopian. This is indeed one of the reasons to further
reflect on what timeless time (uchronia) and its dictates are made of, so that different
ways of imagining, different futurities, non-uchronian ones, may emerge. In other words,
queering eco-temporalities so as to leave uchronia and live livable lives, requires more
critical work to identify what we wish to leave behind, and so as to not conclude that all
imaginations of other possible worlds and times are utopian and uchronian, conserving,
or restoring, or creating, their beauty and helpfulness. Asking what uchronia is would
thus amount to asking how we can imagine and make time, in spite of the dominant
saturation of non-time. One of the goals of my conceptualization of uchronia is to call a
time out on the time outside of time, to make time for invention and for sustaining life. In
this section I will draw out the major traits that constitute what it is I call uchronia,
building upon the critiques discussed above so as to better grasp how a capitalocentric,
teleological time where the abstract futurism of productivism and consumerism
constantly postpones its promise of satiation to a better tomorrow, justifying destructive
presents, and relies upon assumptions of infinite economic growth in a finite world. In
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spite of its apparent immateriality, this naturecultural time has a myriad of material
effects, and celebrates a timeless time which I will conclude is incompatible with a
philosophy of becoming needed in times of dramatic ecological transformation – thus my
eventual turn to Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return.

Uchronia: a Capitalocentric, Teleological and Timeless Futurism
[L’utopie, c’est] le lieu hors de tous les lieux … le pays ou
on peut tomber d’une montagne et se relever vivant, c’est le
pays ou on est visible quand on veut, invisible quand on le
desire.
Michel Foucault
Uchronia is, in part, the temporal manifestation of capitalocentrism: all temporalities that
offer to imagine the future (in the singular) as solely, or predominantly capitalist,
obscuring non-capitalist (possible and more or less probable) futures, are uchronian.
Uchronian temporalities reduce the future to capitalist (impossible) growth. Or, put
differently, they reciprocally deem multitude and plurality, diversity in directions and
forms of the future/futures, to be the only futurity present in the present, whether these
may be probable or not, or less.
Furthermore, uchronian temporalities have reduced the measurement of progress
to supposedly endless growth. At a larger historical scale including the industrial
revolution or perhaps the beginnings of capitalism, progress has been the uchronian
signifier for a linear time moved by a teleological end. The end of history, under the reign
or temporal order of uchronia, tends to be equated to capitalist progress, not only in the
sense of a goal of history, but also as its finish or closing line, its horizon. Teleology,
linearity, singularity (not in the sense of many singular temporalities being deemed
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possible, but in the sense of a reduction to homogeneity, and as opposed to plurality and
multitude) are all components of uchronia.
Uchronias are a temporalities which essentialize or naturalize capitalist ends,
capitalocentric teleological temporality as the only possible one. They take for granted, as
going without saying, as natural, the logic or dynamic of wanting more and more:
naturally, growth is desirable, it is what we cannot help but want, the non-negotiable
logic moving our economies, homo economicus cannot help it because it is in His nature,
etc. We will see further that naturalizing can be understood as reducing, reductive and
essentializing or essentialist, in the sense and as long as nature is imagined as static: 36 for
the moment this is how I am using the term. However what is at fault here is not so much
nature per se, but that what is deemed natural is taken to indicate a teleological goal and
form to attain and strive for, justifying all kinds of damage here and now. In other words,
the problem with nature is not nature but its temporality, when it is conceptualized in a
teleological manner. One consequence of this is that uchronia functions such that inherent
to it is its denial of its own contingency. This is linked to my first point about uchronia
rendering other possible futures unimaginable: if the natural end of time is capitalist
growth, then it could not be otherwise, then capitalist temporality is not contingent.
One additional and crucial defining trait of uchronia is that it refers to the
assumption of an impossible infinite growth in a finite world, which impossibility,
similarly to its contingency, it keeps denying. Indeed, this denial is also an inherent
constituent of uchronia. Here we see that the question of limits directly feeds into the
critical purchase of my concept of uchronia: naming uchronia means naming a
36

See chapter 4, where I will argue that uchronia and also what I call counter-uchronias (such as
environmentalist primitivisms and certain environmentalism’s claims to “return” or “restore” nature, etc)
share a common understanding of Nature as stable background, static, eternal, etc.
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temporality which imagines no limits and relies on this impossibility taken to be the only
possible, to then disguise itself as a forward movement (uchronia is also the assumption
that “forward” equals “good,” that there is such a thing as a line, with two directions, an
arrow to time). Impossibility and limits is the “ou” (not, none) of “ou-chronos” (nontime) in the etymology of uchronia. The denial of impossibility, and valuation of growth
in spite of its impossible infinity, is the “eu” (good, ideal) combining with the “ou.”
Yet another feature of uchronia is related to this latter one: uchronia requires and
entails, as a condition of its existence and reproduction, the eternal postponement of an
end, a satisfaction, an achievement or satiety that will never come. Both this
postponement, and its impossibility, its unattainable character, the fictive nature of the
non-time, the outside timeliness of uchronian time, are crucially important: these are
visible at the quotidian and micro-level, and on a larger scale. Uchronia is the running
after sand castles perched in clouds. It is a matter which affects subjectivities and their
production: the good consumer is that who is never satiated and whose pleasures merely
feed into more desire, and the healthy economy of a given nation-state is that which
strives for growth. Economies must grow, but to what end? Well the end has become
growth, or growth has become the end itself (which one could have thought should
perhaps have been a means… but then again what is capitalism besides the fetishization
of means, their transformation into ends, e.g means of exchange like money? And, then
again, the point would not be to simply reverse the hierarchy here, or separate ends and
means, but to question this binary which is indubitably part of the teleological structure
here). Inherent to the end of capitalocentric temporalities, as a constituent and a vector of
their self-reproduction, as part of how they exercize their desirability and what allows

149

their resilience, is the promise of an impossibility at which we will never arrive, a
timeless, disembodied time which the notion of future generations, for instance,
challenges.
Futurism is another component of uchronia, another aspect or dimension of its
mode of operating. As I have discussed above when outlining the distinction between
uchronian futurity and my reading of the environmentalist notion of future generations,
futurism refers to something more precise than just futurity or the future (I have argued
this in response to Lee Edelman’s “fuck the future!” which confuses the future, futures,
futurity and futurism. By futurism I mean to refer to the subjection of the concrete actual
and virtual presents, present futurity, and possible futures, to one future. In the case of
uchronia, the future is inevitably made of capitalist growth, and this future purports to
dominate and rule over any claims for other possibilities and other possible temporal
orders. The subjection of the present and futures, of temporality, to a capitalocentric
teleological future evidently is highly normative, in this sense, this is how uchronia
arbiters what counts as normal, the normal time, expectations, the expectable, probable
and possible future, the real, etc. Because uchronia is a normative temporality and
because it contributes to the conditions of production and reproduction of the normative,
because, as Cornelius Castoriadis and de-growth theorists like Serge Latouche put it, it
colonizes our imaginaries, any critique of uchronia entails queering temporality. Jose
Munoz has argued that queer time is a “not yet here,” and indeed a critique of uchronia
would require de-colonizing growth imaginaries to imagine (and continue to live, enact
and embody) other possible queer temporalities and times. Yet this cannot take on the
form of uchronia, it cannot be synonymous with the mere invention of new utopias and
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uchronias of substitution, what I would call counter-uchronias. This critique has to
perform queer futurities, as Munoz underscores, yet these must not take the form of
futurisms. As Foucault has put it, speaking of queerness and frienship, no less:
The idea of a program of proposals is dangerous. As soon as a program is
invented, it becomes law, and there is a prohibition against inventing… The
program must be wide open. We have to dig deeply to show how things have been
historically contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but not necessary.
We must make the intelligible appear against the background of emptiness and
deny its necessity. We must think that what exists is far from filling all possible
spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question: what can be
played? (1997)
What kind of eco-queer kinships are made possible by naming uchronia, and striving to
not fall back into counter-uchronia, to avoid a program of proposals that would become
law and prevent inventiveness, so that “what exists” is not only “far from filling all
possible spaces,” but also far from filling all possible times? My concept of uchronia is
meant to describe, to make intelligible, the appeal capitalocentric temporality has had,
and its contingency in spite of its claim to necessity, to being what we naturally cannot
not want.
One way uchronia can act as an apt descriptor of a normative temporality that
calls for queering time, is that it also describes how capitalocentric constantly relies on its
own failure to meet the ideal, non-time it purports to incarnate. Uchronian temporalities
idealize growth as the right direction, they claim their status as the “good time” by
promising more and more comfort, abundance of work and commodities, for those who
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deserve it. The lives of queers, nonhumans, and the many who have been denied human
subjectivity are evidence that this ideal is never met. This is especially salient in periods
of capitalist crisis (and to an extent, capitalism is precisely always in crisis), when, as
Isabelle Stengers (2009) has emphasized in her Temps des catastrophes: resister a la
barbarie qui vient, “we are asked to tighten our belts” and sacrifices nonhuman life, the
conditions of human and more nonhuman life, on the altar of desire to return to growth,
in an exhortation to concede, “realistically” that Gaia (humans included) is not the
priority. The hysterical Earth is throwing a tantrum? Shut her down, we have not caused
her fever. Uchronia by no means describes actual times of capitalist hegemony, but
rather, the ideal temporality of capitalism. Periods of crises and periods of growth both
come with their respective lot of injustices, aggravation of many people’s and
nonhumans’ conditions, exacerbations of inequalities, precarizations, ecological disasters
and destructions, which all drastically contrast with the promises made. For instance,
crises, far from resulting in de-growth (which would de-colonize our imaginaries from
the imperative to growth), is supposed to strengthen the desire for growth, to make it
even more incontestable and silence even further any concurrent desire, any proposal for
different futures. Uchronia refers to the alleged imperative to desire growth, as the ideal
temporality moving capitalism (taken as encompassing all reality) “forward.”
I should make one final precision with regards to the concept of uchronia: I have
used the expression “uchronian temporalities” in the plural, and uchronia to designate all
these, simply because uchronia is multi-faceted, and uchronian temporalities are multiple:
they extend to quotidian, historical scales, they now impact deep time scales (thus the
anthropocene and anthropogenic climate change), they take on various respective paces,
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speeds and rhythms depending on these scales, etc. Uchronia is not a monolith, though it
is difficult to describe and critique without risking to sound as though it was one. 37 This
also means that I have left many of these various facets and temporalities outside the
scope of my examples. Though my concept of uchronia comes out of a specific,
contingent context of ecological crisis and does not propose to be infinitely applicable,
we could imagine many other aspects of capitalist times and temporalities which could be
read as uchronian, thus the importance of the plural. 38

The Immaterial Dimension of the Material, or Temporalities’ High Stakes
There is a certain part of all of us that lives outside
of time. Perhaps we become aware of our age only
at exceptional moments and most of the time we are
ageless.
Milan Kundera
If Foucault asked the provocative question of “what can be played?,” and if my critique
of capitalocentric temporalities as uchronian entails queering temporalities, the task is
nonetheless quite tall and the stakes quite high. It becomes apparent, from the effects of
uchronia, some of which I have described above, that conceptions of time affect what
counts as the real, or what is deemed realistic, realistically desirable. Uchronia’s modus
operandi is to claim realism, “we cannot but want growth, let’s be realistic,” even in the
face of planetary limits, and in an attempt to erase these limits. Temporalities shape
37

J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006) have discussed a similar problem in their introduction to the tenth edition of
The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), where they explain that, just like the feminist second wave had to
risk caricaturing its sexist targets in the process of denouncing them, they have been accused to
constructing a strawman version of capitalism so as to proceed in their attempt at burning capitalocentrism
(p. 10).
38
For example, Ivan Ascher (forthcoming) has argued that while Marx’s critique of industrial capitalism’s
mode of production is still pertinent to this day, financial capitalism now relies upon a “mode of
prediction,” depending on future risks, securities, and speculation on these. This new form of futurism
could be read as yet another manifestation of uchronia.
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modes of living, producing, consuming. Yet in spite of these concrete high stakes and
effects, time desperately seems to remain impalpable, ungraspable.
A number of environmentalism’s and environmental sciences’ key concepts are
symptomatic of both this difficulty and this need to tell, see, feel and think time,
including some that I have described above. The concept of “overshoot day,” as it strives
to quantify the exhaustion of planetary resources over the course of a year, is an attempt
at bringing this exhaustion, the ecological debt, the question of limits, to a graspable
scale, in the form of a calendar, a date, a portion of the year spent spending resources that
will not have time to replenish. As such, it is seemingly able to provide concrete,
temporal terms in which to sense the excess, the rapid pace of an (unevenly) productivist
and consumerist world. But this translation into an annual scale also makes the idea of
ecological debt all the more abstract, and may be paralyzing to think about. Similarly, I
have mentioned how some within the geosciences have now famously been proposing the
term “anthropocene” to name our contemporary “epoch” (the smaller unit of geology’s
periodization of Earth history). The attempt here is to manifest the fact that roughly since
the Industrial Revolution (the moment for a marker is still highly contested) human
activity has been so predominant in traces and changes affecting the Earth’s surface
durably. In order to explain such debate over periodization and to allow the layperson to
understand human time compared to Earth time, geologists often resort to a procedure
similar to the reasoning at work with the concept of overshoot day, yet showing the
complex, multi-dimentional nature of time and the barely graspable character of nature’s
time. Geologists indeed tell us that if Earth history was brought onto a scale of a one year
period, humans would be born at the last minute on December 31st (a reduction of scale
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reminiscent of JFK’s, which opened this chapter). So at times, time is used to help
visualize or better grasp what Tim Morton would call “hyperobjects.” This is telling
insofar as it seemingly may make things palpable, showing how much temporality
contributes to and constitutes our realities and imaginaries. Yet these scalings in calendar
year terms are also symptomatic of the abstraction of time: first, what is mobilized is not
time so much as a way in which time is measured, made sense of, socially regulated and
– rhythmically – organized, and how a particular temporality then accounts for some of
the fabric of reality. A distinction thus needs to be made between temporalities, as
variously capable of showing or trying to show concreteness, and time, as ungraspable, in
need of measurement or linearization (qua temporalities). This resort to temporality
operates as a translation of the incommensurable into an abstraction, paradoxically
designed to allow concrete grasp.
After Bergson, environmental feminist thinker Elizabeth Grosz (2004) points out
that time can be seen as the immaterial dimension of the material. If this is the case, then
it can in fact hardly be “seen,” or only retrospectively: time, or the causalities we take to
be symptomatic of time, works backwards. While the effects of time can be observed in a
concrete way, and the causes of these effects traced back, retroactively, such
reconstitution after the fact, after the passing of time, is the only means available to
account for time’s fundamentally processual nature. This throws us into the impossibly
retroactive reconstitution performed when doer and deed (2006, p. 26) are separated
instead of holding everything as overdetermined effects (Althusser, 1985). One can see a
wrinkle in the corner of one’s eye, or a strand of grey hair, and think back to the last time
this body part was observed with no such trace of time’s passing, blaming aging for it and
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producing a tryadic line distinguishing between past, present and future – Bergson’s
concept of duration is helpful here – to account for this change. Yet one cannot grab the
carving of the wrinkle, or touch the de-pigmentation process of the hair, or even less, the
duration in which these took place. These causes and effects are but points on that
chronos’ line, leaving us with no choice but to imagine the liminal spaces, or rather, all of
it as perpetual becoming, all of reality as open-ended, unpredictable process. My resort to
the terms “line” and “space” are telling in this respect: as Henri Bergson remarked, time
requires spatialization to make sense to us. Where does the present fit in this
spatialization? How can we make sense of processes by which the planet becomes ever
more endangered, especially granted the extreme rapid paces so characteristic of global
capitalism, in spite of temporalities of progress that assume capitalist growth’s infinity?
Climate science has developed accounts of time in the form of “tipping points,”
“mitigation,” and then “adaptation,” to give concreteness to the urgency of the climate
crisis. It has crafted new scientific ways to produce truths about the future qua
anticipation and computer models and multiple future scenarios. As discussed above,
Greenpeace’s campaigns have resorted to stickers simply stating a provocative, pressing,
and urgent “it’s not too late”… which slogan has – tellingly? – disappeared. Greenpeace
and other organization resort also, to enormous hourglass images on banners and as
balloons, to convey urgency. But some dates about specific “tipping points” have
vanished from the new IPCC report released in 2013 and 2014, compared to the 2007
Third Assessment report, while this more recent report has shown that many effects of
climate change had been previously under, and not overestimated… Does this mean that
“it is – in fact, now, at last – too late,” that this disappearance should be taken for the
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hope and urgency then expressed becoming obsolete? What meaning is such a question
allowed when survival of species, and life itself, are at stake? As a process so crucial in
our understanding and experience of the real, time is undeniably material, yet attempts at
contesting its hegemonic modern conceptualization as linear, unidirectional and
unidimentional (Latour, 1993; 2004), seem discouragingly insufficient in accounting for
the fullness of what is at stake in a critical reflection on temporality within the context of
the current environmental crises. I hope that the concept of uchronia can convey some of
these stakes.
The very idea of time ending, when it is difficult to imagine it as anything but
open-ended process, seems an impossibility. The above critique of endism, along with the
critique of teleological time performed by the concept of uchronia underscores the
impossibility of a correspondence between the end of capitalism and an alleged end of
time. This may seem paradoxical, as the point of naming uchronia is to underscore limits,
the particular limits uchronia is running into yet denying, while I still affirm the openendedness of time. Yet the endlessness of time is not at all incompatible with the notion
of limits: in fact these are interdependent. Time’s infinity points to the contingent
naturecultural character of uchronian temporalities: as the above discussion of limits v.
endism suggests, it is not time, as a constant process of becoming, that ends when
capitalist production hits limits. That uchronian temporalities, capitalocentric times and
capitalist futures have an end, that this end may be approaching – in the sense that they
will at one point be washed away by the sea like marks in the sand, just like man will, in
Foucault’s Order of Things (2014) – does not imply that time ends with this wave.
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Uchronia v. Eternal Return: Fuck Futurism! Fuck Endism!
Fuck the Future! Fuck the
Child!
Lee Edelman
In the following and concluding section, I finish (although the task is as endless as time
is) substantiating and specifying the meaning of my concept of uchronia by bringing
Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return in conversation with the considerations above. This
concept also enables to transition from a negative to a positive moment of this critique.
Although the concept of uchronia is distinct from the doctrine of eternal return’s rejection
of teleological envisionings of time insofar as the former stems from the specific impetus
provided by the anthropocene’s context, Nietzche’s critique of progress deeply resonates
with my critique of capitalocentric temporality. Further exploring this resonance will
enable a more precise delineation of the problem that the term uchronia foregrounds. This
section, in weaving the critique made possible by describing capitalocentric temporality
as “uchronia” with Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return, brings Nietzsche’s attacks
against the teleofinalism of progress characteristic of modernity into dialog with
ecological matters of our times. I argue that Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the eternal
recurrence is a welcome support to an environmentalist critique of temporality: in fact, it
was about time such conversations were staged. 39

39

A number of attempts have been made to bring Nietzsche into conversation with environmentalist theory,
including ones that have claimed Nietzsche as a pre-deep ecologist. I do not find these compelling, as deep
ecology postulates a stable, eternal nature to return to (see chapter 4) whereas Nietzsche’s nature is made of
becoming, neither unreason or reason, constant erratic flows, bursts of creation, will to power. Thus I will
not address these readings in depth, also because Nietzsche as a deep ecologist arguments have been
refuted convincingly since. For an overview of this debate, see Acampora, 1994; Drenthen, 2005; Hallman,
1991; Halsey, 2005; Parkes, 2005.
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In the current context of ecological crises, where urgency, the critique of growth
and progress, limits, end-times, future generations make up central concepts in
environmental thought to the point of posing fundamental questions regarding the
reigning temporality, Nietzsche’s attacks against teleofinalist time acquire astute salience.
The eternal return not only feeds into the critical purchase of my concept of uchronia, it
also begins to suggest how other temporal orders are possible (Foucault, 2002), and what
forms they may take. What follows by no means purports to be the result of any sort of
exhaustive mastery over this incredibly rich concept. Yet the eternal return turns out
extremely helpful for purposes of temporality queering. 40 For now, I extract some of its
critical dimensions. I will continue discussing this critical aspect in the next chapter, and
subsequent chapters will weave other ontological and positive ethical aspects to
discussions of alternative eco-temporalities.
This extraction first comes with the need of explaining part of the concept. With
it, Nietzsche was proposing a radical refusal to align himself to Christian, modern,
Enlightenment – or all three at once, as these overlap – teleological visions of History, to
show instead the fundamental contingency and the total absence of pre-set meaning to the
course of time. This is one first point that the eternal return helps specify regarding the
critique made possible by naming uchronia. So far, for simplicity’s sake, I have claimed
that uchronia describes a teleological temporality. Yet we may now be more precise: after
Connolly’s reading of Nietzsche, it becomes clear that the target here is not the presence
of direction (telos) per se, but the singular direction that absorbs or claims erase all other
possible ones, with ends, goals, as justifying or redeeming the process. Teleodynamic
40

Here again we are reminded of Colebrook’s identification (2014) of Nietzsche’s vitalism as relevant to
times of ecological crisis, and as she has more specifically underscored, as part of a queer vitalist tradition
that has challenged other vitalisms.
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temporalities (Connolly, 2015), which may include directions in movement and more
plural, are not as problematic – though Connolly ultimately settles for what he calls
“bumpy temporalities” instead.
In Nietzsche’s view, if the universe had been able or designed to attain an
ultimate goal, a unique and predetermined end, and if it were animated by reason, then it
would already have reached such a goal or end. The fact that we have not yet arrived at
such an end state, that the forces of the universe have not developed to reach their
original objective, shows that there is in fact no such origin or objective. Thus Nietzsche
reiterates this thesis many times in his notebooks, has his famous character Zarathustra
claim it, exposes it in his Gay Science. If the course of history had always already been
unfolding toward an end it contained at its point of origin, as a teleological vision of time
would have it, there would be nothing rather than something, or some kind of impossible
stasis: we would still be in this state, lost in time, out of time. If everything passes, then
there is nothing but the eternity of the instant, containing the infinity of the past and the
infinity of the future at each moment, rather than a meaning, a unified goal, a determined
course.
Let us beware [hüten wir uns] to assign an aspiration, a goal of any kind to this
cyclical motion, or to regard it according to our needs as boring, stupid, etc.
Undoubtedly, the supreme degree of unreason manifests iself within it just as
much as the contrary: but we could not judge it according to this fact, neither the
reasonable nor the unreasonable are predicates that could be attributed to the
universe. (Nietzsche, 1881)
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I will discuss in subsequent chapters the ethical implications of the doctrine of the eternal
return, but for the time being what matters is this impossibility for any teleology to hold
water – as water runs. Yet, with the notion that though there is no linear, unidirectional
and unidimentional, single course for history, no predetermined goal, Nietzsche does not
either claim that no meaning exists. Rather, the only meaning we humans may encounter
in the world is the result of our own contingent creation – we may add that this takes
place in hybrid collaboration with nonhumans, though this addition is deductable based
on Nietzsche’s depiction of the universe as moved by the eternal return and will to power,
far from limited to humans.
Concretely and for our purposes here, Nietzche’s doctrine of the eternal return
provides further ammunition to attack uchronia, i.e to demonstrate the absurdity and
impossibility the direction given to time by a capitalocentric temporality – that is, growth
as the direction that measure progress, progress’ goal as infinite abundance in a finite
world. Or, more specifically, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence shows that such an objective
is nothing but or no less than, contingently created and always re-created anew
(differently at each moment). In other words, in spite of its self-representation as the only
possible reality, in spite of its naturalization (capitalism being presented as the end of
History, growth as the engine of progress and capitalocentric progress as our inevitable,
ultimate end toward which we ineluctably tend), the idea of growth as our end is indeed a
contingent creation of meaning (and uchronia is undeniably highly meaningful to many),
one that we can get out of or leave, rather than the meaning. Furthermore, time is
consequently infinite: no end preexists at the origin, because there is neither origin nor
end, and this is true of both senses of the term “end”: as “the end,” that signs the closing
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of the world’s story, the end in sight, and the end understood as a ultimate goal, a
direction or purpose. Nietzsche affirms that the universe of forces never attains
equilibrium, never gets a moment of calm: its force, its agitation are always of the same
intensity. Whatever the state of the world of forces may attain, it must of necessity
already have reached it. And this state must have been reached an incommensurable
number of times. Reason and unreason are off topic, and all meaning is creatively
contingent, contingently created. If this is the case, then capitalism is but one assemblage
of the forces in the incalculable possible assemblages of forces which will repeat
themselves over and over, ad infinitum. The end of the world cannot correspond or be
equated to or suspected of resulting from the end of capitalism: capitalism will end,
growth and progress cannot, of necessity, be linear.
And this is where things become interesting, as in this doctrine converge
necessity, contingency, and creation – thus freedom. The consequent possibility to get out
of uchronia is what I will examine in the subsequent chapters. In the mean time, we may
think back on the problems of urgency, limits, growth, linear progress, future generations
qua the lens made available by the eternal return. I have synthesized these critiques
thanks to the critical concept of uchronia: we urgently need to extract ourselves from
logics of growth because they fail to acknowledge the limited resources for this planet.
Uchronia describes an assumption of infinite forces in a finite world and ever-postponed
end of abundance we allegedly cannot but pursue, as one would chase the horizon
imagining one can touch it until one exhausts oneself, not before having (re)produced,
meanwhile, (Earth-)exhausting modes of living. Uchronia denounces the naturalization of
this teleofinalism as a simultaneously timeless and idealized temporality. It also sheds
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light on the abstraction characteristic of the futurism at play in such teleology: ecological
destruction (life-denying forces, nihilism, or reactive forces in Nietzschean language) is
justified today, as today is subjected to an ever-postponed, abstract tomorrow of total
abundance that will never come. This (re)productive futurism bypasses the concrete
presence of all of future’s infinity in the present moment, our concrete interdependence
upon future generations of life forms which incalculable configurations repeat themselves
eternally (a vitalism quite different from the vitalism which subsumes the present under
abstract future life). Uchronia refers to this nihilist abstraction, to life-denying forces that
envision time as ending with capitalist growth.
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CHAPTER III
WAIT! LOOK!
ANTI-UCHRONIAS: TIME TO PAUSE AND THINK

Figure 1 : Blu, Untitled.
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My Hands Are Tied, Time Is Money
In November 2008, Italian graffiti artist Blu spent three nights and three days covering an
immense wall in downtown Berlin with a mostly black and white picture representing the
white shirt-wearing torso and arms of a person tightening their tie. Probably about 30
meters high, the black and white of the painting did allow one major exception: the goldcolored watches ornating the person’s wrists. These were connected together by a heavy
golden chain, as though the person was in fact wearing a strange kind of handcuffs. Thus
the tie and gigantic hands, the stiff neck, stage a businessman with his “hands tied” … by
time – of course: “time is money.” Yet, more than a tie constraining his hands, time
literally emprisons, arrestingthe very powerful figure who uneasily tightens the knot
around his neck. For urban spectators also, the image is arresting, inviting to at least
glimpse, if not pause and contemplate. The gigantic painting almost has the viewer hear
the gulping sound produced as the giant character swallows his saliva reaching for the
reassuring symbol of his power. He ordersthis tie so as to grant himself better composure,
as though he did not quite believe his own formulas: “you understand, my hands are
tied… time is money,” echoes unconvincingly, with a broken voice from a giant chest.
My hands are tied indeed, my tie tightening, time is money, and qua the symbol of these
golden watches chained together, time and money intertwine to tie the hands which
desperately tie the tie. The shape is that of a watch, the material is gold, the function,
multiple: that of handcuffs, to tie. That of watches, to tick. But the tying around the neck
is self-imposed, initiated directly by the hands, though spectators may imagine it as
nervous. And the watches must have been desired, and then bought: the rational choice of
a rational consumer and powerful producer, decision-maker, business owner?
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We know that Blu took three nights and three days to create this graffiti, as he
provides “time-lapse” videos attesting of the process. Watchers, eyes wide open and
mouth agape, discover the projector-equipped crane going up and down with the
painting’s progression, as they re-live the graffiti artist’s insomnia in an anxious,
titillating, compressed version. We’ve all seen time-lapse videos of flowers blooming, of
suns rising and setting, of all kinds of otherwise slow nonhumans’ movement and change,
compressed so as to be made visible to the human eye. Here, we watch an urban
landscape in the making. The result of these three nights and three days points at the
prison of a certain temporality and its inextricable relationship to capitalist economies. It
exposes the attentive interpreter to ready-made statements referring to a realism rendered
absurd by the art which caricatures such realism: “time is money”; “my hands are tied.”
This is a pristine example of what I read as “anti-uchronian” art.
On December 11th 2014, this fresco was erased, most likely by the artist himself.
The ephemerity of street art is also what grants it power and impact. Headlines
concerning this event – as the erasure is also an event – read: “the most famous fresco of
Berlin committed suicide last night.” The erasure took place in the context of planning in
this section of Berlin, that were including high-end luxury residences, whose inhabitants
will surely wear ties and gold watches similar to the giant character that vanished
overnight. Appearing and disappearing in ephemeral ways makes the life of a graffiti
painting meaningful beyond the actual duration of its existence, which makes graffiti art
indeed quite a great candidate for producing anti-uchronian moments or glimpses. Blu
has created explicitly environmentalist art. The first section of this chapter includes a
close reading of a couple of his frescos, supporting my clarification of the meaning I
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create for the concept of anti-uchronia. For the time being (or becoming), suffice is to say
that “anti-uchronia” is not the opposite of “uchronia,” a symmetrically oppositional, other
temporality that would replace it. Instead, anti-uchronia is about arresting the eye and
making us see uchronia for what it is. For instance, it is “anti-uchronian” to call uchronia,
“uchronia.” So is my elan to and the process of creatingthe concept of “uchronia,”i.e to
describe capitalocentric temporality as “uchronian,” reversing charges usually directed at
radical politics, so as to call capitalist economies “utopian” and “uchronian.” Antiuchronia is a critical glimpse and/or gaze at uchroniaas the contingent temporality that
denies its contingency, presenting itself as neutral. It makes clear that this temporal order
of things is not a given, that it is not self-evident and could have been otherwise – while it
is true, at the same time, that so many factors explain it, that it is highly overdetermined.
This in fact is the essence of contingency: that which, though over-determined, or
perhaps because it is over-determined, could also have been otherwise. Anti-uchronian
art, science, thought, events, would be those which allow to see the essential contingency
in a temporal order that attempts to naturalize itself, in spite of all odds, as it is, in fact,
timeless, disconnected, absurdly teleological, unsustainable and unbearable, as it always
already postpones the promise it carries, running after sand castles in clouds so
destructive to our Earth presents. So “uchronia” is itself an anti-uchronian concept. The
reality that anti-uchronia refers to is uchronian, but daring to call it that when it claims so
loudlyan exclusive access to realism or pragmatism, is anti-uchronian. Consequently, the
entirety of the argument in the preceding chapter – and in this dissertation – strives to be
anti-uchronian. Anti-uchronia allows to expose capitalocentric temporality as contingent:
it starts the process of de-centering it, of denaturalizing it – in an understanding of nature
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as static and devoid of change, which as Tim Morton (2010) has suggested, is precisely
the problem with the concept of nature, naturalizing something would be coterminous
with making it immutable, true at all times and in all places, for all beings. An antiuchronian argument, anti-uchronian art, moments where the sciences lean toward antiuchronia, all propose a vision that allows to see that capitalist consumerism and
productivism are not naturally the ineluctable direction history necessarily takes, the hope
for the only horizon possible, the only thing to look forward to, the measure of all things.
Anti-uchronia takes a (first) stab at capitalocentric time. It may not (yet) propose
alternative temporalities, but it shows the non-inevitability of uchronia, which, being
teleological, presents itself as inevitable by definition. In exposing tension where things
were previously taken for granted, anti-uchronia opens up a breach for alternative
temporalities to potentially emerge or be noticed.
This chapter’s goal is to take a moment to think what anti-uchronia means, how to
foster this eye, these occasions for pauses. One of anti-uchronia’s effect is to suspend the
race of compressed, uchronian temporality, or at least to disrupt its pace. It is not an elan
to stop time itself: rather, it intends to make time, suspending or disrupting or shaking the
frenetic march of consumption and production, asking whether it is all really necessary
after all, and if necessity doesn’t in fact demand that we take completely different
directions. Is there only one possible direction to time? Is this temporality the one one
should want, the one one “cannot not want” (Spivak, 1996, p. 26) play with, create,
simply because it claims to be, or assumes it is, the only possible horizon? Is this
temporality even possible, let alone the only possible one, granted that it assumes
illimited growth in a world with limited resources? Should we take neo-liberal capitalist
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logics at their word when they call for present sacrifices on the grand altar of growth,
because growth sets the arrow of time, because one day there will be abundance for all?
Should we bow to that future today, even when we are seeing everywhere, today, that the
present sacrifices are tremendously destructive of both human and nonhuman life? These
questions, all anti-uchronian questions, inevitably take the form of a pause. A pause that
is much needed in a time when the paces, speeds and rhythms of capitalocentric, growthdriven progress – uchronia– along with its effects – the approach of limits, and an urgent,
pressing need for change – are at such odds with possibilities to make the time to think
through necessary, vast and rapid changes. So anti-uchronia invests the tension between
the urgency of change in a rapidly changing world, and the need for time to think through
such change.
This chapter meanders through a variety of texts and genres, in the hope of
instillingmy conceptualization of anti-uchronia with further precision and substantial
meaning, and because percepts and affects found in a variety of discourses are capable of
shedding light on, even informing, a concept like anti-uchronia. I find what I call “antiuchronian” critique in a number of sites and discourses, both artistic and scientific
(though also assuming there is more than mere resonance between these: art draws from
the sciences and these are meaning-creating).The examples developed here are thus
substantiating the concept of uchronia, not only because or in the sense that they illustrate
it as perceptual or affective forms resonating with it, but also in the sense that they
effectively support, ground and fuel the following conceptual work: part of the stakes in
what follows is to show that anti-uchronian moments are in fact proliferating at each
instant, all around and with us. Breaches opening up space for doubt and challenge of
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hegemonic uchronia are erupting with the eruption of Gaia, with our context of ecological
crisis, showing that uchronia was, in fact, never really entirely sustained or sustainable –
never will be, even if it suffers adjectival modifications of the sort. It becomes especially,
visibly, fragilized and fragmented now. I read anti-uchronian moments into Blu’s graffiti,
then in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s climatological reports. As it
caricatures the paces and speeds of hypermodernity to depict visions of horror, Serge
Brussolo’s science fiction is yet another example of anti-uchronian vision. Finally, Yoann
Bourgeois’ contemporary circus piece Cavale suspends acrobats jumping and spiraling
on a trampoline and stairs built in white rectangular forms with the curvy Alps as their
background. From street art, to climatology, to circus, anti-uchronia becomes more full.
The first section weaves anti-uchronia to further considerations of Nietzsche’s eternal
return, qua Blu (I). The second draws from Hans Jonas’ concept of futurology to read
climatology, along Isabelle Stengers’ concept of idiocy, addressing multiple futures,
uncertainty in the future, as well as the need to pause and consider these (II). Finally,
Brussolo’s terrifying self-sustaining yet cannibal houses show anti-uchronia in the form
of caricature, and I spiral to close all these considerations back to the eternal return, qua a
series of cairological trampoline jumps (III). The goal of this peregrinating would be to
gather elements for answering more general questions about anti-uchronia and its
conditions of emergence, such as: what does anti-uchronia look like, mean, entail,
require? What do anti-uchronian moments comprise? What are anti-uchronian moments
and events, and what do they look and feel like when they take the form of percepts,
affects, concepts? What forms do they take? How may we foster conditions for antiuchronia to emerge more often?
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Environmental Street Art:
Fleeting, Quotidian Glimpses into Anti-Uchronia
This first section considers the relation between Nietzsche’s eternal return, his
exhortation to engage in the transvaluation of values, and anti-uchronia. I draw from the
ways in which graffiti artist Blu stages anti-uchronian visions and moments in the
quotidian of urban spaces to give further form to anti-uchronia.
Nietzsche’s Hammer
In the previous chapter, I advanced Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return as one
possible path to start contesting the teleological form of capitalocentric temporalities,
uchronia. Nietzsche taught us that envisioning time as teleology is no less than nihilistic.
If time had an origin that contained its own end, if time had actually “started” to unfold
and could be reduced to an unfolding from a supposed origin point toward an end, there
would be nothing rather than something. The world, if it could “reach” an “end,” or be
moved by “reason,” aiming linearly toward an ineluctable end-point would already have
reached such a state. If the present forces could reach an optimal or balanced or maximal
or harmonious state, they would already have attained it. Because it isn’t the case, we can
deduce that no such end or origin exist. Time instead is radically exempt of both reason
and unreason. Any direction or meaning we may see in it is willed, created, and imposed
rather than (re)presenting an actual, objective teleology or sense the universe would
simply have. Thus, claims to realism dictating one course as a given cannot be believed
to be given so easily. More precisely put, they may (perhaps should) be doubted insofar
as they attempt to reduce our presents and futures to one single direction that we
allegedly could not but accept as the only possible meaning or direction. Certainly,
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meaning, sense and direction may be willfully created and imposed on the eternal
succession of chaotic moments owing nothing to reason or unreason (and thus the
adjective “chaotic” isn’t satisfactory either: “creative” would be more accurate). Claims
that one single course with a specific end exists – a course which originated at a point
causally coherent with it and that explains it – are simply attempts to assert one particular
specific and contingent meaning: no matter the claim to know what is ahead and what
should be done according to linear, teleological discourses, by no means are there
absolute meanings or self-evident, predictable directions, beyond those created
contingently (this does not by any means deny, either, the force of such contingency: it
rather highlights it, such that we may re-direct resistance, or anti-uchronia, accordingly).
In later chapters I will return to the ethical implications of the eternal return and to
its ontological implications (Deleuze, 1962) – the eternity of the instant situating us
necessarily in a world of becoming as opposed to one that “develops” or “grows” (see
especially my concept of synchrony in chapter 6). For the moment, I would like to focus
on specifically “anti-uchronian” implications of the eternal return as a critique of
teleological time. If we accept the radical contingency resulting from this, the implication
is that we rule out reductions of our futures to one single direction dictated by economic
growth as the ultimate measure of progress, the imperative to even create or subscribe to
ideals and desires of “progress,” and to the sole possibility of capitalist futures. Not only
is “another world possible,” as alter-globalization contesters have claimed, but many are
(or, rather, become). This excludes granting growth the status of unavoidable value. We
can start to laugh back, when capitalocentric detractors of radical environmental justice
or cooperative practices and worlds laugh at these, when they claim that these modes of
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living and these practices are “not realistic,” “… remember, be reasonable, you know we
need growth!” We can then laugh back and simply ask: “do you? What makes this value
so self-evidently valuable? What makes you so certain this is ‘the way to go’”?
The Nietzschean project aimed precisely to the “transvaluation of all values,” 41
and this is linked to the critique offered by Nietzsche’s central doctrine of the eternal
return. 42 If there is no single meaning, sense or direction to the unfolding of time, all
values should be suspected and examine, potentially rejected, rather than accepted as fact.
“Progress,” and “growth” as the instrument or value for its measurement, are no
exceptions to this need to sound each idol with a careful hammer (Nietzsche, 2005).
Nietzsche’s philosophical hammer has at times been imagined as the doctor’s, but it can
also be likened to the sculptor’s, who sounds the matter she is working so as to carve and
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In Death of the Posthuman Essays on the Brink of Extinction vol. 1, Claire Colebrook (2014) argues: “the
humanism and anthropocentrism that have marked Western thought need to give way to a new relation to
the environment. (…) We would require what Nietzsche referred to as a transvaluation of values. Rather
than generating values on the basis of instrumental reason or utility – rather, that is, than assuming that the
worth of an object or action is gauged by how much it furthers our own purposes – we would criticize
means/ends rationality. We would not assume that all valid means are justified if they serve to maintain
humanity in its current mode. We would, at the very least, consider values as if from a point of view
different than that of ‘man.’” Though I whole-heartedly agree that a Nietzschean transvaluation of all
values is necessary in times of ecological crisis, we must go further than formulate this transvaluation in the
terms above, in my view: if we simply stop treating nonhumans as means to ends, are we really resorting to
a Nietzschean “transvaluation of values,” or are we merely extending to the nonhuman world Kantian
moral imperatives inviting us to treat alterity as an end and not as means, (which would assume that this
imperative has already been met with regards to humans, and this isn’t even the case – Bruno Latour has
provocatively underscored this when he advanced an exhortation to “start treating humans as well as we
treat animals”)? Nietzsche’s transvaluation of all values goes further than a criticism of the means/ends
rationality resulting in the extension/inclusion of the treatment as ends to all living beings. Seeing the
connection between his radical problematization of morality and his concept of eternal return, that is
examining the need to rework temporality for such a transvaluation to be possible, goes beyond such
extension/inclusion. It certainly requires “a point of view different than that of ‘man’,” as Colebrook puts it,
but it does more than “criticize means/ends rationality,” as it abolishes this dualism, and underscores that at
no moment of our lived experience or histories, is reason and unreason actually pertinent.
42
Here I’m intentionally opting for a specific reading of Nietzsche. Some may argue that the transvaluation
of values does not so easily cohere with the concept of eternal return, or at least be skeptical of the
correlation. However, many commentators of Nietzsche have read his radical attacks on morality as more
systematically linked with the eternal return than this seemingly unsystematic or anti-systematic thinker
may have us suspect, from Lou Von Salome’s interpretation (2001), to Heidegger (who, erasing Salome’s
essay, claimed to be the first thinker to read Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as central to his whole
thought), and of course Gilles Deleuze (2012; 2013).
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create something new and get rid of hollow parts. Eternal return’s radical attacks against
teleological time and against claims to knowledge regarding “where we are headed,”
against claims to a reason guiding the world toward one goal or end, all act like the
hammer sounding the unquestioned value of capitalist growth as hollow. The hollow
resonance signals growth as merely one possible meaning created in a contingent time
period and which we may proceed to smash. All meaning is created contingently, as the
symptoms of specific living conditions and configurations of power, specific
arrangements in the forces of the universe which keep re-assembling in new ways yet
remain the same at every moment (the infinity of the past and that of the future being
contained in each instant). All profoundly rooted beliefs that claim to provide a general
orientation to life and determine it as fact (which is the sense in which Nietzsche uses the
term “value” in his denunciations), must be subjectedto questioning, problematizing. For
our purposes here, we can then see that history wasn’t always going in a capitalist
direction, doesn’t have to, and ultimately isn’t. There is no such thing as an “end of
history,” let alone one that would be characterized by the triumph of capitalism. Instead
of such linear temporality of progress measured by growth as the indicator of value
erected on a pedestal masking any other possible value, anti-uchronian moments let the
possibility for other temporal orders of things glitter (Foucault, 2014, p. xvii). Here I am
playing on the multiple sense of the term “value”: Nietzsche intended it as those
assertions which impose a general orientation to life and were taken as facts: he famously
was referring to morality, which may not seem so self-evidently the case when one refers
to growth as value in the sense of measurement, quantitative indicator of economic
wealth. Yet this is precisely part of my point: growth may seem to belong a different,
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morally neutral realm of economy, where morality is put aside and profit reigns instead.
However the fetishized nature of a compulsory imperative to growth is not value-neutral
in the moral sense any more than it is neutral in an economic, quantitative sense, and
growth is indeed celebrated as the object of a desire that set a general orientation to life
though taken as fact. This morally-charged sense of growth is especially visible in
moments of crisis, when growth becomes actually absent but virtually omnipresent due to
claims of being missed, and all the more desired, all the more crucial in setting the stage
and direction of teleological progress: then discourses explicitly tied to morality
proliferate, as with the current discourse of “austerity.” Nietzsche called for the
transvaluation of all values, and as a crucial one informing what counts as the real,
growth must be subjected to such a critique if we are to take his exhortation seriously.
Anti-uchronia thus corresponds to events, moments, visions, artistic, scientific,
philosophical and other percepts, affects, and concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) which
open up the possibility for such alternative temporal orders erupting, and force uchronia
to shake and crack, as they allow to shed the veil off something that up until now was
cloaking itself as the only possible reality. The doctrine of eternal return admits no selfevident value to growth, and cannot concede to pseudo (and/or completely) Hegelians
claim that capitalism is “the end of history” (Fukuyama and the likes) or even an
inevitable “stage” of it (capitalocentric visions of history in general). Anti-uchronia refers
to the percepts, affects, concepts, and events which shed light on uchronia as uchronian,
as an impossibility under the guise of the only possible or desirable course. If capitalist
economies’ hegemony constitute a moment or a “stage,” it is not in the teleological sense,
but rather in the theatrical sense, or in the sense of it being part of teleological theatrics:
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not that they don’t exist, not that the play isn’t indeed taking place, being enacted and
performed, but rather, if the world is a stage and men and women (as well as nonhumans
and hybrids) merely players, then several scripts, interpretations, performances can be
written: actors are also playwrights, improvisers who ascribe meanings to what they do as
they go, for a multitude, a quasi-infinity of reasons. Granted some of the improvising
troop and direction is willing, the plot may twist in unpredictable ways, in surprising
ways. Of course, twisting a plot that has so far been written and performed as predictacle
and coherent, as going without saying, is far from easy. But difficult writing has not
always prohibited new meanings from being created. The present and the future are open,
and meanings, ascribed values are just that: ascribed. This makes them contestable:
concurrent, equally convincing scripts are possible. Anti-uchronia doesn’t (yet) propose
an alternative script, but sheds light on the one script that presented itself as “reality,”
showing the ropes of its show, and it envisions the possibility for other possibilities.We
can start to contest the reign of growth, the inevitable extraction of surplus value by those
who own the means of production (and may now be dispossessed), from Earth and hitting
the metabolic rift (Foster, 2000; Foster, York & Clark, 2011), and from working human
bodies. The eternal return offers an anti-uchronian moment to reject the evaluation of a
place based on its “GDP”’s increase, and to question the preference of such increases as
value indicators to the detriment of, say, the increases in CO2 emissions which growth
depends upon – whether it be decoratively qualified as “sustainable” or not: I return to
this critique of sustainable growth in chapter 3.This latter fact can start being granted as
much meaning, being taken just as seriously, as the way growth is taken to be
synonymous of wealth, as the way wealth is equated to progress and progress to the good,

176

to what must and should be. Anti-uchronia, helped by the anti-teleological moment of the
doctrine of eternal return, sheds light on the ways wealth can happen to the detriment of
concrete, hybrid, present life.
Blu’s Spraypaint
It is precisely such a contestatory, anti-uchronian staging I want to turn to now, giving
further flesh to anti-uchronian visions. The goal is not only or simply to provide an
example that would act as an analogy, or an allegory, or a representation of anti-uchronia,
i.e affording me a parallel to the concept of anti-uchronia, only in artistic form. Rather,
my point is that anti-uchronian moments and visions already coexist with claims of
monopoly over reality and over value performed by capitalocentric times and
temporalities, i.e anti-uchronia always already is at war with uchronia. In other words, I
am not intending to draw a parallel between my concept of anti-uchronia and the
affective effect or the percepts produced by the art work I am discussing, so much as I am
trying to argue that this art work itself is indeed anti-uchronian, it offers anti-uchronian
moments and glimpses. The frescos I describe below are instances, eruptions of antiuchronian art work, through which values are provocatively re-examined and dislodged
from their pedestals, through a new eye, where and when time may pass in an
unpredictable direction that suspends capitalocentric temporality, where for a moment
one sees or feels that things do not have to be so growth-oriented or growth-desiring after
all.
The artist has a creative position to the real: armed with a hammer or spraypaint,
s/he may recognize, suggest, evoke or bring to life several possibilities for the real:
possibilities of sculpting it, of carving several lives, life paths, modes of living,into
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possibility. In these anti-uchronian cases art makes the contingency of a naturalized, selfnaturalizing temporality visible… before potentially making other orders of things, other
temporalities glitter. Two moments or dimensions constitute the make-up of antiuchronia: one, anti-uchronian art shakes uchronia and in shaking it, suggests that we were
always already dealing with a fragile strawman (of the kind, so real yet disembodied, that
could be burned in some festival of the Arizonan desert). It takes down the emperor’s
clothes and shows he was always naked underneath: anti-uchronian art suggests that what
is taken for a necessity – accumulating capital, extracting surplus-value in exploitative
ways, growing capitalist economies – may be an impossibility, or, at least, suicidal,
nihilist. Second, anti-uchronia glimpses at what could be, instead. In exposing uchronia
for what it is, it makes it possible to think and say that other worlds are possible.
Anti-uchronia is thus the possibility that there may be other possibilities. It is not
yet an alternative temporality, but rather the pointing to uchronia as such, as what it is, as
timeless temporality (again, naming uchronia is anti-uchronian already), and the
suggestion which follows from this pointing. It is the invitation, the exhortation:“let’s
claim the time to imagine something else.” It is not yet, not necessarily, the imagining
itself: simply the suggestion or provocation to imagine. Anti-uchronia is the start of
another temporality, “only” in the sense of an interruption so as to make possible another
durable temporality, “only” insofar as it sees uchronia for what it is (“only” is in
quotation marks here, because this is already a lot, and quite difficult). Anti-uchronia
steps out, jumps and sees uchronia in relief… in this gasping for air, this moment of
suspension in (but not of) time, we see that growth’s value is questionable, and that
posing the question may be invaluable. As we will see from the following instances, it
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also interrupts paces and speeds that make it both necessary and seemingly impossible to
stop and think, to stop and contemplate. Where the Nietzschean hammer allows to sound
the idols and shake those which turn out to be hollow out of their pedestals, where the
value of growth and the direction of progress are questioned by the doctrine of the eternal
return’s anti-teleological moment, so graffiti artist Blu’s spraypaint offers city corners
and walls a moment to hail pedestrians and drivers’ frenetic march, making time for
questioning whether this march and its surrounding makes any sense, and what sense
making this is, what value it claims and whether this claim shatters when shaken, in spite
or maybe because of an urgency already omnipresent yet backgrounded.
One of Blu’s frescos (see picture 1 below, page x) portrays a train made of cars,
trucks, small grocery store carts-shaped wagons carrying commodities all rotten and piled
as in a landfill, while other wagons transport oil barrels. Additional wagons are stuffed
with dollar bills. The driver of the factory-shaped locomotive fills theses bills to burn
them in the engine. The factory-locomotive is ornated with long chimneys evoking a coal
plant. The resulting smoke above the locomotive traverses the dark green background.
The train dangerously approaches an abyss, the railtracks hanging in the air, distorted, left
free of a collapsed ground which opens into a threatening cliff. The progression seems
slow, but the fall inevitable, though the stillness of the fresco suspends the movement as
the spectator gasps. But the train worker who feeds the engine cannot see what the train is
facing through the entrance of the engine – which looks like a bank and bears the dollar
and the euro signs. The front of the locomotive, with its external plumbing and triangular
roofs adding to the dollar and euro, bars the view. Scales are all out of proportion, as the
train is not much taller than the human being who bends over to burn the banknotes. The
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grocery carts are the size of wagons – are indeed wagons. Four of the last wagons one can
make out in the horizon,at the tail of the train, are military tanks yet appear to be of equal
size as the grocery carts. This could be a small freight train carrying open wagons during
the gold rush, yet the truck is shorter than two barrels piled on top of each other, which
are the same height as the factory.
This fresco contains myriad signs, symbols and symptoms that remind the viewer
of the quotidian which capitalist lives praise and value: consumer items, dollar and euro
signs, cars, fuel, banknotes, tanks, etc. Yet in this image, these are not heading toward
beautiful horizons of peace and material comfort for all those consumers and producers
who worked hard enough. In fact, the character embodying human hard work – the only
discernable human presence in the fresco – has no clue where he is headed, however
determined his frenetic bill-burning and the subsequent march of the train is: he is about
to collapse in an abyss which he can’t see, yet he inexorably focuses intense efforts so as
to move forward. He is a uchronian protagonist, and this fresco stages uchronia,
caricaturing it just enough for viewers to start seeing it as such and to quit thinking of it
as a coherent or sensible reality, to quit thinking of it as that which needs to be. Antiuchronia, in this case, thus takes the form of caricature. But caricature is not so much an
exaggeration meant to make one laugh or to mock. Though there is a cynically mocking
dimension here, if the caricature were merely an “exaggeration,” the effect would be
much less disturbing, one could dismiss it as simply untrue, or reduce the disturbing
aspects of the image as those parts in the exaggeration that inflate and misrepresent
“reality.” Rather, here caricature performs a different vision of our surrounding, a
competing narrative. The fresco contains just enough traits in common with what we take
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to be reality (and take for granted as something we have very limited capacity to
influence or change), so as to be intelligible to the viewer as a sort of mirror offered to
her. Yet the reflection is reflective in both the mirror and the critical sense, i.e it distorts
these intelligible traits of reality to underscore a different reading of reality, one that aims
to be just as convincing. That is, in spite of the scales of the train worker’s body, the
grocery-carts and military tank wagons, the factory-shaped locomotives all being out of
proportion, the troubling thing is that we can recognize these images, we can identify the
closeness of these key objects in the consumerist and productivist, hegemonic capitalist
economies we are part of, and this proximity is uncanny, because in the reflection, the
locomotive driver will end up smashing the train and himself into pieces, down in the
abyss. The fresco thus interpellates the viewer, who may wish to hail: jump off! Stop! Hit
the breaks! In the grocery-cart wagons, one recognizes objects onehas bought and the
very omnipresent dollar bills of one’s quotidian lives, perhaps identifying with the
locomotive driver, toiling for such destructive labor without having a clue of the direction
he’s taking. Or, one may feel repulsion and contempt at this stubborn character pushing a
train inexorably to its own destruction, while leaving a barren background of ecological
destruction around the tracks. One may feel a need for insubordination against the
locomotive driver and wish to abandon the train, or to stop watching it pass passively,
and stage its derailing. Or one may look forward to its falling into the abyss, remaining in
the barren desert left in its tracks in the hope of restoring some life there, perhaps stealing
a couple of actually useful items from the wagons as they pass by, so as to use and
recycle them to support survival once the fall takes place. Anotherpossibility, of course,
is onewhere despair prevails. The viewer may recognize the reflection as such, and feel
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immense pain knowing that this image is indeed accurately reflecting the situation. The
principal effect, then, corresponds to the first moments of the two dimensions in antiuchronia which I outlined above: here anti-uchronia denounces uchronia and sees it for
what it is, but the second moment is lacking (or not yet there), and the implication of antiuchronian critique, that other worlds are possible, is painfully absent, or at best, left as
bare as the landscape, in the form of a question mark: and if the train does fall, what will
we have left, what will remain, what will its remains be like? However, even in this latter
case, the fresco then provides an occasion for catharsis: Blu’s train evokes the pain of
being unable to be carbon-neutral on a moving train, the feeling of inability to stop its
march, and the current human, all too human condition as one so caught up in said march
that it makes us stubbornly incapable of seeing the direction capitalist ecological
destruction is having us take.
Even in this solely catharsistic latter effect the fresco may have, the antiuchronian moment is carving a crack into uchronia, insofar as it endents, perhaps shatters,
its credibility as the direction we allegedly cannot but take. A viewer standing in front of
this graffiti may venture a claim like: “but we need to keep burning these to move
forward, don’t you see we won’t keep making money otherwise?” Yet such claim is
made uneasy and the burden of proof is reversed: in this graffiti’s vicinity
environmentalist world-making may not have to justify its feasibility as much as
capitalist futures do. The prioritization of capital accumulation even in the face of an
abyss where all capital collapses into pieces sounds hollow, like an idol sounded by the
attentive sculptor or Nietzschean transvaluation’s hammer. As mentioned before, antiuchronian concepts, affects and perceptsreverse the charges and the burden of proof: one
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cannot dismiss those who demand that we slow down or stop, with a shrug of the
shoulder and a “yes but let’s be realistic: we need to keep burning.” Anti-uchronian
vision makes it possible to laugh, pause, and perhaps (hopefully), respond: “there won’t
be anything much to burn among the scattered parts of this whole train of yours after
you’ve crashed it into the abyss: that makes your imperative to ever more capital
accumulation, to furthering capitalist growth, absurd at best, off-topic at most, and
delusional, if we’re being serious.” This can be followed by an elan to stop to look and
notice the destroyed and barren landscape on one’s way, around the linear tracks one has
obsessively and blindly focused on. Instead of keeping on burning these bills frenetically,
it becomes clear that looking ahead and around is needed: “you may be burning bills and
we understand it’s your passion, but you are destoying the landscape around you, along
with your own back, and you are riding into a void.” As Latour has put it, moderns have
long been “running to the future, with their backs turned” (2009). Blu’s train fresco
provokes a desperate and urgent sense of need for jumping off the train or hitting the
breaks, or for pushing it into the cliff to make it disappear and start caring for the
damaged landscape. This fresco depicts uchronia as such, and causes viewers to desire
slowing down, it poses interpellating questions about whether they may identify with the
locomotive driver with his bent back who blindly follows the tracks.
As a caricature staged on an urban wall in the graffiti genre, Blu’s anti-uchronian
form interestingly points to the shape anti-uchronian moments may take. This graffiti
proposes ephemeral glimpses into the absurd promises made by capitalist economies
where accumulation and growth are prioritized over possibilities for life. The nature of
this art is ephemeral: this is not only because graffiti art consists of intervention on urban
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walls that often, regularly get painted over, covered either by the next graffiti or by
municipal intervention “cleaning” the walls which artists may have “vandalized.” In fact,
Blu’s renown now allows him to practice his art in the legal rather than the “vandal” form
(note that graffiti artists’ language reappropriates this pejorative term, so the adjective I
am using here is not a negative value judgment by any means, but rather an attempt to
espouse this genre’s vocabulary). The fact that Blu can legally paint city walls now that
he is a world-recognized artist does not take the spirit of graffiti art away from his works,
as one that used to occur in a hurry to paint before the police arrests or chases the artist,
thus happening by night, in hidden, quick, urgent manners. The tradition of fast execution
remains, beyond the relative institutionalization or tolerance benefiting artists like Blu.
But in addition, urban viewers of graffiti also experience Blu’s anti-uchronian artwork in
the paradoxical form of a quick glimpse, as they go about their quotidian itineraries in the
city’s business and “productive” pace, while also inviting to pause in front of the frescos
and contemplate for a longer moment what the artist portrays. Graffiti is a form of
interruption of fast-pace city living, while also espousing it (with the above-mentioned
speed of execution), insofar as it offers some of the rare still images in city-scapes which
aren’t for commercial or profit purposes. Thus the specific artistic genre of graffiti aptly
lends itself to an anti-uchronian moment: anti-uchronia contains two dimensions, one
showing uchronia for what it is, the other an opener of possibilities, and it often does this
in investing the tension between urgency and need to pause, in the form of an
interruption, and invitation to take the time to think and imagine. It is thus a (critical)
intervention on temporalities, and at the same time its temporal form is specifically
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interruptive (I will further elaborate on this point in section 3 of this chapter, which
discusses the cairological character of anti-uchronia).
So anti-uchronia, in these cases, proposes two moments: a critical one that shows
uchronia as such, and a positive one that opens the possibility for other possibilities. It
does so in the form of a pause, either long or short, an eruption into the quotidian and its
assumptions, its normalcy. As exemplified in the case of the train fresco described and
analyzed above, anti-uchronian art may take the form of caricature, and such caricature
may provoke a desperate desire to hit the breaks, showing uchronia as delusional, and
darkly mocking it. Yet, because anti-uchronia also encompasses the subsequent
implication of possibilities’ opening, caricature may transform into fantasy. This second
moment of anti-uchronian critique is anti-uchronia’s imaginative dimension, or its call for
an expansion of imagination. Here another fresco painted by Blu constitutes a useful
additional instance of anti-uchronia, one taking the form of fantasy rather than caricature
this time (see second picture below). On a large wall bordering a sidewalk and a bus stop,
Blu plays with scales and disproportion once more, painting four giant bikes riding on
and crushing thousands of cars. It is unclear whether the countless cars are simply all
parked statically very near each other, abandoned on a dense yet immense plane, or
whether this is to represent an incredible mass of traffic stuck on an endlessly large
highway. Have these subsequently been abandoned, their numbers forbidding them to
make any progress? Have the drivers simply deserted the vehicles as they couldn’t move
anymore, or have people intentionally stored these cars there, and if so is it so as to
abandon them, or is this, perhaps, a parking lot for cars just freshly out of the factory
ready to be sold? Either way, the cars form a dense carpet soil extending to the horizon.
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The giant bikers’ heads aren’t in the frame of the mural, which further confirms their
giant scale to the viewer’s eye. All that’s visible is the bikers relaxed, leisurely, slowly
yet inexorably and perhaps terrifyingly pushing legs, dressed with skirts, pants and shoes.
The most visible one wears a T-shirt and is slightly bent over in a determined yet cautious
pose leaving a trail of crushed car parts behind her or his bike’s wheels, which sinkinto
the car-carpet, down like war trenches, or like the trail of a demolition machine. The play
on scale, in spite or maybe because of the stillness of the large graffiti, evokes slow
motion, and the slow, sadically pleasuring sound of creeking metal being folded and
flattened by the giant bike wheels. Just like with the train graffiti, and with the
businessman wearing golden watches who opened this chapter, the human element of the
painting is but an evocation, an elliptic suggestion: the time-bound businessman was
headless, the train was moved into space with only one human worker and no human
passenger being visible, he occupied little space in the whole wall: he was bent over,
almost crippled by his blind effort to burn dollar bills. With these giant bikes and carcarpet graffiti, Blu suggests human presence in an elliptic manner again, as the frame
only includes the enormous bikers’ legs, their torso at most. Mostly, Blu’s graffiti insists
on the material world produced and/or destroyed by humans who are much smaller or
much bigger than it. The play on disproportionate scales ricochets into the way the
viewer can imagine the movement’s pace, as both the train and the bikes seem to move
inexorably, perhaps slowly, surely with great strain, while paradoxically unstoppable.
Life, worlds, seen in slow motion, as in a magnifying glass, look contestable, as though
slowness acted like a quesiton mark imposed on a normally assertive, affirmative
necessity. In addition, here the scales evoke a reversal of quotidian city life’s power
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structure: this graffiti covers a large and long wall in an urban space, and even the most
bike-friendly cities are almost always dominated by cars, to the point even that car
circulation is one of the most striking characteristics of big agglomerations. They
dominate in terms of threat to life (cyclists’ lives more acutely than drivers’), cars usually
crushing bikes and bikers rather than the other way round. Cars also dominate as invasion
of air and noise, numbers, and, in appearance, speed (in lives where speed tends to be
valued more than slowness).
Many environmentalists have pointed out that, were bike lanes and public
transportation more broadly available to city dwellers, the speed of their commute on
bike would be significantly higher than that of a car. Andre Gorz and Ivan Illich were
among the first prominentecosophers to make this argument. Andre Gorz argued that cars
had not been invented as a democratically accessible good, but rather a luxury item, and
they immediately lost their value when the perception that every person or at least every
family should own at least one car came to prevail. The generalization of car ownership
also resulted in the congestion of cities. Bottlenecks and traffic jams continue to be
“addressed” by enlarging roads and streets, adding more ramps and highways or bridges,
which “solutions” never do anything but engorge cities with ever more cars. This, in turn,
also resulted in urban sprawl. Andre Gorz sums up some of the consequences of this
situation: “The spread of the private car has displaced mass transportation and altered city
planning and housing in such a way that it transfers to the car functions which its own
spread has made necessary” (1980). Cars allow the masses to live outside and away from
the cities, making for urban sprawl, and then become all the more needed, etc. Before
Gorz, Ivan Ilich also had underscored automobile paradoxes:
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The typical American devotes more than 1500 hours a year (which is 30 hours a
week, or 4 hours a day, including Sundays) to his [or her] car. This includes the
time spent behind the wheel, both in motion and stopped, the hours of work to pay
for it and to pay for gas, tires, tolls, insurance, tickets, and taxes. Thus it takes this
American 1500 hours to go 6000 miles (in the course of a year). Three and a half
miles take him (or her) one hour. In countries that do not have a transportation
industry, people travel at exactly this speed on foot, with the added advantage that
they can go wherever they want and aren't restricted to asphalt roads (quoted by
Gorz, 1980).
And, we could argue, the ever adding advantage of increased health due to lesser air and
noise pollution, accidents, and the superior amount of exercise. In other words, bikes are
already more powerful than cars in many ways. Yet they are outnumbered, dominated,
excluded by them in countless other ways, violent ones. This is what Blu’s cyclist fantasy
reverses.
The fantasy effect is especially salient as the fresco offers no context for these
car-crushing bikes: as mentioned above, we do not know what happened to these
hundreds of minuscule cars (whether they were parked or abandoned, stored, stuck in
traffic and abandoned…), we have no explanation, just two symbols, erupted as in dream,
in black and white, the bikes and the cars respectively blown or shrunk out of proportion.
The cars are indeed shrunk to the point of being annihilated, crushed by magnified, all
powerful bikes. The image is surrealist, invites spectators to pause and gaze not only at
this reversal of forces and power, but also at “reality,” or the hegemonic order of things,
as if in an inverted mirror. This surrealism could go so far as a complete disconnect from
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lived experience, from what counts as the real. Yet, just like in the train fresco caricature
required recognizable elements of quotidian consumerist and productivist life to be mixed
with emphases and exaggerations of scale and shape, dramatizing the sense of
destruction, so does the cycling fantasy require enough concreteness and the recognition
of quotidian figures, i.e connections to both what could be and what is, to function as an
intelligible fantasy. The effect is thus to invite a desire, perhaps partly perverse and
sadistic, for a different world where bikes would take their slow revenge against cars,
where cars don’t dictate the speeds and paces and spaces or scales, where relationship to
space is not mediated by engines but by feet and pedals, where bikes do not get crushed
by automobile traffic, but reverse the roles, and are recognized as more powerful
solutions to commuting needs. By presenting a seemingly absurd image where bikes’
force is inflated to be presented as overpowering cars, the fresco thus offers a vision at
the absurdity of the reign of cars, and opens up the question: what if we granted more
value to a world that would not celebrate these destructive machines, and rather destroyed
them to impose a biking, non-polluting world? What if we considered the possibility that
there may be other possibilities? This seemingly naïve question resonates with force
thanks to the scale of the mural and its situation on a city wall right by a street where cars
pass by every minute. Anti-uchronia thus points to the absurdity, the impossibility of
uchronia, caricaturing it to propose that it may be more fragile than it may be, an
impossibility that claims to be the only possible world. Blu’s graffiti art, positioned as it
is in the midst of city daily life, evocatively portrays uchronia under a light that critically
exposes it, inviting pauses to stop and think in spite of the fast pace of city movements.
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Figure 2: Blu, untitled.

Figure 3: Blu, untitled.
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Climate Science’s Anti-Uchronian Moments: Futurological Productions
Anti-uchronia thus comprises at least two moments: one consisting of critical
engagement with uchronia in which the latter temporality is shaken, fragilized, in which a
crack is open in the hegemonic teleology of capitalist growth showing its contingency, in
spite of uchronia’s overwhelming self-naturalizing pretension. Another anti-uchronian
moment gestures at the desire, the possibility, to imagine other possible temporalities, to
invent different worlds. Note that these two aspects or moments of anti-uchronia aren’t
necessarily simply distinct, and may be simultaneous. Anti-uchronia takes the form of
pause, of interruption, of suspension of time and in time, so as to make the time to think
in a fast-paced world, and a world where ecological crisis urgently calls for change. It is
both in spite and precisely because of this urgency and this fast pace, that anti-uchronia is
interruptive, a gasp for air, a making of time allowing new temporalities to perhaps be
considered. I have argued above that graffiti art is particularly well equipped to create
such anti-uchronian moments. Yet anti-uchronia may also erupt in very different
discursive realms than art, and in the following section of this chapter, I turn to scientific
reports on the climate crisis to underscore this.
Indeed, the sciences have played and continue to play a crucial role in grounding
certain environmentalist claims. Though in chapter V, I will interrogate the limits of these
grounds, for now I would like to underscore the ways in which the evidence generated by
climatology both has taken an anti-uchronian form and has anti-uchronian lessons to
teach us. Just like Blu’s artwork was more than a simple illustration or a parallel to my
concept of anti-uchronia, and rather constituted instances where anti-uchronia erupts, the
scientific reports I examine here are more than an instance of scientific knowledge
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containing similarities with my own concept of anti-uchronia. Neither is it simply
providing an analogy. As I will show, the anti-uchronian moment in the scientific reports
I focus on here productively offer additional layers to anti-uchronia: where Blu’s art
produced, evoked and provoked anti-uchronian percepts and affects, climatology presents
evidence and concepts that add to the very substance of my concept of anti-uchronia (I
will emphasize the multiplicity of climatologically produced futurity, as well as
uncertainty). Furthermore, the form in which these are advanced tells more about how
anti-uchronia may manifest itself or erupt (as we will see, anti-uchronia may take the
form of “idiotic” questions triggered by the conclusions of climatological reports).
The IPCC Reports as Futurology
In a famous passage from his famous Imperative of Responsibility which I already quoted
in chapter I, Hans Jonas underscored a historical shift from economic growth and
technological development as progress to their problematization as threats. Today, this
problematization continues to resonate with the eruptions of new ecological crises that
have gradually added to the specter of nuclear catastrophes: this shattering of the
teleology of progress is precisely what anti-uchronia points to. What could have been
taken for a certain pessimism on Jonas’ part turns out to be quite visionary instead, when
one considers even the most moderate or optimistic projections into the future the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced. This conglomeration
of world-renowned climate scientists within the United Nations synthesizes current
climatological knowledge every few years so as to produce diagnoses regarding climate
change, draft possible future scenarios, and offer prescriptive insights to policy makers.
The IPPC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)’s first part just came out last fall (focused on
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the physcial science basis) only to confirm “anthropogenic” global warming’s severity,
while the second and third Working Groups published their results (focused on
adaptation, vulnerability and mitigation) at the end of March 2014. As philosopher Emilie
Hache has also remarked (2010), the IPCC can be described as producing the
“futurology” which Hans Jonas was calling for. Jonas critiqued Kantian ethics as
incapable to face the new scale of human actions’ consequences which technological
“progress” had so drastically inflated. A new “ethics for the future” was needed: its
implementation would include multiple temporal changes. While technological
innovations and their commercialization would have to be slowed down, a “futurology”’s
development would accelerate. This futurology would inform political leaders about the
possible consequences of technological innovations and production, ideally
contributingto sound, ethical decisions. The IPCC reports are quite close to fitting exactly
this description: the reports synthesize worldwide climatological knowledge periodically
and with each of their reports, they include a synthesis for policy makers, thus directly
attempting to fullfill this role of advisors informing the ethics which will itself guide
policy, in the hope of present and future generations’ lives’ liveability being enhanced, or
at least rendered possible. The IPCC is quite clearly an attempt at futurological
knowledge production, with its elaborate computerized scenarios analyzing millenia of
data, weighing these against the modern period of CO2 production, and projecting them
into decades and even centuries of hypothetical futures. The scope of the research, as well
as the level of worldwide scientific unanimity, are both unprecedented. The IPCC has a
clear vocation in terms of informing what could indeed be called an “ethics for the
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future,” to the point that it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, an award that had never
been given to a large panel of “hard” scientists, or any group of this kind.
While providing an exegesis of the IPCC reports in what follows, I read these as
denouncing uchronia.I then argue that the IPCC reports can be read as anti-uchronianalso
to the extent that they rely upon multiple possible futures. Further, the uncertainty
regarding “equally plausible” futures is made visible in the very form of the texts. The
reports constitute themselves as a “futurology” of multiplicity, while posing questions
that interrupt certainties about growth and capitalist development, showing these alleged
certainties as they are: uchonian.

Impossibility and Futurology’s Diagnosis:
You Can’t Be Carbon-Neutral on a Growth-Activated Train
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “was established by the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) in 1988 to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of
knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
impacts” (IPCC, 2015). Since then, it has famously produced reports explicitly targeted
to government officialsand international organizations (more so than the general public).
In its very latest report on the Physical Science Basis of its diagnoses, published last fall,
the IPCC further confirms and demonstrates its findings that:
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millenia. The atmosphere
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and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level
has risen, and the concentration of greenhouse gases have increased. (2014, p. 2)
These phenomena, described it the opening section of the Physical Science Basis report,
are then explained by a myriad of causes, for the most part “anthropogenic,” or humaninduced (I will further problematize the undifferentiated character of this causal
demonstration in chapter 3, where I will stress the “counter-uchronian” dimension of this
humanist scientific discourse). In other words, the report details the now famous
Greenhouse effect: carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted by a vast array of
human activity trap heat in the atmosphere that would otherwise be sent outside of it. As
we know, a greenhouse replicates the same mechanism on a smaller scale. The IPCC’s
2013 Physical Basis report assertively qualifies “human” influence among the drivers of
climate change, calling it “clear.”
Natural and anthropogenic substances and processes that alter the Earth’s energy
budget are drivers or climate change. Radiative Forcing (RF) quantifies the
change in energy fluxes caused by changes in these drivers for 2011 relative to
1750 (…) Total radiative forcing is positive, and has led to an uptake of energy by
the climate system. (…) Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is
evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere,
positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate
system. (2013, p. 13)
Having established the phenonenon – greenhouse effect’s rising of average temperature
level in the Earth’s atmosphere – and its causes – “human” activities emitting greenhouse
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gases emissions and bringing temperatures to an unprecedented level, the IPCC reiterates
and further develops evidence regarding their physical science-based diagnosis:
Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface
than any preceding decade since 1850. In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983-2012
was likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years (medium
confidence). (2013, p. 3)
I will return in the section below to the language of likelihood and degrees of confidence
used by the climate sciences. The IPCC’s language of uncertainty sadly makes for
breaches which climate negationists happily penetrate (these are also known as climate
“skeptics,” although they hardly deserve this title). For the time being, suffice is to note
that the accelerated and unprecedented warming experienced in the Earth’s atmosphere
has drastic consequences on human and nonhuman livelihoods, health, losses of coastal
land due to sea level rise, mass extinctions and destruction of myriads of ecosystems,
extreme weather events and the subsequent destruction of human and nonhuman habitat,
lives, living conditions, water supplies, etc. This diagnosis regarding the manifold effects
of “anthropogenic” climate change on human and nonhuman environments is the focus of
the IPCC Working Group II’s report.
The second report indeed observes environmental and human, present and
(projected) future changes resulting from climate change, explaining among other things
that “water supplies stored in glaciers and snow cover are projected to decline, reducing
water availability in regions supplied by meltwater from major moutain ranges, where
more than one-sixth of the world population lives” (2014a, p.11). Still according to the
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report, global warming will cause droughts to increase in extent in regions already prone
to these, while flood risk will augment in other regions due to heavy precipitation events.
The resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by an
unprecedented combination of climate change, associated disturbances (e.g.,
flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, ocean acidification), and other change drivers
(e.g., land-use change, pollution, over-exploitation of resources. (2014a, p. 10)
This means that: “Approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are
likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature
exceed 1.5-2.5° C” (p. 11) These mass extinctions are without precedents in the
Holocene. So are hunger risks increases for human populations, which are projected to
occur “for even small local temperature increases (1-2° C)” (p.11). Some may welcome
some changes, and reep the benefits of localized temperature increases. The IPCC, taking
this in consideration, nonetheless alerts its readers: “Costs and benefits of climate change
for industry, settlement and society will vary widely by location and scale. In the
aggregate, however, net effects will tend to be more negative the larger the change in
climate” (p. 12). The report is quite alarming regarding global warming’s consequences
on human health:
Projected climate change-related exposures are likely to affect the health status of
millions of people, particularly those with low adaptive capacity, through:
-

increases in malnutrition and consequent disorders, with implications for child
growth and development;

-

increased deaths, disease and injury due to heatwaves, floods, storms, fires
and droughts;
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-

the increased burden of diarrhoeal disease;

-

the increased frequency of ground-level ozone related to climate change; and,

-

the altered spatial distribution of some infectious disease vectors. (p. 12)

The report specifies that some health benefits may be found in temperate areas, including
reduced rates of deaths from cold exposure, yet these would be outweighed by the
negative health effects of worldwide temperature rise, “especially in developing
countries” (p. 12). I will return to the question of unequal impacts and contributions to
climate change and the way the IPCC addresses disparities among “humanity” (or, to
some extent, fails to address them) in chapter 3. For the moment, what I wish to
underscore is the anti-uchronian dimension and consequences of these conclusions.
The picture of the present and future worlds painted in these texts is certainly not
an attractive or optimistic one. Yet here, the IPCC allows us to see the uchronian
character of capitalocentric temporality, the limits of the current economic systems being
underscored by myriad environmental and health effects arising today. The temporality at
work within the text is important in doing so, as animated as it is by a linear causality I
will further critique below (chapter V). The first working group diagnoses past and
present causes and effects of global warming: the “Physical Science basis” of the reports
concludes the influence of greenhouse gas emissions produced by “human” activity is
“unequivocal.” Then, the report written by Working Group II transitions to a second
moment, as it dives more closely into the projections of current temperature trends into
the short and long term futures, to focus on the ecological effects and their consequences
on human health, food production, livelihoods in general. Finally, Working Group III,
focused on mitigation of the climate crisis, projects possible measures’ ability to address
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global warming into the short and long-term future. My use of the plural for the second
diagnostic, or most descriptive moment, contrasting with my use of the singular in
reference to “the future” in the third, most prescriptive or programmatic moment of the
reports, is of course purposeful.
What is interesting for now, is the way in which this articulation has the IPCC
shed vast doubts upon past and current models of development, and does so explicitly. It
allows environmentalist claims to be made, including mine: infinite, capitalocentric
growth-driven development in a world with a finite tolerance for it, is indeed uchronian,
and one can affirm that “we have scientific facts to back it up.” Such statements are
powerful in a world which, as Bruno Latour has shown, authorizes scientists to cross the
human/nature separation and bring “truths” from the latter that are often capable of
forbidding politics, imposing themselves with more authority even in the human realm.
And they are powerful also, of course, because such truth making powers can cause
controversies. When the IPCC compares millenia of temperature data during the
Holocene to the last two centuries and a half, concluding that high-carbon economies
have caused and will cause unprecendented destruction, progress takes on an explicitly
life-threatening form, and capitalocentric temporalities’ promises of abundance are
challenged, crumbling even to a status of impossibility. It becomes clear that uchronia
disregards the Earth’s limited ability to suddenly receive carbon dioxide sequestered over
millenia into its atmosphere without it heating and without such heat resulting in mass
destruction. The scientific reports produced by the IPCC are clear. They compare
millenia of the Earth’s average atmospheric temperature prior to industrialization, in
1750. These dates correspond to the rise of a predominantly carbon-based political and
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economic world. Timothy Mitchell has compellingly demonstrated the profoundly
mutually constitutive relation between oil exploitation, which is responsible for most of
greenhouse emissions, and capitalist democracies (2011). Today the IPCC is insisting
that future vulnerability depends not only on climate change but also on “development
pathway” (2014, p. 11). In other words, the extent of the destruction resulting from global
warming is deeply contingent upon the horizon in sight taking into account the effects of
past and current greenhouse gas-emitting modes of production. Or, in contrast, this
horizon could continue to exist in a nebulous cloud obscuring its consequences on the
Earth surface to paint an impossible and dangerous, illusory oasis of endless growth,
relentless abundance, with greenhouse gas somehow magically disappearing into thin,
self-purifying air. This oasis-like horizon, which recedes as “we” approach it while
leaving destruction on “our” path, is uchronia. To an extent, the IPCC reports clear the
nebulous cloudlike horizon and rid us of the oasis projected by capitalist modes of
production, to reveal a different horizon. They allow us to see the capitalist horizon as
uchronia, underscoring what is known about the present and future consequences of
capitalist consumption and production, along with the unknown dimensions of “our”
futures: “A wide array of adaptation options is available, but more extensive adaptation
than is currently occurring is required to reduce vulnerability to future climate change”
(2014, p. 19). The IPCC thus attempts to demonstrate that “sustainable development” is
able to reduce climate change vulnerability. In this respect, the Panel has so far relied
upon the Bruntland Comission definition of “sustainable development,” i.e as
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for
future generations to meet their own needs” (2014, p. 20). The “diagnostic” reports on
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Physical Science, adaptation and vulnerability at least gesture at opening the future to
possibilities of change, and takes temporality into account in a new way, where future
generations’ needs would be recognized and incorporated into present decisions. In so
doing, they include grounds for anti-uchronian visions.

Multiplicity and Futurological Projections: Several Futures Are Possible!
In addition to the above-described diagnosis and feeding into it, the IPCC produces a
form of futurology now better known to the greater public (in part thanks to the IPCC’s
Nobel Prize): it entertains “storylines” and “scenario families” imagining various modes
of global socio-economic development and demographic changes. Each of the families of
scenarios branch into several modifications, with a result of more than 40 scenarios in
total, all syntheses of thousands of scenarios invented by worldwide climatological
research. The IPCC’s scenarios are called SRES scenarios. Their description is the object
of a Special Report: SRES stands for Special Report on Emission Scenarios (2000). This
technique is directly inherited from climatological literature, although the IPCC is the
only organization in the world capable of compiling this much data and scenarios into
such efficient models. On this basis of many “equally plausible” scenarios and based on
the collection of palaeoclimatic data, the panel projects itself in the future via as many
models, practicing a form of science-fictional thought experiment.
For instance, the “A1” family of scenarios is characterized as follows:
The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid
economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines
thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies.
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Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and
increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional
differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three
groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy
system. The three A1 groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis:
fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all
sources (A1B). (p. 4)
In contrast, the “B1” scenario family is described as
a convergent world with the same global population that peaks in mid-century and
declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic
structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material
intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The
emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental
sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate
initiatives. (p. 5)
Let’s pause to contemplate the last phrase here, which specifies that the scenario does not
include “additional climate initiatives.” It is quite telling of one of the epistemological
and political choices made by the IPCC. In an attempt to craft what Hans Jonas would
have called a “futurology,” and one that still satisfies criteria of “scientific objectivity” as
opposed to seeming altogether programmatic, the IPCC has designed scenarios that do
not implement the Kyoto agreements, or specifically climate-targeted policy. The idea is
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to pose a programmatically neutral question: 43 if the planet was to keep going in various
possible, or “equally plausible” directions, all with no specific regard to climate change,
what directions would have us experience what results? Then, from observed results
produced by the climate models and purporting to nibble at policy changes in a number
of possible futures, the IPCC’s Third Working Group – which is specifically assigned to
the task of thinking through climate mitigation solutions – considers various measures
addressing global warming and evaluates their respective effectivity levels. Working
Group III’s futurity is thus dancing precariously on the thin line separating the
programmatic and the moderately prescriptive, the whole of the scenarios’ production
being premised upon a claim to remain soley descriptive and analytical.
The IPCC’s futurological epistemology (inspired by climatology at large) is as
unprecedented as the crisis it studies. By proposing so many scenarios, it sheds light on
the multiplicity of the future and the – at least relative – open “developmental paths”
available to the planet. It thus suggests a possible departure from a teleological necessity
that imagines one end only as possible for the future of “our” current capitalocentric
world, evoking this world’s contingency, or at least the presence of contingency in the
future. Indeed, the scenarios are explicitly ascribed equivalent plausibility, for reasons
linked to the avoidance of a programmatic tone in the Special Report on Emission
Scenario (SRES). Yet this undeniably questions current developmental paths’ desirability
and can point to the necessity to rethink their inevitable character. Though as we will see
(chapter V), none of the scenarios go so far as imagining a future world dominated by
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“No judgment is offered in [the SRES] as to the preference for any of the scenarios and they are no
assigned probabilities of occurrence, neither must they be interpreted as policy recommendations” (p.3).
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non-capitalist economies, or even consider non-capitalist economies at all for that matter,
IPCC futurology is a futurology of multiplicity.
Multidirectionality and Futurological Anticipations
Finally, the reports’ relation to temporality at least partly secedes from uchronia insofar
as it proposes a new form of anticipation where humans and nonhumans are taken into
account together. Here, scientific imagination and mathematical models indeed project us
onto multiple possible futures, and it is by throwing oneself into present and future
implications of climate change, andsimultaneously making our way back from the
comparison between these futures to the present that recommendations are made.
Futurology here suggests futures’ multiplicity as well as a multidirectional relationship to
time and to change. In this sense also, the IPCC’s futurology is anti-uchronian, and antiuchronia implies attempting to grasp infinite pasts and infinite futures in the present (this
is where anti-uchronia tends toward synchrony: see chapter VI). In the latest IPCC
reports of 2013-14, the panel further innovated, pushed by climatologists’ criticisms, and
complicated its futurity. New scenarios have been designed that added more
multidirectionality to multiplicity. Indeed, the panel does not limit itself anymore to
project current trends into multiple possibilites, and then make its way back to the present
for recommendations, which movement so far, was the only multidirectionality involved
in relatively linear model. The last reports have corrected a crucial limit in previous ones:
these used to project current economic, social, demographic and other human trends, to
assess the climate impacts, including some feedback effects internal to the climate
system, but with limited to inexistent attempts at including the ways in which these
changes in climates would reciprocally then proceed to affect demographics, economic
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behavior, and how the latter would then continue to affect climate, etc. The 2014 impacts
and adaptation reports have created increasingly dynamic models which include these
reciprocities between factors of change. This further complicated the futurity at play to
render it more multidirectional, in addition to multiple. As I’ve underscored above, antiuchronia includes two moments (granted these overlap, interconnect, and can be
simultaneous, almost acting as dimensions as much as moments), whereby uchronia is
critically shown or portrayed as the timeless, teleological temporality which naturalizes
itself yet is contingent, while at the same time, by implication, the possibility to consider
other possible temporalities emerges. The IPCC’s conclusions, along with its multiple
future scenarios’ methodology, correspond quite exactly to these two moments of antiuchronia. They allow to further explore what anti-uchronia may entail: interrupting
uchronia to think of the possibility for other possibilities may require to open up onto a
futurity of multiplicity and rejecting a futurism which subjects presents to an abstract
singular and reified future (of endless accumulation). It may require readiness to nourish
a relation to temporality that makes room (or time) for multidirectional moments of
anticipation. It may require accepting and even assuming, asserting uncertainty regarding
both the present, and the infinite past informing it, the infinite future flowing from it.
Uncertainty and Futurological Epistemology
Indeed, another dimension of the texts produced by the IPCC further suggests the radical
contingency of “the future,” in addition to the multiplicity of “futures” which the Panel
presents. Consistent with climatological knowledge and epistemology, the reports indeed
insist on carefully underscoring, assessing and distinguishing between likelihood,
evidence and confidence levels. This shows the limits of certainties regarding future
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projections of past and current trends in the Earth’s temperature, greenhouse gas
emissions, and “human” activities causing these. For instance, “very high confidence”
represents “at least a 9 out of 10 chance of being correct”, whereas a “high confidence”
stands for “about an 8 out of 10 chance of being correct.” Similarly,
the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood, using
expert judgement, of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain > 99% probability
of occurrence, Extremely likely > 95%, Very likely > 90%, Likely > 66%, More
likely than not > 50%, Unlikely < 33%, Very unlikely < 10%, Extremely unlikely
< 5% (2013 & 2014).
Finally, in Working Group III’s report on mitigation, yet another classification system is
used to evaluate the levels of agreement among IPCC scientists, and the evidence
available to substantiate each claim. Most paragraphs in the reports are thus followed by
the parenthetical mention of levels of confidence and evidence (e.g., high agreement,
medium evidence; high agreement, much evidence, etc).
The unknown and the known are thus emphasized, in relation to one another and to
time or futurity. While this rhetorically creates breaches into which climate negationists
love diving as deep as their absymal lack of responsibility and the depths of their oilpockets for propaganda funding allow them to, this underscores both the contingency of
the future in addition to its multiplicity, and the specific extent of certainties regarding
“human” emissions of greenhouse gas fueling global warming. In admitting to the vast
extent of the unknown and attempting to evaluate so carefully the portion of uncertainty
in each claim they make, the IPCC reports are anti-uchronian as they evoke contingency–
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one of uchronia’s characteristic, even in spite of its self-representation as the only
possible end in sight, and the future’s unpredictability. The paradox here is that the
measurement of uncertainty with likelihood, evidence and confidence level
corresponding to numerically expressed probabilities (usully numbers of chances of
occurence out of 10), and in percentage points, indicates a will to truth, a desire for
exactitude regarding the limits of climatological knowledge, i.e it betrays a desire for
certain, exact assessments of uncertainty. But precisely in this tension, anti-uchronian
tensions are allowed to glitter: all that science is capable of asserting is that we may be
hitting this or that tipping points, threshold (400ppm), and so on. So anti-uchronia here
takes the form of a question mark, a doubt shed on current “developmental paths.” If we
further extend this anti-uchronian moment in climatological futurology, if we invest this
breach, this crack, anti-uchronian critique ricochets to make any fast and certain
assumption that we cannot not want growth more than dubious.
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Cairological Anti-Uchronia:
Pausing to Think on Time in a Time of Urgency

Reading the IPCC reports as futurological knowledge offering anti-uchronian moments
thus allows to see additional layers in anti-uchronia: impossibility, multiplicity,
uncertainty and multidirectionality inform the past, present and future portrayed and
analyzed by climatologists in the panel to suggest grounds for anti-uchronian questions
about the dangers and limits of capitalist growth. Anti-uchronia comprises seeing
uchronia for what it is, as an impossible horizon that recedes as we approach it and
which, because it is teleological, positions itself as the only possible end in spite of its
contingency. As we have seen both in turning to Blu’s graffiti art and to the IPCC, it also
implies the possibility to consider that there may be other, multiple possible presents and
futures in sight. Finally, I have mentioned that such anti-uchronian percepts, affects and
concepts, such anti-uchronian moments invest the tension between simultaneous needs to
take the time to pause and think, and to act fast in a fast-changing world, a tension
emerging out of a context of urgency. The last section of this chapter focuses on this third
aspect of anti-uchronia. In what follows I will argue that anti-uchronia cairologically
intervenes in and because of this tension. Anti-uchronian moments are moments which
allow barely intelligible questions which slow everyone else down, struggling against the
rapid contamination of our oikos to erupt clearly before all life in it is made unlivable,
and suspending time to make time to think other possible lives. It refers to moments
robbed to imagine myriad possibilities in the face of impossibility.
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The Idiot: Pausing to Pose Anti-Uchronian Questions
“Questioning growth is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists
and revolutionaries. But question it we must.”
Tim Jackson, Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite
Planet.
Anti-uchronia takes the form of a pause imposed upon a uchronian rush, where the future
is considered as the teleological result of inevitable patterns, made of abstract endless
accumulation, and subjecting the present and concrete possible futures to destruction. As
produced by the anti-uchronian moment in the IPCC texts (among others), such a pause is
evocative of a conceptual figure which philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers (2010)
mobilizes to think critically about the state of emergency the climate crisis creates. This
figure is none other than the Deleuzian “conceptual character” of the idiot. 44 In what
follows I describe this conceptual character to juxtapose it to my concept of antiuchronia. Through this juxtaposition, I am simultaneously showing the idiot’s
fundamentally temporal dimension and continuing to specify the meanings, forms and
44

I was told, in a conference presentation context, that “disability studies may have issues with my use of
the concept of stupidity” to denounce geoengineering, among other things (the criticism was mobilizing
“disability studies” at large: such remarks, in bringing on an entire, vast field of literature as vaguely as
possible, are always fascinating, and their vagueness justifies responding to them solely in footnotes). I
hope this time it will be clear, in case it was not in the first place, that both here and when I discuss
geoengineering and the IPCC’s concept of “anthropogenic” climate change more critically (chapter V) – as
these involve stupidity, that I propose the character of the idiot as an inspiring conceptual figure, and that
when I use the concept of stupidity, it is to denounce experts and decision-making (corporate and state)
elites seriously considering geoengineering as our way out of the climate crisis. In other words, the idiot is
by no means stupid, but in fact engaged in a confrontation against stupidity. I read these deciding and
decidedly delusional elites (chapter V) as traversed by stupidity (they themselves are not even characterized
as “stupid,” though their comportment surely makes such generalization quite tempting). Any reader who
would read quickly enough to feel offended by my denunciation of stupidity as a process and confuse this
with an “attack against mentally disabled people” (the terms that were used in the above-mentioned
criticism) might want to interrogate their own rush to the association made by such objectors, between
stupidity and mental disability – an association I do not make by any means. If any parallels between
mental disability and the concepts I deploy here absolutely needed to be made, one could perhaps look to
the inspiring figure of the idiot. But this would probably require an idiotic (i.e slow, careful) reading, which
the critic in question was unable to do, given how incompatible academic life and a certain static and
caricatural kind of identity politics too often are with such idiocy, and given how they flirt instead with
stupidity.
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effects of my own concept of anti-uchronia, my reading of the IPCC reports as in part
anti-uchronian. The IPCC stands as the much needed “idiot” who poses necessary and
pertinent yet disturbing, interruptive, pause-causing, barely intelligible questions with
respect to uchronia. In other words, my purpose is to entangle the idiot to the concept of
anti-uchronia, to show the idiotic dimension of anti-uchronian questions and give
examples of such questions. To this end, my reading of Stengers’ concept emphasizes the
idiot’s temporal dimension.
Stengers describes the idiot as being defined by her 45 resistance to both the
consensual way and urgency:
in the ancient Greek sense, … a semi-private language that excludes from a form
of communication characterized by an ideal of transparency and anonymity …
Deleuze’s conceptual character is the one who always slows the others down, who
resists the consensual way in which the situation is presented and in which
emergencies mobilize thought and action. (2005, p. 994).
Thus idiotic interventions disrupt the rush to a “mise en equivalence,” causing a pause, in
the face of emergency. While those stressing emergency rush to an “…and so…,” the
idiot demands that we slow down, a deceleration inseparable from the conditions of
emergence of thought. In the case of climate change, I would add that such pause and
resulting novel questions being posed are in fact all the more necessary that urgency
results from the approach of the specter of ecological catastrophe. In other words, it is
precisely because the situation is so urgent that one needs to pause and think. The very
urgency invoked to justify rushing to conclusions without taking the time for idiotic
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Here I am using feminine pronouns regarding the figure of the idiot, following Stengers. Yet one should
note that the IPCC reports writers include very few women.
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questions creates the need for the kind of pause generated by idiotic questions. Thus the
requirement to slow down actually takes place within states of emergency.
To an extent, the IPCC reports allow to see the past and present predominant
developmental paths – made of carbon emission, intensive agriculture and industry,
relentless growth on a planet with limited tolerance for such paces and with a growing a
fever – as uchronian. The anti-uchronian moment in these texts is an idiotic one, one that
deploys itself with all its temporal effects: it interrupts, disturbs, arrests, causes pause. It
suggestively casts doubt upon fundamental assumptions of capitalocentric temporality, on
uchronia: are “anthropogenic” global warming patterns of production and consumption a
necessity, or isn’t it necessary instead to at least slow down, if not disrupt, growth and
even the desire for growth?
The idiot’s questions are hardly intelligible in the midst of a rush to conclusion, to
emergency measures brushing off the surface of anti-uchronian moments to quickly
return in the seemingly reassuring and familiar spheres of uchronia. Indeed, the
implications of the above analyzed futurology that growth may not be desirable at all
though it advertises itself as that which we cannot not want, are quite discernable in the
reports, but also entangled in myriad uchronian and counter-uchronian assumptions (we
will see in chapter 3 how the IPCC falls back on counter-uchronian “sustainable growth,”
in spite of the breach it opens to doubt the imperative to growth). The risk of an idiotic
question lies in the possibility that it may not be seen or heard. At the same time, the
IPCC has indeed shaken growth-oriented assumptions enough to cause outrage and
incomprehension on the part of so-called “skeptics.” The idiot’s strength and weakness
(her pharmacological character, in the sense of Plato’s famous pharmakon as both a
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remedy and poison) is that she reaches for the limits of knowledge, and poses disturbing
questions which barely can be deciphered or grasped, let alone accepted. Reading
climatological data and drawing conclusions from observations that post-industrialization
levels of CO2 are on their way to making life unbearable, requires a moment of retreat to
barely intelligible but now growingly pressing questions regarding how things could
possibly be and/or become otherwise, and questions about whether growth-oriented
temporalities would be included in these other order of things.
“Playing the idiot” or “acting the idiot’s part” thus comprises a dimension of time
spent at the limits of knowledge, asking unlikely, unexpected, perhaps naïve sounding
questions, and turning what seems self-evident into problems, to create concepts
responding to such problems. The figure of Dostoyevski’s idiot certainly is one source of
inspiration for this conceptual figure, but the idiotic play also evokes the character of
Socrates. Not that the idiot would perform his role and slow others down by asking his
disturbing and disrupting questions in an insincere or ironic way (as Socrates was
sometimes accused, and at times guilty, of doing): the idiocy may very well be genuine
and sincere, an attention to what most, in common language and caught up in the pace of
“normal” daily life, may pass over too fast. The idiot, in addition to and because she
confronts the limits of knowledge, remaining with the problem instead of rushing to a
solution and/or simply not seeing the problem, ignoring it, is producing idiomatic
formulations regarding what usually goes without saying. It goes without saying that we
all need and want growth, and the question of whether it is the case or not will not be
address, as this would be a waste of time, as this question is indeed not even granted
existence as a question. Thus the idiot is barely intelligible to others, imagined as a
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stargazer (Socrates’ figure erupts again), disconnected from the ground’s reality. She may
be called lazy or superfluous: “you wonder why we should have growth? Perhaps it’s
because you don’t wish to work hard to have it:” already the question of whether growth
is beneficial, desirable, feasible, sensible has been erased as it is assumed to be an
obvious end and the idiot is accused to want to escape solely from the mean deployed.
The escape and the laziness of the interlocutor who makes such an accusation being, of
course, left unquestioned: he, after all, is willing, to “work hard.” Proof being, he very
reasonably wants growth and can see this is the only sensible route. The idiot,
meanwhile, also wastes others’ time by refusing to hurry and propose a program once her
questions are being posed. The idiotic part is not one that attempts to arrive at a definitive
answer, turning idiomatic questions into an axiomatic (“idiomatic” should not be
confused with “idiotic,” but if the two share a root it is precisely because of the barely
intelligible dimension of idiotic questions, such that not all idiomatic questions are
idiotic, but certainly idiotic moments are bound to take on a partly idiomatic form). One
of the strengths of the idiot is precisely that she does not offer a solution, forcing
interlocutors to postpone normative or prescriptive leaps – whether the idiot will in fact
have interlocutors is not guaranteed however: unintelligibility is also one of the idiot’s
problems, though it allows for the conditions of thought. In sum, the idiot’s flirting with
the limits of intelligibility is indeed a pharmacological dimension, both remedy and
poison, both strength and weakness. The idiot forces us to stay with the problem, to grant
it more duration. She stretches out the pause, because it is there that thought can emerge:
this is why she slows all other players down. But thought may be more necessary in a
circumstance of ecological urgency than at any other time.
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I have explained above (section I and II) that anti-uchronia contains two
dimensions, one denouncing uchronia for what it is, the other opening up the possibility
for possibilities. It does so in the form of idiotic pause. Though anti-uchronia does not
claim to definitively offer a temporality to substitute to uchronia, it has a temporality of
its own, one that triggers pause. But under what kind of circumstances can anti-uchronia
erupt in this way, and in what context may it gain resonance, what effects may erupt
when? In what follows, I will linger with the “when” question, along with the question of
anti-uchronia’s form.
Oikos Contaminated: Missing the Right Time to Sustain the Livability of Life
Truth is a matter of imagination.
Ursula Le Guin
In his Cauchemards paralleles: vue en coupe d’une ville malade, Science Fiction writer
Serge Brussolo (2006) describes a city where inhabitants are fleeing and fighting a
strange disease affecting their houses. The oikos has indeed gone mad, and the
protagonist engages every inch of her body in a struggle against the mysterious
“contamination” of houses, which become inhabitable as they (the houses, that is) carve
galleries underneath themselves. Gradually, the reader gathers that the computermanaged houses of the “sick city” use the components of their own surface layers for this
digging and for their meanderous underground constructions. The houses’ “advanced”
technology absorbs old materials, furnitures, curtains, paint, bricks above, and somehow
recycle these to form endless tunnels which turn out more scary and less habitable each
time. Through the eyes of the main character, the horrified reader witnesses the spectacle
of a world controlled by computers once programmed to anticipate every need and new
development of future human societies. This was done through intricate ethnographic and
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algorithmic information aimed at automatically renewing the houses above so as to keep
on carving the house of the next generation with the old one. Yet the anticipation
resulting from the artificially intelligent, self-designing houses has turned into wreckless
machinic speculation incapable of actually fitting human needs. The human world is
being destroyed by this hyper-rationality. The speed of the renewal has accelerated to the
point that human inhabitants could not possibly follow and adapt. In fact, the machines
go so far as to (hyper rationally) perceive and treat human bodies, from skin to hair, flesh,
blood, organs and bones, as part of the houses: they now use human skin, body parts,
hairs, to compose the insane walls, furniture and objects of the most recent galleries. The
computerized, renewable oikos has swallowed the human beings still attempting to live in
it. As a result, computerized renewability, engineered speculative recycling’s fast pace
frenzy has turned comfort-providing houses into anthropophagous ones.
Each bit of progress made by this computerized oikos becomes more inhuman.A
lifeless and destructive hybridization process is at play. Though cyborgs may be
attractive in some understandings (Haraway, 1987), Brussolo’s hybrid forms, in the
poisonous oikos he describes, are terrifying. Instead of sheltering it, the oikos threatens
the fabric of life with computerized and technological colonization, to the point of
reaching death. Technologically-driven recycling results in the absorption of life (I will
return to this when I critique “sustainable growth” as “counter-uchronian” in chapter V).
The protagonist in fact feels this draining out of her life force as she evolves through the
galleries.
Of course this is not necessarily contradictory to Donna Haraway’s critique
(1987) of boundaries between the animal, the human and the artificial and her exhortation
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to embrace our hybridity and foster affinity rather than prefer illusory self-coherent and
bounded identity. That is, one simplistic reading of Brussolo’s horror story could fall on a
flat rejection of technology as necessarily and intrinsically sick, and on a need for
humans to somehow separate themselves from it. Yet the sickness here is everywhere and
knows no boundaries, starting with the fact that the houses’ computers were originally
engineered by humans to manage the oikos. Rather than reading this in a luddite vein, I
read Brussolo’s fables as offering a world where, precisely because the absence of
boundaries between these is made especially obvious, sickness in computer systems and
algorithmic prediction, poisonous directions in paces at which the entanglement between
human bodies and artificial intelligence, pour over all of life so as to void it. More than
hybridization, or rather, inherently linked with a sick form of hybridization, are the paces,
rhythm and speed at which some aspects of such hyridization morph and internally clash
with others. Temporality is crucial in shaping the form of sickness and pushing it to the
boundaries of horror, to anthropophagous ways. The contaminated oikos shows how
much one must make hybridization a fundamental and urgent matter of concern (Latour,
2009).
The first chapter in Parallel Nightmares: Sectional Views of a Sick City (my title
translation) simply describes the protagonist’s desperate and impossible struggle against
the houses (she is inevitably as sick as the technology she is attacking and which is
attacking her, as she moves about the houses constantly to attempt curing them – and
herself). Each “parallel nightmare” in the “sick city” can be read independently as well.
In other words, Brussolo describes a premise, the computerized oikos gone mad, and
from then on the reader may start to interpret the following short as an exploration into
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some the various tentacles or galleries created by the houses. This second storystages
mere automated, lifeless reproduction, perhaps further exemplifying the nihilism of hightech house-building computer(ized) architects (if indeed we are dealing with another
gallery dug by the houses). Here Brussolo describes a long hallway with no end or
beginning in sight, and female human beings attached to beds, confined in rooms as bare
as solitary confinement cells, where voices from some kind of speaker are the only mode
of unilateral communication. Males and females are born in these rooms. The latter are
sent to “grow” in their own confined cells and reproduce there, while the former then
creep their way out slowly, yet never shed their umbilical chords, eventually reaching a
new room where another female prisoner is confined, and where they couple. The
prisoners continue on to produce new humans who replicate the patterns of emprisonment
and rape. The story portrays bare reproduction with unlivable life, and the beings
produced know no escape as the chain constrains their atrophied muscles. Both this
gallery and what one imagines (based on the first story) as the surface, contaminated
world constitute an environment of mechanical, alienated lifeless life, an atrocious
caricature of meaningless uchronia, with a dark surrealist dimension evoking the worst
fantasies imaginable. We have seen (section 1) that graffiti artist Blu resorted to both
fantasy and caricature to propose anti-uchronian visions (though his fantasy was one
where bikes crushed cars, in a flash of environmentalist dream world rather than a
dystopian vision of further ecological destruction). Brussolo’s horror stories critically
stage a different moment of uchronia: a moment situated after the train of progress would
have passed a nihilist tipping point, and fallen down into the cliff. The book certainly
deserves its title: “parallel nightmares,” that is, visions of horror in a world where living
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beings do not cross paths, a world envisioned by the gaze of a mysteriousimpossible
narrator: in the latter story, no one could possibly leave a written account or narrate
anything of this strictly reproductive, alienated and raw human flesh-making
technological apparatus. If they did, would such narrator take on a human form, one that
could write? If not, would the narration be intelligible to us, and if so how?
At first, only the title (“Parallel Nightmares: Sectional Views of a Sick City”), the
opening chapter, and some common themes running through the two stories suggest the
possibility of a whole world containing the various galleries. The stories don’t explicitly
refer to one another, neither are they tied by a single plot or protagonist. Who may be
capable of doing the narration thus remains a mystery for most of the second story
(wait… suspense…), though the title evokes “sectional views.” Each story peeks at each
bit of gallery as such a “sectional view.” Are we witnessing flashes, as in a premonitory
nightmare, of the city’s architects’ viewpoint? If the architects are in fact artificially
intelligent computers, do(es) such narrator(s) feel sympathy, terror, or indifference with
respect to these flashes into inhuman galleries? Indifference seems excluded, as the title
also calls these sectional views “nightmares,” yet if the narrator’s viewpoint is the
computers’, does artificial intelligence render capable of affects, like terror and empathy,
let alone narration? Brussolo’s text is relatively neutral in tone, almost strictly descriptive
(except for moments when narration happens, still in the third person, but qua the
viewpoint of the protagonist in the first story). It remains for the reader to be horrified,
especially as the last element of the title to be mentioned is the adjective “parallel,” that
both may refer to the ways in which galleries meander, one alongside another and never
crossing, and might also signal, in a typically science fictional/fantasy language, this
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desolate and cannibalistic environment as parallel to the readers’ worlds – in the sense
that it may never meet, that it coexists with ours in another reality, i.e that it may play the
role of a metaphor, be compared to our worlds.
In the second story, the plot takes an actual cannibalistic turn that adds to the
evocation of anthropophagous computerized houses from the first story. The character
from whose point of view the narration occurs has found, somehow, a razor blade with
which he cuts his umbilical chord. He then wanders in the hallway in search of the first
female body, the origin point of this unbearable yet absurdly and meaninglessly eternal
network. In his path, his search doubles with the necessity for sustenance: he is now
disconnected from the apparently infinite umbilical chord, and finds no other means of
subsistence than… human flesh. Devouring his helpless victims, his reasoning is just as
inhuman and terrifying as the world he move around in: his victims being immobile for
eternity, are condemned to either powerlessness, or to resistance by way of extraction
from the network, annihilation of the cannibal. In the latter case, they would subsequently
have only two choices: suicide, or reproducing the cannibalism practiced by the man they
just killed:
Que pouvait-on contre lui? Pour lui donner la chasse, pour le combattre et
l’anéantir, il aurait fallu qu’un autre homme acceptât lui aussi de se libérer de son
cordon et le poursuivre de palier en palier, rasoir en main jusqu’à l’affrontement
final. Mais après ? Il y aurait la faim du survivant à combler, la faim du
vainqueur… et tout recommencerait. (p. 51)
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Interestingly, the network of umbilical chords is eternal, yet the protagonist assumes that
it has an origin point, which he feels so enraged against he orients his whole wandering to
the search of the first female, that without which none can be nourished in this
meaningless, solely reproductive world. Life is eternal, because the umbilical chords will
never stop connecting all to all. It is also fragile, given that if one disconnects, all will die
– which makes the purpose of the protagonist’s hunting even more absurd, but the
hunting itself revealing of even more anger against this meaningless bare life. Women are
reducing to complete passivity and imprisoned with a restriction of their mobility even
more drastic than that of men, the originary point of the chain is assumed to be a woman,
and all that remains is eternal expansion of the chain. « Pourquoi l’éternité ? » wonders
the wanderer.
With every step of progress the computerized oikos makes in subterranean
galleries imprisoning any hope for life in nothingness, we watch the unwatchable, lacking
a viewer that could ever become narrator, such that the reality described is a nightmare
not only in the horrific sense of the term, but also insofar as it is impossible to tell as
anything else. Colebrook’s discussion of extinction and her critique of the concept of
anthropocene discusses this paradox (2014): who is the geologist reading the marking of
the Earth’s lithosphere when geologists today argue that our age will be readable as that
when human activity was prevalent over any other factor of geological change (the
definition of “anthropocene”), given that the concept of anthropocene also inaugurates
the idea that “we” humans will not be there by then, given how destructive the
anthropocene would be? Brussolo’s horror dystopia describes a world passed a
technologically, cyborg or hybrid nihilist tipping point, and this horror, just like Blu’s
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caricature of uchronia discussed above, has us interrogate uchronia more critically. But if
similar traits are present in Brussolo’s anti-uchronian science fiction as were in Blu’s
train mural, the former stories emphasize yet another aspect of anti-uchronia, which I will
call the cairological aspect. They tell the story of a world where it is too late for livable
lives to be lived, where no one screamed to the driver of the train of progress that he
should hit the breaks before the machine and all wagons fall into an abyss and leave a
barren landscape behind (above the galleries’ surface). This is a story where “kairos,” the
right moment for action and thought, for speaking out, has been missed, where resistance
did not erupt on time. The problem isn’t that one has missed the train of progress, but that
one has missed the occasion, the moment to derail or stop it. Hans Jonas announced that
progress’ promises had turned into threats, yet both promises and threats were always
situated in an abstract future, in the à-venir. Brussolo’s fantasy novel (if it may be called
this) passes the moment of realization of the threats and realizes them, to impossibly
describes the “afterwards.” This poses the question of “when,” the question of the
opportune moment for anti-uchronian pause to be taken and for critical thought to emerge
while we slow down, and to further slow us down. This last aspect of anti-uchronia, its
cairological dimension, is fundamental. Anti-uchronia caricatures and/or fantasizes, so as
to emphasize the uchronian dimension of our presents, the impossibility of abstract,
futurist, capitalist promises that justify present destructions. By estranging usually reified
and naturalized, teleological capitalocentric temporality from the viewer, anti-uchronian
images expose and discredit claims that desire for growth goes without saying. A second
moment, as we have seen, includes the possibility that there may be other possibilities,
other possible temporalities. In Brussolo’s story, we stay a bit longer with impossibility
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to read, through the impossible eyes of a viewer that will not come to be, the possible
outcome of destruction which fast uchronian paces may breed, if pushed beyond their
limits. This, by implication, powerfully forces to wonder when we may (if at all)
cairologically intervene: for anti-uchronia to matter at all, it needs to occur in the right
interstices left open by uchronia and widen these cracks, making the most of “the right
moments” (if those exist, or can be created).
Brussolo’s fiction stages bare bodies fulfilling their supposedly most “natural”
function, most minimally reduced, a form of vitalism 46 which pro-life advocates defend:
life for life’s sake, certainly, but not in the sense of the affirmation of life as creation of
one beyond oneself, rather the horrifying picture is one of life below oneself, below
humanness, below more-than-human lifeforms. The inhuman humanness of this fable is
telling of what may be one of the distinct traits of the human: its capacity for loss, for
extinction of what makes it human. This dystopia is but the horrific caricature of nihilist
forms of pseudo vitalism and naturalism, coupled with the hyper-technological. In the
first story, the artificially intelligent computers building self-perpetuating galleries for
human housing have drunk the coolaid: life, nature is fundamentally about reproduction.
In the second story, the female bodies are reduced to their most inhuman, naturaltechnological passivity: lying down on beds they are confined to, they breed, expanding
the numbers of human bodies, while the males barely exercise any mobility yet
monopolize all the mobility there remains, one attached to alienating umbilical chords. In
this gallery, contrary to the gallery mentioned above, body parts like hair or skin do not
46

Here again, we are reminded of the distinct forms of vitalism within Western thought and politics, which
I have mentioned above: we may remember that Jane Bennett (2009) briefly mentions the distinct nature of
her material vitalism from the right-wing vitalism of pro-lifers, while Claire Colebrook (2014) has
identified a queer vitalism uniting Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze, etc as a counter current of actual vitalism
(including Plato, Kant…).
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make for the material used for furniture which sits still and will absurdly never be sat,
lied on, or used in any way. In fact it is more rational and more natural than the hair and
organs-made lamps and couches, as there the computers may have fulfilled their mission
of ensuring that human life sustain itself along with human habitat. Yet, the
objectification is perhaps more total than in the first nightmare, as the full bodies reified
in this case (as opposed to body parts) may (or may not) still be able to think and
experience the atrocious reality surrounding and constituting them in a somewhat
conscious way (though these beings’ cognitive capacity are likely highly damaged). The
confinement of female bodies on their beds, where they do nothing but breathe, receive
some kind of nutrients for their atrophied muscles through the never-ending umbilical
chords, get raped and give birth in series, as on a chain in a human flesh factory: the
women are chained to the beds, both males and females receive instructions from
speakers to breed, and, for males, to leave and enter the rooms. These two coercive and
disciplinary (the speaker voice is called “civic educator”) measures assume a need to
respectively stifle potential resistance, give orders, invests bodies in life labor. This
implies at least some residual agency on the part of the inhumanly computer-managed
humans. The thought may be at least as unbearable as the thought of a reduction of body
parts to raw material for lifeless objects, however non-humanly vibrant these may be.
Something about the wholeness of the bodies and their parts still functioning somewhat
dynamically together, added to the coherence of this hyper-rationalism (again, in the case
of body parts fueling furniture elements, there remained the absurdity of the uselessness
of habitat), creates added horror. The kind of imprisonment depicted here replays the
most extreme disciplinary mode of exercise of power: individualizing and totalizing at
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once, solitary confinement is systematized to the point of suppressing any possible sense
of collective, such that the little agency humans in this situation may have, the little
resistance they may exercise serves only to aggravate their suffering. This caricature
offers a glance into what the reduction of life as reproduction entails if pushed to its
furthest implications: if Nature’s aim is reproduction, then high technology gone mad is
capable of fulfilling this mission in the most rational implications. Rationality, hyperrationality, meet madness, loss of all cognitive abilities. The genius of Brussolo’s fable is
to grasp precisely so many of the essential(ist) themes of the anthropocene: human
technology is capable of sacrificing the human on the great altar of reproductive Nature’s
grand goals. In placing the mirror this way to encapsulate the most extreme consequences
of efficiency, rationalism, technology and Nature, Brussolo unveils the dystopian
character of utopian dreams screaming, produce, reproduce, you are designed for it, you
designed your computers for it, and your computers reciprocate in the great natural elan
that you defined as such.
Suspending the horror for a moment, relieving the unbearable suspense, Brussolo
abruptly ends the second short story with a change of voice: the protagonist has dreamed
most of this world, while sedated by powerful experimental drugs during a military
mission which transport included hours chained through tubes. He did, however, sleep
walk and killed (some say he ate) many of his co-soldiers.
Kairos, Suspension, Slow Motion
Suspense and suspension are crucial to anti-uchronian moments, moments when uchronia
is caricatured for instance, creating a critical distance and pause that allows thought. In
the case of non-caricatural forms, as we will see below when I examine the jumps of
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circus acrobats, suspension can also be the physical, embodied creation of space and time
for breath and thought. But these anti-uchronian pauses require a complex understanding
of time, in cairological and chronological terms. Kairos, one of the two ancient Greek
words for time (along with chronos), refers to “the time of opportunity of ‘occasion’
come and gone which marks the significant moments of historical action” (Smith, 1969;
Honkanen, 2007). Thus “chronos” would correspond to the measurement of duration, the
quantity corresponding to a duration, in other words it is the quantitative dimension of
time. Questions associated with it include ‘how old? How fast? How long?’ Kairos, in
contrast, refers to qualitative time, the time of opportunity or “right time.” A season
offering the opportunity for a certain event, or a missed opportunity, is referred to in
cairological terms. Questions associated with kairos include ‘when?’ ‘at what time?’ ‘at
what point?’ The last one is interesting, as it shows that kairos, like chronos, relies on
spatial terms to make sense (see introduction to this dissertation). Kairos allows us to
emphasize constellations of events, events themselves, and stresses the ways in which
these would not have been possible at another time and in other circumstances. It thus
stresses contingency, as the meeting point between necessity and randomness, that which
could have been otherwise but occurred in a certain way at a certain time because of
myriad reasons specific to the moment, context or period. It is, to simplify, time as the
relationship between moment and context, opportunity (missed or taken) and
circumstances.
For anti-uchronia to be capable of seeing uchronia as contingent in spite of the
latter’s teleological character and subsequent self-naturalizing claims, anti-uchronia
positions itself cairologically (which doesn’t exclude, in that cairologically-erupting
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occasion, asking questions having to do with chronos). Global climate change would not
have been possible under circumstances less reliant on capitalist modes of production:
this anti-uchronian claim makes it clear that the critical dimension of anti-uchronia adopts
a cairological perspective. Further, the second moment of anti-uchronia, that which
strives to open up the possibility for other possible temporalities, is also a cairological
intervention. As I have pointed out above, anti-uchronia invests the tension produced by
circumstances of urgency, whereby the need arises to pause and take the time to think
through vast and rapid changes while the need to act fast is also salient, and while both of
these seemingly contradictory needs erupt from the same movement. The kairos of antiuchronia is thus full with tension.
Consequently, it becomes crucial (urgent?) to linger on the cairological dimension
of anti-uchronia. If anti-uchronia is about creating breaches, cracks opening up the
possibility for other possibilities, its questions, its condition of existence (of eruption)
have to do with ‘when? ‘In what circumstances? ‘In what occasion?’ If opportunity refers
to the relationship between time and possibility, and if Kairos refers to the opportune
time (or absence or passing thereof), then anti-uchronia is more a cairological than a
chronological matter, but may also (cairologically) ask chronos-related questions. Of
course these are connected: some questions entail taking both of these dimensions of time
into account: a certain quantity of time may be needed for the right moment to emerge.
Questions posed by Brussolo’s fiction or Blu’s graffiti art or the IPCC’s futurological
climatology concern how much time needs to pass for a “tipping point” to occur, after
which certain actions regarding the climate crisis will not be possible anymore. Kronos
thus refers to a before and after (Aristotle defined it as the number of motion with respect

226

to the before and after, thus stressing the materiality of time, which is also crucial here –
Aristotle, 1984). The relationship of anti-uchronia to these two dimensions is thus more
complex than it simply cairologically saying something about chronos or failing at
finding kairos, the right moment to carve a thought-provoked and provoking pause.
Seeing the cairological dimension of anti-uchronia would have more to do with its
context of urgency, the tension I have been mentioning between a need to pause and think
and a need to act fast in a fast-changing world, which are but two facets of the same coin.
This also leads to questions of how anti-uchronian visions can be fostered, what
the opportune perspective at the opportune moment looks like. Art is again a rich venue
for such interrogation. The performing arts, the arts in movement, depend upon the
passing of moments with repeating and differing phrases, scuplting into speed, pace,
rhythms as their matter. They thus work the fabric of cairological time, and maybe highly
suited for fostering anti-uchronian foresight. A couple of years ago, French contemporary
circus artist Yoann Bourgeois created a piece titled “Cavales.” This word could be
translated very unsatisfactorily as “run” (“cavaler,” “to rush about”) or “escape” (“etre en
cavale,” “to be on the run”). It is often associated with a panicked run, whether it
connotes horses galloping away from a source of danger, or children driven by
excitement and haste. Yoann Bourgeois’ circus piece was staged on a high point
overlooking the city of Grenoble, with a majestic view of the Alps, which surround the
city and together serve as the background. The ground décor was made up of a white
rectangular elevated plane, with a set of equally immaculate stairs in the back of the
rectangle on the right. The scenography thus played with a contrast between the green
curvy Alps, in whose creases the city is nested (urbanized areas being visible in the
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background of the stage and horizon), and white geometrical, cold planes, though these
could also curiously evoke curveless clouds. On the stage, the light and muscular bodies
of two acrobats walk, move, lean, jump into each others’ arms, and eventually make their
way to the half of the rectangle that is in front of the stairs, which turns out to have
cloudlike rebound: a trampoline is dissimulated in what could have first seemed like a
solid and strictly horizontal structure throughout, and the acrobats’ jumps amplify, slow
down, spiral, accelerate, also using the stairs. Moving on a melancholic music (a track by
experimental rock band Silver Mount Zion), the softly bouncing bodies interchange
position at various stairs, letting themselves fall down on the trampoline while in an
upright but loose position, barely touching the surface underneath to land, back like
feathers on stairs higher or lower after their bodies have crossed in a scissor-like pattern
until their feet meet the stairs. The stairs quickly feel like they erupted from a dream, and
suggest that they may lead to the sky. In the sound background, at moments when the two
acrobats are slowing down, the voices of Roland Barthes and then Gaston Bachelard
emerge, and excerpts of their lectures shed light on some of the many meanings, effects
and affects evoked by the jumps, rebounds, suspensions and movements in the
choreography.
The piece by Barthes is an excerpt from his work on the category of the neutral,
where he cites Pasolini claiming that all we have left is a “desperate vitality.” I will return
to this Pasolinian idea for different purposes later (chapter VI on synchrony), but already
the phrase, along with the choreography and scenography are suggestive of many of antiuchronia’s conditions of emergence. The suspension in the air of light bodies rebounding
regularly on the rectangular, cloudlike stage often lasts long, as the artists have incredible
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control over the speed of their motion, and these suspensions go from the rational looking
geometrically shaped rectangle to the sky and the Alpine background, beautifully
entangling images of nonhuman and human things and living beings. In watching this
elevation and return to the soft ground, also landing softly to the harder stairs, spectators’
breathing may rhythmically follow the movements, gasping in admiration while also
lengthening their breath as the image is impeccably timed and the pace is slow. The
exchanges of positions and places between the two bodies, their turns and spirals are
movingly soothing as well. Yet a tension remains throughout, against which the phrase
“desperate vitality” resonates and echoes. The surfaces on which the artists are moving,
the ground which they rebound against, are geometrical and made of straight white lines,
rational, rigid, yet transform to cloud and dreamlike under the artists’ feet. The Alps are
irregular, full of abrupt cuts and tall long curves, and the city sinuously couches in its
valley.
As I pointed out already, anti-uchronia may take the form of a pause, yet like
these performing artists, suspending time or pausing does not equate stopping it, but
rather makes time, opens possibilities of evocation of despair as well as vitality. Antiuchronia isn’t, either, not yet, an alternative temporality that would purport to replace
uchronia, but rather questions it and lets other temporal orders of things glitter. The term
glitter is useful here, as again, it is the possibility of other possible temporalities that
emerges, rather than these temporalities themselves. Yet this possibility itself “makes the
time” to think, so it does have its own temporality, just like the suspensions created by
trampoline jumps happen in space, have their own duration, yet also make space and
time. In the repetition of movements as well as in the seemingly more static motion of
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this circus piece, the eery association of white and geometry is advanced in soft tension
with the background and the bodies wearing black though their movements evoke a form
of unattainable purity as well. It is through tension, pauses, suspension, rebounds,
repetition, difference and interruption, that anti-uchronia may take a cairological form.
High Stakes
My searching for anti-uchronian affects, percepts and concepts in micro-literatures like
eco-science fiction, or in climatological reports to policy makers worldwide, in graffiti
art, in contemporary circus shows the political dimensions and powerful stakes these
discourses and genres engage in, and is symptomatic of an age where even conversations
on the weather, once a shelter for easy consensus and seemingly apolitical
(intergenerational) ‘small’ talk, no longer can afford consensual small talking, taking on
scales that widen beyond understanding: these conversations will not be any more
protected from the storm than any place else, and they in fact resolutely question what
this storm is, says, does. The shelter is shaken, and the oikos needs kairos, in order to
become habitable. If the arts and sciences have never occupied a realm outside of politics
(considering them as such in fact may serve highly conservative purposes obscuring
powerful sites for change), they have special political salience with the eco-crises, now
more than ever: the stakes are about the livability of human, nonhuman, and hybrid lives.
Meandering through these artistic, scientific and literary genres and forms, we
have seen that anti-uchronia cairologically invests the tension characteristic of a context
of urgency, with its contradictory needs for rapid change in a fast world, and for time to
think. If anti-uchronia suspends time, it is not in the sense of stopping it, but rather in the
sense of a gasp for air, a gasp for thought, idiotically slowing down everything else to
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claim that perhaps something more important is at stake. It contains two moments, one
whereby uchronia is shown for what it is, stripped down of its credibility when making
naturalizing teleological claims ruled out by the eternal return. In doing so anti-uchronia
insinuates into uchronia’s interstices to creates larger cracks, where we may carve the
time to allow other possible temporalities’ emergence. The task is tall and the stakes are
high, however. The next chapter will engage temporalities that present themselves as
alternatives or substitutes to uchronia, yet still take the teleological form of timeless
temporalities, and make promises linearly abstracted from concrete presents, failing to
confront the question of limits. These “counter-uchronias,” I will argue, are not up to the
task. Again, the stakes are high: if we have killed God, who was replaced by all too
human humans without getting us rid of the place. 47 Now some may have been trying to
celebrate homo economicus and his capitalist market in the same way, de-humanizing
man, and developing a teleology of endless accumulation. But the world is limited, and at
this point we might as well also kill capital, and, perhaps more importantly, its insatiable
desire for growth. Note that it is interesting that cowboy capitalism would form
assemblages and resonance machines with fundamental Christians (Connolly, 2008)
precisely while God has been sacrificed on the altar of growth, yet growth and life are
now engaged in a fight to death. But if growth can only survive as lifeless – indeed, so
many are already filling the ranks of the living dead compulsive digitalized consumers
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Deleuze explains very clearly, synthesizing so many passages in Nietzsche’s work in simple terms, that
“the thought of Nietzsche, is that the death of God is a great noisy event, but insufficient” … “in
Nietzsche’s works, the versions of the death of God are multiple, at least 15, all of great beauty. But
precisely, according to one of the most beautiful, the murderer of God is “the ugliest of men.” …
“Nietzsche is the first one to teach us that killing God does not suffice to operate a transmutation of values”
(Deleuze, 2013, p. 30). The “ugliest of all men” depiction is of course a reference to Zarathustra.
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and producers watching zombie movies in their ‘free’ time – then the struggle opposes
nihilism and life.
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CHAPTER IV
GOING BACK?
REGRESSIVE COUNTER-UCHRONIAS:
REPRODUCING UCHRONIA

Finally Contemplating What We’re Facing… By Running Backwards?
If uchronia is the timeless (ever-postponed) and idealized temporality, which subjects the
present to an abstract and impossible future of relentless, never satisfied or satiated
growth on a limited planet, it is also often resisted (enters anti-uchronia), questioned,
critiqued. Anti-uchronia may show uchronia to be contingent rather than natural,
impossible rather than the only plausible way, radically outside any desirable reality
rather than the reality. It opens the possibility for other possibilities, yet not all
alternatives to uchronia take a form radically different than uchronia, and many mimic
both its (often unfortunate) appeal and its problematic nature (enters counter-uchronia)
and/or relationship to human/Nature.
In the previous chapter we meandered through the (performing and street) arts,
the sciences, science fiction. Through some instances of these, I argued, the idealized
temporality I have called “uchronia” may be shown or at least suspected as contingent
rather than “natural” or self-evident, as an impossible and undesirable horizon, rather
than the (only) probable and desirable one. Certain artistic representations or practices,
scientific reports and observations, stories and narratives, proliferate cracks in the
uchronian narrative, with the anti-uchronian effect of slowing us down, perhaps even
making us pause, so as to allow critical thinking to emerge. This slowing down evokes
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the figure of the idiot, making pause to ask the disturbing questions which uchronia (its
paces) normally rejects as unintelligible. Thus in chapter 3, the helpful character of the
idiot was incarnated among others by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
reports’ diagnostic moment. In what follows, I wish to further complicate this landscape,
suggesting that, often entangled with uchronia and anti-uchronia’s resistance to it, we
find what I call “counter-uchronian” moments. These replicate or mimic the teleological,
linear, idealized and abstracted form of uchronia, and they make claims to substitute to it.
If uchronia was about moderns “running to the future with their backs turned to it”
(Latour, 2009), “counter-uchronia” may be about jumping, leaping, running or simply
going, either back, forward or ahead on the same (highly problematic) line. For instance,
when I return in the next chapter (V) to the IPCC reports, it will not be so as to
underscore the helpful, welcome (in an eco-crisis context), idiotic anti-uchronian moment
I first read in these texts (chapter III). This time, I will emphasize the counter-uchronian
dimension of the reports, which, leaving idiocy behind too hastily, leap to conclusions
incompatible with their very own diagnosis: this time, the not-so-idiotic IPCC reports
will be read as traversed by stupidity. After its anti-uchronian moment has queered
uchronian temporalities, the IPCC straightens time again.
Counter-uchronias offer either to merely amend or to symmetrically oppose
uchronia, and remain trapped in similar paces, speeds, rhythms, pasts, presents, futures,
linearity, teleology, futurism, and/or passéisme. I will examine below various contrasting
examples of this, in “primitivist” or reactionary dimensions of some environmentalist
thought and art, on the one hand (this chapter), and on the other, in the oxymoronic,
futurist “sustainable growth” advocated – for instance – by the IPCC and some of the
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climate sciences (chapter V). In the former examples, counter-uchronia has moderns start
running backward, finally facing where they are running to... now rushing back after an
equally illusory time to replace uchronian futurism (seeking a glorified past of harmony
between “Man” and “Nature” which has never existed). In other words these examples
are past-oriented (let us “return” to “Nature”) and they constitute themselves as reactions
against, attempts to counter, uchronia, in symmetrically oppositional forms. In the latter
examples meanwhile (in the case of sustainable growth), the same running forward with
one’s back turned to the future is occurring as does with uchronian temporality, only the
adjectival modification of growth by way of the term “sustainable” makes the running
take the form of a series of sinuous steps or leaps, of uneasy and awkward contorsions,
creating a choreography substantially similar to uchronia, perhaps more absurd and
farcical. First as tragedy, then as farce. Part of the farce, I will argue, has to do with what
I see as the truly problematic nature of a certain version of “Nature,” namely its
temporality: when Nature is conceptualized as a teleological end, congealing a stable
harmonious state, whether this Nature needs to be restored, conserved or returned to,
naturalizing politics are damaging nature as becoming, nature as surprising,
unpredictable, uncertain, unstable, the ungrounded Earth under our moving (perhaps
dancing) feet. Consequently the problem with “Nature” is not nature: the issue lies in the
counter-uchronian and uchronian temporalities at play to constitute this concept.
In this chapter, I examine some instances that would have us suspect some
environmentalisms of being merely counter-uchronian, of the sort that would risk to fall
into or be tempted by a “backwards” movement toward an idealized past, a symmetrically
oppositional response to progressive uchronia. I will end on the distinction between anti-
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as antidote and counter- as reactive, as mirror. I begin this reflection with the example of
de-growth, which privative prefix “de” raises the question of whether what is advocated
by political ecologists and tenets of this movement is a gesture backwards, or a “return.”
As we will see, a number of counter-uchronian dimensions may be encountered in degrowth thought, but I will argue that they do not necessarily reside in the initially
suspected “backwardness” (I).
How may we then explain impressions of ecologism as potentially coterminous
with “backwardness,” of “returns” to nature, the candle (as a symbolic tool or technology
from an era where “Man” would allegedly have lived in harmony with “Nature”), or
“caveman” lifestyles? Are such suspicions evidence that ecology indeed mimics
uchronia’s linearity and teleology, only to reverse it, giving it a declentionist and
reactionary form (counter-uchronia) that would oppose progressive and modernist
capitalist growth qua an alleged “primitivism”? I will try to respond in part to this vast
question, examining some of the problems involved in the very term “primitivism,”
loaded as it is, just like progressivism, with colonial assumptions about linearity and non
co-evalness between various cultures and modes of living. I will look into anarchoprimitivism and deep ecology’s respective versions of the theme of a “return” to Nature
(II). Finally, I will read Viennese artist Hundertwasser’s works (III) as symptomatic of
temptations to “retreat” to counter-uchronia (for the time being – see chapter VI for an
alternative reading). These various examples will hopefully show how reactionary
counter-uchronian dimensions are sometimes present in specific currents of
environmentalism. In concluding this chapter, returning to Nietzsche once again, I will
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recapitulate the anti-uchronian critiques I propose with respect to “regressive”
environmentalist counter-uchronias.
De-growing Uchronia: Growth Objectors, Progress and Backwardness
Il y a un autre monde, mais il est dans celuici.
Paul Eluard
Is de-growth a form of counter-uchronia? The following will not provide a clear-cut
answer to this question and will rather lean toward a non-conclusive negative answer.
Instead, the goal of critically examining the “de” of “de-growth” and the objection
practiced by those calling themselves “growth objectors” 48 will be to show (or at least
wonder) how anti-uchronian critiques can be entangled with counter-uchronian
dimensions. This should not be surprising to anyone (self-critically) aware of the fact that
any critique is bound to mimick and perhaps even risk reproducing its own target,
especially when it slides toward merely oppositional perspectives, or tries to fight off
such temptation. But if this is the case, then the distinctions that anti- and counteruchronia offer may seem vain, pointless, a mere play on words. However, the critique of
critique, so as to more finely tune the latter, is rarely vain, 49 especially in times of such
high stakes as those present, when uchronia claims hegemonic status in the face of mass
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The phrase “growth objection” was first coined by the French constituency within the transnational degrowth movement, to add nuance and even sometimes as a critique of the term “de-growth,” as internal to
the movements debates emerged about how de-growth unsatisfactorily centered growth and risked
confusing people, precisely about impressions that not wanting growth meant “going backwards.”
Objection to growth is obviously a pun on “consciousness objection” (in French consciousness –
conscience – and growth – croissance – rime), but it is also a way to signify that the point is not so much to
back-track the “advance” of growth, but rather to distance ourselves from the imperative to growth, to ask
whether it is necessary.
49
This is where I part ways with JK Gibson-Graham (2006): abandoning critique is unhelpful at best,
dangerous at worst. I would rather side with Gilles Deleuze’s understanding of the left as (partly) defined
by its refusal to ever abandon critique (see also chapter VI below on this point).
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inequalities, ecological destruction of scales capable of threatening life, or at least the
liveability of human and nonhuman lives today and tomorrow.
(De-growth = Backward only if Growth = Forward)
(We Have Never Moved Forward)
What hides behind the prefix “de” of “de-growth,” and the objection “objecteurs de
croissance” strive to practice? We may recall, from chapter 1, how one of the leading
figures of this movement, economist Serge Latouche, defended this political position
against potential accusations to retrograde and reactionary tendencies. Yet he and other
theorists advocating for de-growth are quite aware of the limitations of the term, which as
they regularly remind readers, is more provocative than literal. The term “de-growth” has
been gathering a diverse array of European (especially French, Italian, Spanish), South
and North American groups and movements, 50 often coming from or overlapping with
the alter-globalization movement, these regions’ respective leftist movements, social
movements such as Occupy and Indignados, political ecologists (in the lineage of Illich
and Gorz – see chapter I). It intervenes in a uchronian sea of assumptions according to
which growth is deemed the inevitable goal one cannot not want, raising the question of
how to de-center this desire: the objective is consequently quite clearly anti-uchronian.
However, de-growth economist Paul Aries himself has referred to the term “de-growth”
as a rather “obtuse” (quoted by Latouche, 2009) one, meant to help “decolonize the Left
from progressive imaginaries” (Latouche, 2009) rather than being a literal signifier: the
prefix “de” should not be interpreted as implying a return, a move “backwards.” The
50

We may note the recent publication of a glossary of degrowth vocabulary with contributions by theorists
from all these regions, which speaks to the diversity and vibrancy of the movement today (D’Alisa,
Demaria, Kallis et. al., 2014).
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question then becomes more complicated: does de-growth indeed perform such decolonizing, or, in attempting to do so, does it partly reproduce progressive teleological
visions (countering uchronia yet ultimately running on the same path and in the same
direction), or, finally, does it regress to run backward toward an also dangerously illusory
past (reproducing uchronia insofar as it tries to take its opposite direction again on the
same path)?
One is first tempted to answer unequivocally that de-growth does in fact strive to
perform the first of these three, and there is indeed plenty of evidence within de-growth
and growth objection discourses to attest for what I have called an “anti-uchronian”
moment. First of all, if the “de” in “de-growth” were to be suspected of signifying a
backward movement, it would only be in relation to the assumption that “growth” is
indeed a movement forward, and that there is such a thing as a line threading the past,
present and future so as to give only two possible directions to the passing of time, while
the orientation would either be ascending or descending, and while the ascent and descent
would be measured by growth. If on the other hand, the anti-uchronian moment of degrowth critique were to be capacious enough to challenge this assumption, what is being
undone by the “de” in “de-growth” would not necessarily result in it running backwards.
Thus we need to examine de-growth’s anti-uchronian moment first, to then turn to its
programmatic moment and how or whether it may be assimilated to a backward
movement. De-growth anti-uchronia offers many layers, at mundane, minute and also
larger scales, and focused on consumption as well as production. Here de-growth critique
does not simply imply a return, or a reversal of ongoing trends. In a text titled Manifeste
Utopia signed collectively by members of this movement and recently re-published after
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participatory democratic re-drafting (2012), the authors call for a radical
reconceptualization of our “relationship to time” (rapport au temps). This critique
operates simultaneously at the quotidian and the larger scales, taking on the notion of
progress along with daily activities, both being equally in need of rethinking with respect
urgencies and priorities.
Anti-Uchronian De-growth From Quotidian to Historic Time
Quotidian temporalities are critiqued from the perspective of work and productivism, as
well as consumerism. The Manifeste Utopia denounces capitalist economies’ equation of
personal fulfillment with consumption and work. Yet the fluctuations of consumers’
buying power and the constant creation of more needs by a society that’s also one of
spectacle creates the impossibility to satiate the imperative to consume. The only good
consumer becomes the frustrated, never satisfied consumer, compulsively and
impulsively quenching part of her thirst in quick moments, brief durations of time, when
buying, partly and never completely soothes the pain. From the perspective of my
conceptualization of anti-uchronia, we may see in this critique an insightful denunciation
of the forever postponed, self-feeding promises of capitalist economies, along with fast
paces and high speeds (all defining traits of uchronia). Consumers run after a future
satisfaction that is always postponed, a time with no time.
The same goes with the productivism characteristic of capitalist economies:
Manifeste Utopia calls for questioning “the value of work,” which tends to monopolize
quotidian time: I’ll work until exhaustion and sleep when I die, because working always
more hours is both the key to and the sign of success, virtue, fulfillment, etc. Here our
growth objectors underscore the ethical stakes, pointing out that the quantity of time
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spent working is taken, in capitalist contexts, to be an indicator of individual virtue,
morality, etc. Thus quotidian temporalities and the critique both of the relentless paces
and speeds of consumerism, along with rhythms, durations and hours generated by
productivism, are an essential part of the objection to growth critique, even when it does
not make temporality as central as I make it here, and even when the elements described
above are sometimes scattered in the text rather than thematized under the rubric of
temporality. One is not hard-pressed to find numerous excerpts in the text that stress the
question of time in a manner that I would describe as anti-uchronian. 51 For instance,
bringing together the critique of productivist and of consumerist times, we find
statements such as:
We wish to promote a management of time that, throughout life, would allow
everyone to articulate daily both their professional life and other times of their
life, or to interrupt their work so as to dedicate themselves to personal and
collective projects. (2013, p. 42) 52
The proposal is to change priorities, rhythms, and paces so as to slow down and live more
liveable lives, and this resolution is visibly tied to an anti-uchronian resolution to reinvent
temporality, as here the emphasis is on the possibility for other possible temporal orders.
Manifeste Utopia also examines another anti-uchronian aspect of objection to
growth critiques of temporalities: the authors raise the larger-scale temporal question of
what they call “the ideology of progress.” In their view, progress is “erected as value,” to
the point of “subjecting man instead of serving him” (p. 43). Along with growth
51

We must note here that the more than 200-page manifesto does include one short section in a chapter
which focuses solely on the question of time, while the claims I am synthesizing and commenting on here
are also spread across the text. One may thus read this as at least one of the many threads that run across the
overall argument. Here I choose to provide a reading from the perspective of temporality.
52 NB: this and all the following translations of this text are my own.
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objectors’ self-proclamation as “utopians,” the humanist and gendered language
mobilized in this critique contributes, as I will discuss below, to the counter-uchronian
moment in the text. Yet the denunciation of progress offered testifies of this manifesto’s
anti-uchronian character as well, pointing to how both facets may indeed cohabit in one
single text.On the anti-uchronian front still, Manifeste Utopia goes on to claim that:
Since the industrial revolution, our cultural history has had us believe that our
civilization inexorably follows an ascending slope, a temporal linearity which has no
more limits than growth does. The critique of a certain relationship to temporality and
to “meaning” seems central to us. The renewal of modern political thought indeed
relies upon taking finitude into account as well as plurality in relationships to the
world. (2013, p. 46)
After showing the relation between temporalities of work and morality, here we see an
attention to temporalities and meaning. Both of these insights, as we have seen and will
examine again with regards to the Nietzschean notion of eternal return’s pertinence to
anti-uchronia, seem to be at odds with the idea that this manifesto may risk to reproduce a
linear, teleological and progressive form of uchronia. This critique of progressivism is
two-fold: it targets both a futurism (the subjection of the present to an abstract future), as
well as a “relationship to time [that is] turned to immediacy and ephemerality.” Building
on Illich’s work, the text underscores thresholds beyond which “medicine is a nuisance to
health, speed has us waste time, school makes us ignorant, communication is so invasive
that one does not understand anything anymore” (Mouvement Utopia, 2013; see also
Illich, 1976; 1973).
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Counter-Uchronian Moments: Between Progression and Regression
In spite of these anti-uchronian elements though, at times the Manifeste Utopia seems to
merely inverse the linearity and teleology of growth denounced, keeping it intact in this
linear and teleological form by glorifying a past that would allegedly be (or have been)
both more natural and more humanist, resulting to an extent in a counter-uchronian
declentionist narrative as well as a call for “returns.” At other times, the Manifeste Utopia
also reproduces the form of uchronia, to propose a counter-uchronian progressive
alternative. In addition, the explicit claim of objection to growth politics as “utopian” all
the way to the title of the text indicates the concession to a certain abstraction and the fact
that a program situated outside or beyond necessity and reality remains present.
Some passages in the text may indeed incite to confirm the suspicions to a
declentionist or backward-oriented perspective which de-growth’s prefix first created.
Indeed, growth objection as reflected in the Manifeste Utopia resorts to teleological
origin points reminiscent of a quasi-Rousseauist narrative. When denouncing
consumerism, we find the claim that “the logic of needs, originally natural, has expanded
itself to the totality of human desires…” (p. 32) or the critique of the Left as succumbing
to progressive perspectives and to productivism, but insofar as it “claims a lineage
whereby the meaning of the history of man would be to humanize the natural, to model it,
to push aside the world’s animality” (p. 38). Of course this last statement may be read as
encouraging a challenge against the human/nature dualism, denouncing both it and its
association with a future/past dualism, and/or a dualism opposing archaism to modernity.
Yet this challenge tends to be formulated as though the implication was one of return,
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reversal, with little to no further deconstruction of the dualisms under discussion. The
possibility that the world may be (re)composed of hybrids, a mesh of strange strangers
(Morton, 2010) neither human nor natural, or perhaps too much of both, or perhaps never
having been either even when claims were made to the contrary, is nowhere to be found
in the text.
Yet these slippages to a form of declentionist narrative and a temptation to merely
reverse the path, reverse the human/nonhuman relation associated with modernity, are
also complicated by the opposite but equally counter-uchronian impulse: in a both
humanist and naturalist tone, Manifeste Utopia wishes for “tools and technologies” to
“serve people rather than the reverse.” But again, what if we had always been hybrids,
never been modern, never been quite so human? What if “Nature” was a form of
technology (Haraway, 1989), and of recent invention at that? These questions are left
unaddressed. The text also claims its utopian nature even though it opens with the incipit
quote (stolen above here, to open this section) by surrealist poet Paul Eluard: “there is
undeniably another world, but it is inside this one” (Eluard, 1968, p. 986). 53 Interestingly,
the growth-objecting authors admit to the risk of mimicking the very target of their
critique and struggles: “the mimetic temptation mustn’t lead de-growth activists toward
the detrimental logic of a new ‘de-growth ideology’” (Mouvement Utopia, 2013, p. 27).
Also interestingly, the text presumes that capitalist economies are founded upon a form of
utopianism as well: “the capitalist utopia of illimited material growth is leading us right
into a wall” (p. 23). If there is mimickry then, the imitation is partly conscious and even
53

The Manifeste Utopia quotes Eluard, but the famous poet himself was quoting French writer Albert
Beguin, quoting the scientist, writer and philosopher Ignaz-Vitalis Troxler: “There is undeniably another
world, but it is within this one, and to attain its perfection it must be recognized and one must engage in its
promotion. Man must seek his state to-come within the present, and the sky, not above the Earth, but within
himself.”
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intentional. And if capitalist economies make claims to reality, de-growth advocates
know better. Then why still resort to utopia to describe their own project?
Ultimately, the counter-uchronian dimension of de-growth arguments defended in
this manifesto does not simply reside in a form of alleged backwardness, a desire to start
running back, inverting the direction or running backwards in a race initially moving
toward the future with our backs turned to it, as moderns tend to do according to Latour.
The goal is not to start running to a glorious and idealized past, although to an extent that
is not entirely excluded either. Again, some parts of the text call for restoring a lost
“naturalness” in human interactions and modes of living, as well as a lost humanity, a
humaneness, a humanism. Though no simplistic “return to nature” is praised, one senses
a partly declentionist account of history, when attacks are made against “the ideology of
progress” as betraying and subjecting both “man” and an originary “nature” to a
dangerously abstracted future, hopelessly defying material limits. In contrast, some other
parts in the text claim a certain artificialism drawing complicatedly from both old and
new, asserting the impossibility and improbability of running back, of simply turning
back the clocks of progress. Yet this artificialism is indeed imbued with a humanism and
a concept of “Nature” reminiscent of… moderns’ justifications of progress. Thus both
futurist and retrograde moments and movements, both forms of counter-uchronias, are
present in the text, along with helpful critical gestures that may be described as antiuchronian, and anti-utopian assertions that the “other world” is “within this one,” that
linearity and temporality do not sit well together, that the world is plural, and that
relationships to time are also plural.
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Reversing and Deepening Uchronia:
Anarcho-Primitivism and Deep Ecology’s Counter-Uchronitis
The best thing we can do with environmentalists is
shoot them… They are Luddites marching us back
to the 18th century.
Michael O’Leary, chief executive officer at Ryanair
De-growth, as discussed above, illustrates that reducing critiques of progress formulated
by various currents of environmental thought to declentionist, decadentist, backward calls
to rush away from modernity would be simplistic at best. Yet, greens have been
caricatured as “primitivists” calling for a return to caveman life and ‘the candle,’
arguably much beyond any claims they themselves have been making. The image of
backwardness of dark green agendas is surely amplified by the sensitivity of the critiques
made, with respect to questions of (sacro-sanct) consumerist lifestyles, for instance. The
violent, defensive and paranoid tone of the above quote by Michael O’Leary illustrates
this. In addition, in contexts of capitalist economies, contexts where temporality takes a
uchronian form, the reflex of casting any critics of modernity as “backward” is, to an
extent, expectable. In other words, in worlds that conceive, idealize and experience
temporality as linear, teleological, progressive, futurist (in the sense that it is subjected to
an abstract, impossible, ou-chronian, future), imagining any objection to progress as
being strictly oppositional and thus operating on the same track only backwards, is a most
logical assumption. Many environmental activists, beyond eclectic currents within the
movement, would probably agree that they have encountered multiple times this type of
fearful and angry response to their arguments regarding limits to growth (something in
the aggressively derisive vein of: “at this rate, do you want me to give up all my comfort
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and go back to prehistory?”). Thus the stereotyping of environmentalists as solely
declentionist and regressive advocates of an illusory golden past of harmony with nature,
desirous of returning to the cave and/or candle (depending on when that harmonious past
may be situated) often performs the role of a discrediting strawman mobilized by
detractors of certain radical green politics who cannot but imagine an alternative to
uchronia as taking on the same teleological form, only in reverse (a counter-uchronian
form). This may distort or exaggerate the extent to which past-oriented counter-uchronias
are present in environmentalist imaginaries, and quite conveniently portrays
environmentalist times as belonging to a remote, utopian past. If we can disentangle
aspects of environmentalist claims that risk being easily dismissed with accusations of
being retrograde and naively praising a return to a past that has never existed (counteruchronia), from powerful, compelling and needed (anti-uchronian) critiques of progress,
and if we can distinguish between the extent to which detractors of environmentalism
portray it as a counter-uchronian regression, and the actual (or virtual) ways in which
some currents or dimensions of environmentalist discourses do indeed fall into this trap,
then anti-uchronian critique may be more finely tuned.
Some currents within the recent history of ecosophy didin fact evoke themes of
“return” more unambiguously and unapologetically than others, and among these
nature/return lovers, various figures and schools of thought ventured more or less far into
the past on a cursor of how much “going back” to “Nature” is allegedly necessary.Some
of these decadentist or declentionist narratives were indeed just as caricatural as, almost
reversed mirror-images of, uchronian progress narratives and their assumptions that
capitalist growth measures the good life. They too, took the form of a desire for a
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timeless time, a time outside of time. In what follows I will examine two examples of
this, first turning to the anarcho-primitivism of John Zerzan, who continues to write well
after the boom (and decline) of this movement – a movement whose most famous figure
may have been the Unabomber (boom indeed). I will then turn to a movement that also
has its roots in the 1980s though it too is still influential among dark greens, and which I
have already discussed in chapter 1: namely, deep ecology indeed slips toward themes of
“return” to “Nature” quite often – in fact deep ecology and anarcho-primitivism have
sometimes overlapped, in the sense that, for instance, eco-terrorism draws from both
currents. Reciprocally, deep ecologist Arne Naess has occasionally praised monkeywrenchers’ ‘propaganda by the deed’ type of methods, 54 and anarcho-primitivism
sometimes draws from a deep ecology ontology and ethics. Deep ecology’s counteruchronitis is arguably more subtle than anarcho-primitivism’s, yet both can be versions of
a reply to, and a reversed replica of, uchronia, i.e here I read them as instances of
counter-uchronias.
Anarcho-Primitivism: After Language All Went Awry
In Primitivism: An Illusion with No Future, Stephen Booth vehemently attacks anarchoprimitivism with tirades only a fellow green anarchist could address to his comrades, yet
in so doing, he also provocatively encapsulates what I would call the“counter-uchronian”
issues with the anarcho-primitivism of a John Zerzan or Unabomber Ted Kaczynski. In
Booth’s view, anarcho-primitivism was a “complete failure” because it busied itself:
54

An exhaustive, and much more precise description of the lineages would not be feasible here. But it is
worth noting that not all monkey-wrenchers would identify as anarcho-greens. The relation I am pointing to
specifically here, is that qua a repertoire of action and discourse partly inherited from left-libertarian
propaganda by the deed, direct action, illegalism, and though they cannot be reduced to this influence,
monkey wrenchers who also often turn to deep ecology for philosophical influences are one instance which
link the two currents of ecosophy together.
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proclaiming etiological myths about the palaeolithic origins of our present
problems in agriculture or in symbolization, and an eschatology of collapsing
civilization, empty supermarket shelves and failing electricity supplies; leading on
to the language-less bliss of non-hierarchical oneness with each other and our
eventual merger with the primal wilderness. (Booth, 2015, p. 2) 55
Further clarification of this angry tirade is of course needed, but the essential traits of the
anarcho-primitivism defended by someone like John Zerzan are indeed well captured: in
Zerzan’s view, humanity started to err and create the conditions for our current ecological
crisis and unequal, violent society, when sedentary agriculture replaced nomadic huntergatherer lifestyles, when language emerged (and the reign of the symbolic severed
humans’ relations to their own bodies, corporeality, sensuality, nature, etc), when gender
emerged to inaugurate millenia of division among humans, a decay into difference,
hierarchy and inequality. Late capitalist societies are thus doomed to catastrophically fail
in ensuring survival, and they worsen even more the grasp of the symbolic over human
beings, with the “tired communication” via emails and such digital technologies
ceaselessly cutting us off further even from the immediacy of material experience.
Zerzan denounces in one fell swoop everything that came after sedentarization,
agriculture and language, depicting language and any representation, i.e “the symbolic” at
large, as nothing but a form of emprisonment and alienation from the real, from the
immediacy of sensory experience. He equates language to a form of disembodiement, as
an “all-defining imprisonment, rather than liberatory triumph.” The invention and
dissemination of language is guilty for “subordinating natural systems that humankind
55

For more on anarcho-primitivism see for instance Gagliano, 2010; Zerzan, 2002; 2005; 1994; Kaczynski,
2005. More pacifist versions of this eclectic movement include Jacques Ellul (1964), who was quite close
in many respects to Ivan Illich and influences the political ecology movement in France to this day.
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was once attuned to,” and it is coterminous with the loss of the world. This decay
culminates with the modes of communication now commonly used at least among the
most privileged segments of a globalized world’s populations, namely the internet, digital
communications in general: “human connectedness and corporeal immediacy have been
traded for a faded sense of reality.”
At no point does Zerzan consider the possibility that language, along with other
technologies and modes of communication and representation, may perform empowering
or emancipatory functions as well, or connect humans among themselves, or to some
extent, play a part (positive or negative) in new kinds of “transcorporeality.” The latter
concept, which belongs to environmentalist feminist Stacy Alaimo, is an interesting
contrast to Zerzan’s hypothetical “corporeality”’s and its alleged purity from any
linguistic dimension. Alaimo’s “transcorporeality” (2010) includes performativity, in its
discursive and material dimensions, instead of falling in the trap Zerzan leaps into, where
the realm of the linguistic is so neatly separated from bodily natures. In his account,
anything “symbolic” is inevitably and profoundly flawed, alienating. Thus Zerzan blames
every evil on language, leaping from the invention of language to nation-states and
nationalism for instance. Though he certainly has a point that nationalism has relied on a
certain language, vocabulary or discourse and the imposition of certain “national”
languages being imposed to create specific national subjects, this example (among others)
reveals the shortcomings in Zerzan’s decadentist vision of human history: no mention is
made of languages that were violently erased to make nation-states and their
monolingualism possible. The distinction underscored by Ivan Illich (2013), between
vernacular languages and knowledges on the one hand, and standardized, commodified
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language is silenced to enable a smooth causality, an equation going from the original sin
of inventing language and the symbolic, directly to violent and alienating ends.
Thus the account proposed is a teleological one, the exact inverse of the most
caricatural progress narratives: where uchronian temporalities reduce all of time passing
to a march of progress, flattening bumps, contradictions and contingencies on the way,
Zerzan reduces all events in human history to a downwards fall away from nature. Here
Zerzan also reveals a reactionary, reifying and caricatural idealization of indigenous
modes of living as closer than Western modernity allegedly is to this originary and pure
nature of the past, citing for instance how some indigenous people (the mention is often
vague) recognize the existence of reality beyond language. These, he claims, have the
merit of acknowledging that language is inadequate to account for all of reality and what
Western conceptions would call “nature” (the quotation marks are mine though, as
Zerzan is blind to the fact that many of the indigenous people he refers to do not have a
term for “nature”). Yet, an important detail is missing from this claim as well: namely the
distinction between rejecting language at large, as though it were fundamentally flawed
and always already synonymous of corruption or “denaturing,” and simply (humbly)
acknowledging that human language has limits as to what it may represent or express.
This point is exemplary of a number of twists in Zerzan’s regressive counter-uchronian
argument which are founded on a caricatural depiction of “indigenous people” at large,
“hunter-gatherer tribes” in general, supposed to represent a time passed and
extinguishing, that we moderns should long for nostalgically as it was so much closer to a
perfect, pristine and harmonious relationship with the natural. Thus indigenous and non-
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Western ways of life are lumped together with nature, the whole being in turn thrown to a
remote past.
In Zerzan’s declentionist narrative, language, sedentarization and agriculture also
inaugurated or coincided with the apparition of gender. This to the anarcho-primitivist is
also a marker for what we may ironically call the “original sin” that allegedly caused our
decay and lead to the modern ecologically destructive world we now live in (the indeed
ironic parallels between Zerzan’s declentionism and some forms of religious
eschatological narratives are numerous). The beginnings of the Paleolithic and
sedentarization inaugurate a “shift from the non-separated, non hierarchized life”
(Zerzan, 2008, p. 16) to modes of living reliant upon hierarchy and domination, with the
originary form of such domination being founded in gender. To Zerzan, “the general
crisis of modernity has its roots in the imposition of gender” (p. 18). Interestingly, to an
anti-feminist writer he quotes as praising cranes as (allegedly) male-invented
technologies and claiming that "if civilization had been left in female hands, we would
still be living in huts" (p. 18). Zerzan responds that "to some of us 'grass huts' represents
‘not taking the wrong path’” (ibid.) The objection is not about denouncing a hasty
assimilation of a certain mode of living with femininity and another modern one with
masculinity, with each term in this strange equation, and the interdependent dualisms
constituting these terms, placed under critical scrutiny. Instead, Zerzan affirms and
celebrates a supposed (essentialist) anti-technological femininity. Nature or language-less
oneness, femininity or genderlessness, are deemed to all belong to a past Zerzan longs for
us to run back to. “The symbolic” (language, science, the arts…) is seen as having
emerged with gender which itself emerged with agriculture which altogether created a
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world of destruction and domination, and Zerzan calls for our running back to a
genderless, a-symbolic oneness: for instance, according to him "there is no evidence of
symbolic activity (e.g cave paintings) until the gender system" (p. 12). Apparently the
only way to get out of a world based on domination and violence and return to blissful
primitive ways is to give up on both gender and art, in one fell swoop: let’s throw the
creative baby with the gendered bath water.
Zerzan’s eschatology and his denunciation of “dis-embodied high-tech futures”
suggests apocalyptic ends, as Stephen Booth’s summary above graphically describes
(“collapsing civilization, empty supermarket shelves and failing electric supplies”).
Though he is most vague about such apocalypse, the decay seems to eventually bring
humans full circle, to a redeeming a-linguistic oneness supplanting the separated disembodied denatured humans: “the wholeness of original genderlessness may be a
prescription for our redemption” (p. 18). Ultimately, we have oneness, non-hierarchical
and sensory, a-linguistic, a-symbolic hunter-gatherer simple modes of living in perfect
union with nature and bodily reality, which belong to a remote past, being destroyed and
separated, hierarchized, alienated the minute agriculture, gender and language came
about, then a long downhill evolution where humans are increasingly de-humanized and
de-natured, and finally a grand collapse closing the cycle to bring us back to a form of
second state of nature and oneness. This narrative is of course highly reminiscent of
Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequalities (1984), where the good savage of the ideal state of
nature was corrupted by the invention of property and civil society (and we may
remember that Rousseau also includes language, knowledge, the arts in this downward
slope), the emergence of social inequalities, to then decay into an increasingly violent
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state, where one hopes for a second state of nature to come. 56 At least one major
difference is striking however: besides the fact that Rousseau’s historical context was
immensely different, the XVIIIth century contractualist also famously recognized how
little was known about the origins of civil society, and that his discourse was to a great
extent speculative. Proposing to “begin by laying facts aside,” Rousseau specified that
“the investigations [he] may enter into … must not be considered as historical truths, but
only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the
nature of things” (p.109). Zerzan’s account reifies and idealizes hunter-gatherers as good
savages united to nature in a different way, as he allegedly grounds this depiction on
anthropological and archeological research, and yet importantly, he intervenes after so
much has been discussed and contested to shake any uncritical mobilization of terms like
“primitive” and “civilization.” Of course Rousseau is not merely excused his colonial
assumptions due to his context, and the fact that he raised an appraisive voice with
respect to non-Western modes of living in a context where non-Western people were
barely considered human is not either an excuse for his ‘kind’ racism. Yet Zerzan’s
caricatures and equations lumping non-Western/genderlessness/past/Nature all in one
basket seem quite naïve and dangerous in a new way. His declentionist, reactionary
counter-uchronia incites the reader to desire apocalyptic destruction of all that is present
and/or recent to “return” to hypothetical better times, constructed on the basis of
dangerous assumptions regarding “the primitive” and “civilization.” Zerzan’s example of
counter-uchronia reveals some aspects of the problematic nature of “primitivism,” the
colonial legacy of this adjective, whether it is used appraisively or negatively. This point
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Rousseau does suggest though, that democracy would be the closest civil societal state to a harmonious
second state of nature.
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illustrates how progressivism and primitivism, uchronia and regressive counter-uchronia,
in fact converge to “deny co-evalness” (Fabian, 2014) to non-Western traditions and
ways of life. Zerzan’s anarcho-primitivism is therefore exemplary of what I would call
regressive counter-uchronia. Zerzan sees progress and capitalist growth as untenable (in
this respect his premise is anti-uchronian), yet resorts to a mere symmetrical opposite to
fight progressivism with: primitivism is key to him because it simply reverses the
supposed march of progress, it turns that teleology upside down, yet replicates the
linearity. Ultimately, his “primitivist” counter-uchronia uncritically transforms the
“tomorrow everything will be fine and abundant” into a “yesterday everything was happy
and simple.”
Deep Ecology Back to the Future Primitive
Another instance of current within ecosophy that contains counter-uchronian dimensions
would be deep ecology. To some extent this movement overlaps with anarchoprimitivism, though we will see that deep ecology does not propose quite the same kind
of clearly reactionary reading of human history. Neither does it deploy themes of “return”
to “nature” in quite the same manner. But the first striking difference between the two
movements probably has to do with the fact that, though anarcho-primitivism has
occasionally enjoyed a certain notoriety partly thanks to eco-terrorist actions and such
spectaculars (e.g Ted Kaczynski), within dark green activist groups the ranks of those
influenced by, or identifying to deep ecology are significantly more important. For these
different reasons, both movements’ counter-uchronian dimensions deserve examination.
Timothy Luke (2002) has situated deep ecology as follows:
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The deep ecology movement grew during the 1970s as a reaction against
reformist environmentalism. …The most well-know figures in deep ecology –
such as Warwick Fox, Arne Naess, Bill Devall, George Sessions – aggressively
staked out difficult conceptual positions in their own complex philosophical
approaches to nature protection that have only proven to have other severe ethical,
political and social limits. Yet the influence of deep ecology now plainly extends
beyond the philosophical analysis of nature… Deep ecology principles sustain
innumerable local, regional, national, and even transnational political action
groups all around the world.
Luke then goes on to cite Friends of the Earth!, Greenpeace, the monkey wrenchers,
various green political parties in North America, Australia, Western Europe and Japan,
Earth First!, and many others as having been significantly impacted by deep ecology
ideas and ideals, this influence being still palpable today.
I have already evoked the works of Arne Naess, the author who coined the phrase
“deep ecology,” in chapter 1. I then noted how this current insists that all natural things
have “intrinsic value” rather than merely instrumental value in serving human needs. We
may remember that it is on this basis that deep ecology justifies calls to “protect,”
“conserve,” “preserve,” “restore” nature – a past-oriented paternalism close to that of the
conservation movement (there is a lot of overlap between the two traditions as well).
Further, we have seen that deep ecology, like a number of other ecosophical schools of
thought, emphasizes urgency, sustainability and future generations: the temporal is
consequently an important dimension of deep ecologist thought.
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To an extent, deep ecology differs from the vague apocalyptic visions anarchoprimitivism offers with respect to the future: it imagines what I would call non-uchronian
futures. In this respect, deep ecology is quite far from regressive or reactionary counteruchronias. For instance, Arne Naess stresses the urgency of projecting ecological
imagination into “the twenty-second century,” which he envisions by way of multiple
future scenarios he situates “in 2101.” To conjure pessimistic “doomsday prophets,”
Naess claims that deep ecology “has a mission, however modest, in shaping a future that
is not remote. Just a couple of hundred years” (Naess, 2008, p. 312). Naess thus
multiplies broadly described possibilities for the future, a multitude I’ve called antiuchronian in the previous chapter (when discussing the multiple scenarios imagined by
the IPCC):
1. No major change in ecological policies or the extent of poverty. An ecological
catastrophe occurs because of the slowly accumulating effects of a century of
ecological folly. The dramatic situation forces new ecologically strict policies,
perhaps through undemocratic, even brutal dictatorial military means used by rich
countries.
2. The same development except for a major change in the poor countries:
considerable economic growth of the Western kind. Five times as many people
live unsustainably. A breakdown follows very soon, and harsh measures are
applied to fight chaos and to start a decrease of unsustainability.
3. A couple of similar developments, ending in catastrophic and chaotic
conditions and subsequent harsh, brutal policies implemented by the most
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powerful states. There is a turn toward sustainability, but only after enormous
devastation.
4. Ecological enlightenment, a realistic appreciation of the drastic reduction in
life quality, an increased influence of deep ecological attitude, a slow decrease of
the sum total of unsustainability. The planet follows a trend of decreasing
unsustainability discernible in the year 2101. (Naess, 2008, p. 310)
Of course these future scenarios are not devoid of doomsday dimensions: in all first three,
Naess imagines catastrophe, brutality, chaos and anti-democratic measures dictated by
the increased gravity of the crisis. These descriptions certainly have the (anti-uchronian)
merit of underscoring the multiplicity of possible futures ahead, and of ending with the
envisioning of a possible deep ecological future. This at least depicts the future as open to
several routes, a much needed multiplicity that at least partly parts ways from a single
linear vision. Furthermore, Naess insists that for this deep ecological future to come into
being, “every week counts,” this emphasis on relating present urgency to possibilities for
more sustainable futures qualifying to an extent as what I will call (see chapter VI)
“synchrony.” However, what would this future then entail, and what does Naess (along
with other deep ecology thinkers) picture the deep ecological future to look like? What
does Naess have in mind when he refers to the “deep ecological attitude” that may
permeate his fourth scenario, and does such attitude entail a counter-uchronian “return”
to “nature”?
I want to suggest that the deep ecological notions of “intrinsic value” and
“ecological self” rely upon images of a “return” to “purer” subjectivities. Thus at the
ontological level, deep ecology’s essentialist tendencies position this movement closer to
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what I call counter-uchronia. In addition, this comes with the notion and praise of a
counter-uchronian “future primitive” just as problematic as the primitivism of anarchist
John Zerzan discussed above.
In deep ecologists’ accounts, one trait of deep ecological thought distinguishes it
clearly from other branches of ecosophy (though some, often deep ecologists themselves,
also claim or assume that deep ecology is the only philosophical foundation of ecology
and environmentalism). Arne Naess and others are careful to repeat regularly that deep
ecology is difficult to define in rigid terms, and advance that it cannot be reduced to a
fixed set of principles, let alone one principle. However, one notion, in the last analysis,
is reiterated and returned to over and over, deep ecologists ultimately granting it the
status of principal distinction: namely, deep ecology advocates that nature and all natural
things have intrinsic value beyond instrumental use serving human needs. As Reed and
Rosenthal have summarized, for instance, “some lands might be preserved for their own
sake, giving nature value in itself, independent of human need” (Reed and Rosenthal,
1993, p. 1).
The first consequence of this is that it often results in a portrayal of nature as
relatively stable, as coming into equilibrium if only humans were to interfere in it
significantly less or not at all. As William Connolly sums up, deep ecology “emphasizes
the gradual self-maintaining character of nonhuman processes if and when the human
footprint is light” (Connolly, forthcoming). In other words, nature somehow changes little
when left untouched by bipeds’ prehensible hands and their tools. Nature supposedly
tends toward harmony, stability, and to do so privileges biodiversity (all these claims
being amply contradicted by lots of ecosystems and events which rather make a case for
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what Connolly calls “bumpy temporalities”). This alleged equilibrium in circumstances
of human non-intervention, grants deep ecological “Nature” a sort of originary status, or
at least a relative stability and staticity that most (scientific) ecologists would likely agree
does not exist. Queer ecology has also taught us about the surprisingly unstable, everchanging, unpredictable and queer ways of nonhumans, which shed doubt to this deep
ecological portrayal (Hird, 2010). Thus we see how deep ecology assumes a nonhuman
temporality that is somehow coterminous with stability, longevity, reliability and
predictability. In addition, the biocentric, mere reversal of the human/nonhuman dualism
(as opposed to a deconstruction of the two terms and their relation advocated for instance
by ecofeminist Val Plumwood, 2002) strengthens the depiction of “Nature” as originary.
Natural things, be they living beings, landscapes, rocks, etc, come before human ones, in
both sense of this conjunction: nature before man, chronologically, and also in terms of
importance. Of course the point of a critique of this counter-uchronian account is not to
contest or deny that nonhumans existed long before humans in history. But the moral
grounding and the organization of value according to this chronological order and this
alleged state of stability and equilibrium are reminiscent of a certain uchronia, only
turned upside-down, or “forward-back,”i.e a counter-uchronia. We humans – the exact
meaning, complexity and contestability of this category is barely touched by deep
ecologists – allegedly are situated on a line which has an origin in a past stable and
harmonious moment, just like narratives of growth-driven progress may present us with a
line going toward a fictitious end of abundance and satisfaction never attained, yet always
justifying a certain organization of values in the present.
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What then is to be done, according to this counter-uchronian ontology? Devall
and Sessions preach for privileging “basic intuitions and experiencing ourselves and
Nature” (in Clowney, Mosto et al., 2009, p. 213) which allegedly should result in what
Arne Naess has called “self-realization and biocentric equality” (Naess, 2008). It is when
this nurturing of an “ecological self” breaking away from “materialist egos” is evoked
that we find the most striking rhetoric of return being deployed. Naess for instance claims
enthusiastically that “[going] to a cabin for a weekend is to return to a less complicated
way of life more in touch with nature” (Naess, 2008, p. 22) Such “retreats” into “Nature”
are of course evocative of Thoreau’s utopia of one and his Walden Pond cabin, as well as
a long tradition of outdoor recreation and conservation ethics where the wilderness is
taken to foster a certain sense of manly self at one with his environment (Haraway,
1989). Nature (for leisure rather than labor) provides eternal truths and its pristine images
experienced on one’s own in isolated hiking trips offer opportunities for “materialist
egos” to be replaced by the ecological self, at one with the nonhuman world. This kind of
sense of self is interpreted as the only one capable of intuiting the intrinsic value of all
living beings’ vital needs now perennially secured. Going “back” to nature and finding
inner essence so as to “sustain” vital needs for future generations to come all the way to
the 22nd century produces a temporality shaped so as to counter uchronia, where what is
imagined as the eternal laws of a mythical past project individuals to a “future primitive,”
to use deep ecologist Warwick Fox’s formulation. Individual spiritual growth supplants
capitalist growth, and the forward thinking of deep ecologists requires a turning back to
nature, envisioned as relatively static.
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What then, does this “future primitive” look like? The oxymoronic phrase of
course underscores the tension in this counter-uchronia, and just like anarcho-primitivist
Zerzan’s grandiloquent narrative of decay and eventual collapse came full circle to evoke
a dramatic return to age-old ways, deep ecology’s prescriptive moment is not only
suggestive of a return at the level of individual subjectivities, as we just saw. It is also
accompanied with occasional mentions of a supposed “return” to ways of living broadly
depicted as pertaining to what some deep ecologists call “the minority tradition” (Devall
& Sessions,1985). This refers to so-called “primal” human traditions that have been
minoritized as a result of productivist societies’ hegemony, which entails a reenchantment of the world and a re-sacralization of ancient ties to natural beings and
things, the possibility for personal growth in small communities living in “simple” ways,
cultivating ecological consciousness and attachments to place. What indeed defines the
ecological self is that the place in which one lives, along with its ecology, becomes part
of oneself, an integrated whole. The problem is, according to deep ecology some aspects
of German romanticism, Native American cultures, indigenous cultures in myriad places
not always specified, cultures that pre-date capitalism’s emergence, Buddhism and
various “oriental” traditions, etc, are all lumped together to constitute “the minority
tradition.” The long list assembled by deep ecology would be quite rich and highly
helpful if it wasn’t for the fact of homogenizing, orientalizing so-called minority
traditions – note that Devall and Sessions in fact use the singular – and associating them
to the past, to non-Western, non- or anti- modernity, without further ado regarding the
possibility that “we” may never have been modern, and with little attention to what “the
West” may mean. As was the case with Zerzan’s counter-uchronia, the colonial
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undertones of this sweeping collection of influences come from an implicit and assumed
denial of co-evalness (Fabian, 2014) between various cultures that are in fact
contemporaries (e.g. some Native American cultures with “Western” ones), along with an
assumption of coevalness where there may have been violent extinctions for some,
persistence for others, etc. This move is interestingly shared by deep ecology’s
temporalities and those it denounces, driven by growth, which makes the former earn the
qualification as counter-uchronian, merely attempting to “reverse” the course of uchronia
yet leaving intact the assumption that such a course exists as well as the linear and
teleological form of this course. A mythical past is homogenized, reifying and fetishized,
to aspire to re-instate just like uchronian temporalities may aspire to abstract futures. One
interesting anti-uchronian point here is evaded, namely the possibility (likelihood?) that
there may not be anything to “reverse,” as, to paraphrase Latour once more, we have
never indeed been modern.
Tim Luke has called Deep Ecology
dangerous. Because of its qualities, deep ecology tends to ring up politically as a
form of utopian ecologism. As a utopia, the imagination [thus] articulated
presents some alluring moral prospects for what might be. At the same time, they
fail to outline practicable means for realizing these moral visions. Deep ecologists
are trapped by endorsing new images for new “ecotopias,” but they do not have a
very practical program for anything their visions of future primitive reinhabitation
or bioregional community building. Political action is pushed off into the realm of
ethical ideals, making it every individual’s moral duty to change himself …. —
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this individual moral regeneration might be, at best, a green quietism. (2002, p.
180)
But deep ecology does not only posit a form of utopia or ecotopia lacking practicality, as
Luke underscores here. More specifically, it also does so at the temporal level, and in a
reactive form aiming to counter yet symmetrically oppose and consequently reproduce
myths attached to progress. Deep ecology does, to an extent, advocate a form of
regression to an illusory past. But more specifically and problematically, it fails to
question whether there may be any such thing as a line of time on which to regress on,
and instead reasserts this line, in the hope of reversing its direction. An anti-uchronian
perspective teaches us that growth-driven progress never had a direction, never took
place, and neither will it take place. Rather than reverse, perhaps we may begin to rethink
temporalities, at the quotidian and the larger scale, parting from their linear and
teleological form, as well as their predictability and single or binary directions.
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Building Substitutes to Uchronia: Quintuple Skins and Tree Tenants
Anything linear should be met with distrust.
Don’t carry any straight lines around with
you.
Friedensreich Hundertwasser
Friedensreich Hundertwasser was an artist who claimed that “[he] want[ed] to show how
simple it is basically, to find paradise on earth” (cited in Restany, 2001). He also
happened to design numerous, famous posters for Greenpeace throughout the 1970s and
1980s, and numerous stamps attempting to spread environmental messages. He proposed
an alternative flag for New Zealand on behalf of the Maori people. He modified his name
so as to signify “Peaceful HundredWaters.” He sailed around the Mediterranean for most
of his later life on board of a ship he had called Regentag, or “rainy day.” Earlier when he
first taught at the Fine Arts school in Vienna, which he promptly left, he would tell his
students to go study their own creativity outside and dismiss class, only to paint irregular
lines all over the walls without anyone’s permission. Because he didn’t believe in straight
lines, he never ironed his self-made striped clothes. The multi-disciplinary artist preferred
what he called “fluidoid” lines and spirals to straight ones (I will discuss this matter in
more depth in chapter 5). But most importantly for our immediate purposes,
Hundertwasser may help us envision what forms some of the “regressive” counteruchronia may take aesthetically: as Greenpeace activists were reading and citing deep
ecology, he elaborated a theory of the five skins and built houses were trees lived as
tenants at a time, which I will argue may be read as counter-uchronian art, though I will
also show in chapter 5 that we may read this as heterochronian and heterotopian art.
The five skins’ representation, a naïve drawing under Hundertwasser’s pencil
(“skin,” n.d.), looks like this:
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Figure 4: Hundertwasser’s Five Skins.
The drawing divides existence into five various “skins,” which depicts a whole
reminiscent of some deep ecologist account of the “ecological self” I have discussed
above: first the epidermis (1), then clothes (2), the house (3), identity (4), Nature (5). In
what follows I will describe and critique what Hundertwasser’s diverse array of forms
and genres (poems, paintings, sculptures, happenings, architecture, declarations,
manifestoes, etc) attached to each of these skins, with the corresponding prescriptions for
each of these aspects of a self supposed to live in harmony with the whole. Or rather, if
Hundertwasser granted the status of “skins” to each aspect depicted above, it was because
each was to be considered literally part of the body and mind of each unique individual.
As we will see, many issues in the “vegetative painter’s” representation are shared with
the philosophy of deep ecology.
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First Skin: the Epidermis
The first circle, a human body’s shape, refers to the epidermis. In Hundertwasser’s view,
his first skin should be exposed to the most external ones, as often as climate and weather
deem it possible. In 1967, Hundertwasser gave a conference in the nude, to indicate that
the epidermis’ exhibition in public offered great potentialities for the assertion of the
uniqueness of individual bodies, from shape to texture to color. If the experience of
nudity as a spontaneous practice may seem appealing, the normative injunction seems
more problematic. Nudist movements and groups have a long history tied to a form of
social control, de-sexualizing bodies to standardize them, and have often deployed a
rhetoric of authenticity along with the longing for a past, golden age of infantile,
primitive and pure nudity. Arnaud Bauberot’s study of nudist practices (2004) from
antiquity to Nazi Germany on to contemporary nudist movements, shows that these have
shared imperatives of exposing the bodies so as to cultivate desire and control of athletic,
muscular, potent and able bodies, along with a rhetoric of return to a lost state of nature.
If Hundertwasser’s advocacy of nudism belongs to the specific context of an
environmentalist activism now including events like the annual world naked bike ride,
quite far removed from fascist uses of nudism, the myth of a return to authentic selves
qua nude bodies nonetheless sheds doubt on the bodily diversity argument presented by
the artist. In addition, the fact that Hundertwasser held a press conference in the nude to
make such claims to authenticity, accompanied by two attractive and young women
standing naked alongside him and who as far as I was able to ascertain did not peep a
word while he talked (their presence is left unexplained in all the accounts I have
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encountered), also points to the danger of rendering (female) bodies more immediately
available for objectification.
Second Skin: Clothes
The second skin is made of clothes, which Hundertwasser grew into the habit of creating
himself early in his life (Restany, 2001). Like the nude body, the normative invitation for
making one’s own clothes was intended to guarantee the display of individual
uniqueness, against fashion prêt-a-porter’s dictates. In addition, individual creation of
one’s clothes was held to be less likely to result in the production of straight lines, which
Hundertwasser’s anti-rationalism considered a way for modern life to annihilate any
“natural” sense of creativity in human beings. As I mentioned above, ironing was also
looked down upon as it risked straightening the “natural” striations and undulations of the
material. Hundertwasser wore striped pants, striped shirts, ornated his sailboat with a
striped sail, and the curves and irregularities caused by wrinkles and wind respectively
allowed for the non-straight striated motifs to manifest fully. Ironically, any sailor knows
that a wrinkled sail indicates poor orientation of the sail and inefficient use of the wind,
but Hundertwasser probably did not care about these details. Another “detail” left
unexamined by these prescriptions has to do with a lack of critique at the level of
quotidian temporalities and gender roles: as Ivan Illich has put it, most of the “ghost
work” (Illich, 2013) allowing for commodities (such as, in this instance, materials to
make clothes) to be consumed is performed by women, and in a society where salaried
work predominates to dictate the value of time, the enforcement of Hundertwasser’s
hand-making of clothes would be quite problematic were it to come without a more
general attention to such temporalities. The lack of this kind of critical lens also risked

268

obscuring the fact that many “still” in fact make their clothes by hand today, further
reducing this work to “ghost work.” In addition, the principal reason advanced by
Hundertwasser in banning straight lines resided in his association of such lines with nonnatural, rationalism. The artist claimed (wrongly) that straight lines were nowhere to be
found in nature. The assumption that “Nature” is the opposite of “rationalism” and
“modernity” is of course left implicit and unsubstantiated, and the ascription of normative
value to Nature resonates with deep ecology’s originary Nature supposed to guide ethics.
Third Skin: the Oikos

Figure 5: Hundertwasser’s Tree Tenant House
The oikos is the third skin. In the very heart of Hundertwasser’s ecology, it also allowed
for the artist to intertwine the various skins: his most famous architecture is covered with
trees and green, and includes what he called “tree tenants,” who inhabited floors and
rooms here and there and would “pay their rent” by providing oxygen and trapping urban
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noises to the surroundings. Hundertwasser’s five skins theory is thus highly holistic: all
skins must be integrated harmoniously, as part of one single coherent irrationalist project.
The houses themselves were supposed to function and breathe as a closed circuit, as
human excrements, celebrated in Hundertwasser “Sacred Shit Manifesto” (ibid., n.d.) was
supposed to be re-used internally, in each house, to nourish the trees as fertilizer –
granted human excrements are actually highly toxic unless treated for a number of years,
before which they cannot serve as compost, revealing a temporal dissonance in the
strange immediacy depicted here and clashing with the necessary slowness of this closed
system. The above, naïve picture represents a tree-tenant house which was never built
quite in this way, as the constantly open windows turned out to be quite inefficient for
heat. The drawing is thus very much a utopian depiction of what a tree-tenant house
would look like in a place devoid of weather, climate, and fluctuation.
Fourth Skin: Identity
The fourth skin, namely that which Hundertwasser referred to as “identity,” includes “the
family, the home country.” These words are written in the five skins’ drawing with no
further precision as to whether this list should be punctuated to signal an ellipsis, i.e
whether the reader or viewer should see the rest of the inside of this skin as an “et
cetera,” or whether the list is closed and exhausted by these two categories. Nonetheless,
the choice of the categories seems problematic and counter-uchronian in a number of
aspects. If familial and patriotic values ring quite reactionary, and certain understanding
of identity as fixed or made of sameness among members of a particular groups, the
inscription of “other people” along with “nature” and both perched in a tree in the midst
of the fourth skin reveals similar problems as those discussed above with respect to what
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deep ecology called the “minority tradition.” The adjective “other” of course raises
question regarding who these people are other to, and no explanation is provided as to
their proximity with a “Nature” which also constitutes the fifth skin. From various
writings of Hundertwasser’s, the other relates to “Western modern man,” in a gesture
reminiscent of the counter-uchronian “primitivisms” already examined above.
Fifth Skin: Nature
Finally, Hundertwasser offers “Nature” as the fifth skin’s fabric, though it is also present,
as we just saw, in the fourth. We have seen that Hundertwasser opposed reason and
Nature, straight lines being associated with the former and “fluidoid” ones with the latter.
The Nature the artist describes in a number of poems and texts is quite close to the stable,
reliable, predictable and originary one dear to ecology’s intrinsic value. Here in the
drawing, it circles all other skins to unite what deep ecologists have called the “ecological
self,” so that the self is not only inclusive of mind but also an embodied relation thanks to
the skin metaphor. Gaia is the organism that brings the whole together, the background
upon which the supposedly unique individuals must evolve, in the nude and with their
fluidoid clothing, equipped with national and familial identities. The whole thus looks
like a counter-uchronian and counter-utopian union of spheres supposedly separated by
modernity. As we will see in chapter VI however, if this drawing were to be read as a
spiral, a motif of predilection for Hundertwasser, it may take a heterotopian and
heterochronian form instead of a counter-uchronian reductive flattening.
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Human, All Too Human and Natural, All Too Natural Teleologies?
An age of happiness is quite impossible, because men want
only to desire it but not to have it. … The destiny of man is
designed for happy moments - every life has them - but not
for happy ages. Nonetheless they will remain fixed in the
imagination of man as 'the other side of the hill' because
they have been inherited from ages past.
Nietzsche, Human All Too Human.
From a de-growth manifesto to an anarcho-primitivist’s declentionist vision of history,
from a deep ecological future primitive to an environmentalist artist’s five skins,
contemporary ecosophy and ecologist art offer a number of examples of responses to
uchronia which counter it sometimes by replicating some of its traits. In these cases,
rather than challenges to the uchronian myth of a timeless time, to a simplistic yet
contradictory linearity and teleology, reversals of direction emerged out of the ecological
crises from the late twentieth century on. The placement or situation of the myth of a
timeless time on a chronological line switches from an abstract future to an abstract past,
yet it remains, in these examples, that the time in question is timeless, that it has no time.
Although initiated from an anti-uchronian impulse, these counter-uchronias reproduce
uchronia as much as they oppose it, or, to put it more precisely, as they oppose it, in
opposing it, precisely because they merely oppose it.
Regressive, Reactionary, Backward Counter-Uchronias
This is probably due to the very nature of oppositional stances, to an extent. But these
also prompt further need for anti-uchronian critique. The above examples mostly include
what we may call “regressive” counter-uchronia, or past-oriented ones rather than futureoriented, progressive ones. However, the very term “regressive” is perhaps inadequate, or
only partially adequate, and so would be terms like “primitivist” or “reactionary” or
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“backward.” Each have some specific reasons for their respective inadequacy and for
their partially helpful, partially unhelpful ways, and at the same time they share some of
these reasons in common.
One shared reason is that, quite simply, “we have never been modern,” or
progressive, or future(s)-oriented. Uchronia was always a timeless temporality, a time out
of time, the elan forward onto a line that did not exist but in fictitious form. Yet as such,
in its contingent fictitious ways and unconvincing or contradictory claims to a natural,
self-evident, inevitable, non-contingent or universal singular future, uchronia exercises
such attraction and power as to constrain attempts at countering it or opposing it to
espouse inverted mirror forms. There was never any forward movement involved in
growth-oriented progress, the progress was never to, toward any actual time when
capitalocentric temporality would fulfill its promise, but based on a futurist vision lacking
a concrete future and subjecting the present. Yet, to various extents, some
environmentalist discourses, exemplified above, have called for running the clocks
“backwards.” There is no more backward to run back to than there was ever a forward to
run to. The past, harmonious, idealized time of “regressive” counter-uchronia is nowhere
to be found in these simple or idealized forms, yet some have felt compelled to call for
such illusory regressions in response to illusory progressions, even though these efforts
had stemmed from a realization that the forward movement was impossible.
“Backward” counter-uchronia cannot run backward without tripping, yet the
phrase refers to a desire for a mythical past. The adjective “reactionary” also partially
helps describing what is at work – a mere reaction or re-action – but is vastly tied to
ideological traditions and histories distinct from the particular, partly idiosyncratic

273

movements, groups and discourses under scrutiny here. “Regression” in the form of
counter-uchronia cannot occur in actuality, as progression never did. Yet neither uchronia
nor counter-uchronia are about actuality: both are appeals, rallying cries and ideals that
claim (and fail) to justify certain concrete strategies, practices. They have effective
consequences, but rely on myths of a time to-come or a time past which lacks a time
coming, passing or passed. Among the major effects of uchronia are depletion of present
resources, aggravation of inequalities, attachments and desires that generate compulsive
work and consumption on scales and at paces, rhythms and speeds unsustainable to the
planet and the concrete material livabilities of human and nonhuman lives. As for
“regressive” counter-uchronias, they not only rely upon, keep intact, but also perpetuate
assumptions entrenched by uchronia, including interdependent dualisms: past/future, nonWestern/modern, primitivism/progressivism, Nature/human.
Teleological, All Too Teleological Humans and Nature
One amendment to these dualisms often emerges, however. In the instances above,
because humanism is not problematized and “the human” is still postulated as indicative
of something valuable, as a value in the sense Nietzsche denounced (a claim taken as fact
so that it provides a general orientation to life), and because “the natural” is likewise
granted normative value (as is the case, to some degrees, with uchronia: “it is quite
natural to want growth,” capitalism is the “natural” end of history, etc), going back to a
mythical “more natural” past also is associated, at times, with a re-humanizing process,
with a return to more human and humane ways allegedly lost by hyper-modernity. In
other words, when themes of return emerged above, they were about parting ways from
the supposedly in-human consequences of uchronia, to “go back to” simultaneously more
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human and more natural ways of living. The human, as well as “Nature,” are erected once
again as values, granted normative status, qua their serving as ends to be achieved.
Where in uchronian times, the “natural” end of homo economicus is economic
growth, accumulation, and situated in the (singular, naturalized) future, the end of
regressive counter-uchronian times is to retrieve the once lost human and natural ways.
For instance, we have seen that anarcho-primitivist Zerzan claims that modernity has
“subordinated natural systems that humankind was once attuned to.” Of note here is the
fact that the reference to humans is not in plural form, but takes instead the form of a
pompous “humankind” or “humanity” as a whole species. The struggle is against an
allegedly de-humanizing modernity and progress that has supposedly separated “Nature”
from the human. As such, it lacks a contextualization and critical engagement with “the
human” and “Nature” as Western, recent, contingent categories (Foucault, 1971; 1979)
that guide and distribute value within a contingent economy of power, although these
categories’ value may, perhaps should, be questioned. Surely there is a form of critical
engagement in the “de-humanization” argument, but the target is partly missed as it fails
to wonder whether the (temporal) order of things valuing the natural and the human as
teleological ends could possibly be otherwise. Counter-uchronia errs by assuming that
what is being questioned by the eruption of Gaia is the direction taken on a teleological
line supposed to aim toward humanity and naturalness.
The example of the Manifeste Utopia critiques the human as a teleological goal to
attain, not insofar as it is teleological, but because and when this teleology is supposed to
lead to humans’ separation from nature. De-growth advocates denounced a modern
narrative where “the meaning of the history of Man would be to humanize the natural …

275

to push it aside the world’s animality.” Here the denunciation critically targets a
temporality where the development of the human is equated to a gradual distancing from
nature, a work of separation modern uchronia purports to advance. The critique of
modern understandings of human evolution as the achievement of a gradual denaturalization is certainly appealing in times of ecological crisis. However, here it is the
separation, not the teleology that the manifesto’s authors denounce. Though this
separation is indeed problematic, re-assembling the various forces at play cannot occur
without addressing how the teleological dimension of this separation supports it, or how
it informs the shapes espoused by these conceptions of Nature and by the human.
Therefore, ultimately the Manifeste Utopia falls short of interrogating the categories of
the human and Nature, along with, and insofar as they are partly constituted by, their
temporal dimensions. Instead, it responds to uchronia by way of a desire to “return” to
uniting the two categories, as though their existence preceded the claim to separate them,
or the teleological vision that informs these categories.
In other words, this reactionary move purports to re-naturalize the human so as to
finally make it human(e) again. The initial move in this critique is quite needed, but the
prescriptive implication is mislead by desiring a mere reversal of the human/Nature
dualism, and a mere reversal of the direction taken, which do not go so far as to question
the lines (or separation, of direction). This de-growth counter-uchronian moment solely
problematizes the human/nature separation, and the direction of their teleological
movement, rather than their teleological character. This fails to draw the fullness of the
critique’s implication and to keep pursuing more critical work: “Nature” is now taken as
a value which value is not questioned. This move, instead of transvaluating values, in fact
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replaces a value with another rather equivalent one, celebrating Nature as a normative
model. Similarly, Hundertwasser praises fluidoid and spiral lines by opposition to straight
ones, deeming the latter as foreign to Nature, and does so claiming to an “antirationalism” which would be more aptly named “counter-rationalism,” a merely
oppositional stance whereby natural (un)reason is supposed to guide the course of ethical
action. Yet as we have seen (see chapter II & III), Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return
teaches us that neither reason nor unreason pertain to the course of the world. We cannot
find guidance in Nature’s alleged “laws,” or its allegedly stability, permanence, reliability
or stillness, as it is no stable background, and is made up instead of becoming, of agentic
and dynamic change always partially unexplained and unexplainable. While
Hundertwasser sought in Nature a way to justify his fluidoid lines, which were in turn
meant to open up possibilities for uniqueness and creativity, his (re)turn to Nature as
value, and as guidance, as unreason, ultimately may stifle creation and change. If there is
any such thing as a justification for fluidoid rather than straight lines, it cannot and will
not be found in “Nature,” or in Man, or in both of these finally re-united. This implies a
re-conceptualization of both, in fact, and a de-centering of the dualism in favor of
hybridity (a mere reversal will not do), which is only possible if one interrogates the
temporal dimensions of these teleological ends (wherever they land on the line of time –
past for regressive counter-uchronia, or future for progressive counter-uchronia and
uchronia).
The problem with “naturalizing” a mythical time, i.e with making the end of
capitalist teleology natural, making teleology natural, making capitalist economies and
their growth natural, is only a problem if and insofar as “Nature” has been erected as
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stable law, or crystallized as background, congealed as static (though none of these
metaphors completely work as ice, crystals, and erections are all made up of movement,
change and becoming, once one looks closer). It is because “Nature” has been
conceptualized as a teleological end, and/or as moved by a teleological movement, that it
becomes counter-uchronian or uchronian. “Nature” and “naturalizing” (capitalism,
growth, past ages, etc) are only problematic, not because of nature, not by nature, not
because of the claim or even the assumption that a particular movement would have
natural attributes or be natural, but because of a temporally flawed (untenable,
unsustainable) version of “Nature.” In other words, teleological Nature is at issue, not the
nonhuman per se. Temporality remains the problem, that which requires rethinking, and
if the emphasis were placed on a natural and constant becoming of all (natural and human
and hybrid) things as different, if nature was to be read for difference (Gibson-Graham,
2006), if nature was to be read from the perspective of the eternal return, “naturalizing”
time, pasts, presents, futures, paces, rhythms, speeds, assemblages would not be
problematic. On the contrary, in our current “anthropocene” context of extinction, this
would be quite desirable instead. If the only constant is change, if the only being there is,
is the being of becoming, as in the Nietzschean eternal return, then conceptualizations of
the human and nature must radically be reworked and cannot suffer a counter-uchronian
or uchronian status. Put differently, I could say that the above title of this last part of this
chapter (IV) is (playfully) misleading. The problem is not that teleologies involved in
uchronias and regressive or progressive counter-uchronias would be made up of too much
“Nature” or be too “human.” Rather, what is at issue is that both the nonhuman and the
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human have been conceived as teleological, all too teleological. Thus the question mark,
in this title. Thus the reversal, in this section’s title.
Myths of Happiness from Ages Past:
Counter-Uchronian Happiness and Anti-Uchronian Joy
Regressive counter-uchronian movements also fall short of critical anti-uchronian
moments, in their resorting to myths of happy good savages and an appraisive racism one
would think (hope) could have been left to certain eighteenth century Western male
thinkers. The gesture is interestingly very similar to that just described regarding a
“return” to “Nature.” Here reactionary counter-uchronia joins hands with uchronia in
colonial reifications and homogenizations involving a denial of coevalness between
various naturecultures. Though making “archaic” peoples exemplary, counter-uchronias
portray these as remote (note however one distinction: in regressive counter-uchronian
discourses the term “archaic” is rarely used, as it rather belongs to progressivism.
“Primitivism” is used appraisively instead). In the case of anarcho-primitivist Zerzan, this
myth of the good happy savage is accompanied with the myth of genderless or
alternatively (and contradictorily) feminized societies.
The question of happiness is important to each of these counter-uchronian
examples. Each portrays the good (eu) and remote (ou) time (chronos) as happy,
describing leisurely paces and quotidian life, the fulfilment of reduced needs, satisfaction.
The terms happy and happiness keep resonating to make this remote time a form of “age
of happiness.” Here Nietzsche is helpful again, as the quote opening this section shows.
To Nietzsche an age of happiness is “quite impossible, because men want to desire it but
not to have it.” He thus evokes “happy moments” in lives, but rejects the possibility of
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“happy ages.” He also claims that the latter “will remain fixed in the imagination of man
as ‘the other side of the hill’ because they have been inherited from ages past.” Indeed,
just like the eternal return entails that there can be no state of equilibrium, no maximal or
minimal state, but a finite set of forces constantly shifting, re-assembling and redistributing in unpredictable ways to form new arrangements at each moment (long or
short), and there cannot be either reason or unreason guiding the course of events, there
cannot, either, be ages of happiness or ages of sadness. Instead, all we are left with is –
neither chaotic nor rational – joyful and sad moments, joy and sadness being (constantly)
unevenly (re)distributed from moment to moment (long or short). What is the distinction
however, between long moments and “ages”? If we understand long moments as
extended durations of time with uneven and unpredictable ways, whereas “ages” would
refer to societal states, 57 then we start seeing the pertinence of this idea to my critique of
uchronia. But be it at the level of a life, or of societies and epochs, the “happiness” taken
to be coterminous with mythical times of counter-uchronian longings, understood as a
stable state, a being, is a form of time paralysis or freeze.
Here Nietzsche is not rejecting happiness per se, but rather emphasizing moments
as opposed to ages, movement rather than states. I would even suggest that joy (in the
Spinozan sense of the increase of what a thing can do) would resonate better with these
moments, while happiness indeed projects imagination to still times, timeless times, everpostponed ones, and abstraction. The difference does not lie so much in the duration of
moments or ages, but their quality as respectively made of movement and becoming, as
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Joy, in a Spinozist sense (Spinoza, 1992; Deleuze, 1988), refers to the increase of what a thing can do,
whereas sadness is its decrease, and even in common language it connotes a moment, a cairological
dimension or duration rather than a chronological dimension, whether short-lived or long term, a point of
an oscillation rather than a stable, still or permanent state.
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opposed to being. For instance, consumer satisfaction, an always postponed state
belonging to a future that will not be reached, otherwise the consumerism this never
satiated state contributes to render possible would collapse. Are you happy with what you
have? Sure but I’d be happier with more. Simone de Beauvoir wrote about happiness in
the Second Sex:
It is not quite clear just what the word happy really means and still less what true
values it may mask. There is no possibility of measuring the happiness of others,
and it is always easy to describe as happy the situation in which one wishes to
place them. In particular those who are condemned to stagnation are often
pronounced happy on the pretext that happiness consists in being at rest.
(Beauvoir, 2014).
The fact that a stable state of happiness will never come to be in a full, stable, indefinite
form yet the desire for such stillness is perpetuated makes consumerist desires possible.
In fact, as we might recall the anti-uchronian moment of the Manifeste Utopia includes
this very critique: the good consumer is a never-satiated consumer. Even at the level of
the quotidian, happiness is something one wants to desire but not to have, it operates in
uchronian terms: the appeal is in the endless postponement. Counter-uchronias similarly
propose a state of harmony, stillness, a stability nowhere to be found. And again,
Nietzsche writes about ages of happiness that “they will remain fixed in the imagination
of man as ‘the other side of the hill’ because they have been inherited from ages past.”
Ages of happiness are these ages or states where we are not, rather than these actual or
virtual joys we may encounter and foster in a present re-thought. If these ages evoked
may be inherited from ages past, it is not because they have existed, as a state of maximal
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(or minimal), perfect stillness is only attainable in a timeless time: if time can indeed
pass, it is because it is inhabited, moved and changed constantly, neither by reason or by
unreason, made of unpredictability, surprise and contingency.
Moving Forward or Spiraling Autopoietically
At the same time, it may seem to some degree that the very same condition allows for all
kinds of change and resistance, including anti-consumerist ones: it is often because
dissatisfaction rises, or because promises are not met yet still hoped for, that some of us
mobilize, think critically, question. The problem is thus to keep identifying, deciding,
creating distinctions between uchronian states of happiness, thus coterminous with
temporal stillness, and joyful moments where the possibility for other possibilities arises
(anti-uchroinan critique). I have tried to suggest here, and will continue to do so in
considering yet other temporalities, that (counter) utopia and (counter) uchronia are
incompatible with a philosophy of becoming. If anti-uchronia incites a pause, a
suspension of a certain time to create time for critical thought and practice, or their
possibility, counter-uchronia traps us right back to paralysis, stasis, stillness,
timelessness. Anti-uchronia can be read as an antidote, that which disrupts a certain logic
or phenomenon and inoculates it with new possibilities, whereas a certain form of
strictly, symmetrically oppositional critique is drawn to “counter” a logic or phenomenon
with a mirror-image of itself. But if counter-uchronian longings for stillness in fact stifle
change under the guise of inspiring it, how may surprising becomings erupt without being
contained by a projection of imaginaries to a “good” and “non” place or time, an outside,
an earlier/back in the day or a later/tomorrow? May these becomings emerge
autopoietically, to borrow Felix Guattari’s borrowing of Francisco Varela’s notion (1989)
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of self-creating change? How may we account for, espouse, embrace and nurture
unpredictability, becomings, the new, emerging out of both the present actual and
virtual, 58 and imaginaries connected to the here and now and multiple futures and pasts?
While I will try to partly address these inexhaustible questions in chapter VI, for
the time being I will turn to some examples of what I call progressive counter-uchronias.
As I have discussed above, some dimensions and moments in de-growth discourse does
not escape the progressivism it purports to question, thus hybridizing regressive and
progressive counter-uchronia. To move forward with our going back to Nature, could
indeed sum up a number of the positions discussed above. We may add that, in a way, in
more than one way in fact, there are myriads of counter-uchronian, uchronian, antiuchronian and synchronic moments or dimensions in eco-temporalities and temporalities
which make up our daily lives, imaginaries and desires. Thus the distinctions are not
stable attributes or natures for the discourses examined here, but rather they aim to
underscore and disentangle what enables the new, and a kind of new that may enable
more of itself. For instance, while in the previous chapter I had read the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports as offering a welcome and needed
anti-uchronian perspective, they may also be read, as in the next chapter, as presenting a
dangerous form of progressive counter-uchronia just as capitalocentric as unqualified
growth-driven progress, i.e uchronia. Similarly, I will return in the last chapter (6) to
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Though as I have mentioned Claire Colebrook (2014) has proposed that two traditions exist among
vitalist ones, some being anchored in the actual and some, queer vitalisms investing the virtual, I do not
think that synchronic change does or has to solely emerge from the virtual, her criterion for this distinction:
there are, here and now, actual practices and politics which to various degrees are capacious enough to
sustain synchrony. In fact if we make these invisible, we risk to fall back into (counter)uchronian
imaginaries.
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Hundertwasser’s art, arguing for a heterochronian reading of his spiraling through five of
our skins.
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CHAPTER V
GOING AHEAD?
PROGRESSIVE COUNTER-UCHRONIA
OR HYPER-UCHRONIA

Rushing to Gaia’s Deathbed… to Save Her Growth
Counter-uchronias refers to emerging eco-temporalities that attempt to counter existing
uchronian temporalities yet retain most of their form. Merely reversing linear progressive
understandings of time that make impossible promises postponed to an abstract futurism,
we have seen in the previous chapter that regressive counter-uchronias idealize a golden
age of Nature, an age of happiness when the human/Nature dualism was supposedly
reversed, with Nature on top. Futurism is then supposed to be countered by a sort of
“past-ism,” progression by a regression (the French language has a word for this,
“passeisme”: we may need to invent a word for the English language). In this chapter,
what I will read as “progressive” counter-uchronias also reactively responds to the
shattering of uchronian temporalities performed by the eco-crises. However, contrary to
regressive counter-uchronias, they continue on to a new form of amended futurism. They
rely upon the same teleological and linear direction as uchronia’s. The progressive
counter-uchronias examined here repeat, to an extent, the (linear, progressive,
teleological, futurist) forms constitutive of uchronias, but they perform contorsionist
gestures trying to adjust the linear progression of time postulated by growth-oriented
capitalist economies to some awareness of limits, the goal being to overcome limits. Let
us bend the arrow of time a bit, … so that it can keep it pointing “forward” (to an
impossible forward beyond limits). These amendments can take several shapes and
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forms: in the examples I draw from below, one of these is the “techno-fix” contorsion: we
shall tweek, adjust the Earth temperatures and climate with vast-scale technological
devices, do not worry, Gaia is feverish but engineers are on it, ready to shoot massive
needles into her massive veins, or, as Gaia theorist James Lovelock’s metaphor goes,
ready to “put her on dyalisis” (Lovelock, 2009) Another form of contorsion progressive
counter-uchronia performs so as to amend and bend the trajectory of uchronia while
failing to contest it, consists of “internalizing” global warming in capitalist world
economies’ accounting: capitalist production has indeed played a tremendous, crucial
role in feeding climate change, because it failed to exhaustively and rationally calculate
the cost of environmental devastation. Thus we shall proceed to fix one of capitalism’s
limits by expanding it: capitalist production and consumption are running us into a wall,
let’s swallow (capitalize, speculate on) that wall and keep running. Global warming
becomes, under this kind progressive counter-uchronia, an opportunity to create new
markets where carbon emissions shall be traded – and, therefore, speculated upon, etc. As
we will see, technofixing manifestations of progressive counter-uchronias and carbonmarketing ones can ally and overlap: the creation of carbon-markets called for, among
others, by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change associates with techno-fixes
like so-called renewable energies, themselves the objects of new markets. Meanwhile,
would-be (or, as we will see, actual) geoengineers trying to tweek temperatures on earth
do so with some conservationist concerns mixed with hopes that their brand new, grandscale engineering techniques become lucrative sources of carbon credits, providing them
with a head-start in the emerging, brand new carbon markets. These changes may be
called progressive counter-uchronias insofar as they illustrate ways in which uchronia is

286

amended so as to allow it to keep following its course (into a wall), but they may also be
called “hyper-uchronias.” A form of uchronia on steroids, these hyper-uchronian
temporalities imagine the future as potentially extending capitalist markets to integrate its
own devastation and speculate on it, and they invent quick and easy technofixes assuming
a confidence in technology even more relentless than prior to the eco-crises, as it scales
up to fantasies of intentionally tweeking the planet’s temperature like one would their AC
in one’s apartment.
Why would it matter to name deep ecology’s image of Nature as something to
“return” to “regressive” counter-uchronias, or to name carbon market fantasies of
speculation and geoengineering hubris “progressive” counter-uchronia? It should be
apparent by now that my concepts of uchronia, anti-uchronia, and counter-uchronia (and,
finally, heterochronia, synchrony in the next chapter) refer to temporalities embedded in,
informed by and informing world views, responses to ecological disaster, ways of living,
ways of imagining and experiencing the (past, present, future) living that profoundly
differ, sometimes even diverge, and that these divergences have tremendous effects on
what is being done in the midst of Gaia’s fever. Yet these are sometimes difficult to tell
apart. Given the centrality of temporality to the problems and questions posed in times of
eco-crises, looking at all these competing discourses from the vantage point of their
temporalities helps distinctions to be made and reflected upon critically, and it helps
seeing how these elements may also be (sometimes ambiguously) entangled. Thus this
fourth concept of “progressive counter-uchronia” may add another layer of possible
criteria for distinguishing temporalities erupting with and within ecological discourses
and times of dramatic ecological change.
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For example, when I initially discussed the IPCC reports in chapter 3, I read these
as helpfully providing a needed critique of uchronia, which I called anti-uchronia. The
questions posed by the IPCC, I argued, were “idiotic” questions in the sense that, as any
good science and/or philosophy hopefully does, they may provoke readers to slow down
and wonder: these were questions previously barely intelligible (do we really need
growth? Can we really want it?) that cause us to pause. Yet, in this chapter, I return to the
IPCC reports to examine another aspect in these texts, namely their counter-uchronian
dimension. From this perspective, the IPCC does not stop at asking helpful, sorely needed
idiotic questions: it instead commits leaps that I will characterize, after Stengers, as
animated by “stupidity.” Consequently the reports provide an apt illustration for how
anti-uchronia cohabits with counter-uchronia, how in a historic moment when the
contestation and fragility, the contingency and fallacy of temporalities of progress are
coming under attack, alternative temporalities erupting in response oscillate between
merely reactive forms and more disruptive, radical challenges. The distinctions I am
laboring throughout this dissertation strive to provide ways to disentangle the former
from the latter, and see how complex these differences are, prompting a need for never
abandoning anti-uchronian critique.
While as we may remember from chapter III, the IPCC reports offer a futurology
which anti-uchronian moment depicts the future (futures) as multiple, uncertain,
multidirectional, and suggesting the impossibility of sustaining growth, we will see in
what follows that these texts also contain a counter-uchronian moment when “business as
usual” takes over. Though the diagnostic and prognostic moment is one offering
scientific fuel for anti-uchronian critique, here the prescriptive moment entails a rush to
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Gaia’s deathbed… supposedly to “save” her, and yet the creation of carbon markets
ultimately proposes to save growth (though of course there will hardly be any capitalist
growth, or “business as usual,” if the Earth becomes inhospitable to human life as a result
of unsustainable growth). I will locate one of the points of distinction between the IPCC’s
anti-uchronian and counter-uchronian moments in the difference between its “idiotic”
gestures, which slow us down, and “stupidity,” which fast-forwards and leaps to make
impossible demands on a situation, demands that are radically at odds with the situation’s
own demands (Stengers, 2005).
But let me return for a second to the distinction between regressive and
progressive counter-uchronia I have made here, to address one possible source of
confusion. It may seem as though in the distinction I am making here, the sciences tend
toward espousing progressive forms of counter-uchronias, while the arts, various
manifestos, ecosophy, eco-literatures, would turn mostly to regressive counter-uchronia.
However I wish to underscore that one could select a number of examples that would
nuance this impression: the regressive or progressive nature of various counter-uchronias
encountered here are not generalizable by discipline. In fact, my own examples
themselves do not fit such easy and reductive dualism: as we saw, de-growth as discussed
with regards to the Manifeste Utopia is partly a forward form of counter-uchronia, while
as we will see the conservationism of rogue geoengineer Russ George or the praise of
geoengineering by Gaia theorist James Lovelock include mixtures of regressive and
progressive counter-uchronia. While the previous chapter focuses on regressive counteruchronia and draws mostly from political and artistic examples, and this one focuses on
progressive counter-uchronia illustrated by scientific and engineering discourses, from
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this focus follows a goal of carving conceptual tools enabling complex distinctions.
Perhaps this suggests that the ecological crises afford us no simple replacing of uchronia
with inversions of its direction, and how equally problematic various forms of counteruchronias are, in their imperfectly successful claims to challenge, supplant or amend
uchronia. All these stem from an anti-uchronian impulse, but bump into difficulties in
reshaping imaginaries in non-uchronian ways. These troubles to go from a critical antiuchronian moment to a more normative and/or prescriptive moment, as they fall back on
counter-uchronia, are shared across regressive and progressive counter-uchronias and
across genres, be these scientific, literary, artistic. In other words, regressive counteruchronias do not necessarily emerge from one genre while progressive ones would be the
monopoly of the sciences. First of all, the following discussion of the IPCC reports and
geoengineering should shed light on some of the political and economic dimensions of
the sciences’ insight into the eco-crises and their temporalities. Secondly, much art and
literature (accelerationist aesthetics, certain futurist science fiction) could be read as
progressive counter-uchronias, which I do not discuss here for lack of space and so as to
prioritize analyzing a diverse array of genres: the organizing distinctions made here stress
the temporalities involved but the nature of the examples in terms of disciplinary
boundaries and sorts of discourses are only secondary. If they are important, it is in the
sense of demonstrating a thread through a variety of eco-discourses, and indirectly, one
lesson to take away would be that the analysis of eco-temporality adds one more reason
to challenge disciplinary boundaries, genres and forms’ limits, as well as limits between
various domains of what Latour has called the modern constitution (Latour, 1993; 2004):
Science, politics, the arts, etc. The endemic presence of temporality as a problem

290

traversing ecological and environmentalist discourses through and through shows that the
traps of counter-uchronias, acting like limits onto anti-uchronian critique, threaten the
humanities and the so-called “hard” sciences alike. In fact both the future of humanities 59
(centering on the human in a period when the nonhuman overwhelmingly erupts), and the
future of “pure” “apolitical” or “politically neutral” “hard” sciences, i.e the problematic
nature of disciplinary boundaries and of the contours of spheres like science and politics
which have long been affirmed as separate while always already porous (Latour, 1993),
are in question with the way the eco-crises have fragilized uchronia.
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Regarding this question of humanities’ futures, see among others Braidotti, 2013; Colebrook, 2014;
Grusin, 2015: the discussion of humanities’ futures is vast and varied, yet recurrent in recent decades in
Science and Technology Studies and New Materialist Theory, and these are not exhaustive examples in an
ongoing debate I cannot develop here but which central problems this dissertation illustrates in part.
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Several Futures Are Possible…
… Only If They Are Capitalist: IPCC Stupidity
It is not in the least assured that the sciences, at
least as we know them, are equipped to respond to
the menaces of the future.
Isabelle Stengers

Normative and Prescriptive IPCC:
All Futures Will Be Capitalist, so Let’s Trade Carbon Emissions!
In chapter III, when I discussed the anti-uchronian dimension of the IPCC reports, I
focused mostly on the first two parts of the reports, crafted by Working Groups I and II of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. These, as I mentioned, concentrate their
research on the “physical science basis” of climate change (working group I), and its
“impacts, [as well as questions of] adaptation and vulnerability” (working group II).
Working group III specializes in questions of mitigation. To simplify, we could say that
the three working groups correspond more or less to three moments we may call
diagnostic, prognostic and prescriptive. While the reports compiled by working groups I
and II are written mostly by climatologists, the various scenarios used in all three reports
to make projections regarding various carbon-emitting trends and the report composed by
working group III regarding possible measures for mitigation of climate change are
informed not only by “hard” scientists but also by economists’ input. Interestingly,
counter-uchronian dimensions of the IPCC reports emerge in the latter two, and
especially the prescriptive moments of the texts, whereas the diagnosis would be where,
as I argued in chapter III, we find anti-uchronian, critical questions. In what follows I
argue that there is a gap, a leap committed between a diagnostic moment that
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provocatively encourages anti-uchronian questions to be posed, and a counter-uchronian
prescriptive moment. This gap, characteristic of what I call progressive counter-uchronia,
is a rush from scientific conclusions which provoke questions of whether we should even
want growth, to hasty programmatic impulses endeavoring to continue on with growth, or
“business as usual.”
The IPCC is explicit in its diagnosis:
globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important
drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The
contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly
identical to the previous decades, while the contribution of economic growth has
risen sharply. (IPCC, 2014b, p. 8)
Yet all scenario storylines which the IPCC deploys for its modeling assume economic
growth and the predominance of capitalist economies, even though many scenarios
include a decline in global population growth after the middle of the 21st century, and
even though some include a more equal distribution of per-capita income growth across
the world. We may remember, for instance, the descriptions provided by the panel for the
A1 storyline, which I commented on in chapter III, then insisting on how these enable to
imagine multiple rather than one single future:
The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid
economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines
thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies.
Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and
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increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional
differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three
groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy
system. The three A1 groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis:
fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all
sources (A1B). (IPCC, 2000, p. 4)
Though this scenario family portrays a world that goes against some of the current trends
toward aggravation of inequalities, toward “convergence” and “reduction in regional
differences in per capita income,” the description opens with the mention of rapid
growth, implicitly assuming a globalized world dominated by capitalist economies: the
various groups within the A1 family differ among themselves in the kinds of resources
mostly used (more or less fossil intensive, “technological emphasis”), “efficiency” of
technologies, but no mention is made of a reduction of consumption or production per
capita: the only reduction of consumption and production that may be implied would
result to the decline in the world population. Even the B1 scenario family, which is the
one that tends toward “equity” the most, fails to even consider the possibility of degrowth and/or of a proliferation of capitalist economies resulting in the disappearance
(whether it be gradual or rapid) of capitalism. Dramatic reductions in consumption levels
worldwide are not included either among the futures considered, however multiple these
are: across the more than 900 scenarios collected, the IPCC privileges imagining instead
the increased use of so-called “renewable energies,” with little decline in energy
consumption. Thus every storyline deployed for modeling purposes assumes capitalist
growth, with more or less fragmented paces and levels (i.e, growth interrupted by regular
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crisis without interruptions of the desire for growth, as capitalism has long experienced).
Not only do the scenarios collected by the IPCC assume capitalism: they take this
assumption to go without saying, and the assuming is always done implicitly rather than
as a clear postulate. As we can see above, no explicit mention of capitalist economies or
capitalism is made in scenarios’ descriptions. The term is not even necessary as it is taken
to be the only possibility, merely taking on various forms or modifications. Each scenario
family stresses “technologies,” “resource efficiency,” convergence or divergence, some
reductions in “material intensity” in scenarios where the service and information
industries predominate (as though the information industry was less energy-intensive,
which remains to be proven), and throughout the text, though capitalism is rarely named,
its presence is always already assumed: imperatives of profit, commodity exchange,
growth, and markets are omnipresent. Green capitalism, less green capitalism, grey
industrial capitalism, make for the various shades of future capitalist paths envisioned. I
will return in the next chapter to a playful re-writing of these descriptions imagining what
they would look like were we to invent non-capitalist futures. For now I wish to
underscore the capitalocentrism inherent and implicit to these various possibilities, in
spite of the multiplicity I stressed earlier, when reading the reports from the perspective
of their anti-uchronian dimension. Through the constant mention of the creation of
carbon markets, the neoliberal language deployed, the instruments “measuring” “the
economy” (this phrase is always used in a singular form erasing any possible or existing
diverse economies), the “developmental” paths considered, the IPCC remains attached to
a capitalocentric futurism. The developmentalist assumptions so omnipresent especially
in Working Group III’s report on mitigation associate population stabilization with
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continuous growth. In other words, according to the IPCC several futures are possible, if
and only if they are capitalist.
At best, the IPCC looks at growth qualified or amended rather than ever
questioning it or its desirability: it advocates for “less carbon-emitting growth” (IPCC,
2014b, e.g. p. 4, 10). More precisely, in the most recent, fifth assessment mitigation
report, published in November 2014, the IPCC specifies that baseline scenarios
(“scenarios without explicit additional efforts to constrain emissions”) would “result in
global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7% to 4.8% compared to preindustrial levels” (p. 8). Looking at scenarios which include efforts to constrain
emissions, the IPCC still assumes growth, and merely imagines less growth than in the
baseline scenarios: “mitigation scenarios that reach atmospheric concentrations of about
450 ppm CO2 eq by 2100 entail losses in global consumption … in 2100 relative to
consumption in baseline scenarios anywhere from 300% to more than 900% over the
century” (2000, p.12). The losses in consumption levels are only relative to baseline
scenarios’ rampant growth, which skyrock with at least 300% over the century.
Furthermore, note that here the relatively less intensive consumption levels are described
as losses: the section I extracted this quote from focuses on “costs” of mitigation. Even
declines in growth (as opposed to de-growth) are framed as “losses” and “costs,” in other
words not as desirable paths but as unfortunate concessions or amendments to an
orientation that remains growth-driven, though with lesser rates. The IPCC then fails to
entertain scenarios where de-growth is valued and a radical change of the future’s
orientation toward capitalist growth is considered as even being a possibility.

296

The IPCC reports painfully attempt to present themselves in a not-so-explicitly
programmatic form, thus preferring to enumerate seemingly disparate measures rather
than a general outline of what policies would best enable facing the climate crisis. The
reports repeatedly assert that no particularly scenario among those considered (all
capitalist) is deemed most probable, though some are described as more desirable than
others in terms of mitigating, adapting to climate threats (those scenarios that go beyond
baseline ones). Thus the third working group’s report, offering recommendations for
mitigation, purports to offer no recommended paths but rather compilations of
recommendations. Prescriptive claims are presented in this way for reasons of diplomatic
prudence as well as epistemological credibility, yet the result is an underlying assumption
that all recommended measures intervene in a predominantly capitalist context taken for
granted, as a naturalized background or unchanging law, to the point that again,
capitalism is not or rarely named in the texts. Ultimately, if no program is laid out, and
though no scenario among these capitalist ones is deemed more plausible or probable
than another, the lack of any non-capitalist scenario normatively excludes non-capitalist
modes of living. There is no arbitering among equally probable or plausible scenario, but
the field of what is possible is limited to a capitalocentric horizon.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, among the array of measures it
recommends, one thread runs across the IPCC’s Working Group III’s report, which
further confirms the capitalocentrism at play: the creation of future global carbon
markets. The shared dimension of most prescriptions made is thus highly capitalocentric:
it consists of commodifying green gas emissions. If so far, neoliberal economy has
treated such emissions as a form of what it calls “externality,” the move here consists of
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integrating the formerly “external” in calculations of costs and benefits by calculating
carbon emission levels and taxing these, allocating and trading (and presumably opening
the way to speculate on) carbon credits, at the international and national levels. In spite of
the multiple futures presented by the IPCC, in spite of its dramatic and breath-taking
diagnosis, in spite of the uncertainty of the futurity at play suggesting that our presents
and futures may after all be relatively diverse, at no point does the IPCC entertain the
possibility of the end of capitalism, or of the prevalence of non-capitalist futures. Neither
does it read the present projected in the reports as constituted of diverse economies that
cohabit with hegemonic capitalist ones. The picture proposed for mitigation is one of
amended uchronia, or “counter-uchronia.” The temporal horizon remains tied to a drive
toward always already capitalist modes of production, consumption and living. Instead of
taking on the implications of its own diagnosis more fully so as to ask whether growth is
even desirable, or what carbon emissions and temperature levels would look like in a degrowth scenario, the IPCC asks how we may continue on with growth, protect growth in
spite of, against, and beyond the eruption of Gaia it describes. In addition, by imagining
carbon markets as the main, recurrent set of measures recommended, the IPCC’s third
working group goes beyond simply reproducing counter-uchronian futurities and indeed
further expands the reach of capitalocentric visions: capitalist economies pollute? Let’s
add pollution in capitalist accounting methods and proceed to commodify it, to integrate
it into capitalist trade! The defense of the creation of carbon markets entails that what has
been more and more astutely recognized as a destructive side-effect of capitalist
production, what used to be seen as an external waste product of commodity production
and consumption, will be incorporated among commodities up for sale. Thus counter-
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uchronia amends uchronia only to strengthen it, to reinvent capitalocentric futures.
Ultimately, the IPCC’s progressive counter-uchronia is a form of uchronia on steroids, a
hyper-uchronia.
The IPCC’s Embrace of Geoengineering:
Pollute Now, Clean Up Later, On to Hyper-Uchronia!
In the IPCC’s November 2014 Mitigation report and in its 2015 Synthesis report, a new
turn unfolded in the history of the first scientific panel to have won a Nobel Peace Prize.
The IPCC then embraced, for the first time since its creation, the idea of Carbon Dioxide
Removal (CDR) technologies as an allegedly compelling technique that even justifies a
certain permissiveness of this new report with regards to carbon emissions levels. The
AR5 (i.e the 2015 fifth assessment report) developed the notion of “overshoot,”
accompanied with subsequent development and deployment of carbon trapping
technologies, as one possible path to mitigation. More simply put: international
conferences on climate have gradually and (in)famously generated, the threshold of a 2
centigrades’ increase in global mean surface temperature as the maximum “acceptable”
limit or goal (note that many environmentalist movements, small islands states and global
South countries have long protested this limit, which would reep devastating effects for
many populations, posing the question of whom it was acceptable to). While the IPCC,
an outgrowth of the United Nations, had always taken the two degrees goal to be
consensual (even though it had provided evidence that small island states and others
would suffer drastically even from such increase), with its AR5 the panel opened up to
possibilities of “temporarily” going beyond carbon emissions that would cause a rise of
two degrees (“overshooting” the target), eventually compensating this “overshoot” by
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way of CDR technologies to-come. In fact, this “pollute now, clean up later” strategy,
which counts on hypothetical geoengineering technologies that have yet to be proven
effective, feasible, or without risk of worsening the situation, is an emerging theme
throughout this most recent, 2015 report. In short, the hypothesis is that CDR
technologies to be invented, perfected, and/or generalized mid-way through the 21st
century, would justify more flexibility with respect to the two degrees’ objective.
Among CDR techniques, the IPCC most seriously considered Bioenergy with
Carbon-Capture and Storage, or BECCS (2014b, p. 12). These would consist in growing
trees and other carbon-absorbing biomass to subsequently burn that in power plants
designed to capture carbon emissions before they would reach the atmosphere,
supposedly generating energy with “net zero” emissions and even removing carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere. Many questions are
unanswered regarding BECCS, including where such captures would then be stored,
where the immense necessary biomass could possibly be planted, how such massive land
use would not further aggravate climate change (land use contributes 24% of direct
emissions according to the IPCC itself), how leaks would be avoided from carbon
storage, etc.
The IPCC itself concedes that such scenarios count on the hypothetical use of
future (mid-century) technologies not yet perfected (and, we may add, not at all certain to
ever be reliable enough): “overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and widespread of BECCS and afforestation in the second-half of the century” (p. 12). Thus the
reasoning, if we may even call it this, is that we may head toward exceeding carbon
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levels of 450 ppm CO2 eq (associated with the two degrees threshold), as long as massscale technologies trapping the carbon succeed, in 40 years. Time will tell whether
hubristic confidence may pay off this time around. Let us remain caught up in the same
growth-oriented logic, and postpone to a hypothetical future the solution for the problem
wrought by such logic, granted the “solution” itself is one that assumes more
technological progress, on a vaster scale, more exhaustive knowledge and mastery of
nature, this time at the planetary level. Furthermore, and quite importantly, the possibility
that further, more exhaustive knowledge concerning the technologies imagined could
result in conclusions that such technologies be too risky and uncertain, i.e the conclusion
that we do not and will not ever know enough to tinker with the global climate, does not
fall under the IPCC’s scrutiny: the specific kind of scientific-technological knowledge at
play here refuses to entertain its own limits. Welcome to uchronia on steroids, a.k.a
hyper-uchronia. Uchronia finally appears for what it is, in its impossible form, thanks to
anti-uchronian conclusions the IPCC itself advances, … so now let us continue on to
invent new, boosted forms of uchronias that would counter what is deemed to be mere
side-effects of growth, somehow with further trust in the very technological age that has
produced the crisis: the IPCC’s counter-uchronian rush to fall back on more growth even
after slowing down to take a bit of time imagining its devastating effects, espouses and
scales up the futurism of uchronia. This leap, similarly to the regressive counteruchronias I examined in the previous chapter, rebounds on similar temporal forms as
those it opposes or amends, even after an anti-uchronian moment. Hyper-uchronia offers
to boost uchronia with a shot of geoengineering and carbon markets after bumping into
Gaia’s anti-uchronian challenge.
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IPCC Stupidity:
Leaping From Anti-Uchronian Diagnoses to Counter-Uchronian Prescriptions
In Aux temps des catastrophes: Résister à la barbarie qui vient, Isabelle Stengers (2009)
points to the urgent need to name “la bêtise” (which translates as “stupidity”). Stengers
explains that our need to make ourselves think becomes dangerously incapacitated in the
current ecological crisis. She distinguishes stupidity from dumbness (the French false
cognate “stupidité”). Stupidity (bêtise) consists in an active force rather than a stable
attribute defining specific individuals. It traverses, seizes people and assemblages. Being
dumb when confronted to a terrible situation would manifest itself as a form of paralysis
(in fact the French word for dumb shares its root with “stupor”), curtailing any possible
action in the face of a larger force. Dumbness’ effect is numbness. In contrast, stupidity
actively engages forces into actions that do not match, and even worsen, the conditions
and exigencies of a particular situation. Worse, stupidity engages us on a path that
consists of making demands on a situation that are in fact incompatible with the
situation’s own demands, and it is this tension that causes the situation to further worsen.
I argue that the IPCC’s prescriptions correspond to the absurdity described by Stengers,
even in spite of its anti-uchronian diagnoses. The situation indicates that growth is the
primary driver of climate change? Let’s imagine technofixes and new market expansions
so as to continue demanding (assuming) growth in this, out of, this situation.
In Stengers’ view, stupidity currently inhabits those “(ir)responsible” for making
decisions. In the IPCC reports, I would contend that stupidity manifests itself in the form
of the discrepancy between the highly helpful and necessary diagnosis of the situation of
climate crisis as one requiring rapid, drastic change, and the incapability to think beyond
a temporality tied to capitalocentric futurism, led by large-scale technological innovation
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and experiments, top-down policy-making, expert-led environmentalism rather than
climate justice, de-growth and diverse and slow economies. As we saw in chapter II,
Greenpeace, among other examples of organizations, has based some claims, arguments
and positions of its campaigns on the body of scientific knowledge produced by the
IPCC: it was in the aftermath of the 2007 IPCC fourth assessment report that the famous
environmentalist organization crafted the “It’s Not Too Late!” campaign I’ve discussed at
length above. If the IPCC diagnosis have not only allowed for many to see uchronia for
what it is, a temporality assuming illimited growth on a limited planet, and if the
climatological knowledge presented by the panel offers food for thought and critique, if it
constitutes part of the grounding evidence environmentalists often seize to advance antiuchronian mobilizations, the reports part ways from such activism when they invoke
carbon markets, “development,” “sustainable growth,” BECCS, as ways to address the
climate crisis. The anti-uchronian moment, where the IPCC’s description and
documentation of climate change challenge notions of progress and disrupt assumptions
in favor of growth, are followed by a resolute commitment to “overcome” global heating
insofar as it is an obstacle to growth, rather than take in the consequences of knowledge
and uncertainties regarding global warming so as to carve more livable ways of living.
Stengers provides examples of rhetorical phrases deployed in the context of “our”
officials’ stupidity. In the face of “the eruption of Gaia” and the subsequent need to put
growth in doubt, they retort: “mais ce serait la porte ouverte à…” which could be literally
translated as “but this would open the door to…” (and in a more idiomatic English
expression, would likely be conveyed with images of slippery slopes). The suggestion
here is that the door would open to radical change and collective mobilizations objecting
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to growth, for instance. The stupidity at play in recommendations to create carbon
markets and resort to certain kinds of geoengineering strategies takes the counteruchronian form of a rush to close doors to radical changes in production and
consumption, and to solve a problem with the very tools that created it, only deploying
them on a larger, planetary scale this time. Capitalist, carbon-emitting growth has given
the planet a fever, … so let’s expand capitalist commodification to the emission of CO2!
The technological age has spinned out of control, so let’s hurry and invent new
technologies, … like air conditioning for the Earth! Stupidity, a moment where the
demands made upon the situation do not match the situation’s own exigencies, arises
from the persistence of uchronia’s appeal and even its strengthening: once again,
technology and market expansion are expected to act as a fix to continue to ensure
growth (to reproduce themselves), feeding its own self toward hypothetical all-masterful
futures. This generates a form of hyper-uchronia.
The temporal dimension of stupidity, and the stupid dimension of counteruchronia or hyper-uchronia are important here. With the term counter-uchronia, I refer to
the leap, the rush to assumptions that growth will and should persist even when it has just
been acknowledged as the primary cause of a world-historic eco-crisis, whereby obstacles
to uchronia are countered and its logic prolonged. This also underscores the common
reactive character of regressive counter-uchronias and progressive or futurist ones. By
hyper-uchronia, I refer to the specific form of boost to uchronian logic performed by the
futurist turn to carbon market, geoengineering, and such amendments to uchronia. One of
the crucial constitutive elements of this hyper-uchronian moment has to do with
stupidity’s temporal dimension: the stupid impulse to make demands on a situation which
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aggravate it against its own demands depends upon a skip to hasty conclusions, a reactive rush to rescue the Earth without taking the time for doubt in a fast-paced,
disconnected temporality reliant upon a teleology of growth. In spite of its future
impossibility and its current and future destructivity, growth of capitalist markets is held
once again as the only imaginable horizon. Only this time, technological tinkering will
take place directly at the planetary scale. The stupidity at play is especially visible from
the temporal perspective: there is a gap between diagnosis and prognosis on the one hand,
and prescription on the other, then a leap to abstract futures echoing and even
caricaturing uchronia that would subject the present to even more carbon-emitting ways:
thus the IPCC proposes “temporary overshooting” and eventual deployment of
hypothetical future technofixes which effects are unknown but deemed knowable in the
future.
Stupidity v. Idiocy: IPCC Sustainable Growth as Counter-Uchronia
In the 2014 reports (AR5), the IPCC re-wrote their definition of the notion of
sustainability, which they previously drew from the Brundtland Commission’s definition:
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for
future generations to meet their own needs.” The definition now used in the reports reads
as follows: “a dynamic process that guarantees the persistence of natural and human
systems in an equitable manner” (IPCC, 2013; 2014a; 2014b) The new definition is more
anchored in the present and lets go of a reference to future generations in favor of the
more vague term “persistence,” a term which, however, has the merit of still underscoring
a present-future continuum. Indeed, many of the changes projected in the 2007 report
have now become present ones, and are treated as such in the 2014 report. In fact, many
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among the IPCC’s predictions have been proven wrong, not so much in the sense that the
changes anticipated did not take place, but more often than not, in the sense that the Panel
had underestimated the extent, speed, pace of the change. Here the IPCC is being caught
up by its own prognosis, which is becoming a diagnosis in need of updating to more
dramatic states.
Both understandings of sustainability share one common trait however: the goal is
by no means to supplant capitalocentric, growth-driven temporality (uchronia) with a new
temporality of sustainability, but to create an adjectival modifier to amend uchronia:
“sustainable growth” is the new, counter-uchronian horizon. The multiple scenarios
entertained and the measures promoted, normatively obscuring non-capitalist economies
and prescribing the creation of carbon markets as well as increased confidence in the
technological age’s capacity to “fix” the problem it created, converge within a
capitalocentric futurity supposed to be adjusted to a bit of equity and some persistence.
Namely, in spite of their anti-uchronian moment, the IPCC reports fall short of taking the
time for sufficiently idiotic questions: do we, after all, need growth at all? The IPCC
models rush back to the “stupidity” that consists of saying, in the same breath, that
growth is a fundamental driver of greenhouse gases’ emissions, and that in order to
continue to have growth happily ever after, we should create carbon markets and trust
geoengineering expertise. The capitalocentric horizon, uchronia, is merely amended by
an impoverished concept of sustainability to give rise to a “counter-uchronia,” or
strengthened even, by a geoengineering boost that may justify calling this futurist vision a
hyper-uchronia. Isabelle Stengers did not bring her two concepts of idiocy and stupidity
in conversation when crafting them, nor did she explicitly tie these to a reading of
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climatological knowledge or emphasize their temporal stakes (although she clearly has
the current ecological crises in mind). I now return once again to idiocy for a moment,
qua the prism of anti-uchronia’s battle against both uchronia and counter-uchronia.
Indeed, the question French philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers poses in the
incipit of this section remains: There is “no guarantee whatsoever that the sciences, at
least as we know them today, are equipped to respond to the menaces of the future”
(Stengers, 2009, p. 22). Against the declarations of an IPCC which synthesizes, second or
third-hand and as a result of long negotiation seeking consensus within a community of
hard and soft scientists accountable to the United Nations, idiocy may compare the
mitigation “solutions” proposed by the IPCC to a multitude of proposals and direct
attempts for the concerted and participatory proliferation of a new ethics and new modes
of living at local and micro-levels, i.e diverse economies in the here and now, with future
generations as a matter of concern. Yet as Stengers points out, the idiot may easily be
discarded or excluded as having nothing to propose, no clear program, no single solution,
or as abusively and ruthlessly denying its power to scientific knowledge and
technological progress.
This response to emergency contrasts with and stands against stupidity as a
temporal leap. Where stupidity leaps away, from a moment of seeing growth as an
unsustainable temporality, to rushed and dangerous tweeks in conditions supposedly
aiming at the continuation of growth, anti-uchronia may slow us down to contemplate the
idea that growth be replaced by experiment with the present, taking the future into
account (what I will call cultivating “synchrony” in the next chapter). As Stengers claims:
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Idiocy thus slows us down, in part because it poses barely intelligible questions in
precisely a moment where temptation is so great to just skip over rapidly. If
idiocy slows us down, if it contests the consensual presentation of our situation, if
it resists urgency,[it] is not because the presentation would be false or because
emergencies are believed to be lies, but because ‘there is something more
important’. Don’t ask him why: the idiot will neither reply nor discuss the issue.
The idiot … produces an interstice … But his role is not to produce abysmal
perplexity … the idiot demands that we slow down, that we don’t consider
ourselves authorized to believe we possess the meaning of what we know.
(Stengers, 2005, p. 995)
The idiot does not only cause and require us to slow down: she is defined, in Stengers’
view, by her status as that who is likely to be excluded, on the basis of assumptions that
she has nothing to contribute, that she does not know any solutions to the problems she
herself may pose. This question of distinguishing idiocy and perplexity, and of the
absence of a program, goes along with a distinction between idiocy and ignorance. Idiocy
is a form of skepticism, holding on to the possibility that science may not be best
equipped to make all decisions for us, and while useful as one of many actors involved in
diagnosing situations, it should not have a monopoly over either such moments or
prescriptive moments: the idiot does not deny articulated knowledge, does not denounce
it as lies, is not the hidden source of knowledge that transcends them. The constraints
proposed are idiotic in the following sense: they refer to no arbitrator capable of judging
the validity of the urgencies that the experimenters claim to exist. In other words, idiocy
consists of a thoughtful moment of pause, one capable of making other ways of living
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glitter within an order of things seemingly closed to such possibilities. It is an ethical
interrogation that does not assume a particular temporal order or teleology to the world
that we should construct, that is not attached to any preconceived notion of this world. In
contrast, the stupidity that animates the crafting of diagnoses regarding the
unsustainability of growth as a driver of global warming, and the articulation, in the same
breath, of capitalist expansion and technofixes, is a form of reaction embedded in
urgency: the technological society’s (Ellul, 1964) growth is throwing us into perilous
shaky grounds, let us keep growing, helped with a dose of technofix.

Who is the “Anthropos” of “Anthropogenic” Climate Change?
Another aspect of the counter-uchronian component in the IPCC reports is made striking
qua its universalizing claim that climate change is “anthropogenic,” that it has been
caused by “humans” and will be, is being, experienced by all. In the following section I
explore some of the problems posed by this sweeping gesture, this “mise en equivalence”
(as Stengers may put it) that brings humans together as the cause of a natural
phenomenon they allegedly will all have to suffer from, unless “we” act fast. As we will
see, not only is this interestingly tied to a narrative of progress with human mastery of
nature undertones reminiscent of uchronia before it was ever disrupted by the eruption of
Gaia, i.e, not only does this “anthropos” category point to a persistent attachment to a
certain temporality, but reciprocally, it is also in the periodization, in the reading of Earth
and human history supporting the argument of climate change as “anthropogenic,” that
the problem of who counts as “anthropos” arises.
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All Humans Shall Be Affected by Man-Made Climate Change…
Unevenly and in Different Ways
Civilized man says: I am Self, I am Master, all the rest is
other – outside, below, underneath, subservient. I own, I
use, I explore, I exploit, I control. What I do is what
matters. What I want is what matter is for. I am that I am,
and the rest is women and wilderness, to used as I see fit.
Ursula Le Guin
With each new report (every 7 years or so), the IPCC specifies some of the changes made
from one report to the next. It does so in general terms, mostly limiting itself to indicating
that more data and a greater number of scientific publications are available with each
report, that more detail was added. However, one of the qualitative changes that occurs
with each report often has to do with the IPCC having to go into more depth regarding
regional variation of the impacts of climate change: though climate change has been
caused by humans and impacts all of them in one way or another, these causes and effects
are not evenly distributed. The reports published in 2014 and 2015 include ten new
chapters. Chapter 13 of Working Group II’s report focuses exclusively on climate
change’s impacts on poverty, livelihoods, and inequalities among and within world
regions – though interestingly, a language of “variation” tends to be preferred to terms
like “inequality,” which is rarely used in the reports. As the following excerpt from the
2014 report attests, the IPCC itself has thus admitted shortcomings in its pastinvestigation
of inequalities and poverty:
Understanding future vulnerability, exposure, and response capacity of interlinked
human and natural systems is challenging due to the number of interacting social,
economic, and cultural factors, which have been incompletely considered to date.
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These factors include wealth and its distribution across society. (IPCC, 2014a, p.
56)
Yet these differences are not explained by power dynamics or dependency between
regions, but rather – in a discourse highly symptomatic of the linearity of
developmentalist approaches – they are framed by a language of “lacks,” insufficient
“capacity,” “adaptability,” in the most “vulnerable” regions. Focused on Latin America,
this passage of the report is telling:
Some countries have made efforts to adapt, particularly through conservation of
key ecosystems, early warning systems, risk management ... However, the
effectiveness of these efforts is outweighed by: lack of basic information,
observation and monitoring systems, lack of capacity building and appropriate
political, institutional and technological frameworks; low income; and settlements
in vulnerable areas. (2014a, p. 1048).
Thus Latin America is presented as at best plagued by some mysterious “lacks,” at worst
responsible (“made efforts to”) for its “vulnerability” due to ill-informed decisionmaking. This language of “low adaptive capacity” is deployed with respect to Africa and
Asia as well, where information on climate change impacts in these areas is admitted to
be incomplete, with little to no attempt at pointing to the power dynamics, inequalities,
colonial legacies, and interdependencies (in the sense both of a dependency of the global
North on global South poverty, and of the global South on global North hegemony) that
may explain this uneven distribution of climatological knowledge, beyond the complexity
of climates in areas like the Sahel, for instance. As for Europe and North America, it is
apparently just as class, race and genderless as Africa, Asia, Oceania.
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The interdependencies at work in aggravating inequalities worldwide and within
regions, countries, areas, among class, race, gender, etc are not mentioned. Poverty and
inequality are treated as “other stressors” aggravating the impacts of climate change,
rather than as complexly overdetermining ecological crises. For instance, chapter 13 of
the new report introduced references to women for the first time in the IPCC’s history,
which was about time (until then there was no mention of gender in the thousands of
pages of reports), yet they are constantly reduced to descriptions as “vulnerable,” absent
of any account of how gendered power dynamics may work to inform and produce such
“vulnerability.” The “capacity” and “adaptability” language obscures the larger question
of capitalist power dynamics, notably between regions. However, as environmental
historian Mike Davis has demonstrated in his work on El Nino famines (Davis, 2002),
these have often been the result not only of natural disasters but of failure for markets and
capitalist states to distribute available resources where most needed in emergency
situations, along with active appropriations of resources by colonial powers. There is no
reason to believe that global warming-induced famines would now differ, if one persists
in considering– even an array of – capitalocentric scenarios. Adaptability, capacitybuilding, vulnerability, in sum the IPCC’s language when dealing with the unevenness
and inequality inherent to the climate crisis, is drawing exclusively from
developmentalist accounts of “the economy,” which assumes “developmental paths” all
directed toward generalizing the dream of global North “development,” a generalization
the panel itself proves to be impossible without a limitless planet. This
developmentalism, reliant upon a vision of history as linear and universally marching
toward the same goals, erases specific cultural contexts, colonial legacies, power
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dynamics and violence. 60 This issue is also interestingly tied to the one discussed above:
in the IPCC’s accounts, the future (futures) is multiple, as long as it is capitalist: all
scenarios assume “development” as an end-goal, with all the colonial Western
underpinnings of this linear vision making it impossible for projections to do anything
but imagine capitalist hegemony as the default, unproblematic state worldwide. But
however implausible this may seem, what would happen to carbon emission levels, were
the IPCC to draw from models projecting a worldwide generalization of traditional
indigenous modes of living, and/or societies, naturecultures, which “still” rely mostly on
small-scale, subsistence agriculture?
Furthermore, the IPCC evokes the heightened risks of local and regional conflicts
over resources, and the increase in migratory flows due to higher number of climate
refugees. This in fact is part of why the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to the IPCC in
2007. Yet at no point of the reports does the IPCC offer insight into how global North
countries who have contributed most of the carbon emissions placing world populations
of humans and nonhumans in today’s catastrophic situation are also likely to be the least
violently affected by global warming, and what ethical and political responsibilities this
may create. The narrowing of income difference explicitly and dubiously assumed in
many scenarios also runs counter to any evidence considered even by the most superficial
observation of capitalist history, which the recent disasters resulting from Structural
Adjustment Programs have only confirmed: growth cannot be assumed to narrow
inequalities, and neither can the creation of a global carbon market, or the deployment of
geoengineering techniques like BEECS – which most global South countries would
60

For critiques of developmentalism and postdevelopment theory that inspire my criticisms of the IPCC,
see Ivan Illich (1973; 2013), particularly his concepts of “modernized poverty,” and “war on subsistence”;
also Arturo Escobar (2005; 2011), Ferguson (2005), Fabian (2014), Rahnema & Bawtree ed. (1997).
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hardly be able to afford contributing to – that the Working Group III calls for. The report
starts many sentences with formulas such as “assuming that market efficiency is
improved…,” further confirming its own capitalocentrism. It cites “studies of market
potential,” advances that “literature identifies taxes as an efficient way of internalizing
the costs of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions,” and praises “revenues from carbon
taxes or auctioned permits under an emission trading system used to promote low-carbon
technologies or reform of existing taxes.” These are but examples of the many passages
on regulating carbon emissions by way of taxes and creating a worldwide carbon market
which the report on mitigation is filled with. Little to no consideration is taken of who in
the world would be able to afford these “auctioned permits” to pollute, how such
auctioning may aggravate existing inequalities and thus shed serious doubts on
speculations that equity in income distribution could possibly come with a continuation
of growth (e.g. A1 scenarios). The question of what states would be able to enforce
carbon taxes, what underground markets would develop as a result and their scope
relative to what economies, are also unaddressed. Yet the answers to these questions can
be suspected, and they would most likely not benefit the Global South, or women,
minorities, the poor, etc. The “anthropogenic” character of climate change has been
demonstrated by the IPCC reports. Yet who is the “anthropos,” and the “we” in its
injunction that “we” take action to address global warming because it impacts “us all”?
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Remember Back When We Became Human, All Too Human, in 1750?
Man is neither the oldest nor the most constant
problem that has been posed for human knowledge
… It was the effect of a change in the fundamental
arrangements of knowledge … Man is an invention
of a recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If
those arrangements were to disappear as they
appeared … then one can certainly wager that man
would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the
edge of the sea.
Michel Foucault
As a vast, worldwide conglomeration of hundreds of scientists and economists who
synthesize findings from peer-reviewed climatological literature under the auspices yet
autonomously from the United Nations, the IPCC is well known for having constituted
itself as a legitimate voice confirming a quasi-unanimous diagnosis that current global
warming was “anthropogenic.” Its issuing “synthetic reports for policy-makers,” it has
served a function of vulgarization and translation of climatology to international politics,
and the resulting texts have informed international environmental summits from Cancun
to Rio, Kyoto and Copenhagen. This is in part why it received the Nobel Peace Prize: at
the intersection of international science and politics, the IPCC has given tremendous
weight to the claim that climate change was caused “by us humans” and consequently has
offered fuel for thought and action to myriad mobilizations. Its most striking contribution
to worldwide debates on global warming is arguably that the climate crisis is
“unequivocally” (the vocabulary has become more adamant in the last, 2014 report)
anthropogenic. The panel supports this claim with a comparison of millennia of climate
change cycles to the short period of industrial modernity, with the predominant date cited
in the reports placed at 1750. Throughout the reports, the IPCC refers to “pre-industrial
levels,” which in itself is a misleading phrase, as it does not in fact literally mean that
315

levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere before industrialism have been constant,
and suddenly destabilized starting in 1750. This makes room for objectors to the
anthropogenic climate change position (who when backed up by far right dollars, have
been quite vocal, in spite of their ultra-minoritarian situation, and have even succeeded in
usurping the name of “skeptics”) to point out that Earth history has experienced
tremendous amounts of variation throughout. What climatologists mean by “preindustrial levels,” is the relative stability of greenhouse gas throughout the Holocene,
though even this stability is indeed relative: many of us now know about the ice age (for
instance) that took over Europe during the middle ages. This variation does not discredit
the argument that from 1750 on, industrialism caused CO2 levels to rise dramatically.
However, did we indeed become human in 1750? Are economies not reliant upon
the predominance of industrial growth not animated by humans? May we syllogistically
deduce that the rise of capitalism was a process of humanization, before which medieval
populations were less-than-human? Are today’s non-industrial economies producing
inhuman modes of living? These anti-uchronian questions point to how the timeline, the
periodization advanced by the IPCC, the vision of history underpinning its language and
arguments, are profoundly capitalocentric. Yet the equation humanism = industrialism
may have some critical purchase, perhaps against the IPCC’s original intentions in
crafting the terms of debate. Indeed, simply replacing the adjective “anthropogenic” with
a seemingly more specific “capitalogenic” may obscure that, precisely, the economy of
power-knowledge that was born around 1750 did inaugurate a certain figure, man, who
proved to be quite carbon-emitting.
Much debate has taken place in the humanities as a result of Paul Crutzen’s
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coining the term “anthropocene” to designate the geological epoch “we” may allegedly
have inaugurated by modifying the lithosphere, including allegations that such an epoch
may more aptly be called “capitalocene.” In a recent article titled “Anthropocene,
Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin,” Donna Haraway has written
that
A big new name, actually more than one name, is warranted. Thus, Anthropocene,
Plantationocene, and Capitalocene (Andreas Malm’s and Jason Moore’s term
before it was mine). I also insist that we need a name for the dynamic ongoing
sym-chthonic forces and powers of which people are a part, within which
ongoingness is at stake. Maybe, but only maybe, and only with intense
commitment and collaborative work and play with other terrans, flourishing for
rich multispecies assemblages that include people will be possible. I am calling all
this the Chthulucene. (2015, p. 160)
Similarly, the adjective “anthropogenic” that the IPCC mobilizes invites the proliferation
of qualifiers to name global warming: the warming would thus not only be global and
anthropogenic, but also capitalogenic, plantationogenic, and the cooling down hoped for
may prompt the adjective chthulugenic. I will return to Haraway’s Chtulucene in the next
chapter, but for the time being, we may simply say that here Haraway refers to an ethical
call to join forces with
the diverse earth-wide tentacular powers and forces and collected things with
names like Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa (burst from water-full Papa), Terra, Haniyasuhime, Spider Woman, Pachamama, Oya, Gorgo, Raven, A'akuluujjusi, and many
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many more. (p. 159)
As Haraway puts it, “the issues about naming relevant to the Anthropocene,
Plantationocene, or Capitalocene have to do with scale, rate/speed, synchronicity, and
complexity” (p. 159). We may say the same about anthropogenic, capitalogenic, etc
global warming. What the IPCC’s use of the adjective “anthropogenic” indicates and
calls for problematization is the apparition of “man” as coinciding with the
“development” (one may rather say contingent eruption) of a certain economy that
generated enough carbon emissions to threaten most species on the planet of extinction.
The IPCC suggests this coincidence without problematizing its contingency, however: it
uncritically equates capitalism with the anthropos, in a sweeping, universalizing gesture
that extends industrialism’s legacy to a human legacy, both in terms of cause and in terms
of those impacted: “we” humans have caused the planet to over-heat, which claim may be
as empowering as it is overwhelming (in the sense that, from a hubristic viewpoint it may
provoke feelings that only humans can fix the damage they have reeped). Though the
IPCC’s own marker for when excessively carbon-emitting ways began is 1750, the panel
fails to further qualify anthropogenic climate change, which results in a blind
capitalocentric reading of progress, history, the anthropos. This hyper-uchronian
blindness makes for the ontological grounds upon which the IPCC then proceeds to a
series of hyper-uchronian positions, from the prescription to create carbon markets to the
leniency regarding overshooting two degrees’ increase targets while counting on
hypothetical future technofixes, and from the qualification of growth as “sustainable” to
developmentalist paths, along with the relative indifferentiation in global warming’s
uneven impacts.
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Hubristic Leaps “Forward”: Geoengineering Stupidity
These technological fixes should not be condemned
without considering their value as an extender of
the time we have to act. In a longer run they are
probably no more a cure than is dialysis for kidney
failure but who would refuse dialysis if death was
the alternative.
James Lovelock
The IPCC has so far espoused only one kind of geoengineering method: it has imagined
the BECCS (carbon-dioxide removal and storage techniques) that I described and
critiqued above to be perfected in about 30 to 40 years, so much so that overshooting is
also made imaginable and acceptable in the near future. Some have gone further and
imagined other geoengineering schemes, and even gone ahead to implement them.
Geoengineering, or large-scale, deliberate interventions in planetary climate systems
aiming to counter the effects of carbon emissions, hypothetically includes myriad
experiments which the U.S Congress has amply discussed and considered serious options
in various hearings. These techniques would include, for instance, spraying large amounts
of sulfate aerosols in the atmosphere to cause drops of temperature similar to those that
occur as a result of volcanic eruptions. Other techniques take the form of massive satellite
shields blocking some of the sunlight from entering the atmosphere. Others yet entail
planting forests of genetically-modified trees that would be more carbon-absorbing than
natural trees, thus offsetting some of the current and future carbon-emissions. Yet another
example would consist in changing the reflectivity of clouds so as to modify the albedo
of the Earth. In its fourth report (2007), the IPCC wrote with skepticism about the
techniques, though not ruling them out completely:
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Geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertilization to remove CO2 directly from
the atmosphere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material into the upper
atmosphere, remain largely speculative and unproven, and with the risk of
unknown side-effects. Reliable cost estimates for these options have not been
published. (IPCC, 2007, p. 79)
The IPCC’s subsequent shift, in the fifth assessment report (2015), to open up to carbon
removal procedures as more credible alternative is certainly evidence of leaps from
diagnosing a situation of urgency to considering actions that reproduce and dramatize a
futurist technofix and renew further desire to continue with growth, overcoming the
climate crisis (as opposed, perhaps, to facing it). But some scientists, engineers and
millionaires outside of the IPCC have gone further in this hyper-uchronian direction.
The Earth Has a Fever? Put Her on Dialysis!
Millionaire Russ George and Gaia Theorist James Lovelock to the Rescue
On October 15th, 2012, the Guardian reported that in July of that year, “an American
businessman [whose name is Russ George] [had] dumped around 100 tons of iron
sulphate into the Pacific Ocean as part of a geoengineering scheme off the west coast of
Canada” (Lukacs, 2012). The article explained that “the iron has spawned an artificial
plankton bloom as large as 10, 000 square kilometers. The intention is for the plankton to
absorb carbon dioxide and then sink to the ocean bed – a geoengineering technique
known as ocean fertilization that [Russ George] hopes will net lucrative carbon credits.”
The Guardian also specified that “scientists [were] debating whether iron fertilization
[could] lock carbon into the deep ocean over the long term, and [had] raised concerns that
it [could] irreparably harm ocean ecosystems, produce toxic tides and lifeless waters, and
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worsen ocean acidification and global warming” (ibid.). A list of side-effects at least as
scary and consequent as those on the banner for certain drugs’ ads on TV, except on quite
a different, to a great extent unknown, temporal and spatial scale.
George violated the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s orders who had
warned him that he could not fly the U.S. flag near the Galapagos and Canary Islands
after his boats had been banned from ports from the Spanish and Ecuadorean
governments because he had already made attempts to conduct his little experiment near
these islands. The millionaire nonetheless claimed that some of the equipment used to
monitor effects and results following his initiative off the coast of British Columbia had
been loaned by U.S. agencies like NASA and the National Ocean and Atmospheric
Administration. In order to conduct his Pacific Ocean experiment Russ George had
convinced an indigenous village on the nearby Haida Gwaii islands to not only grant
approval for his project, but also to establish the Haida Salmon Restoration Corporation,
which would raise and contribute one million dollars to fund it. George had assured the
indigenous village council that the experiment was about restoring the salmon population
in the area. His geoengineering initiative was subsequently accused of violating two U.N.
Conventions (on biological diversity, and the London convention on the dumping of
wastes at sea) which prohibited for-profit ocean fertilization. As the news of his
experiment broke while a United Nations environmental summit was being held in
Hyderabad, India, the governments of Bolivia, the Philippines, several African nations, as
well as indigenous peoples’ organizations called for a more extensive ban on
geoengineering.
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Russ George has a personal website (called “Bring Back the Fish”) boasting titles
of blog posts like “A Penny for Our Planet,” “Poof Go the Puffins Unless We Help,”
“Science Confirms: Dust + Plankton = Ice Ages,” “Sockeye to Return in Historic
Abundance” (George, n.d. “Bring Back the Fish”) along with arguments about his
experiment having allegedly been successful both in generating carbon-absorbing
plankton, and proliferating depleted salmon population. The language in his website is
dominated by four interestingly entangled semantic fields: that of corporate business and
profit, that of restoration, that of “miracles,” magic and mermaids, and finally, science.
Money and Science restore enchantment, an all-in-one formula blending magic dust and
hubris.
George’s personal bio (George, n.d., “Me: A Personal Story”), an incredible firstperson narrative and the very first choice of pages on his website’s toolbar, specifies that
he was taught to swim in Walden Pond. He claims that “if you soak there you can be
imbued with some of Thoreau’s magic” (ibid.). Before George tells readers about the
allegedly restorative idea of soaking magical dust in the Pacific in other pages of the
blog, he takes care to enumerate many of his experiences in the “great outdoors,”
promptly and inevitably thanking his first car, “a beat-up old 1958 jeep” (later car models
are also mentioned in narrating various oh so wild anecdotes). Russ George’s mother is
also thanked, the daughter of a farmer who “didn’t need today’s notions of being
locavores or organic foodies” to tend the garden and feed him well.
Russ George also tells about having lived in a tiny log cabin, working in tree
logging “to make ends meet,” as according to him that was what “us back-to-the-landers”
did (ibid.). There, he specifies, he befriended a native faller, in whose company he later
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decided to quit logging (but who subsequently does not reappear in the story): this
decision follows a clumsy personification of trees screaming as he runs his saw through
them. After logging, George created his own tree planting company having “hired a
bunch of hippy friends.” The story of course is punctuated with solemn declarations and
grandiose twists and turns: “thus was born another chapter in my life of fixing the
damage to Nature that our kind has wrought,” (ibid.) exclaims Russ George. He also
shares an anecdote illustrating his childlike, creative purity mixed with his virile go-getter
assertive defiance: George once presented a report to the Canadian prime minister when
he worked as an ecology consultant, delivering the report in the form of kindergartenlevel flashcards (George had had an epiphany reading his kindergarten attending
daughter’s report, but the link there is unclear as this excerpt in the story is particularly
rich in typos and approximative grammar). The Premier allegedly responded to this with
an “OK smart ass now that you’ve shown we’re remiss in our management you fix it”
(ibid.).
“Fixing Nature” has long been Russ George’s vocation. The bio page on his blog
does not include any written mention of the iron dust dumping, but instead a short video
of the apparently joyful event, which was conducted from a beautiful sailboat. The low
voice of a friend filming the large red trace of dust following the ship’s stern and spilling
in the ocean, half solemn and half laughing proudly, exclaims that “this is Americans
doing somethin’ about the Earth… trying to make it a more habitable spot… cause, we
know we do a lot of things that tend to make it uh, not so habitable … so here we’re
doing our best” (ibid.). Not only humanity but the planet shall now proceed to thank Russ
George as he has thanked Thoreau, his jeep and his mom. The closing paragraphs of the
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bio can hardly be paraphrased without doing violence to the exemplary, virtuous,
meriting “scientists and managers,” – or should we simply call them heroes? – “working
on the inside” to “do the right thing,” “walking the walk” that Thoreau’s magic may or
may not have blessed, had he not bit the dust before the iron-fertilized sea ever came into
being:

Jump forward a few more decades and here I am still walking the walk instead of
talking the talk out there restoring trees and seas with the sweat of my own brow.
Soon I’ll be posting a television documentary program here that I wrote,
produced, and directed in the late 80’s. It’s titled, “The New Environmentalists,”
and tells the story of environmental scientists and managers who work on the
inside, within industry. They go to work every day and do the right thing. That
right thing is usually just doing something about the earth, trying to make it a
better place. Walking the walk is far more important than talking the talk.
(George, ibid.)

In addition to producing this kind of rich prose to praise their own merits, new
environmentalists indeed jump forward sometimes, on interesting imaginary lines. And
Russ George is not alone in his righteous rescue mission. His own technofixes are
informed by a version of conservation rhetoric, while someone like James Lovelock, one
of the inventors of Gaia theory, also advocates for considering geoengineering as a
serious option. James Lovelock revolutionized the way biology and other sciences view
the Earth by demonstrating that its systems act very much like those animating a living
organism. The Gaia hypothesis took a long time to be taken seriously by the scientific
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community, but Lovelock, along with Lynn Margulis, was eventually able to make a case
so that it is now recognized as shedding a new light on the blue planet. This theory has
tremendously inspired environmentalist positions, and the term Gaia, which he coined to
describe it, has been seized by many including among radical ranks. When Isabelle
Stengers refers to “the eruption of Gaia,” though she does not define this event, she is in
part referring to the sciences’ understanding of Earth systems, which Lovelock greatly
advanced, and in part to the current, unprecedented ecological crises that have challenged
anew modernity’s claims to separation between nature and humans.
However, in his recent book The Vanishing Face of Gaia, Lovelock (2009) offers
a questionable logic which consists in arguing that if global warming is already a form of
unintentional geoengineering, we might as well go ahead and reverse the process of
warming, “curing” the ill we have wrought, only this time “deliberately.” Thus Lovelock
writes:
There are signs that we can treat global heating by engineering or other means.
We have proved that our unscheduled and unintended experiment of adding large
quantities of carbon dioxide into the air by burning carbon fuel heated the planet,
and we know that it was a mistake. Does this mean that we can cure global
heating by adding some other gas or material that does the opposite and cools?
Scientists, including me, think that we may have little option but to try; but surely
it is much better to try as a planned experiment than as a panic response. (2009, p.
137)
The tense mix of urgency and criticism of panic response is striking: according to
Lovelock, we have “little option but to try” geoengineering, and not enough time to
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question “business as usual,” a phrase that comes up regularly in his prose. On the other
hand, he contrasts geoengineering experiments with “panic responses,” trusting that one
could “plan” for such “experiments.” However while planning is surely part of what
makes an experiment more or less rigorous in a laboratory, part of the very planning
involved has to do with making room for the unexpected. Any experiment starts with
hypotheses one then tests with a certain openness to surprise, to the unanticipated. Given
the planetary scale, how one would proceed if such experiment of adding cooling factors
to Earth systems were to fail or produce detrimental effects is quite unclear. Yet
Lovelock’s confidence in science is impressive, and so is his capacity, in this case, to
rhetorically imply that “scientists” in general think we have “little other option but to try”
(note that he does not write “some” scientists or specify in any way). Somehow, from the
fact that global heating has been proven to be caused, inadvertently, by human action,
Lovelock leaps to the conclusion that we may go ahead and continue on the same
interventionist path, this time “knowingly.” The question of where and how the
unknown/known border may be delineated does not seem to trouble the Gaia theorist
enough to call for abstinence from large-scale tinkering, and rhetorically, he situates this
at the level of cairological temporality: the “unscheduled” experiment is contrasted with a
“planned” one. First as tragedy, then as farce, first as “unscheduled” then as “planned,”
humans are entrusted the “management” or “cure” of Earth systems so complex that no
complete consensus on what exactly we may anticipate is reached – Lovelock is a loud
voice insightfully contesting the IPCC’s projections and claiming that their modeling is
excessively linear, that the panel may have underestimated feedback effects, tipping
points and possibilities for runaway climate change, for lack of a sufficiently
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interdisciplinary scientific approach. But between “panic response” and “having little
option but to try,” Lovelock walks with amazing confidence on a very thin line of threat.
Describing Earth’s history by comparing it to the life of a woman, he explains that Gaia
can be considered an “old lady,” which fragile state calls for protective intervention on
the part of humans. He repeatedly claims that a sudden, dramatically catastrophic event
would be, to an extent, desirable as it would shake the powers that be out of their apathy,
into action. What we would need, in his view, is a cataclysmic event comparable to a war
(his last book abounds in belliquose metaphors), which would finally justify a strong
leader stepping in – here Churchill’s figure is each time invoked to praise “blood, sweat
and tears” attitudes that would not shy away from circumventing excessively slow and
impractical democratic imperatives, which to Lovelock impede acting with the necessary
boldness.
Thus Lovelock, a former MD, also deploys threatening, anthropomorphizing
metaphors where the Earth is again staged as a fragile old lady that human scientists
rescue as her benevolent doctors – deemed knowledgeable enough to help and save her –
as with the quote in incipit of this section, which is worth re-examining here:
These technological fixes should not be condemned without considering their
value as an extender of the time we have to act. In a longer run they are probably
no more a cure than is dialysis for kidney failure but who would refuse dialysis if
death was the alternative. (p. 142)
Western medicine, which indeed has a history of declaring itself capable to act as the
ultimate life extender, 61 is taken to be exemplary of the kind of ethics that shall guide us
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Granted, according to Ivan Illich’s Medical Nemesis (1976) argument, the life expectancy of adults has
not been improved for more than a century in the Western world. Here Lovelock is bringing on his belief in
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to the path of geoengineering. Life on dialysis is assumed better than death, in a
peremptory “who would refuse” turn of phrase, yet one may pose another “who” question
shaking the accuracy of the metaphor: whose death is being discussed here? The death of
the planet as we know it, in the Holocene form we are (un)familiar with and have evolved
in, may be at stake, but leaping from this to the death of the planet in general seems the
kind of leap only a strong human exceptionalism may be able to perform. Besides, the
very leap from individual lives and life-saving dialyses in the human medical realm
(which ethical assumptions are already contestable) to the planetary scale serves an
impressive yet dubious confidence in our capacity to “cure” ills caused by “us.”
Lovelock’s trust in technology and his desire to see “business as usual” enabled to
continue in spite of the climate crisis, his futurist confidence where “experiments”
inadvertently conducted by heating the planet can be reversed as long as the
“inadvertent” is turned into “deliberate” and the “unscheduled” in turned into “planned,”
erasing unpredictability in even stronger a way, his call for a bold anti-democratic blood,
sweat and tears leader and his desire for a catastrophe of a scale and suddenness
sufficient to prompt dramatic action, his thin impossible line between claims that
geoengineering would be “better than a panic response,” and threatening “we have little
other option,” “dialysis or death” tone, make for an incredible exemplar of uchronia on
steroids, or hyper-uchronia.
I will refrain from elaborating on Stengers’ concept of stupidity with respect to
Lovelock’s rhetoric. It would be just as debasing to apply it to an old man known for
having invented a not only scientifically revolutionary but also poetically beautiful Earththe Truths and righteousness of medicine and jumping to apply these to Gaia, but even the former are
highly contestable, let alone the fact that the leap from human living beings to the vast systems that
constitutes and animate Gaia is preposterous.
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as-living-organism theory, as his paternalistic gestures to cure old Gaia are preposterous.
Nonetheless, Lovelock’s demanding of democracy that it concedes “we have little other
option,” his demanding of the Earth that it lets geoengineers experiment, his demanding
of geoengineering and science that they “cure” Gaia’s fever, seem to run into a sharp
dissonance with what the climate crisis situation could be read to demand, and with the
complexity of his own Gaia hypothesis. Lovelock writes that “we have proved that our
unscheduled and unintended experiment of adding large quantities of carbon dioxide into
the air by burning carbon fuel heated the planet” (p. 139) and from this he somehow
deduces that more experimenting, this time “deliberate,” is in order. One may oppose to
this an anti-uchronian suggestion that we have “proved” a certain “business as usual” so
dear to his heart can reek havoc, that some of the sciences have been able to diagnose a
likely relation between this damage and certain industrialist, technology-dependent
modes of production, and that we know too little to continue treating the Earth as the
object of our “experiments.” Lovelock’s recommendations are indicative of the powerful
appeal of uchronia, to the point that frenetic fixing is at times preferred to phronesis even
by incredibly inventive scientists. Here the relationship between limitless confidence in
scientific knowledge’s unstoppable progress and uchronia is made visible. It is based on
the confidence that discoveries of techno-scientific “solutions” to fix complex Earth
systems’ disruptions will be found in the future that both the IPCC and Lovelock
conclude geoengineering may be the right course of action (though the latter is very
critical of the former they do share this assumption in common). We shall put the Earth
on dialysis for the time being, and figure out later how to perform a more definitive
kidney transplant. The idea of global heating “proving” that we must continue on the
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same path of experiments intentionally, to counteract the current inadvertent effects,
imagines untangible courses and directions to Earth and human history, where the
technologies and mode of production that brought the crisis shall counteract their own
effects (counter-uchronia), and where more trust in futurist experiments and technologies
shall be invested (hyper-uchronia).
“New Environmentalist” Emergency and Hyper-Uchronian Heroism
Russ George and even James Lovelock’s respective practice and defense of
geoengineering could easily be reduced to a cynical hope to speculate on carbon credits
or maintain “business as usual,” and in Russ George’s case there is certainly an explicit
rhetoric interpellating the climate crisis as a business opportunity. One could certainly
stop here with sufficiently compelling reasons explaining their positions. However, James
Lovelock’s views are more conventionally reactionary than this venture capitalist
explanation would inaccurately account for. Even for George, if the search for
speculation on carbon credits is reason enough, his self-avowed desire for turning the
climate crisis into a source of lucrative activities is couched in a peculiar conservationist
discourse he seems to genuinely adhere to and which deserves noting. Indeed, would
someone who wishes to profit off of global warming even invest millions of dollars in
carbon credit speculation endeavors if they didn’t believe that large-scale tweeking of the
Earth’s temperature at the very least did not risk to result in planetary holocaust or mass
biocide? What good (profit) will this speculation do when the experiment has failed and
caused runaway climate change and subsequent mass extinction (including, perhaps, of
our species)? This latter question is surely one that would-be and actual geoengineering
speculators should spend more time on, yet one can assume relatively safely that they did
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consider these risks, albeit hastily. Furthermore, it turns out that beyond a strangely
cynical and naïve conviction that geoengineering can’t hurt the planet, the two examples
of pro-geoengineering rhetoric described above are both ones coming from what Russ
George calls “new environmentalists,” i.e folks who seem to sincerely be attached to a
version of conservation ethics and a certain scientism, and as such belong to a long
tradition of virile pseudo-scientific managerial and technocratic environmentalism.
Both the characters described mobilize images of heroes acting boldly in a
moment of urgency, playing on a certain version of masculinity. For Russ George, the
hero is none other than his ever so humble Earth-servant autobiographical self. His car,
his swimming in the “wild” magic waters on which shores a great transcendentalist once
built a utopian-of-one cabin, his self-depiction as an “American doin’ somethin’ right,”
his being called “smartass” by the Canadian Prime Minister, and his characterization of
“new environmentalists” as “working from within the industry” to “fix” things, all
participate in painting the portrait of a conservationist high-tech hyper-modern hero. In
Lovelock’s case, the desire for virile heroism comes up when he evokes the figure of a
strong Churchill-like leader daring to sidestep democracy for the greater Gaian
(understand, human-hospitable Holocene Earth) good. Another heroic figure is that of the
Gaian doctor, who will protect fragile old feminine Earth. Note, regarding the sick
patient’s character, that Lovelock scientifically supports his claim about Earth’s old age
by telling his readers about his rich Gaia hypothesis and living systems, Earth’s life
expectancy with respect to the sun, etc, but he never explains why the Earth should be
female, besides a tautological explanation: his having named his theory with the name of
a Greek goddess.
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These different forms of virile heroisms also mix with a specific scientism, selfrighteousness and human exceptionalism, all informing the hyper-uchronian futurist
narratives here. This does not imply, by any means, that hyper-uchronia has to take this
particular gendered form, of necessity. Yet this is the form it takes in both examples, in
what’s only a caricature of the relative genderblindness of the IPCC’s own counter- and
hyper-uchronias discussed above.
Human exceptionalism is another constitutive trait of this hyper-uchronian
horizon. The repetition of terms and phrases like “fixing,” “doing the right thing,”
“curing,” sustains Lovelock’s hyper-uchronian reasoning: “we have experimented and
been mistaken, let’s now experiment and fix our mistake” (p. 139). While this language
of fixing assumes that humans are in a position of agency, control and deliberateness or
“planning,” it blatantly underestimates the agentic and unpredictable ways of Gaian
response, even in the midst of evidence that intervention into so much complexity can be
disastrously destructive and may not be possible to anticipate. Reciprocally, it arguably
over-estimates human capacity for deliberation, intentionality, conscious action, the
unstoppable extension of human scientific knowledge, and human planning, foresight
abilities, the latter two being a condition for deliberation and intention. What is being
proved by the climate crisis exactly? According to Lovelock, it is not so much the vast
extent of the unknown, but rather that we may now proceed on the same route,
“deliberately” this time. The “deliberate” character ultimately amounts to an act of faith,
but that does not disturb the confident scientist. The idea of heroic manly figures “fixing
the damage to Nature that our kind has wrought” taps into the image of a (male)
individual conservationist lover of (female) Nature rising to protect, save and serve her
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against an evil “kind.” Thus human exceptionalism is entangled with exceptionally heroic
and virile individuals. Again, the gendered aspects here may not be sine qua non
conditions of existence of human exceptionalism, yet they feed into and support this
specific contingent hyper-uchronian arrangement.
The claim to altruistic “saving” of course is fragile, as not only is Russ George
experimenting to eventually beat competitors to new markets of carbon credits, but the
goal is also not simply to help the Earth per se: again, the point is to rescue the Holocene,
i.e human-habitable Earth. Even though Lovelock can hardly be suspected of being avid
capitalist speculator (after all, he failed to acquire the copyright when he invented the
micro-wave), he does recurrently repeat the phrase “saving business as usual” to express
urgency, throughout this Vanishing Face of Gaia (2009). This is another aspect of the
human exceptionalism at work: humans have damaged Gaia as we (do not entirely) know
it, humans are the only ones capable of “fixing” the damage, they are assumed to be
capable of it on an act of faith, and finally, it is for the human species that such saving is
assumed to have to take place. From conventional, simplistic moral imperatives with
strong doer-deed understandings of responsibility – fix the damage you have caused – we
leap to assumptions of exclusive possibility – the doer behind the global heating deed is
the only one capable of undoing what he has done. Rugged individual conservationist
figures are, to an extent, a caricature of human exceptionalism, though Russ George selfrighteously denounces the “damage [his] kind has wrought,” and presumes with no
particular reason but anthropocentrism that because humans have caused the climate to
warm, they can also reverse the pattern. Urgency (“we have little other options,”
according to James Lovelock’s lacking imagination) is supposed to legitimize hubris.
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Hyper-uchronia is made of a futurism where Man shall triumph once more, even in
correcting his own mistake, even in scaling up those among his actions that are
“deliberate,” to the level of the planet (that this is possible is of course assumed: only one
quick step separates, if at all, inadvertent, accidental cause-effects from intentional,
deliberate ones). Similarly to what I remarked in the case of regressive counter-uchronias,
this hyper-uchronian vision relies upon understanding the extension of Gaia’s life as a
goal, her preservation, cure, treatment, control and protection, her restoration, as a
teleological end which Man must tend to, and the human can become truly human,
human exceptionalism’s end can be met in this heroic mission. Both Man and Nature are
once again celebrated in teleological forms, and in this hyper-uchronian futurism
uchronia gets a new breath.
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CHAPTER VI
WHAT IS BEING DONE?
EMBODIED HETEROCHRONIA,
SYNCHRONY, ECO-CHRONIA

Present: De-growth Livelihoods Here and Now
Coming up: Non-Capitalist Futures
What would a non-capitalist, de-growth description of a scenario family used for
modeling futurological climatological data look like? My own proposition would read as
something like this:
The Z00 storyline and scenario family describes a future Chthulucene world of
rapid de-growth and slow living, global population that peaks in mid-century and
declines thereafter in favor of queer kinships, and the rapid introduction of
convivial tools following the abolition of private property (including intellectual)
as well as the proliferation of DIY. Bicycles generalize as a means of transit, feet
are also used more and more, distances being covered more slowly. Food
production diversifies as a result of a global ban on GMOs and the generalization
of subsistence permaculture as well as indigenous agricultures, decreasing in
quantity also with the decrease in population and simplification/diversification of
local diets. Generally production becomes almost exclusively local and organic,
with commodities’ value being measured (if at all) not by exchange but based on
the durability of objects. Bartering and the collectivization of both needs and
goods at local levels become prevalent compared to transport over long distances.
Major underlying themes are naturecultural bio and economic diversity,
bioregional cooperative units, community economies building, increased cultural
and social interactions and leisure time, with a generalization of participatory
local democracy practices. By 2101 the term “growth” in reference to economies
is recognized as obsolete and only found in etymology dictionaries, along with
terms like “capitalist” and “profit.” The Z00 scenario family develops into
multiple groups that describe alternative directions of economic, social and
political change toward diverse forms of post-capitalist economies. The multiple
Z00 groups are distinguished by their convivial emphasis: diversification of
naturecultures and in renewable energy sources with contraction of material
production such that liberated time is mostly dedicated to the collective and
individual creation of vernacular sciences, art, dance, music (e.g Z0068X),
diversification of naturecultures and in renewable energy sources with contraction
of material production such that liberated time is mostly dedicated to joyful
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farniente and queer love (e.g Z0069Y), diversification of naturecultures and in
renewable energy sources with contraction of material production such that
liberated time is mostly dedicated to a bit of both and more sustainable activities
and farniente – mostly unimaginable to 2015 human generations (e.g Z0070Z).
This is not a program.
I have already quoted (at more length) Foucault’s claim that “the idea of a program of
proposals is dangerous. As soon as a program is invented, it becomes law, and there is a
prohibition against inventing” (Foucault, 1997). In other (my) words, programs entail a
counter-uchronian futurism. Rather than outlining “what is to be done,” the above play on
IPCC scenario language is meant to disrupt capitalocentric assumptions, to eco-queer
temporalities, and perhaps, to imagine other possible temporal orders of things, based
partly on what is already being done.
Though the above scenario description may seem science fictionesque, it is by no
means utopian. If some may judge it unlikely or improbable, it is not outlining a strict
project to guide pre-drawn lines, and neither should it cave to being cast as impossible.
My critique of certain (many) greens’ utopianisms is in no way a rejection of desires and
needs to expand our imaginaries: I have tried to show, on the contrary, that claiming
utopianism may restrict imagination, crystallizing, immobilizing creative, surprising,
unlikely and imaginative experiments. This however is not an apt metaphor, as crystals
are ever so slowly dynamic in minuscule ways reticent to human naked eyes, and neither
would be the description of utopia as making things and life too “static,” as static energy
is also made of movement. Utopias and uchronias, armed with their privative “ou,” have
represented an urge to make time stand still, to abolish time, to get out of time, to escape
time (and how could this be done without ending life: “realized” utopia and uchronia
would be death). Change is contingent upon time (not necessarily long durations, but
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necessarily passing), and it is all there is, all that becomes, all we have (only we arguably
don’t “have” it in any simple sense). Though they exercize an understandable appeal (the
appraisive “eu”), utopian projects connote a longing for immobility incompatible with the
espousal of unpredictability and becoming I call for here (change, which requires time to
pass, happens within, inside, rather than from an illusory pristine outside: the problem is
in the association of “eu” with “ou”). Imagination (also within us) does not need, and
must do without utopia and uchronia. But, as Ursula Le Guin puts it, “truth (note the lack
of capital “t”) is a matter of imagination.” (Le Guin, p. xi, 2012). This is why what
preceded and what follows is far from rejecting science fiction as an art form: the above
scenario is not a utopia, but it may be read as science fiction, and to a great extent science
fiction already feeds life. As Dorion Sagan suggests, “perhaps the greatest science fiction
story would be a literal description of our present reality, but couched in terms that made
it unrecognizable until near the story’s end” (Sagan, 2013, p. 48). Similarly, the border is
quite thin between, on the one hand, ethnographic work by Chris Carlsson (2008) on
“Now-Topian” DIY, hackers, cyclists, urban homesteaders, and on the other, a narrative
like Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1973). This novel portrayed a relatively close future
in which the U.S. West Coast had seceded from the rest of the country to create a
confederation of small cooperative, mostly direct democratic spaces where sustainable
“steady states” were nurtured. The practices described in both of these texts are very
much alike, only in the latter case, they are generalized to the whole natureculture. Here
science fictional imagination may tremendously inspire radical green alternatives to
spread, without requiring that green activists and movements claim utopianism (and in
fact Callenbach’s novel has caused an ecotopian group to create, that called itself
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“Survivalists,” just like in the novel: the relationship between reality and science fiction
is a mutually constitutive one, or better still, because science fiction is always among us,
an autopoietic one). In other words, we may proceed to turn the table, and claim loud and
clear that ecotopianism is much more realistic than the capitalist utopianism that is
currently having us drown.
A few precisions on the above scenario description may help make the openness
of the futures imagined in this perspective even clearer. The term “Chthulucene” was
recently coined by Donna Haraway as an alternative to the anthropocene, the
plantationocene, the capitalocene, the age of Dithering. 62 This would be a past, present,
future epoch (note that Haraway emphasizes the anthropocene, not as an epoch but as a
border event) that would enable the proliferation of more hospitable timespaces for the
many refugees lacking a refuge who populate the planet in our current context, be they
human or not. Indeed, the name is a reference to myriad of vibrant human, nonhuman and
hybrid things, including:
the diverse earth-wide tentacular powers and forces and collected things with
names like Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa (burst from water-full Papa), Terra, Haniyasuhime, Spider Woman, Pachamama, Oya, Gorgo, Raven, A'akuluujjusi, and many
many more. “My” Chthulucene, even burdened with its problematic Greek-ish
tendrils, entangles myriad temporalities and spatialities and myriad intra-active
entities-in-assemblages—including the more-than-human, other-than-human,
inhuman, and human-as-humus. Even rendered in an American English-language
text like this one, Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa, Medusa, Spider Woman, and all their kin
[can be imagined and embraced within and by] the webs of speculative fabulation,
62

This age name is Haraway’s reference to Kim Stanley Robinson’s science fiction novel, 2312 (2012).
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speculative feminism, science fiction, and scientific fact. (2015, p. 160)
If these would make for some of the present and future possibilities, they require reimagining temporalities, giving visibility to existing non-uchronian ones, along with
critiquing existing ones (part of the previous chapters’ goal was to start the latter task).
As J.K. Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink have put it, this implies shifting the
questions we ask:
Rather than pose the time-honored but often paralyzing question of “what is to be
done” to produce change, we choose to marshal examples of “what is already
being done”, thereby contributing to the credibility and strengthening of
alternative economies. (2009, p. 331)
Here the term economies could be substituted with temporalities. In fact, GibsonGraham’s project already implies a different relationship to temporalities: “What is being
done?” allows an inclusion of the present yet often marginalized economies and, I argue,
temporalities which would make and that already make the proliferation of alternative
livelihoods, paces, speeds, futures and presents possible. However, as I mentioned in the
introduction to this dissertation, this cannot limit itself to a simple presentism, nor to
solely envisioning myriad alternative futures as if present alternative times didn’t already
exist. The effort here must encompass the combination of present imaginations and
experiments, the imagination of futures, and more (slowing down, speeding up, pacing,
pondering, wandering…): when now-topians (Carlsson, 2008) and interim futures
(Connolly, 2008) assemble, non-utopian and non-uchronian temporalities are made
possible. Neither presentist nor futurist, the temporalities I propose to foster and that are
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already challenging the reign of uchronia are not tied to a program, because they ask what
is being done, because they are committed to non-commitment, democratic participation
and direct action, surprise, contingency, the anticipation of the non-anticipated and the
unknown – thus the playful, parodic yet serious Z00 scenario family description
concludes with the assertion that most activities envisioned there cannot truly be
envisioned or imaginable by our 2015 selves. The description above implies a complete
rethinking of sustainability as not tied anymore to sustaining growth, but rather,
sustaining anti-uchronian critique, as well as a heightened awareness of present and
future “queer kinships,” as Donna Haraway has put it. This latter concept echoes the
concept of “future generations,” in contrast with uchronia’s futurism, but further
radicalizes it to accommodate for the limitation of mammal populations (mostly humans
and their lifestock) whose bodies suffice on their own to make carbon emissions a threat
to life.
These efforts are partly informed by my reading of the Nietzschean eternal return.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, the eternal return has a history of
being dismissed as a serious Nietzschean concept, though a renewed interest in this
notion has been emerging in recent continental philosophy, 63 often in response to
Heidegger and then Gilles Deleuze’s influence. So far I have drawn mostly from the
critical implications and dimensions of the eternal return, notably the critique of and
incompatibility with teleological visions of time. Nietzsche places contingency and

63

Throughout this dissertation I have relied mostly on Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal return:
see Deleuze, 2005; 2013. For more, recent interpretations and (attempts at) critiques of this concept,
including failed, Badiousiard critiques among the ranks of object-oriented ontologists, see also Ray
Brassier, 2007; Meillassoux, 2010.
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randomness at the core of the ontological condition of eternal return (the throw of dice).
Neither reason nor unreason are pertinent to the course of time, an insight I have brought
in conversation with my critiques of endism and growth. We have seen, importantly, that
if many of the temporalities examined above are human all too human, and natural all too
natural, certain understandings of the human and the natural may also be scrutinized as
teleological, all too teleological. I have discussed the necessity for the transvaluation of
all values in relation to these themes, and Nietzsche’s claim that there cannot be any ages
of happiness, though there may be moments of joy.
In this chapter I will elaborate on the question of how joy may be possible in a
time of ecological crisis, a time when the world of becoming and eternal recurrence erupt
to be experienced all the more intensely, intensifying every moment, long or short. If
Nietzsche’s thought may richly inspire a reconceptualization of temporalities in a context
of global warming and mass extinction, it is also because he called for cultivating a
capacity to cry out “da capo!” (in music, this Italian phrase means “from the beginning!”)
even in the face of the thought of thoughts, that everything will eternally return, that the
infinity of the past and the infinity of the future are ever present in the present and in each
moment, which is the only way time can pass. If all there is, is the ever-repeating
moment, then what is being done, and will we joyfully welcome its eternal return?
This chapter turns to the positive ontological and ethical dimensions of the eternal
return to inform my conceptualization of a couple more notions that could serve as
needed distinctions in our contemporary condition. “Heterochronia” refers to the
juxtaposition of otherwise seemingly incompatible moments and temporalities in specific
times, a needed experience as the planet is warming and as we realize this warming is
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anthropogenic. To illustrate this, I will propose an alternative reading of Hundertwasser’s
five skins theory in the light of his spiral motifs and “tree-tenant houses,” a heterotopia
(to borrow Foucault’s term) that inspires my concept of heterochronia. “Synchrony” also
refers to the cohabiting of multiple temporalities, yet with this concept I emphasize the
(sometimes dissonant) simultaneity of this cohabitation. Synchrony does not imply a
homogenous, coherent, smooth or synchronized temporality in the sense of “everything
being interconnected” in any simple way: what coexists in synchrony here would be
pasts, presents and futures, virtual and actual. Though some of that literal synchrony may
manifest in symbolic choreographies erupting in activist moments, as for instance in the
case of a Flood Wall Street protest in New York City where all the protesters tapped their
hearts in silence at the same time so as to evoke an alignment with Gaia’s heartbeat, by
no means can all the living beings and forces of the Chthulucene be sync-ed as easily as
an iPhone and a computer, and neither would this necessarily be desirable. Finally, I
discuss eco-chronia as the temporalities of the Chthulucene, multiple, unpredictable,
surprising, contingent and creative, human, nonhuman and hybrid. This hybridity
resonates in bodies, must be embodied, thus I turn to Pina Bausch’s contemporary dance
and its metaphors bringing heterotopias or transcorporealities (Alaimo, 2010) of human
and nonhuman bodies out on stage. I examine these in conversation with Foucault’s
discussion of the utopian nature of the body, to eventually return to a (not-so) different
kind of dance, where Nietzschean character Zarathustra’s moves join those of life in
unison.

Eternal Recurrence, Joy and Desperate Vitality
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ma allora cos’ha
lei all’attivo?…”
“Io? – [un balbettio ... mi trema la
voce] –
Io? Una disperata vitalità.
Pier Pasolini
When Nietzsche Traveled to Messina
When Nietzsche sent his “Messinese Idylls” (which now close the Gay Science) to the
newspaper Internationale Monatschrifft, he told the publisher that he thought “even the
most serious writings, once in a while, need[ed] something cheerful.” Yet as he was
writing joyfully about “an albatross who felt sorry for envy,” and a woodpecker who told
him that he, Nietzsche, was a poet, which made the philosopher-poet laugh, the thinker of
the eternal return was staying just a couple hundreds of kilometers from one of the
world’s most active volcanoes, the Etna. This mountain of lava regularly threatens to
erase the whole area as we know it (as a 2014 eruption which caused ashes to rain all
over Messina attests), in spite of the persistence of traces marking the hills at this point of
Sicily all the way from antiquity, produced by Greek enslaved labor to terrace the slopes
and prevent the potentially rapid erosion of the volcanic soil – we may note that the mafia
and capitalist economies are now much less efficient in maintaining these. In 1908, just a
few years after Nietzsche visited and stayed in Messina, a massive earthquake devastated
the town, leaving it looking very different from the landscapes and architecture his
woodpecker friend had flown once over. Today new threats are emerging here, including
a mega-project to build a bridge across the straight of Messina that would connect
Calabria to Sicily, making the town even more unrecognizable to a XIXth century
Nietzschean eye. Swordfish are disappearing rapidly from the straight, as the latter’s
current helps intensive fishing, another threat which graffiti artist Blu, whose work I have
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already discussed alongside Nietzsche’s (chapter III), has beautifully depicted in a fresco
decorating the wall of a Messinese squat/cultural and social center downtown (see
below). The artist has represented swordfish perhaps taking a revenge against humans,
perhaps saving them from their consumerist, urban, crowded and frenetic drowning, as
they too are an endangered, all too endangered species.
The long and the short term, the imminence of destruction and the persistence of
antiquity’s history, the latter history’s minuscule weight in the vicinity of Gaia’s core
lava, seem to highlight tension and fragility here by the straight, and must have been
palpable also in the Messina that Nietzsche knew. In spite of this, he affirmed the
necessity to write “something cheerful.” However, Nietzsche often oscillated between
joyful and crushing, unbearable affective responses in facing the eternal return. Or,
rather, as I will try to suggest, he oscillated between exhilarating yet also crushing,
unbearable joy, desires for lightness and joyful dance, and crushing sadness or perhaps
despair. Thus he also wrote: “my most profound objection again the eternal return, my
properly abysmal thought, is always that of my mother and my sister.” The thought of the
eternal return weighed an unbearable weight on Nietzsche and his dancing and laughing
Zarathustra, and yet they desired a state where they could watch the whole orchestra and
cry out: “da capo!” Would we cry out “da capo!” while contemplating Blu’s fresco and
the crying naked bodies of humans, drowning in a sea of commodities, caught in nets
with swordfish’s bills breaking them open? Surely some joy can be found today in
Messina: two years ago, Renato Accorinti, a Messinese gym teacher and anti-bridge
activist was elected mayor of this city against all odds, and in a recent protest to protect
convivial plazas in the city, he carried a sign with Mark Twain’s quote: “they did not
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know it was impossible, so they did it!”
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Figure 6: Blu, untitled.
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The Eternal Return as Condition of a “Real Philosophy of Becoming”
The eternal return, like the constant, age-old imminence of an earthquake, like the
cohabitation of deep and quotidian time and the eruption of Gaia and/or the Etna,
questions what is possible and probable, and heightens both joy and sadness, under the
crushing weight of a certainty that if all will pass, all has to return infinitely. Contrary to
dismissals of this notions that deem it a “half-mad idea,” as Milan Kundera claimed in his
lucky unbearable lightness of being, I continue to argue that this notion is especially
welcome, needed and inspiring in a context of eco-crisis. William Connolly, who has
abundantly drawn from Nietzsche in his recent works and also extensively addressed
temporality and environmental matters in relation to the German “philosopher of the
future,” has nonetheless brushed off the concept in his recent book, The Fragility of
Things. Connolly’s work on Nietzsche and ecology is rightly recognized as key to
contemporary Environmental Theory and to contemporary political thought at large, and
his insistence on temporality among other threads offer important references and
differences that will help situate the reading I ultimately defend. I will then turn from this
difference with Connolly to Deleuze’s interpretation.
In the Fragility of Things, Connolly footnoted a Nietzschean quote affirming
becoming with the following remark:
How, it is surely to be asked, does this formulation and innumerable others like it
in several Nietzschean texts, square with the idea of eternal return as the return of
long cycles, in which everything that becomes during one cosmic cycle returns in
exactly that mode in future cycles? There is no tension if this idea is merely posed
as an existential test: ‘would you choose life again if everything in it repeats?’ But
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Nietzsche, besides treating it as only a test sometimes, also experiments with long
cycles as a metaphysical theme. To me that theme is incompatible with a real
philosophy of becoming. (2013, p. 217)
Besides the fact that I struggle to understand Connolly’s “would you choose life again,”
which questionably seems to assume that we “chose” it at all, this remark differs from my
reading of the eternal return on a number of counts. Firstly, the eternal return implies that
there be no simple free will, the condition necessary for “choice”: our freedom is
constrained by a contingent and constant rearrangement of forces, including ours, which
will is beyond us as individuals or any kind of simplistic choice an “existential test”
would include. It would be to greatly misunderstand both the will to power and the
eternal return, to think that we “choose” life. Instead, the ethical challenge that results
from our ontological condition of eternal return has to do with espousing fate – amor fati
– or being crushed by the demon that reminds us everything will return. Secondly, the
eternal return is not necessarily the return of long cycles, but may be seen at multiple
scales. It is the return of the moment that returns, all forces of a closed universe being
constantly re-distributed anew, through the play of relations of force: thus the metaphor
Nietzsche often deploys of a throw of dice: all faces and dimensions of the dice are
always present with each new throw, yet each combination is unpredictable and differs
form the previous one, and at one point each will return. If this is the case, we may
understand the eternal return as concerning infinitely short as well as infinitely long
moments. Furthermore, Nietzsche repeatedly rejected the image of “cycles” as adequately
describing the eternal return, especially in his notes that were published posthumously –
many have not been translated in English, and are only available in this language, in their
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distorted version in the Will to Power, a book assembled by Elizabeth Nietzsche, a sister
who as we have seen is one of the figures whose eternal return Nietzsche has the hardest
time with. Connolly’s reading understands the object of the return, what is returning, as
long cycles, and as matter. Thus he evokes “the assumption Nietzsche makes about the
finitude of matter and the infinity of time is the key problem here” (2013, p. 217). Yet
here too there is a different possible reading, one that has been stressed, among others, by
Gilles Deleuze: Connolly takes matter to be finite for Nietzsche, where Nietzsche in fact
sees the universe as closed and insists on forces, not matter. In the Deleuzian, forcefocused interpretation, Nietzsche is not claiming that matter returns, after long cycles, but
that the return of forces returns. It is the return that returns in Deleuze’s reading, the
diverse, the lack of goals, contingency (which contrary to what Connolly also asserts
does imply necessity, only a complex kind), becoming that keeps on returning, making it
possible for time to pass.
Thus, to William Connolly’s statement, “to me that theme is incompatible with a
real philosophy of becoming,” I would answer that a real philosophy of becoming
requires the eternal return, which, as Deleuze has put it, is the being of becoming (the
only being there can be). Here Connolly seems to imply a non-ergodic 64 kind of
becoming, similar to Milan Kundera’s complaint that, because everything passes and
allegedly will never come back, every moment is fleeting and light as a feather. Thus
Kundera’s lament about the unbearable lightness of being. To Nietzsche things are not as
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The term “ergodic” refers to “a process in which every sequence or sizable sample is equally
representative of the whole (as in regard to a statistical parameter),” and in its second acception, it refers to
a process which “involves or relates to the probability that any state will recur; especially : having zero
probability that any state will never recur” (Merriam-Webster). Thermodynamics, which Nietzsche was
familiar with, hypothesizes this state. See also Dorion Sagan and Eric Schneider, 2005, p.56, for a
commentary on the eternal return from the perspective of thermodynamics.
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simple: it is precisely the awareness of the eternity of the instant that crushes the
philosopher-poet-Messinese woodpecker friend, whether this weight may weigh joyfully
or desperately. Furthermore, we will see when discussing the dance of life and thought,
that the return is not always so heavy: Nietzsche’s struggle for amor fati was in fact about
seeking a way to face the return in a joyful and light manner, a joy and a lightness staged
in Zarathustra and his dance with life. For this reason in part, I will draw from examples
in contemporary dance to think about our current condition of extinction and whether
light, joyful affects and percepts may emerge in its midst.
What follows is my translation of a posthumous fragment Nietzsche wrote in the
fall of 1881:
The world of forces has suffered no diminution: for otherwise it would always
have been emptied of its power and would have succumbed in the night of infinite
time. The world of forces has suffered no interruption in its movement: for
otherwise its end would be reached and the clock of life would be still. The world
of forces thus never comes into equilibrium, never has a moment of calm, and its
strength, its agitation are equal at all time. Whatever the state this world may
reach, it must have reached it already not only once, but countless times. Thus this
instant: it has already existed once and many times and will also come back, all
the forces distributed exactly as now: and thus with the instant that gave birth to it
and so as well of that which is the child of the present instant. Man! Your entire
life will be turned again and again and again like an hourglass always spilling –
meanwhile, a great minute of time for until all conditions from which you have
become to come together again in a circle over the world. And then you'll see
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again every pain and every joy and every friend and foe and every hope and every
mistake and every bit of grass, every sunshine, the integral series of all things.
This ring, on which you are nothing but a grain, shines again and again. And on
each ring of human existence, taken in its absolute meaning, comes the hour
when, to one, then many, then all, the most powerful thought arises, that of the
eternal return of all things – for humanity it is each time noontime. (Nietzsche,
1881b, my translation)
As I have pointed out already in chapters II and III, to Nietzsche time cannot have either
end or beginning, an original or ultimate moment of culmination where all forces would
cohere and organize rationally, it cannot “suffer any diminution,” “interruption,”
otherwise it would cease to exist. A teleological vision of time is excluded by this
account, given that if forces were to unfold from a beginning to a goal, this goal would
have been achieved already. The very condition of becoming we are caught in is evidence
that there was always already nothing but becoming, and will always be becoming,
otherwise there would be nothing rather than something. Thus this idea that the eternal
return is the being of becoming: nothing is ever lost, no force ceases to exist, but is reabsorbed, mobilized and transformed, to form and assemble anew, at each moment. Thus
also, the ergodic quality of difference and becoming. Nietzsche then asserts: “whatever
the state of the world may reach, it must have reached it already not only once, but
countless times.” In the above passage, it is clear that Nietzsche does not merely conceive
the eternal return as an “existential test” or ethical challenge, though it is very much the
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latter as well, but also as our ontological condition. 65 And if every grass, every bit of
sunshine, every friend and every foe, every joy and sadness will eternally return, the
metaphor deployed is not that of a cycle, but that of a ring. Nietzsche does qualify the
ring metaphor where grains of sand would constantly be animated and in motion,
eventually coming back to exactly the same point where they have been an infinite
number of times, and keep on in this motion within a closed universe, cautioning that the
image is imperfect (Nietzsche, 2003). The ring of sand and the throw of dice, though
imperfect as metaphors would necessarily be, should not be confused with cycles, where
loops may advance and not get us completely rid of straight linearity. Just like drops or
grains of water or sand constantly flowing in a closed loop, the only way time can pass is
for all forces to return, and this movement of repetition is one that may be sliced at
infinitely small and infinitely large scales.
The above quoted excerpt also poses a question I wish to discuss here through
dance: Nietzsche enigmatically refers to “the hour when, to one, then many, then all, the
most powerful thought arises.” This is an occasion to ask what the proliferation of
heterochronias and temporalities of synchrony would look like, and more specifically,
what these may look like not only in the form of the philosopher’s solitary ruminations,
but also in experiential, collective forms? May such eruptions be joyful and light? In
what follows I will try to reflect on the embodied practices (architecture, sex and dance
provide some examples) that may generate, create or make visible alternate temporal
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Though I am situating my reading in contrast with William Connolly’s here, as his works are important
to respond to in the context of a discussion of temporality, ecology and Nietzsche, and offer an occasion to
clarify what I am not saying so that what I argue becomes (hopefully) clearer, perhaps it is helpful to
underscore here that this argument according to which the eternal return is an ontological concept rather
than only ethical (though it has ethical implications) is not uncommon in Nietzschean scholarship or in
contemporary political philosophy. Thus from Lou Salomé (2001) and Heidegger (1961) to Deleuze (2005;
2013) and on to recent discussions of the eternal return by Brassier (2007) or Meillassoux (2010) I have
already mentioned in a footnote above.
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orders of things, as well as how these have to take a transcorporeal form which par
excellence goes beyond the strict boundaries of separated, individuated subjects, to
anchor themselves instead, in selves co-constituted by and for myriad human and
nonhuman alterities.
Ethical Implications of an Ontological Condition
Nietzsche’s ontological views certainly do have ethical consequences. Zarathustra
oscillates between praising and hating the throw of dice, who he at times calls his lover.
In the excerpt below, it is ardent love that prevails, and is even presented as inevitably
attractive – “how then could I not…” :
If ever a breath come to me of creative breath and of that heavenly necessity that
forces even accidents to dance astral rounds:
If ever I laughed with the laugh of creative lightning that follows rumbling but
obediently the long thunder of the deed:
If ever I rolled the dice with gods at the gods' table of the earth, so that the earth
quaked and ruptured and snorted up rivers of fire –
– because the earth is a gods' table, and it trembles with creative new words and
gods' throws –
Oh how then could I not lust for eternity and for the nuptial ring of rings - the ring
of recurrence! Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted children,
unless if were this woman whom I love: for I love you, oh eternity! For I love
you, oh eternity! (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 185, emphasis mine)
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Zarathustra exclaims: “I have liberated them of goals!” in a triumphant outcry directed
against teleology. But if Zarathustra takes for self-evident, here, that this fate be
irresistible not only as inevitable but also as desirable, we may just as well ask a question
opposite to his: how could such a crushing thought, whereby “even accidents dance astral
rounds” (even the most seemingly unexpected is ever so fateful and will repeat ad
infinitum), and the earth spectacularly “quakes, ruptures, snorts out rivers of fire,” prompt
dancing, love of fate, joy? How could the great randomness of the throw of dice recurrent
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Nietzsche’s reflections on the eternal return be
accompanied with images of lovers, the affirmation of the Earth and its eruptions, the
joyful affirmation of life? To Deleuze, Nietzsche’s entire works seek to affirm life, to
transvalue all values, and reject philosophy and Christianity’s tradition of asking life to
redeem itself, redeem the suffering it contains, and further, read all suffering as a
redemption of life. The critical problem becomes the value of values, and in the famous
aphorism of the Genealogy of Morals, which proclaims the death of the subject, the
relations between the transvaluation of all values, Nietzsche’s critique of morality, and
the eternal return are glaring:
A quantum of force is … a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing but
this driving, willing and acting, and only the seduction of language (and the
fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which construes and
misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a ‘subject’, can make it
appear otherwise. And just as the common people separates lightning from its
flash and takes the latter to be a deed, something performed by a subject, which is
called lightning, popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of
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strength, as though there were an indifferent substratum behind the strong person
which had the freedom to manifest strength or not. But there is no such
substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it;
‘the doer’ is invented as an afterthought, – the doing is everything. Basically, the
common people double a deed; when they see lightning, they make a doing-adeed out of it: they posit the same event, first as cause and then as its effect. The
scientists do no better when they say ‘force moves, force causes’ and such like, –
all our science, in spite of its coolness and freedom from emotion, still stands
exposed to the seduction of language and has not rid itself of the changelings
foisted upon it, the ‘subjects’ (the atom is, for example, just such a changeling,
likewise the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself ’). (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 26)
There is no doer behind the deed, indeed, just as there is no separation between lightning
and flash, an image cherished and recurrent in Nietzsche’s thought. 66 If the flash is not
caused by lightning but rather is the lightning, or simultaneous to it, or a doubling,
language’s doing, a doing-doing, similarly our actions are not caused by us, but belong to
the unpredictable and contingent ever-becoming continuum that we reduce to a self. Thus
the “existential test” could not be about whether we would “choose” life again, as
Connolly puts it, but has to do with an oscillation between love or joy, and despair, an
oscillation that may be well known to those of us and those moments within us to whom
and when the thought of extinction, of global warming, of the destructive character of
carbon-emitting ways comes crushing. But if we have no choice, in the free will, liberal
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Nietzsche did, after all, experience the crushing weight of the thought of thoughts by the shores of lake
Sils Maria, in Switzerland, among mountains which make thunder quite spectacular, and one could
speculate that some of his visions of the eternal return were “caused,” or rather, erupted in the context of,
epileptic shocks perhaps in response to lightning (Salome, 2001).
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sense of the term, and if all we may have is amor fati, then how could this possibly be
helpful at all in a context of ecological crisis, and not result in a paralysis? The point is
evidently not to be subdued by fate, to become fatalist and passive, but rather to actively
embrace fate: we are engaged in the forces that Nietzsche describes and in the will,
action, deeds that move about, in creative ways that go much beyond us and extend ad
infinitum to the pasts and futures that are present in our present, beyond the human. The
embrace of the earth and life, as they deploy active forces and as the eternal return is the
animating principle of a life-affirmation beyond nihilism, seems particularly pertinent in
our current context of extinction, though at the same time this amor fati is made more
complicated and challenging by it – as we will see however, the point is not to simply
affirm the real, which has been sculpted into hollow idols and has damaged life, as
nihilist forces have required of life a redemption, compensation, justification. What
Nietzsche calls for, as visible in the penultimate excerpt quoted above (“If ever I rolled
the dice with gods at the gods' table of the earth”), is that we actively throw ourselves in
the divine throw of dice. If it is not the case that “force moves, force causes,” etc, then
responsibilities shift and the question of what makes life worth living, in a context of
facing species death, is disrupted by questions about the worth of worth, the value of
values.
One last long quote regarding the oscillation between a desire to reject the thought
of thoughts as unbearable, despicable, and desire for the return may illustrate the
difficulty here. Its length will hopefully be forgiven as the reader (you) enjoys the beauty
of this famous Nietzschean aphorism, from the Gay Science, an aphorism that is usually
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referred to even by commentators who dismiss the ontological aspect of the eternal return
yet grant it the quality of an ethical challenge:
The greatest weight —What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you
into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and
have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought
and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return
to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this
moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it,
speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and
curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous
moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I
heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would
change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every
thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie
upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to
become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate
eternal confirmation and seal? (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 273)
This aphorism emphasizes the return at the scale of a life, and poses the challenge of
saying ‘yes’ to it even when a demon asserts it will recur eternally. This may be part of
the confusion in Connolly’s analysis, where the affirmation of life is taken to be a matter
of choice: life-affirming Nietzsche should not be confused with life choosing Nietzsche,
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as choice, reason, unreason are irrelevant to the thought of thoughts. The metaphor
deployed here is obviously even more of a playful image than the imperfect description
of the ring of sand, but the aggressivity of the thought, incarnated in a demon, who calls
his interlocutor not a grain of sand but a similar, apparently more insignificant and
disposable, wasted or useless “speck of dust” is revealing of the weight of this experience
of eternal return, of the intensity at play in facing the crushing thought: the alternatives
are extreme, dramatic: either to “throw [oneself] down and gnash [one’s] teeth and curse
the demon,” or to “crave nothing more fervently.” The former is what philosophy has
often been so busy doing, asking life to redeem all the suffering it contained, blaming it
for the suffering, reading suffering as a redeemer of life’s indecent liveliness. The latter,
the “craving,” is Nietzsche’s call to cry out “da capo!,” to desire the eternal repetition
from its beginning as if we specks of dust were the conductors of the orchestra of life,
which indeed, we would join, dance with, play within.
The ethical implications of the eternal return are indeed a tall order that refuses
any petty pleasure, justified in utilitarian manners by something else they are not, means
subjected to ends postponed to a later moment, especially when the same forces will be
present in that future moment. Thus Deleuze insisted, in his reading of the ethical
dimensions of the eternal return, that small pleasures, petty compensatory acts, actions
performed “one last time,” as a temporary exception redeemed elsewhere or some other
times, are systematically excluded by this principle of selection. In a sense, all actions
should be performed for their own sake, or both for no reason or purpose, and with all the
reason and purpose in the world. Reason and unreason, purpose and aimlessness, are
irrelevant to the course of the universe. We specks of dust are put before a high-stakes
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test: would I be prepared to live this instant an infinite number of times, can this action be
both self-justified, performed for its own sake, and completely gratuitous, can means and
ends collapse into one in each moment, radically opposing any form of utilitarianism?
Can I embrace this moment and the forces engaged in it asking no further justification,
with no bad conscience or resentment, granting no moral status to suffering as either
redeeming life or asking of life to redeem itself, knowing that all of it is eternal and
repeats? By this logic we cannot be asked to sacrifice Gaia on the altar of growth, an
ever-postponed satisfaction of abundance, or one last carbon emission out of our exhaust
pipes so as to continue on with growth just a bit longer, to accumulate now for later
postponing our confrontation with present and future planetary limits.
Affirming Life and the Earth
Nietzsche’s demonic eruption asks, “how well disposed [we would] have to become to
[ourselves] and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal
confirmation and seal.” What, here, may be affirmed so fervently? How could the eternal
return be a joyful thought, and not a paralyzing one? In Deleuze’s reading the eternal
return is a selective principle that reactive and active forces go through. As Deleuze
summarizes, the slave mentality, which triumphs with common morality, separates
strength from what it can do, and causes “a becoming-reactive of all forces.” It
“triumphs, not by the composition of its power, but by the power of contagion” (Deleuze,
2013, p. 27). To Nietzsche, European man, domesticated man, is the embodiement of this
sickly triumph of resentment and nihilism, where the will to power “ceases to mean
‘creating’ and instead means to desire power (puissance), to desire domination” (p. 32).
Nietzsche’s philosophy, with the eternal return at its core, is one that calls for a change in
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the valuation principle, one that dares question the value of values. Deleuze writes: “the
transmutation of all values is defined as follows: a becoming-active of the forces, a
triumph of affirmation in the will to power” (here the will to power can again be
understood as synonymous to creating, in contrast with the reign of nihilism). What is
affirmed then? Again according to Deleuze’s reading: “affirmation is the highest power
of the will. But what is being affirmed? Earth, life” (p. 33).
If it is high time for a Nietzschean ecology, or, as Claire Colebrook has called it, a
queer vitalism, it would be one that affirms life and its eternal return, with “every pain
and every joy and every friend and foe and every hope and every mistake and every bit of
grass, every sunshine, the integral series of all things,” knowing that each of us are
“nothing but a grain” or a “speck of dust” on the ring. This could also be called, after Pier
Pasolini’s phrase, “desperate vitality” – quoted in the circus piece I read above as antiuchronian, because, as the Italian poet-intellectual-filmmaker-ecc put it, “every act in life
is a segment already signed in a line which is life itself, clear only in dream” (Pasolini,
1964, p. 118). Pasolini’s line metaphor is problematic if imagined as a straight line, but if
queered in the form of a dancing spiral, it could offer another image in addition to
Nietzsche’s ring of sand. In Pasolini’s poem “una disperata vitalità,” rather than linear in
this straight sense, life is depicted as “magmatic.” Magma, volcanoes, the eruption of
Gaia, Nietzschean lightnings shedding doubt on linear causality, prompt us to understand
every moment as containing all pasts, presents and futures, such that a walk around
Messina, a conversation with woodpeckers and albatross, the threats posed against
swordfish nearby, the deep time of volcanic life, all cohabit at once, in a heterochronian
movement that makes faith in the Truth of progress or growth impossible. The examples I
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discuss below of architecture and dance share the motif of the spiral in common: away
from straight time (Halberstam, 2005), the queer movement of the spiral brings spaces
and times together in surprising and otherwise unlikely ways, and may indeed make
another possible – temporal – order of things glitter to the surface of times of extinction.
Heterochronia and Synchrony: Changing Perception in a Heartbeat
I have a bicycle. Paris is big. I want to say that the
lines I draw with my bicycle through this great city
are extraordinary. …
And it pleases me enormously to see that the line I
trace is never straight, never confused, but has a
reason to be like this in every tiny part.
Beware of the straight line and the drunken line.
The straight line leads to the downfall of humanity.
Friedensreich Hundertwasser
In chapter IV, I read Friedensreich Hundertwasser’s theory of the five skins as a form of
counter-uchronia celebrating a long-lost Nature that we should return to, loaded with
assumptions about “primitivism” and essentialism. However, in what follows I propose a
counter-reading of this counter-uchronian dimension, which illustrates my concept of
heterochronia. To do so, I will take a detour through space and the Foucauldian concept
of heterotopia, and then attempt to read the theory of the five skins as represented in
Hundertwasser’s drawing, this time in relief, qua his favored motif of the spiral and the
agency he grants to trees the artist planted in the tree-tenant houses he designed and built
in Vienna and elsewhere.
From Heterotopia to Heterochronia
Michel Foucault opens the Order of Things with a quote by Jorge Luis Borges that, the
French philosopher claimed, prompted him to write his book
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out of a laughter that shattered, as [he] read the passage, all the familiar landmarks
of [his] thought – our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our
geography, breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we
are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long
afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between
the Same and the Other. This passage quotes ‘a certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in
which it is written that ‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the emperor, (b)
embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h)
included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with
a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher,
(n) that from a long way off look like flies. (1994, p. i)
Foucault goes on to explain that this uncanny taxonomy, unthinkable to “us,” but
thinkable for “exotic systems of thought” (the Orientalism is laughable too here, though
the main point is still helpful) encourages questions about what is possible to think, and
what kind of impossibility is faced in the encounter with what he calls a “heterotopia.”
The oddity of this classification, Foucault argues, does not so much come from the
inclusion of imaginary and real animals, monstrosities or fabulous creatures, but from the
fact that they are linked together by way of the alphabet (one wonders what the supposed
original Chinese text looked like with ideograms, though here Foucault implies that the
robbing of a common ground has been accomplished by Borges). According to Foucault,
it is in the interstitial spaces of the text, in its relations, that the oddity resides. He adds
that the mere propinquity of these unlikely elements, the juxtaposition of otherwise
remote things, is not sufficient either in making for the strangeness here. Rather, “what is
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impossible is the very site on which [the animals’] propinquity would be possible.” Let us
note here that, when the eternal return and all its ontological, critical and ethical
implications erupt in Nietzsche’s thought, it is also an entirely different (temporal)
principle from which to create values, a bit like this uncanny site Foucault gets puzzled
at. The French philosopher goes on: “where would they ever meet, except in the
immaterial sound of the voice pronouncing their enumeration? … Where else could they
be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language?” (1994, p. iii)
The laughter and unease experienced in this reading is what causes Foucault to
resort to the concept of “heterotopia,” in reference to the “heteroclite,” a kind of disorder
“in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the
dimension, without law or geometry, of the heteroclite” (p. xvii). Foucault then
introduces heterotopia, a word he borrowed from medical science where it refers to the
presence of an organ or limb in an anomalous location of the body. He opposes
heterotopias to utopias, as these “afford consolation,” imagining a site that may be nowhere but where improbable things all belong and share in common. In contrast, Foucault
argues, heterotopias allow for “another possible order of things” to “glitter,” another
order that is not no-where. Could heterochronias similarly suggest other possible
temporal orders of things? Foucault asks about where, besides “the non-place of
language” this kind of juxtaposition could occur, what site could act as its common
ground. We may ask what common time, moment or moments could bring together
things and times otherwise incompatible.
In a 1967 essay published in Dits et Ecrits only in 1984, where Foucault further
discusses this concept of heterotopia, he does mention the term “heterochronia,” though
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here again space eclipses time. Foucault even claims that “we are in the epoch of
simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the
side-by-side, of the dispersed.” To Foucault, this means that the current period may be
opposed to the previous one as that of space in contrast to periods of time. Where he
takes spatial juxtapositions for the proof of the importance of topos, and the need to stress
heterotopias as heteroclite sites disrupting the (spatial) order of things, Foucault pushes
simultaneity aside and does not similarly conclude that an important, similar disruption of
(temporal) orders may emerge from heteroclite times and temporalities juxtaposed in one
moment. However, I have mentioned before that Foucault’s later analysis of discipline
includes an emphasis on temporalities of the disciplinary societies. If we may agree that
the contemporary period could be read as one of simultaneity, it would be because
various temporalities – uchronia, counter-uchronia, the deep time of the Earth and its
possibly anti-uchronian consequences, may cohabit at one and the same time. And
perhaps some non-uchronian nurturing of other possible temporal orders requires unlikely
juxtapositions that seemingly have no common time.
In his essay on heterotopias or “other spaces,” Foucault explains that heterotopias
have “the curious property of being in relation with all other sites,” and these “contradict
all the other sites,” as they challenge the separations otherwise omnipresent in modernity.
To Foucault, utopias also belong to this category, yet they do not have an actual location.
If heterotopias can be defined as spaces which further desacralize oppositions modernity
has generally upheld by operating in relation to all other spaces while being effectively
localizable, Foucault also proceeds to further describe them by listing a number of
principles which he speculates could organize the “heterotopology” he calls for. I will not
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add further detail to the definition I have already paraphrased, but one of the principles
suggested in this speculative heterotopology is pertinent to our purposes here:
heterotopias are connected to a “découpage” of time corresponding to the juxtaposition of
spaces, which Foucault calls “hétérochronies.” Two heterotopias could thus be
distinguished based on their respective temporalities, namely the eternitarian
(éternitaires) ones, accumulating time ad infinitum (which corresponds to the modern
project pursued for instance by libraries or museums), and the chronic ones, passing but
reoccurring times (festivals would be an example of the latter ones). We can see here that
eternitarian and chronic heterotopias may converge: their heterochronian dimension
shows that all the pasts and all the futures are present in the presents, and that this is the
condition for the passing of time. I would suggest that they may have the effect of
providing a glimpse into the eternal return. Foucault privileges space in his essay, to the
detriment of time, seeing heterochronia as merely the temporal dimension of heterotopia
among many other principles animating the latter ones, and he does not mention the
reciprocal, that heterotopia may be the spatial dimension of, and among the principles
animating, heterochronia. He claims in the beginning of his essay that time is the problem
of the XIXth century, while space is that of our contemporary period. Space takes
precedence in Foucault’s argument to the point of preventing thinking the temporality of
simultaneity which heterochronia may offer. This is ironic because if time and
temporality must often be described and conceptualized qua spatial metaphors, here
Foucault resorts to temporal terms to describe heterotopia, without making note that he is
doing this. For instance, he describes heterotopias as juxtaposing in one single space,
simultaneously, otherwise incompatible and separate spaces. Furthermore, if it were true
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that our times are times of simultaneity, this does not deprive time of importance but
rather does the opposite, increasing its salience, having us experience at each moment,
the plurality, multitude, non-linearity of time, the condition of time passing. Foucault’s
otherwise capacious concept of heterotopia is accompanied by his underestimation of the
importance of time (an importance which, again, he will grant later on in Discipline and
Punish and on) in the sense that he claims: “space has not yet been entirely desanctified,
unlike time.” In his view, time was “detached from the sacred in the XIXth century.” Yet
when considering uchronia, we see that a pseudo-secularized teleology replaced the deist
one, substituting Gods’ ends with the market’s and consumerism’s insatiability, as well as
teleological notions of the human and the natural.
Tree-Tenant Houses, Fluidoid Lines and Spirals: Hundertwasser’s Heterotopias
However, Foucault’s sketch of a notion of heterotopia can be helpful for a detour through
space reconsidering what I first read as a regressive counter-uchronia in Friedensreich
Hundertwasser’s art and architecture, from a different, multi-dimensional perspective.
From this we may gather some food and trees for thought regarding my conceptualization
of heterochronia.
Hundertwasser’s five skins theory undeniably contains counter-uchronian
dimensions, especially if it is to be read alongside some of his poetry, or his praising
nature as a prescriptive model understood in a teleological form. Yet, if Hundertwasser’s
five skins’ drawing were read in relief, and perhaps distorted a bit based on the
omnipresence of spirals in his architectural work, and if the tree-tenant houses
Hundertwasser built are brought into the conversation, one may also make out,
challenging the counter-uchronia at play, the possibility of a heterotopia, for “other orders
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of things” to “glitter.” The tree-tenant houses Hundertwasser imagined (see the
reproduction of that drawing above – page 275) as entangling the five skins were never
built quite in the way of the drawing he created for it. However some were granted a real
location, in Vienna and other places. They usually took the form of larger buildings and
were often used for low-income housing projects, and they included communal and some
small commercial spaces. There, trees would be planted on roofs and within the floors,
and would “pay their rent” by providing oxygen and absorbing some of the noise
pollution in the surrounding urban streets, in sort of hybrid, more-than-human bartering
spirit. This granting the status of active tenants to trees challenges how agency is
distributed among humans and nonhumans, making for a vibrant more-than-human
heterotopia. These locations are heterotopian, in the sense that, hybridizing both nature
and humans, they bring together spaces and realms modernity otherwise claims to
separate. It is also worth noting that Hundertwasser did not intend the concept of ‘tenant’
to connote a restriction on usage in favor of landlords, based on property rights. A tenant
is a user, and the artist wrote a manifesto on tenants’ rights, including the right human
tenants would have to paint their windows and the surrounding facades, based on how far
their arms + their paintbrush may reach. The extension of the status of tenant to trees is
all the more significant that the tenant herself is extended more abilities and rights than
usually accepted in common, private property-centered arrangements.
Spirals and “fluidoid” lines dominate Hundertwasser’s architecture. Buildings
sinuously spiral up, often devoid of stairs. His clothes, the sail on his ship (where he lived
most of his later, nomadic life) were striped on purpose and never ironed, to underscore
the anti-rationalist lack of straight lines. Thus the stripes were meant to underscore the
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anti-straight aesthetics, queering the lines. These are present yet meant to be meandrous,
wrinkled, animated by wind (the ship’s sails) and by bodily movement (the clothes, or
second skin). If we are to propose a generous reading of this art work, we may push aside
Hundertwasser’s claims to erect Nature as a prescriptive and static model, and simply
point out that if we live in naturecultures, it is in the sense that nature is a technology
emanating from culture which itself is within nature, etc. Or put differently, as Dorion
Sagan writes, “we dwell circumscribed by culture inside nature. Whether that second
nature is also inside culture I’ll leave for you to decide” (Sagan, p. 35). I would not be so
presumptuous as to “decide,” but would suggest that the answer can be yes, and again ad
infinitum. And if Hundertwasser’s insistence that the nonhuman world’s “fluidoid lines”
should be mimicked by human architecture, art and life, then the question arises of the
effect of such mimesis and such meanders, arguably a heterotopian effect. A spiral or
fluidoid not only moves in irregular and perhaps unpredictable patterns, it also ascends
and descends, thus offering no stable hierarchies, and it may move with time, connecting
the otherwise seemingly unconnectable, creating dynamic entanglements. If we were to
look at the five skins’ drawing (reproduced here back on page 272) in this dynamic
manner, then the various schematically described spaces are juxtaposed where they are so
often kept separate, hybridizing various aspects and dimensions of humans and
nonhumans’ lives. Agency to trees, hybridization of otherwise incompatible spaces qua
unlikely lines, make for a provocative ecological heterotopia.
What kinds of heterochronias may consequently come into view and what
simultaneities may we nonhuman humans and human nonhumans be able to experience?
Heterochronias refer to the quotidian paces, speeds, rhythms, and the relationships
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between pasts, presents and futures, that emerge in the context of heterotopias and
elsewhere. If we inhabit a nature that is within culture within nature, etc, then nature
cannot be cast to an idealized past any longer, and neither culture nor nature may be
experienced as static or as abstract futurist futures, but instead as contingent and
dynamically co-evolving. Time cannot take the form of a straight line connecting the
past, the present and the future, but entangles, in interlaced spiral forms, multiple pasts,
presents and futures. As we will soon see when turning to contemporary dance, these
heterochronias must spiral through bodies as well as the oikos (the spiral is also a
privileged motif in Pina Bausch’s choreographies). Each moment, as with the eternal
return, contains all these, virtual and actual, unpredictable and surprising, multi-scale –
the deep time of nature and its volcanoes, for instance, cohabits, perhaps at odds with, not
always harmoniously, the mundane times of the quotidian and historical times irreducible
to solely human experience(s). The difficulty of heterochronia is that, like heterotopia as
described in the preface to the Order of Things, which site is most confounding,
heterochronia seems at first to be missing a cairological moment: what is the temporality
of temporalities, the time of times, how could the juxtaposition of all these temporalities
in one moment not be a form of end-on or outside of time perspective, which the eternal
return rules out (there is no end from which to experience time, as time has neither end
nor beginning, nor, therefore or either, an outside). At first, therefore, heterochronia
seems to lack a time, or at best, to refer to a “time out of joint,” as Shakespeare’s Hamlet
put it in the face of the collapse of succession. Note, however, that Hamlet did not say
“time out of time” – ou-chronia – but “out of joint.” In his essay on heterotopia Foucault
amended the puzzlement expressed in the Order of Things’ preface with respect to an
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apparent lack of site, and relegated such site-less topos to utopia. If utopia was a placeless
place that juxtaposed all locations, heterotopias had a real location. Similarly,
heterochronia is in fact present at all moments, and is a matter of perspective: the eternal
return has and is a temporality, it is, indeed, the being of becoming, the experience and
conceptualization that at each moment, all times and temporalities are present.
Heterochronia juxtaposes, in time, on time, all times.
More-than-Human Synchrony in a Heartbeat
In October 2014, in the midst of protests responding to an international gathering on the
climate crisis taking place at the United Nations in New York that was meant to prepare
the December 2015 Paris meeting, a couple thousand activists gathered at Battery Park
and marched to Wall Street, with the intention of “flooding” it. This protest took place
the day after one of the biggest climate justice marches in history, which mobilized
400,000 people. Though there were overlaps, the Flood Wall Street protest distinguished
itself from the larger climate justice march in a couple of ways. One was the rejection of,
say, Al Gore’s claim that the climate crisis was a business opportunity for a new, green
capitalism. Gore has called for and praised the emergence of “Earth Inc.” along with a
“global mind” – both of which he defends in his last book, The Future (2013). To Flood
Wall Street protesters, if global warming is largely what I have called above
“capitalogenic,” it will not be faced properly and sustainably with more capitalism, but
with the latter system’s end. Another difference had to do with the protesters’ repertoire
of action. While many had also marched the day before in the Climate Justice March’s
ranks, the march and sit-in organized on Wall Street were not legal, and many protesters
were prepared to get arrested. The sit-in was mostly peaceful and lasted a number of
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hours, blocking traffic for the afternoon. About one hundred protesters were eventually
arrested that evening. But the moment in this protest that seems most pertinent to my
argument here is not directly linked to the civil disobedience at play. At one point of the
sit-in, in its very beginning, protesters, all wearing blue to symbolize a time when Wall
Street will be under water due to ocean levels’ change, became silent. Or almost. They
started tapping quietly on their heart, two beats, a pause, etc, in unison, to symbolize
Gaia’s heartbeat in front of the symbol of capitalist markets. Collectively, the gentle and
rhythmic tapping of protesters’ hands on their own hearts resounded strongly enough to
be perceivable in spite of Manhattan traffic in the background.
This heterochronian choreography symbolically brought together a number of
rhythms at once: from farthest to closest, traffic, police sirens, the hearts tapping, the
image of the Earth’s breathing, the rhythmic, emotional human breathing of protesters.
Gilles Deleuze has claimed that the left, in his view, was not a matter of morality, not
about a “beautiful soul,” but could be characterized as two things (Deleuze & Parnet,
1987): on the one hand, the resolution we may call epistemological, to never give up
critique. On the other, a matter of perception: this would mean perceiving the contours,
the outskirts of one’s world first: the universe perhaps, then the planet, then the Global
South when one is speaking, as was the case with most Flood Wall Street protesters, from
the privileged West, then one’s area perhaps, city, street, one’s immediate loved ones,
then oneself. If we were to return to Hundertwasser’s five skins’ drawing again, this
would mean that the chronological order in which the various spaces are read, fluidoid as
it becomes with the motif of the spiral granting relief to it, also can change everything
about the reading: starting with the fifth skin, and working one’s way back, 5, 4, 3… go,
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may be closer to what Deleuze called the left, as again, not a matter of morality but as
one of perception – note that making it a matter of perception does not only evince
common morality from the concept and movement, but also common, strict senses of
politics, and qualifies art, as a realm of creation of percepts, as much more political than
some may have us believe... thus the theatricality of certain protest becomes especially
important.
The Flood Wall Street protest’s collective heartbeat embodied a heterochronian
redistribution in perception: first the rhythms and breaths of the Earth, enacted
collectively by a crowd of human bodies, then the city’s traffic and authorities’ siren. The
order of things (temporal and otherwise) is challenged, not only because traffic is blocked
in front of a building supposed to set the pace for the rest of the world, erected so as to
host the frenetic, now algorithmic rhythms of the markets, which made no sound in this
case, but also because the goal is to symbolically have Gaia as we know it, be heard.
Furthermore, the blue attire in which protesters swarmed Wall Street that day was to
prefigure a possible future where the algorithmic paces of trades will not be able to
continue operating there unless they are absurdly equipped with submarine infrastructure:
these were made into dislocated, anomalous presences. At one point of the protest, one
humorous yet angry activist screamed: “why don’t you come out you cowards? Don’t
you see we’re trying to save you from drowning too?” What was this cowardice’s object,
but one where Wall Street speculation and carbon-addicted capitalist globalization fails to
face the possibility, or the opportunity of affirming life? Here the heterochronia at play is
double: in a collective heartbeat, in a choreographed instant, Flood Wall Street staged the
juxtaposition of otherwise dissonant temporalities and the redistribution of chronological
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order, of priorities in perception. Synchrony is one aspect of heterochronia: it underscores
the simultaneity in the juxtaposition of various temporalities, where heterochronia
stresses their heteroclite character. However synchrony is not quite an alignment: in a
way, it is an asynchronic and dissonant simultaneity, rather than a sync-ing into depths of
hasty and linear stupidity (see chapter V) and their hyper-uchronian narratives of
unstoppable progress. It brings together dissonant temporalities in one moment:
synchrony is the temporality of heterochronia, the cairological time through which, or
when, of all these tempos are juxtaposed, just like the eternal return is the thought of
thoughts, just like in the eternal return, it is the return that returns.
Similarly to heterochronia, synchrony refers to the cohabiting of multiple
temporalities. However in this case, my point is to stress the – sometimes dissonant,
conflicted, always contested, ripe with friction – simultaneity of this cohabitation rather
than the cohabitation itself. Synchrony answers the question of: what paces, rhythms and
speeds does it take, what forms, times and moments may juxtapose incompatible times,
or in other words, what is the temporality of heteroclite juxtapositions of temporalities? If
Foucault’s discussion of heterotopias obscured time and temporality, we may remember
that it was because Foucault asserted that the temporality at play in heterotopias is one of
simultaneity. Yet rather than relegating time to the background, simultaneity brings
various times, moments and temporalities to the foreground, at once. Synchrony does not
imply a homogenous, coherent, smooth or synchronized time when “everything is
interconnected” in a simple and easy way. It is quite different than sync-ing one’s various
electronic devices. The deep time of Gaia, and cairological moments in its history, are
often at odds with the paces of traffic, and these may clash with needs to slow down and
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breathe, urgent needs called upon in a heartbeat. But what I mean by proposing
synchrony as a term is to highlight precisely this: that these conflicts, these
incompatibilities and tensions between various paces, speeds, rhythms, pasts, presents,
futures, possibilities, probabilities, may all cohabit at each moment: synchrony could be
described as the experience of eternal return. All forces being present at once, in each
moment, what can be played? Some events highlight this more intensely, and this was
partly the point with Foucault’s heterotopia: that they shed a different light on all spaces,
as they refer to all of them in one. The synchrony at play in heterochronias has a similar,
only temporal, effect.

Dancing with Zarathustra: Ecochronian Bodies in Movement
Only in dance do I know how to speak the
parables of the highest things.
F.W. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Le corps, c’est le monde.
Chopinot.
The contemporary dance of choreographer Pina Bausch offers examples of what I would
call eco-chronias, the kinds of heterochronias that, as such, juxtapose otherwise
incompatible temporalities in uncanny ways that make other possible temporal orders of
things glitter, using synchrony, and specifically stage such heterochronias that confound
human and nonhuman temporalities – it is in doing so that these may be called “ecochronian.” These choreographies share the motif of the spiral with Hundertwasser’s
architecture. Where Hundertwasser’s five skins theory offered a way to spatially think of
embodiement of heterotopia within the oikos, confounding what is taken to be boundaries
between humans and nonhumans, Pina Bausch’s dance does so temporally, deploying
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moving spirals animated by the dancers’ spine, limbs and heads and by the curves and
shapes in Bausch’s scenographies on stage or outdoors. The lightness and weight of
dancers, contrary to the old norms of classical ballet, do not defy gravity but espouses it
instead. The break between classical and contemporary dance, usually attributed to early
twentieth-century choreographer Martha Graham, indeed theorized the spine as put in
motion in spiral movements of relief and extension, as Graham started to explore the
ground beyond the mere feather weight and contact of the feet (and traditional pointe
shoes which surface of contact was minuscule). Contemporary dance spent much more
time than ballet on the earth, rolling, crawling, at low levels.
Pina Bausch’s more recent works continued these explorations but also included
humor, joyfulness, re-introducing lightness, along with unlikely juxtapositions with trees
being carried on dancers’ backs, rocks, rain and flooding the stage. It is through
surprising accelerations and slow motions, spirals created with arms, legs, spines, heads
and with the sand covering the stage or rocks’ meandering lines, that in my reading, Pina
Bausch challenged straight lines and straight time. This example of eco-chronia is
especially interesting in that Bausch’s dance created percepts for two dimensions perhaps
specific to eco-chronia, as one sort of heterochronia dealing with humans and
nonhumans. Namely, it underscores the necessary embodiement of these new
temporalities, and it poses the question of how myriad times may simultaneously be
experienced in common, collectively. As Regine Chopinot, another great popularizer of
contemporary dance, has claimed, “the body is the world.” In what follows I will further
develop my concept of heterochronia, synchrony and ecochronia, emphasizing
embodiement and intersubjectivity.
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Pina: “Dance, dance, otherwise we’re lost”
In Pina Bausch’s Vollmond, “Full Moon,” (2006) dancers on a predominantly black and
grey stage seem to be entering in an uncontrollable yet extremely precise trance while
rain is pouring on the stage. They throw their feet, for a few steps, on a large rock about
two and a half meters tall… Then they land back on the ground. The piece starts on a
music by Rene Aubry, throbbingly joyful jazz, quiet rhythms into the movements of long
dresses and long hair undone, flying with the spiral at the basis of any contemporary
dance, spirals which once upon a time Martha Graham invented as reconciling a formerly
ethereal ballerina defying gravity, to the ground, the spine, the core. There is gravity,
sometimes heaviness, but also lightness, in Bausch’s choreographies, and here, always
the seemingly static rough surface of the massive piece of mineral in the back. The rock
too seems to dance, its immobile but curved shapes contrasting and helping the spirals
and movement in the human bodies in the front stage. The sand on the stage marks the
itinerary traced by the dancers’ feet. If Zarathustra claimed that “dancers have their ears
in their toes” (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 181), what do Bausch’s dancers’ toes hear when they
trace fluidoid lines in the sand? Eventually the rain fills the stage, and dancers crawl in
water, imitating breaststroke yet tied and slowed by the ground. What is being heard
when water covers dancers’ bodies and offers the points of contact with the ground, when
they playfully slide on the puddles but also seem like the border between play and
drowning is near?
There is lots of joy in the heaviness of soaking wet movements and clothes. The
water invading the second skins of dancers, in Hundertwasser’s sense, has them drag
themselves down on the ground and slow down each gesture. When lightness takes over
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the upper parts of bodies – very few jumps take place here, the stage lighting amplify
drops and splashes radiating around the spirals. Nonhuman water exaggerates each
human gesture, either accelerating or slowing down the movement at each moment. At
one point, about half-way through the show, a dancer crawls on the meteorite-like rock,
embraces it and cries out: “it’s mine!,” only to slowly crawl away. The exuberant and
sudden declaration of affection but also desire for appropriation with respect to an
inanimate rock seems absurd, and this absurdity estranges us also from property and ideas
of property whose object would be the Earth, or pieces thereof: a piece of nature or of the
cosmos has been placed on stage (again the rock could look like a meteorite), one that is
motionless, and the slow climbing of the dancer before his sudden, unexpected outcry
makes us laugh, just like Foucault recalled laughing at Borges’ heterotopia, because the
associations there made very little sense, or at least were unintelligible to the reader, yet
their very unintelligibility offered a window into the possibility for other orders of things.
These instances are instances where heterochronia is primarily deployed in the sense of a
dimension of heterotopian stagings: the rhythms, movements, accelerations and
decelerations accentuate, highlight and provide the necessary (sometimes comic) relief to
reconsider our order of things, where pieces of Earth can be claimed as someone’s
property. But the heterotopian dimensions of the piece reciprocally informs the
heterochronian one: waters rising slow down movements while splashes and drops
exaggerate the velocity of certain gestures.
After the “it’s mine!” sudden outburst upon embracing the rock, the rock-hugging
and/or property-hungry dancer exits and Pina Bausch enters the stage. She first walks in
back to the audience, helped by a dancer to gracefully step on the rock in her long black
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dress, and the audience bursts into applause when she turns and is recognized, after the
dancer that helped her gently lifts her chin so that her hair separates and lets her face
show. He then places a small paper cup on her head. The cup keeps falling off, the dancer
climbs back and replaces it, until it falls again, before the dancer has time to step off, take
a camera out of his jacket’s pocket, walk a few meters back. Each time, the cup slides off
the rock in a different direction before the dancer can take the picture. Pina leaves. Here
fragility, weight, lightness, water, stability and instability all cohabit in one short scene:
the rock and Bausch’s standing upright may evoke both stability and instability (one has
to climb to stand awkwardly on its slope), and Bausch’s thin figure seems so light, and
the water cup above it so precarious. The contrast between her silent, feminine figure and
the masculine appropriation that preceded, with its absurd sudden scream, “it’s mine,”
humorously caricatures gendered human-nonhuman tensions without affirming that
things are as simple. Similarly, the above case of the exuberant “it’s mine!” embrace of
the rock, captured the tension between an impulse to embrace the Earth, or at least rocks
and grounds, and a desire to appropriate these. By deploying metaphors, Bausch’s
heterochronian dance was evocative of unresolved questions, frictions, tensions, joy,
lightness and gravity, without imposing rigid grids to simply impose on the complex
realities staged. In the scene staging the repeated falls of a water cup, Bausch resorts to a
technique now very common in postmodern dance: durational performance relies directly
on temporality to advance images. The repetition of the same gesture, especially in this
case, with the failure to secure a relationship with gravity and balance that would procure
stability repeated each time, is what provokes the uncanny. Many almost identical
moments and movements repeat and succeed one another until spectators wonder
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whether there will be an end and begin to meditate on each detail, or the whole, or the
myriad possible interpretations, connections and references in what is repeated. Without
extended duration, this form of repetition would not be able to loop and take on as many
meanings, producing the uncanny feeling of heterochronia. The loops in time, the
duration within which repetition happens, gives the choreographic time a spiral form
which proliferates meanings, in this case conveying the gravity, fragility, lightness and
precarity of human and nonhuman things and (im)balance.
After the cup scene ends and Pina exits, another dancer enters, in a long red dress,
and walks through the stage by fastidiously lifting her feet and pompously bending her
knees high, as if she were enormous. At each step, she pauses, immobilizing her feet, and
draws lines in the sand around them: she circles the advanced foot with a large monstrous
or animal paw’s footprint. If, in the famous closing sentences of the Order of Things,
Foucault described man as a contingent invention that, “like a face drawn in the sand at
the edge of the sea” (1970, p. 387) may disappear with the next wave, here animality is
slowly enacted as the disproportionate, monstrous contours of enlarged footprints drawn
in the sand by a human dancer. Again a sense of uncanniness and laughter are created
from the petite female dancer’s pace of movements and gestures themselves, juxtaposing
otherwise incompatible images. It is the pace that provides the time of laughter, the
weight and size of the animal and her pompous, aberrant character. The legs are raised
slowly, which seems like so much effort because of the slow motion, and they stomp in
the sand suddenly, after which the back slowly bends over and fastidiously draws. Later
on, a dancer will lie down, casually, his side resting on the ground’s dark sand to face the
audience, wearing a suit. He then waves his lion tail with a mischievous smile at the
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audience. Human/nonhuman monstrosity emerges through movement. This is possible
only because of the slow motions juxtaposed with accelerated gestures. A still
photograph could not portray the uncanny normalcy of wagging a lion’s tail: here
nonchalance is signified with a quick wink of the human eye and after a long, relaxed
pause. The tail jumps up suddenly from behind the casually, still relaxed and immobile
body lying down on its side with one elbow supporting the head. The rhythm is so
realistically close to that of felines wagging their tails on a hot day, chasing flies while
letting their heavy bodies soak in the heat lazily. Similarly, the enormity (both the literal
size, and the aberrant nature) of large animal footprints left by a small human dancer’s
feet could not be staged by an immobile statue. These heterochronias stage questions
about the boundaries between human and nonhuman, inert and animate, living and
nonliving beings and things.
If we moved away from Vollmond for a bit, we would encounter in a number of
Bausch’s choreography other similarly heterotopian and heterochronian metaphors
posing such questions, invoking among other things the fragility of life. The back of a
dancer cautiously, gently carries a small tree, walking slowly, around the edges of a
shallow pool, under a bright sun. The slow pace evokes the immense fragility of the tree
but perhaps also of the dancer’s feet, and both are tied closely. At the same time, the very
slow motions can be read as paradoxically suggesting the immense weight of this living
being tied to the dancer’s back, a paradoxical suggestion indeed, as the tree is small and
seems so light. In the duration of the walk, the question arises of whether the tree is being
carried and supported by the dancer, or whether the dancer is arched over on the ground
because of his own weight and gravity, yet helped up and forward in his steps by the tree
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tied on his back. Furthermore, is the tree just one tree, or all trees? Are these bodies (all)
the world, (all) worlds? Wherever the spectator may take the significance and scope of
the metaphor, it is the slow movements that enact the fragility of things in this case.
Bausch did not always play with slowness or stillness, however. As we have seen in the
previously described scenes, it is often the alternating and quick juxtaposition of slow,
sudden, fast motions that together bring about a sense that several temporalities cohabit,
including in tension, humor, lightness and heaviness. These heterochronias, because they
invoke humans and nonhumans together, sometimes in one body, sometimes juxtaposed
on stage, can be considered, more specifically, ecochronias. They also show how
juxtapositions of multiple times and spaces can take embodied forms meant for
performance, thus partly answering the question I posed above about the eternal return
and its bringing out the infinity of the past and the future in each moment, beyond the
solitary thought of a philosopher. If Pina Bausch famously called for us to “dance, dance,
otherwise we’re lost,” this call may also be read as an antidote against uchronia, where
collective, embodied evocations of the eternal return not as conceptual thought but as
perceptual experience and as its own temporality – a synchronic one – may glitter and be
discerned. In what follows I will further elaborate on these two aspects, namely the
necessary embodiement of synchrony and heterochronia, and the intersubjective or
collective possibility of these ecochronian temporalities.
Utopian Bodies and Transcorporeality: Lovers, Dancers, Others and Selves
In a text titled “Utopian Body,” Michel Foucault claims that our bodies are inaccessible,
the ultimate utopia, a place where we can never truly be, not without it being mediated by
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myriad utopias (the mirror, tattoos, …). However, one possibility for overcoming the
utopian nature of the body is entertained at the very end of the essay:
To make love is to feel one’s body close in on oneself. It is finally to exist outside
of any utopia, with all of one’s density, between the hands of the other. Under the
other’s fingers running over you, all the invisible parts of your body begin to
exist. Against the lips of the other, yours become sensitive. In front of his halfclosed eyes, your face acquires a certitude. There is a gaze, finally to see your
closed eyelids. … If we love so much to make love, it is because, in love, the
body is here. (Foucault, 2009)
To arrive at this final suggestion where Foucault makes lovemaking the way in which we
may finally exist, not in utopia, but “here,” the French philosopher has gone through
waves of unveiling utopias as such throughout the essay. Opening by claiming that the
body is a heavy, alienating materiality that we cannot simply leave for a moment to go
elsewhere, Foucault first postulates that utopias conjure this imprisoning materiality. The
soul, in this light, would be the ultimate utopia, representing the body as smooth,
weightless and perfect, immortal, the essence. Yet we know that Foucault will claim, a
few years later (“Utopian Body” was first released in 1966) in Discipline and Punish, that
the soul is the prison of the body (1971, p. 30). Indeed, in “Utopian Body,” he promptly
refutes his initial postulate, objecting that the body, this materiality one has to drag with
oneself, is in fact mysterious, unreachable: I have two eyes but know this only from
mirrors, where I am not, and I see through them only one vision; I cannot see the back of
my neck (besides through several mirrors, again where I am not). There are all kinds of
holes, cavernous curves, inaccessible things about my body. Thus Foucault ends up
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considering the possibility that this estrangement from a body where we are not, a
utopian body, be overcome through alterity, in the act of love. The self, an embodied
reality, may come to be, or become, only through (coming with) the other. Though this
insight, the idea according to which we might only be able to be here and now qua
alterity, is helpful for my purposes here, contrary to what Foucault seems to reductively
imply I would suggest that the sex act is not the only way into the intersubjective
condition of embodied selfhood, of finally getting out of utopia. In addition, a nonhuman
dimension to this question of embodied intersubjectivity must be added. My goal in what
follows it to arrive at the conclusion that the body is indeed a hybrid (human and
nonhuman) heterotopia, one that dance may help us experience, while science can help us
grasp it.
Our bodies are made of myriad earth others. Stacy Alaimo has coined the concept
of transcorporeality to describe the queerness of bodies that never are only human. In
Bodily Natures, she proposes a trans-corporeal understanding of the relationships
between bodies and places. Because our bodies are animated by the “traffic in toxins,”
because the outside, environments and natures are also inside, because these are not
static, inert or deprived of agency, but entangled in a dance which confounds boundaries
and questions the notion of a self-coherent, homogenous and bound subject,
transcorporeality entails that what we do to natures, we do to ourselves, and vice versa.
Science, like art, offers insight into this transcorporeality, though it grants us no definite
foundation: “Science offers no steady ground, as the information may be biased,
incomplete, or opaque and the ostensible object of scientific inquiry - the material world is extremely complex, overwrought with agencies, and ever emergent” (Alaimo, 2010, p.
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20). Matter is active, and actively undoing any assumption that there may be a stable
subject to be found at the end (and neither is there such a thing as end) of our
investigations. Furthermore, the relationships at play are not without destructive aspects
and conflicts, tensions, violence: as Alaimo points out, in landscapes of risk, contingent
upon particular historical contexts, bodies may be hurt, damaged or destroyed. Myra
Hird’s work has shown that these entanglements are no less than queer. In “Naturally
Queer” (in: Mortimer-Sandilands & Erickson, 2010) Hird multiplies examples to
illustrate this. For instance, and directly pertinent to Alaimo’s concept of
transcorporeality, she points out that most of the cells of our bodies are unisex. These
insights challenge easy separations between nonhumans and humans, queer and normal,
nature as static and stable truths and culture as changing and contested. As Dorion Sagan
puts it:
ten per cent of our dry weight is bacteria, but there are ten of ‘their’ cells in our
body for every one of ours, and we cannot make vitamin K or B12 without them.
The maverick Russian geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky thought of life as an
impure, colloidal form of water. What we call ‘human’ is also impure, laced with
germs. We have met the frenemy, and it is us. (2013, p. 19)
Not only, then, is our body full of mysteries and not as easily accessible as a simplistic
account of materiality would have us believe, to the point of being aptly characterized as
‘utopian’ in Foucault’s view, but it is also constantly mixing spaces and realms which we
deem separate. The juxtaposition of these realms, the realization that they constantly
mingle and that we depend upon these, through scientific (always provisional) knowledge
or through percepts and affects created by performing and other forms of art, may enable
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to distance ourselves from utopian relations to bodies and attain forms of heterotopian
embodiment.
Thus I would add to Foucault’s assertions according to which, if “we love to
make love so much,” it is because embodiment can thus be realized: the love act enables
our body to finally be “here” through the other, her gaze, touch, smell, her own body, but
if we may finally experience a not-so-utopian form of embodiement by having sex, we
also always already are mingling with myriad others, without and outside our bodies. The
heterotopian and heterochronian nature of the sex act allows, as do all heterotopias and
heterochronias, to refer to all other sites, to relate to all kinds of realms that constitute us
and juxtapose what seemed incompatible spaces and temporalities. Besides the nonutopian insight here, what would a non-uchronian or ecochronian experience of the body
and self look or feel like, one that would emphasize not only spaces mingling, but times,
or what would the temporal, heterochronian or synchronic dimension of this heterotopian
body be? If bodies are profoundly transcorporeal, they are also this over time, qua
movement. This is why dance, a time-based performing art par excellence, as it relies on
rhythm, pace, speed, movement, contrasts between stillness and immobility, active
staticity, and fast gestures, is particularly apt at illustrating the temporal dimension of a
potential intersubjective, human and nonhuman, experience of embodiement, a truly
heterochronian experience. When, as was the case in the Pina Bausch scenes described
and analyzed above, this art form stages various human and nonhuman components of
intersubjective embodiement, it becomes not only heterotopian but also heterochronian.
Love-making may seem to have us loose ourselves to become more ourselves, with and
in the other, and enable us to finally be here, but both love and dance, and probably many
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other useless, unproductive (non-teleological) things allow us to be now, in a now that
integrates the infinity of the pasts and infinity of the futures – note that I call love-making
unproductive, weighing my words: most coital experiences are non-reproductive: any
heteronormative reproductive-centered objections denied here. They are, however,
creative: of pleasures, amorous sentiments, moments, etc. Thus if dance and its spiraling
heterochronian movements is non-teleological, it is because it does not have an end to
which the here and now would be subjected, as uchronia does: abstract, reifying, everpostponed (uchronian) goals that movements in the instant would be subservient to are
irrelevant here. However one interesting thing to note here is that dance does have myriad
directions: it eliminates goals in a strict teleological sense – in other words it eliminates
telos in the sense of goal, though it uses and deploys direction – but it does perform the
complex heterotopian and heterochronian fabric of life, over time, through time, in each
moment of the choreography.
The dances Pina Bausch created highlight this point. This is not only, though it
plays a tremendously important role, because stages are highly heterotopian and
heterochronian, bringing together otherwise incompatible spaces in one effective location
(in his essay on heterotopia, Foucault suggests that theaters are indeed a striking form of
heterotopia). The soaked bodies and clothes of dancers who move in apparent trance
inhabited both by heaviness and lightness, with rhythms, decelerations and accelerations,
quick emphases and slow motion, through rain and puddles over rocks, the bodies
carefully carrying trees, human bodies nonchalantly wagging their lion tails, underscore,
in movement, with rhythm, pulsations, speeds, slowness, paces, accelerations,
decelerations, stillness, agitation, that life cannot but contain all past, present and future
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forces at each moment redistributed, including conflict, friction, love, humans and
nonhumans. Here synchrony is clearly not a matter of matter synchronizing gestures, but
one of forces constantly re-distributed: Bausch’s dancers, in the pieces I described above,
rarely give their bodies identical movements at identical moments. Contrary to more
conventional forms of dance like classical ballet, these dances rarely have dancers all
execute the same movement at the same time. As Deleuze has pointed out, the eternal
return, evoked through these synchronic temporalities, is not the return of the identical or
some kind of simple sameness, but instead it is the return of all differences, the return of
return, of what differs, which is why it is also the condition for time to pass, for becoming
to continuously come into being. In dance, synchrony is not about identity of movement
but about simultaneous, spiral-shaped struggles in many directions of many times at any
given moment. The motif of the spiral is important, as it may provide a more capacious
metaphor than Nietzsche’s “ring of sand” for the dance of life: the ring is imperfect in
expressing the eternal return in part because it is strictly circular. It was useful to
Nietzsche because it implied a closed universe where all forces continuously flowed and
eventually traversed the exact same point, repeating their course an infinity of times. But
this same motion can be envisioned, with the same grains of sand (evocative also, as
some passages in Nietzsche attest, of the hourglass) flowing and returning eternally yet
doing so in endless spirals, like a snake biting its tail.
Bausch proceeded by metaphors: in one dancer ever so carefully carrying (or
being lifted) by a fragile tree, in rain, water and on rocks shedding droplets that
underscore movement, we see or experience that “the body is the world.” Heterotopian
when it dances the metaphors of Pina Bausch, the body is shown to contain,
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synchronically, simultaneously, all the parts. And again, heterotopian and heterochronian
bodies, like heterotopias and heterochronias at large, have this property that enables them
to reveal all spaces and all times as containing all others: they proliferate and shed a
heterotopian/heterochronian light on all things. The forces work together in tension and
support, such that all effects are effects of myriad effects, and so on ad infinitum.
Dance on, Zarathustra!
This is probably why Nietzsche’s Zarathustra claimed that he considered any day when
he hadn’t danced, a day wasted, and why he also asserted that “[he] would only believe in
a god who knew how to dance” (2006, p. 29). 67 It is in the “other dance song” of
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra that we find one of the most striking iterations of
Dionysos’ prophet staging his affirmation of life, along with the whispered presence of
the thought of eternal return. Zarathustra then encounters life and dances with her, and,
proceeding with metaphors, Nietzschean thought affirms the dance of life, and life
activates the thought of the eternal return. The encounter and dance are both very sensual,
a seductive game and playful dialog: life and Zarathustra seem both dance partners and
lovers – after all, as was suggested above love and dance may be among the experiences
that allow “other orders of things to glitter,” to access the body as heterotopia rather than
utopia, “in love, the body is here” (Foucault, 2009). The “Other dance song” opens with
the following amorous lines: “into your eyes I looked recently, oh life,” says Zarathustra.
“I saw gold gleaming in your night eyes – my heart skipped a beat at this thrill”
(Nietzsche, 2006, p. 181). Nietzsche evokes his protagonist’s “dance-drunken foot”
67

Maurice Béjart, who not unlike Pina Bausch, did his share in popularizing contemporary dance, once
created an adaptation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra to the stage. However part of the beautiful temporality of
this art form includes the fact that without a video recording, dance is lost (and conserved) to (and by) the
moment of performance: I was not able to find any trace of this show beyond ones that taught me it had
once existed.
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(ibid.) and claims, in a literal heterotopia (the term, we may recall, comes from medical
language and there it refers to the presence of an organ in an anomalous location of the
body), that “a dancer has ears in his toes.” Zarathustra exclaims, addressing life: “I dance
after you, and follow your trail using any clue” (p. 182).
The “Other dance song” also stages the link between the ethical and ontological
dimensions of the eternal return, the transvaluation of all values and the affirmation of
life: both life and Zarathustra, caught in their amorous dance, are beyond good and evil.
The passionate and tumultuous dance has Zarathustra oscillate between love and hatred:
“you whose coldness ignites, whose hate is alluring … who would not hate you, you
great binder, and winder, temptress, attemptress, and finder! Who would not love you,
you innocent, ardent-one, wind-bride and child-eyed sinner!” (p. 181). Life, herself a
protagonist in Nietzsche’s parables, engages with the protagonist of Nietzsche’s
masterpiece in quasi S &M embraces, in what may be an allusion to the love experienced
with Lou Salome and famously captured in a picture where she threatens Nietzsche and
Paul Ree with a whip – or would it be the picture that is an allusion to Zarathustra and
life’s dance? Whatever the case may be, Zarathustra says to life:
I am truly tired of always playing your sheepish shepherd pal! You witch, if I
have so far sung for you, now you for me will – yell! To the beat of my whip you
will dance so and yell so! But did I forget the whip? – oh no! (p. 182)
To which life replies,
covering her dainty little ears: Oh Zarathustra! Please do not crack your whip so
fearfully! Surely you know: noise murders thoughts – and just now the most
tender thoughts are coming to me (p. 182).
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Life goes on: “we are both a real do-no-goods and do-no-evils. Beyond good and evil we
found our island and our green meadow – we too alone” (p. 182). Life, along with the
figure that will announce the thought of the eternal return, transvalues all values. Shortly
after Zarathustra whispers something in life’s ear, something which we may deduce is the
thought of the eternal return. To this, life exclaims: “you know that, Zarathustra? No one
knows that” (p. 183).
In the first dance song, Zarathustra had asked dancing girls: “how could I be
hostile toward godlike dancing, you light ones?” In “the Other Dance Song” however,
gods are absent, and life, immanent and engaged in its playful, joyful and light dance,
activates the thought of thoughts, whispered in her ear by Zarathustra. His joining in the
dance is a parable for how thought affirms life, and for what amor fati would look like:
an engagement, espousing in and of the creative dance of life. Only in dance does
Zarathustra “know how to speak the parables of the highest things” (p. 86). Or so he
claims.
We may still need an attempt to clarify this parable however: in so doing I turn to
Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation for support. Deleuze opens an essay on Nietzsche (2013)
with the three metamorphoses of the spirit staged in Zarathustra, which not only rely on
human and nonhuman figures, but can enlighten our purposes here: first the camel, who
carries the heavy weight of established values, to then transform into a lion, who breaks
all the idols and stomps on the values, and finally the child, who through play, can begin
again, creating new values with a new, different principle. Nietzsche, in Deleuze’s
reading, asserts the fundamental unity of thought and life: again, life activates thought
and thought affirms life. In other words, as Deleuze puts it, “our modes of living inspire
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our modes of thinking, and our modes of thinking create modes of living” (2013, p. 18).
However, with the triumph of slave mentality, “a spirit of heaviness that unites reactive
and depreciated life and negative and depreciating thought” has come to predominate.
Extracting ourselves from this means creating. As Deleuze and Guattari have claimed in
What Is Philosophy? (2013), art creates percepts and affects, while philosophy creates
concepts. For instance, the art form of dance may stage the dance of life, including Pina
Bausch’s figures of human dancers nonchalantly wagging their nonhuman lion’s tails,
with a provocative smile and fleeting wink in the eye, a playfulness prefiguring a possible
transformation into childlike play and creation, from destroying values to creating new
ones based on new, life-affirming principles. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, “creating
means lightening, liberating life from its load, inventing new possibilities of life. The
creator is legislator – dancer” (Deleuze, 2013, p. 20). Indeed, Nietzsche regularly
opposes, on the one hand, the creator and the dancer (two figures or facets also incarnated
by the child resulting from the three metamorphoses), to the slave mentality, reactive
forces, nihilism, on the other. Nihilism has required of life that it justifies itself, that it
compensates for the suffering present in it, and, going even further, it has made suffering
a justification of life, a way to redeem it. Once we shed the weight of old values, we may
finally engage fully with the eternal return, espouse the dance of life, lightly and playfully
creating. Thus the struggle, to unite thought and life again, to engage in it with amor fati,
should not be confused with a passive fatalism or acceptance, submission to the real as it
is: “the real, as it is, is precisely what the values have made of reality!,” exclaims Deleuze
(p. 22). Teleological temporalities of progress (what I have called uchronia) have
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weighed on life for long enough, and we may not accept the reality it claims any longer,
if new ecochronian temporalities erupt from and with Gaia’s dance.
Dance and play are crucial to the Nietzschean project of affirming life. When
Zarathustra joins life in a sensual dance, the tragic, Dionysian spirit, the thought of the
eternal return who enters in a conversation with life, at last. Thus he whispers the thought
in life’s ear. What then, might this dance tell us in terms of temporalities of
transcorporeality, or ecochronias? As we saw in the previous chapter, geoengineering
arguments are tied to teleological (conservationist) visions of nature as corresponding to
Gaia in its Holocene, human-habitable form, understood as a stable, reliable and
predictable background, in addition to values, like growth, dictated by business as usual,
are presumed to be equatable to the good, to a healthy economy. Ecochronias, on the
other hand, do not have a blueprint or program, but affirm the openness, surprise,
contingency of time, and the simultaneity of all times past, present and future in each
moment. Queer kinships may proliferate, ones that are not tied to the real as it is, as the
utopian and uchronian real subjects us to values weighing heavily on creation and
preventing the affirmation of life. Readiness to face even extinction (and we could also
re-write yet another IPCC scenario descriptions accordingly), to draw animal footprints in
the sand around our dancing feet, Chthulucene multiplicity and contingency, would make
for part of the substance of ecochronias, so we may finally experience the here and now,
knowing and feeling that it is radically inclusive of all forces of the past and future, ad
infinitum. Armed with ecochronias, we may ask “what is being done?,” and imagine
many futures including possible ones that may not seem so probable but offer more
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livable lives than the abstract promises of uchronia do. In the Chthulucene dance, all
there is becomes: da capo!
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CONCLUSION
The pages above have sought to displace depictions of certain radical green politics as
belonging to a placeless and timeless, ideal place and time: characterizing these as
utopian and uchronian is both a strategic mistake and inaccurate. Reciprocally, I have
argued that, instead, it is the unsustainable paces and directions of growth-driven,
capitalocentric progress that belong to uchronia and utopia. The concepts I have
developed here aim to help rethinking temporalities in a context of extinction, so as to
turn the tables and accuse capitalist times and spaces of corresponding to idealized,
placeless and timeless, times and places. The distinctions offered by the conceptual
framework I have sought to build aim to enable seeing “other possible orders of things”
(Foucault, 2014) as they have developed, are currently developing, will and could further
proliferate, not deeming these unrealistic on the basis of their alleged improbability, a
measure often assessed based on established values inapt in facing ecological limits.
This turning the tables is both complicated and hopefully simplified, made more
effective and clearer with the concepts I have deployed and the distinctions they seek to
render possible. Simply put, hegemonic temporalities of progress, growth, linear and
futurist teleologies that subject the present and concrete futures to an abstract futurity that
will not come, are not as inevitable as they may seem, and in fact it is they that belong to
the non-realistic, the absurd, delusional deliriums. Anti-uchronian critique makes it
possible to see that the reign of growth is and will continue to be collapsing on itself,
while taking limits into account would require ecochronian experiences and
understandings of time to proliferate.
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Neither Presentism Nor Futurism: What Is Being Done, What Can Be Played
I have proposed an original contribution insofar as my argument draws from queer
temporalities and from the Nietzschean eternal return to position itself against
utopianism. The stakes are high, as again, calling a particular political or philosophical
(or both) project “utopian” determines its situation with respect to the real, and to what is
deemed realistic or probable. If geoengineers and carbon markets’ true believers continue
to bow on the altar of growth, continue to hold on to teleological visions of the human
and the natural, I contend that we may head toward future worlds where lives (be they
human or nonhuman or hybrid) would hardly be livable, and the air hardly breathable.
Though a possible, perhaps even (sadly) probable outcome, this does not seem to be the
only possibility. A Chthulucene, heterochronian and synchronic possibility does not only
seem more realistic when it comes to livability: in fact, it also may be more appealing.
This displacing of capitalocentric temporalities as in fact uchronian while green politics
call for their own new and possible temporal orders of things has a number of important
consequences.
We have seen in the last chapter above that synchronic temporalities that stage, at
the same time, in one moment (long or short), seemingly incompatible times, are rich in
bringing images of the human and the nonhuman together and underscoring the
transcorporeality that challenges their delimitations. I have introduced heterochronia and
synchrony through the performing arts, through my parodic re-writing of another possible
modeling climatological scenario that may playfully assess climate change and which
possibility – whether improbable or not – we may face the crisis with, through
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heterotopian architecture and spiralesque dances and oikos. What would it mean to join
life in its dance and affirm it, à la Zarathustra, at each moment?
First it would entail shifting questions, as I have mentioned, from “what is to be
done?” to “what is being done?” (Gibson-Graham and Roelvink, 2010) or “what can be
played?” (Foucault, 1996) and also proliferating possibilities by expanding imaginaries
that would not be subjected to the probable: ecotopian science fiction, now-topian,
already existing alternative economies, may be sought now and imagined as generalizing
in the futures, in defiance to what is usually presented as more likely given realities
which values we – anti-uchronians – may not share. Ecochronia is thus neither presentist
nor futurist, but brings to light alternatives now and dares imagine what is deemed
unimaginable for myriad futures. Knowing, thanks to anti-uchronian critique, that the
total destruction that could possibly result from hubristic geoengineering experiments or
nihilistic convictions that growth is the only à-venir there is, is no more imaginable than
more seemingly idealistic life-affirming alternatives: one is unacceptable and unbearable,
the other is deemed less probable but may be more bearable and give currently
endangered humans and nonhumans more of a chance.
Put differently, the conceptual framework I have proposed above seeks to feed
into a project of transformation where the improbable is not so hastily equated to the
impossible, where non-capitalist present and future realities and potentialities are not so
quickly confined to utopia, elsewheres and other times. This transformation would entail
that the times outside of time towards which (capital) speculative desires orient
themselves capitulate under reversed accusations of unrealizability, and the suggestive,
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propositional, improvisational and creative supplants the programmatic, while the
planet’s limits are taken into account and imaginaries are not assumed to be limited.
Sustaining Synchrony
The synchrony I have proposed above results from nearing extinction, from a heightened
experience of becoming, of time passing only because every moment contains all past
and future forces constantly re-organized. This synchrony, astutely staged by the dances
of Pina Bausch, implies a radical ethical shift which has important consequences on how
sustainability may be conceptualized.
I have explained, in chapter 2, that the environmentalist concept of future
generations changes our relationship to futurity insofar as the future takes on both a
different affective charge and a different object: from uchronian futurism to future
generations’ futurity, abstract and impossible hopes for endless growth are replaced with
a concern for the concrete livabilities of human and nonhuman future lives. Similarly, if
we weigh all our actions and all phenomena that affect us against the provocative
question posed by the Nietzschean demon, asking ourselves whether we would engage in
each moment were it to repeat ad infinitum, sustainability changes both object and
means. The sustainability preached by mainstream environmentalisms like that of the
IPCC or geoengineering advocates would, de facto, have us sustain a specific mode of
production taken for the end of history, and deploy technofixes to do so (geoengineering,
more windmills, solar panels to sustain the same or even more unrealistic levels of
consumption, i.e all sorts of miracle technologies for all sorts of continuations of growth).
Meanwhile, a synchronic version of sustainability would seek to sustain an ethical
attitude, and it would do so by collapsing means and ends: if each moment integrates all
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other past and future moments, if there is no doer behind the deed, if we are to ask the
value of all values, then no small action (Deleuze, 2013, p. 30) which value may only
come to be realized as a means to an end encountered in an abstract future, a postponed
moment, can be justified in this uchronian manner.
In other words, at the level of each action and moment, this ethical perspective
may radicalize a concept like sustainability to require that no mediocre or ecologically
damaging action be exempt of being weighed against the unbearable lightness of
becoming. What we would then sustain, is a readiness and openness to contingency and
becoming, to radical difference in each instant. What returns is the diverse, difference,
becoming, and if that is the case, then each time our forces engage with all others is a
time of heightened intensity where the livability of future lives is taken into account.
Fostering this ethical state is about creating diverse, life-affirming presents and futures.
The eternal return makes the concrete, material infinite connectedness between past,
present and future inescapable: this implies that present and future generations of humans
and nonhumans cannot but be virtually present in each step “we” take, radicalizing also
the concept of responsibility toward future generations, playfully inventing queer
kinships (Haraway, 2015).
Future Generations and Queer Kinships
This indeed would be a third implication of the distinctions I have attempted to make by
deploying the above battery of concepts: firstly, critiquing uchronia for what it is –
contingent and fragile in spite of its idealization and ever-postponed impossible promises,
and opening up possibilities for other temporal orders of things, entails a change of
questions from ‘what is to be done’ to ‘what is being done’ and ‘what can be played,’ and
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a refusal of both presentism and futurism. Secondly, sustainability changes means and
object: no more sustaining one single mode of production out of a principle which value
is taken for granted, no more subjecting actions of today as mere means to a postponed
impossible promise’s fulfillment. Thirdly, if we have seen in chapter 2 that the
environmentalist notion of responsibility future generations changed the nature of futurity
away from uchronia’s abstract desire for growth to more concrete concerns for future
lives’ livabilities, we may add a particular stress on Haraway’s concept of queer kinships
(which I also mentioned in chapter 2). This is not in lieu of the more generic and
commonly mobilized notion of future generations, but rather adding further nuance and
precision to this concept. Future generations must include nonhumans and humans, and
concerns for them must take the form of an audacious gaze into difficult problems,
including the problem of limits (now and later). The notion of queer kinships provides a
positive formulation to limits in terms of population, and underscores that, when it comes
to future generations, less is indeed more: endeavoring to make our and their lives livable
entails less abundance in numbers. As Donna Haraway puts it:
“Make Kin” and “Not Babies” are both hard; they both demand our best
emotional, intellectual, artistic, and political creativity, individually and
collectively, across ideological and regional differences, among other differences.
… Evidence of many kinds, epistemologically and affectively comparable to the
varied evidence for rapid climate change, shows that 7-11 billion human beings
make demands that cannot be borne without immense damage to human and
nonhuman beings across the earth. …These issues demand difficult, unrelenting
work; but they also demand joy, play, and response-ability to engage with
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unexpected others. All parts of these issues are much too important for Terra to
hand them over to the right or to development professionals or to anybody else in
the business-as-usual camps. Here's to Odd Kin—non-natalist and off-category!
(Haraway, 2015, p. 164)
If the ethics described above is so demanding, the example of its implications for kinship
and future generations is indeed telling of these challenging exigencies: the question of
future generations cannot take the form of a reproductive futurism where
(hetero)normative pressures incite to fetishize the Child, because such pressures would
destroy the conditions of life of future humans and nonhumans. Our current condition
requires a transformation of values and norms where we would not only learn to care for
present and future human and nonhuman generations in new ways, but where we would
also value these concerns qualitatively rather than by equating growing to health –
distancing ourselves from uchronia toward ecochronias. Continuing to make demands on
a situation which demands completely otherwise would be ‘stupidity,’ as Stengers has
helped us grasp. ‘Make kin, not kids!’ and many other seemingly impossible yet
necessary (at least if humans and myriad currently threatened species are to be given a
chance) calls, may have to proliferate to envision drastically different futurities than the
uchronian horizons we have been offered so far.
Heterotopia and Heterochronia as a Challenge to the Disciplines
One last, formal question remains of note, one that I have not been able to elaborate upon
it above. In order to deploy my concepts of uchronia, anti-uchronia, regressive and
progressive counter-uchronia, hyper-uchronia, heterochronia, synchrony and ecochronia,
I have drawn from existing graffiti art, dance and circus performances, science fiction,
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climatological reports, activist videos and manifestos. The variety of sources used aimed
to underscore that questions on temporalities are omnipresent in environmental
discourses, across disciplines and genres, calling for more critical reflection on the
subject. In current environmental political theory, more and more attempts are made to
cross disciplinary boundaries and draw from science studies as well as the humanities,
while the latter ones are questioned alongside the anthropos who also animates, for
instance, present geological debates. It it is without doubt in heterotopian reflections
bringing together myriad discourses usually not expected to cohabit, that we may find
uchronia is not the only temporal horizon: different than an interdisciplinary endeavor,
my close readings of these texts could be described as giving a heterotopian form to my
defense of ecotopias and ecochronias. My argument thus intervenes in a vibrant context
where art, science, politics meet. In fact we may note that if heterotopias have the unusual
property of making other orders of things glitter in that they create spaces which
peculiarity is to connect to all other spaces, recent challenges to the disciplines in
academic and activist realms (from Rosi Braidotti’s reflection on posthumanities – 2010
– to the emergence of whole interdisciplinary fields like science and technology studies)
tend to show that politics, science, the arts, literature, etc were never so separate as the
disciplines had purported to make them. The relationship between science, politics, and
art is not something I could thematize within the argument developed above, but the form
it took on certainly poses new questions that are crucial to the ecological crises.
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O man, take care!
What does the deep midnight declare?
"I was asleep—
From a deep dream I woke and swear:—
The world is deep,
Deeper than day had been aware.
Deep is its woe—
Joy—deeper yet than agony:
Woe implores: Go!
But all joy wants eternity—
Wants deep, wants deep eternity
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